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Summary of Thesis
Incremental ism and the Politics of Resource Allocation in 
Local Authorities
This thesis represents a largely naturalistic and qualitative 
examination of incrementalism and the dichotomy between incremental 
and 'rational' resource allocation techniques in local authorities.
It attempts to 'return to basics' in order to learn inductively frcm 
resource allocation activity 'on the ground' Which of the very wide 
range of incremental concepts are actually defensible as explanations 
of what occurs. Pointers are derived frcm this examination for the 
validity of 'rational' techniques, and of the theoretical dichotomy 
itself.
Incremental conceptions of resource allocation outcomes are dismissed 
as analytically meaningless; what is identified as the 'cognitive' 
strand of incrementalism similarly emerges as being of little use in 
explaining resource allocation processes. Attention then turns to the 
'political' strand of incrementalism where, building on the 
examination of cognitive constraints and the sources of variation in 
the reactions of the authorities studied to events, the argument is 
developed that the review and allocation of resources may be seen as 
aspects of the negotiated order in each authority. Each had its own 
distinctive profiles of reviewing activities and resource allocations, 
formed and sustained over time as the actors involved defined their 
responses to each other and those of their circumstances which they 
took to be relevant. Features of a "micro-political model" of the key 
negotiation processes which emerged frcm the data are also outlined. 
The order negotiated may or may not reproduce seme of the features of 
political incrementalism, as an artifact of the underlying trends 
involved.
It is then suggested that the incidence of ' rational' techniques in 
resource allocation processes, and the extent to which they achieve 
the objectives set for them will also be a function of the negotiation 
of order in each authority; consequently, many aspects of the 
theoretical opposition between incremental and 'rational* approaches 
to resource allocation collapse.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis attempts to initiate a particular type of exploration of 
the dichotomy which may be discerned in academic thinking over the 
last ten or twenty years, between the analysis and advocacy of 
'incremental' or 'rational' approaches to resource allocation and 
policy-making. It arose from the writer's ESRC (then SSRC) 
studentship linked to a research project in the School of Management 
at the University of Bath attempting a naturalistic, and much closer 
and more intensive look than hitherto, at issues connected with 
accounting and resource allocation in this case in local government. 
The project was already under way when the writer joined the team, 
with intensive fieldwork taking place in a nearby local authority. 
However, frcm participating in the team's discussions and frcm 
examining the existing literature in the field, the objective was 
conceived of testing the enormous range of concepts in the 
incremental-rational dichotomy through a similarly close and intensive 
case-study investigation of how adequately they actually 'captured' 
what those making policy and allocating resources actually did.
The research was conceived in a strongly 'non-positivist' vein. This 
reflected the theoretical orientation of the writer's colleagues, but 
also the perceived need to clarify the evident confusion of claims and 
concepts within the dichotomy, in the first instance by simply 
constructing an impressionistic picture of budgetary review and 
resource allocation as it was observed to be carried out. There was a 
deliberate avoidance of any structure which might have been imposed by 
hypothesising in advance of the data, and a deliberate attempt to take 
as little for granted as possible, in order to see just how much of
(i)
the existing structure in each 'pole' of the dichotomy could be shown 
from the picture to be justifiable. There were certain suspicions 
that the answer might not prove entirely favourable, and once the 
process of investigation had begun, it very quickly emerged that 
neither the incremental nor rational poles fitted satisfactorily with 
what was being observed. It therefore became apparent that the 
dichotomy itself, with its competing claims and analyses, could 
perhaps be 'resolved' by formulating 'from basics' - that is, frcm the 
impressionistic picture being built up of the behaviour and events 
actually observed (cf Hari Das, 1982: pi) - a set of concepts more 
accurate in terms of 'capturing* those observations, and thus more 
useful than either of the two poles. Accordingly, this thesis records 
the construction of this picture, and the analysis and development 
from it of these concepts, in outlining seme features of a 'micro­
political' model of the activity in question. It is hoped that as a 
set of abstracted concepts, the product may then be applied to other 
contexts, offering a different and more useful analysis of behaviour 
which might otherwise have been labelled in blanket terms 
"incremental" or "rational".
Notwithstanding these overtly inductive intentions, the basic aims of 
the research and what we have seen so far of their execution already 
imply certain theoretical and methodological preconceptions. While 
the process where these preconceptions and the writer's developing 
theoretical stance were applied to undertaking and interpreting the 
research is set out fully in the Appendix, it is however worth 
outlining seme key points here. The style of approach adopted meant 
that the theoretical and practical execution of the project were not 
somehow separate or sequential, but took place largely in parallel, as 
the Appendix attempts to show by illustrating the reciprocal linkages
(ii)
between them. (To this extent, the Appendix represents an important 
part of the theoretical basis of the thesis, and should be read as 
such). Inevitably, of course, as we have already seen and as the 
Appendix details, the preconceptions referred to meant that certain 
basic stances and features were decided upon in advance, with 
duplications for the mode of learning adopted. Apart frcm the initial 
suspicions of the dichotomy which prompted the research, there was 
also the decision to implement the case studies on a strongly 
qualitative basis, in the determined attempt outlined to explore how 
the actors involved actually went about 'reviewing budgets' or 
' allocating resources'. This served in turn to seme extent to 
'pre-set' the focus on the practical effects (intended or unintended) 
of action and interaction, and as we shall also see, an the processes 
underlying these, rather than on fixed or structural features.
However, experience of the fieldwork itself then served to reinforce 
this attitude, and in other respects a genuine attempt was made within 
the generally "retroductive" (Bulmer, 1979: p652) framework inplied, 
to 'root' any specific theoretical or conceptual developments 'in' the 
data, by allowing it, so to speak, to ' suggest' what was appropriate.
The case studies in which this design was pursued took place over the 
period frcm June 1981 to November 1984, with the most intensive phase 
lasting until October 1982, but wdth a series of follow-up interviews 
thereafter. These latter were pursued as frequently as the writer's 
new full-time employment would allow until March 1983, thus allowing 
the budget cycle for 1983/84 to be covered in detail, along with that 
for 1982/83 covered in the main part of the full-time fieldwork 
phase. For the record, the case studies took place principally in two 
relatively right-wing Labour-controlled authorities (labelled 
Authorities A and B), but with additional data coming from a third,
(iii)
Conservative-controlled authority (Authority C). There was little 
that was 'scientific' in the selection of this sample: as Flynn (1979: 
p745) also found, access to local authorities, and in particular to 
local authority officers or for intensive case studies involving 
matters which were often sensitive or confidential, has to be taken 
where it is offered. The price of this access was a frequently-sought 
promise of anonymity both for the authorities involved and actors 
within them. In Authority A, this extended to concealing what type of 
authority it was (although the references to housing will indicate 
that it was not a county I); Authority B was an Outer London Borough, 
while Authority C was a small rural Shire District.
Turning d c m  to the fieldwork itself, there were three main 
"triangulated" (eg, Hall & Bucholz, 1977: p23; Halfpenny, 1979: p814; 
Hari Das 1983: pll) sources of data. Briefly, the first of these was 
over eighty hours of face-to-face interviews, almost all of them 
taped, but deliberately structured only by a checklist of issues to 
cover if the opportunity presented itself. The second was documents, 
principally budget and Comnittee papers, but also internal working 
papers. The third was participant observation of private or public 
meetings, backed up by many hours of ad hoc conversation with the 
actors involved, often after working hours, as the writer became 
acquainted with them and gained their acceptance. In particular, 
these contacts ware enhanced in Authority B, where a desk was provided 
in the Chief Executive's section which the writer endeavoured to use 
as a base for at least 2-3 days a week throughout the full-time 
fieldwork phase. It is difficult to overstate the value of this 
gesture in increasing the depth of access to and penetration of 
Authority B, and in increasing the understanding of the other 
authorities studied. Finally, while the debt to those who became
(iv)
involved may be gathered, a fourth data source later became available 
to the writer through his past in the Finance Section of the 
Association of County Councils, and this experience is drawn on at a 
number of points.
It is hoped that, following the work of the other members of the 
project team, the data reflects a depth of access and penetration 
which overall is perhaps unusual in studies of local authorities and 
resource allocation, and that the insights gained are correspondingly 
valuable. However, as the rather unsystematic construction of the 
sample has already indicated, the study is certainly not without many 
of the drawbacks or flaws associated with the case-study approach, and 
these ought to be admitted at once. The first of these is the 
unevenness arising where the overall depth of access could not be 
sustained in particular instances, leaving areas which the writer was 
unable to explore by being present in person (cf also Flynn, 1979 s 
p752, who reported similar problems in the local authority he 
studied). An example here was the majority Labour Party Group and its 
Executive Gcranittee in Authority A, where conclusions are based 
primarily on ' second-hand' sources such as reports and ccrrments from 
those present. While care was taken in forming any specific 
conclusions frcm this data, it remains the case that in such instances 
triangulation was less adequate.
A second shortcoming is the at times uneven or incomplete coverage of 
the area of research as defined by the gerunds listed above, even 
where access was fully adequate. As Patton (1980: pll9) also noted, 
any one person's view of a complex set of events may be less than 
complete, and there are accordingly areas where, with hindsight, the 
writer was either ' looking the wrong way' at the time, or where more
(v)
effort could have been invested in exploring them. An example of the 
former would appear to be the relative lack of specific identification 
in the thesis of the impact on allocating resources of officers' 
professional orientations. These did not emerge frcm the data as 
influences which could meaningfully be separated frcm the other 
factors involved: while it may be that they genuinely were not 
salient, the weight of other material on the subject (most recently, 
Rosenberg, 1985) suggests that their non-emergence was perhaps a fault 
of the study rather than a feature of the data I An example of where 
more effort could have been invested in making a particular influence 
explicit is the inpact of external pressure groups as a feature of the 
circumstances within which the actors studied had perforce to 
operate. However, as a final and mitigating Garment, it will be seen 
in due course that the conceptual structure developed in the study 
does at least allow the inpact of these external factors to be 
assimilated in any 'model' of resource allocation constructed frcm it, 
even if this facility is not explicit here.
Finally, it might also be admitted now that the thesis presented here 
is itself incomplete relative to the original research design. Within 
the confines of a Ph. D thesis, it has only proved possible to mount a 
thorough ooverage of the incremental pole of the dichotomy originally 
identified. At the same time though, this in no way invalidates the 
product of the research and, indeed, the concentration on incre­
mentalism offers compensating advantages of its own. Incrementalism, 
as we shall see, is primarily a view of resource allocation as it 
allegedly is in reality and must inevitably be. The critical 
examination here of the concepts and claims embraced by the term 
therefore very effectively prepares the ground for an examination of 
the rational pole of the dichotomy (which, as we shall see, is
(vi)
primarily a set of aspirations to what resource allocation allegedly 
could or should be), by providing a more accurate view of 'the 
reality' frcm which to proceed (Wildavsky, 1979a: pl44 in fact makes a 
similar point). The evidence of this study suggests that the 
implication of the various ' incrementalist* views of reality which may 
be discerned, namely that 'rational' techniques of resource allocation 
and policy-making must inevitably fail, is ill-founded; equally, 
though, this suggestion arises in a manner which has profound 
implications for the potential of rational techniques relative to 
their own archetype. Accordingly, in presenting the research an 
attempt has been made to show where an examination of the rational 
pole might profitably begin - even if the necessary work will have to 
be undertaken by another student I
Whatever the faults or mitigating factors of the study, though, it 
will be seen frcm what follows that for all its weaknesses the 
case-study approach is amply justified by the need to cut through the 
confusion and inprecision within the incremental/rational dichotcny - 
and in particular, here, within incrementalism - if a more satis­
factory conceptualisation of resource allocation is to be arrived at. 
Certainly, nothing here of general applicability is proved in the 
sense of successfully 'testing' a prior hypothesis, but it should 
already be clear that this was never the intention. The intention was 
to begin anew a process of working from the particular to the general, 
because it was felt that the generalities already available within the 
dichotomy were confused and contradictory in the abstract, and then 
because (as suspected) they proved to be inaccurate or unsatisfactory 
in relation to the way in which resources were actually observed to be 
allocated. At the level of the particular - that is, within the 
detailed picture built up of each of the authorities studied - as the
(vii)
Appendix sets out, great care was taken to verify the accuracy of the 
data. The final validation, however, will cane in the transition to 
the general, as the generalisations from the data which are offered as 
the results of the research cure applied to other contexts, perhaps 
even to the examination of 'rational' resource allocation techniques 
discussed above. It is, therefore, hoped that further testing, and 
applying the conceptual structure set out, will also provide the final 
validation of the study which this one writer, operating frcm a small 
set of intensive case studies, was unable to provide.
On that note, however, we now outline the thesis itself. An attempt 
has been made to structure the account in a way which broadly reflects 
the research process set out in the Appendix. The reader may find it 
beneficial, therefore, to turn to this before proceeding further.
PART I. INGRfMENTALISM IN CONTEXT
Chapter Is The Incremental/Rational Dichotomy. This Chapter sets out 
the dichotomy itself, and the areas of confusion which emerged even 
before the fieldwork began, prompting the decision to attempt to bring 
the dichotomy 'back to earth' and ground it in what actually happened 
and what actually appeared possible in order, it was hoped, to test 
the concepts within it and resolve many of the confusions outlined. 
Rather than representing coherent concepts, it will be shown that the 
"incremental" and "rational" poles of the dichotomy are in effect no 
more than syndromes of loosely related, and not always consistent 
ideas.
We then turn to the study of incrementalism with which, for the
(viii)
reasons set out above, the bulk of this thesis is concerned.
Chapter 2; Incremental Outccmes. Following LeLoup (1978: p494), 
incremental categorisations of resource allocation outcomes are 
separated frcm those of resource allocation processes. For all the 
apparent simplicity of measuring outcomes to determine whether they 
fall within a given 'incremental' range, it will be shown that this is 
much the weakest area of the incremental syndrome, and may therefore 
be disposed of as essentially a digression before moving on to more 
fruitful areas.
Chapter 3: T<ocal Authorities in Context. Incrementalism purports to 
deal with reality, the 'what is* of policy and resource allocation. 
This chapter examines what appeared to be the salient aspects of 
reality in the world around local authorities. It emerges that local 
authorities have displayed a variety of responses to their 
circumstances which cannot easily be explained by deterministic or 
'contingency1 type approaches. It is this variety of responses which, 
it is suggested, conceptions of policy and resource allocation 
processes must acccnrnodate.
Hereafter, it is helpful to distinguish between the ' cognitive limits' 
and 'political/bargaining1 conceptions of incremental processes, since 
although they are frequently combined (eg Wildavsky, 1979a: p62) they 
are really logically distinct (Danziger, 1978: pl25), in that they 
imply separate and conflicting consequences for features such as the 
budget base.
(ix)
PART II. COGNITIVE FACTORS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Chapter 4. Cognitive Limits. This chapter introduces and assesses the 
accuracy of the cognitive limits variant of incrementalism in 
capturing 'what went on' in the resource allocation processes 
observed.
Chapter 5. Individuals and their circumstances. This chapter takes 
the lessons learned from Chapters 3 and 4 and begins to build an 
individual-level theoretical framework capable of explaining what has 
been observed so far, as the foundation for the resolution of the 
incremental/rational dichotomy.
PART III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND POLITICS
Chapter 6. Politics and Incrementalism. Here, we introduce the 
incremental view of politics as the other strand identified above by 
Danziger. The aim of this chapter is to allow us to enter the 
'politics' of resource allocation with at least some idea of what we 
mean by ' politics'. Certain pointers cure extracted from what we have 
already seen, and also 'in advance' from data to be presented, that 
allow us to reject from the outset as necessarily true the incremental 
view of politics as marginal bargained changes from an essentially 
fixed status quo. Building also on Chapter 5, a 'micro-political' 
perspective is outlined, based on the work of Mangham (1979).
Chapter 7. The Politics of Budgetary Review: the Status Quo. A 
further distinction is drawn for convenience between the politics of 
budgetary review, and the politics of resource allocation. This and
(x)
Chapter 8 are concerned with the former. Here, the nature of the 
status quo itself is examined in terms of the legal constraints and 
'existing ccnriiitments' vhich are held by many to make it up. The 
conclusion is that 'the politics of the status quo' is far more 
important than is often allowed, because it is the negotiation of 
order around the status quo and its review. The impact of resource 
shortage on this negotiation of order only increases its importance.
Chapter 8. The Politics of Budgetary Review: Case Studies. This
chapter develops the concept of the budget base and budgetary review 
as the negotiation of order. It emerges from the data that each 
authority studied had, following Danziger's notion of a "critical 
policy style" (1978: p76) its own 'critical reviewing style', in terms 
of how it approached the status quo and the task of accommodating it 
to financial cirConstances. The particular processes of negotiating 
order in each authority around the issue are shewn to underpin the 
differences in reviewing style.
Chapter 9. The Politics of Resource Allocation. This chapter 
explores the negotiation of order around the allocation of resources, 
that is, the area covered by Danziger's original concept of "critical 
policy style". In effect, the argument is extended from Chapter 8. A 
number of key concepts emerge, helping us both to structure what has 
been seen so far and to outline some features of a ' model' of the 
processes involved, and to begin to see how the analysis may be 
applied in other directions.
(xi)
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Chapter 10. Surinary and Conclusions: The Rational Pole, and the
Dichotomy. Finally, we pull together the various themes which have 
emerged, to outline the implications for the 'rational' pole of the 
dichotomy, and thus for the dichotomy itself.
(xii)
PART I. INCRE24EOTALISM IN CONTEXT
CHAPTER 1: THE INCREMENTAL/RATIONAL DICHOTOMY
(i) INTRODUCTION
The study of policy and resource allocation processes has long tended 
to take place within a distinctive theoretical framework. This 
embodies the dichotomy between on the one hand, ' rational' or 
' comprehensive' methods of assessing priorities and alternatives and, 
on the other, incremental 'satisficing' or 'muddling through' by 
reference to ad hoc or even 'political' criteria. Simon (1957), Simon 
& March (1958) and Lindblcm (1965) figure predominantly amongst the 
originators of this overall view of the subject. In particular, 
Lindblom (1965) is known for his preference for "partisan mutual 
adjustment" between competing and essentially self-interested actors 
or factions as a means of allocating resources, over what he labelled 
'synoptic' (frcm synopsis, ie 'conprehensive' - 1965: pl34) methods.
The volume of work which has actually recognised this dichotomy, or 
which is more-or-less explicitly aligned to one or other pole of it, 
is enormous. Writers such as B A Williams (1979); Gershuny (1981); 
Lyden & Miller (eds 1982); Bunce & Echols (1978); Brunsson (1982); 
Goodin (1982); Pfeffer (1981); Dearlove (1979); and Wildavsky (1975, 
1978, 1979a & b, 1980, 1983) are clearly aware of the choices of 
approach it poses. The numbers of those who advocate or analyse one 
pole or the other are even larger. Thus, writers such as Quinn
(1977); Lars son (1982); and Jablonsky & Dirsmith (1978) are strongly 
aligned to the incremental pole or are critical of its 'rational' 
opposite; equally, eg, Wanat (1974); Natchez & Bupp (1973); LeLoup
(1978); David & Kantor (1979); Pyhrr (1970); and White (1982) are all
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either critical of aspects of incrementalism or have advocated various 
forms of rational planning or analysis. Perhaps the one conclusion 
which may tentatively be reached is that the incremental pole is 
currently the one 'in favour', if only on pragmatic grounds following 
the perceived failure of rational techniques such as PPBS and ZBB (eg 
Wildavsky, 1979a; Jablonsky & Dirsmith, 1978; see also Van Gunsteren, 
1976). Advocates of incrementalism, both as a description and as a 
prescription, appear more numerous or at least more strident, while a 
number of erstwhile advocates of rational techniques have either 
apparently modified their former views (eg Schick, 1983: p24) or have 
recognised that 'political' and other facts of organisational life 
cannot be wished away (eg Draper & Pitsvada, 1981).
As with policy and resource allocation studies in general, so it is 
with English local authorities in particular. Interest in the range 
of possible approaches to resource allocation has long been fostered, 
notably by INLOGOV, with Greenwood et al recognising the dichotomy 
thus:
"At one extreme, discussion of budgetary proposals may 
approximate to the 'rational' or 'synoptic' view of 
decision-snaking ... At the other extreme, discussion may 
take the form of ... systems politics ... [where] increments 
cure negotiated in bargains that neglect outcomes" (1977: 
pp37-8).
Similarly, Tcmkins (1980a); Alexander (1982); Haynes (1980); Dear love 
(1979); Jones & Pendlebury (1984); and Midwinter (1984) all directly 
or indirectly explore aspects of the incremental/ rational dichotomy 
itself as it applies to local authorities. There is again the fullest 
possible range of views within the dichotomy. Members of INLOGOV (eg 
Skelcher, 1979, 1980; Greenwood et al, 1977, 1980a & b; Greenwood, 
1979; Hinings et al, 1980; and Norton & Wedgewood-Oppenheim, 1981) are 
well known for their advocacy or analysis of 'rational/comprehensive’
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techniques, often typified by the notion of 'corporateness'.
Danziger's (1978) examination and criticism of incrementalism is also 
well known. Equally, though, those such as Tomkins (1980a); Dear love
(1979); and Cockbum (1977) have with varying degrees of enthusiasm 
either preferred the incremental pole or criticised the application of 
corporate/rational techniques. Again, it is also possible to detect a 
pragmatic trend away frcm the rational pole. Midwinter (1984: 
pp473-4) notes in the context of local government that PPBS and ZBB 
have had severe problems; Greenwood (1983) is notably more cautious in 
advancing corporate ideas than hitherto, and explicitly adopts at 
least seme of Wildavsky' s notions of incrementalism as an analytic 
yardstick of which, in Greenwood et al (eg 1977: p28), he was severely 
critical. Further, there appears to be a greater interest in 
specifying how rational techniques need to be adjusted to operate in a 
political environment (eg Greenwood, 1983; Midwinter, 1984), and to 
recognise the importance of non-rational modes of behaviour (eg Walsh 
et al, 1981).
The influence of the incremental/rationed, dichotomy in the field of 
policy and resource allocation studies is therefore abundantly clear. 
It will emerge frcm this thesis, however, that its influence is not 
healthy. For all the ubiquity of the dichotomy - indeed, largely 
because of it - each pole, and the structure of their interrelation­
ships have in major respects become deficient as the theoretical basis 
for study in the field. A general incoherence has crept into the 
framework provided, which actively hinders our understanding of, and 
prescriptions for resource allocation processes. The intention is 
therefore that this thesis should begin to dissect the vast range of 
concepts and arguments which has grown up so that what is useful may
3
be salvaged, and then employed in any reconstruction which is shown to 
be necessary.
The first stage in this process will be to 'set the scene' by 
outlining the scope of each pole of the dichotomy as it currently 
stands, and by pointing in a generalised introductory way to the 
problems which arise. The arguments outlined cure then picked up in 
further detail in the body of the text.
(ii) A DICHOTOMY OF SYNDROMES
(ii)(a) Incrementalism
Schick notes that "... incrementalism is an extraordinarily elastic 
and elusive concept" (1983: p2). As a tern it has suffered greatly 
frcm over-use, both as a general label for anything not clearly 
identifiable with the rational pole of the dichotomy, and as a 
descriptive/explanatory/normative vehicle in its own right. As Schick 
intimates, this has robbed it of all precision, to the point where in 
seme cases it is little more than a term of abuse. Dearlove (1979: 
pl30), for example, cites one writer who warns of "... that most 
malignant disease of government, that of creeping incrementalism 
...". In this sense, the term seems at times to be taken as part of 
some general malaise, as Dearlove observes to be used almost 
interchangeably with 'fragmentation', 'specialist management' or 
'professionalism' (Dearlove 1979: pl44), or with what are labelled 
'political' methods of resource allocation (see, eg, Greenwood et al, 
1980a: pl71 where 'political' and 'rational' styles are contrasted). 
Incrementalism is "... extraordinarily elastic and elusive to
4
use Schick's description, because it has in fact become a syndrome.
It is in effect a large collection of different approaches to 
describing or explaining what is taken to be the 'reality' of existing 
policy and resource allocation processes; alternatively it is also a 
series of means of advocating that attempts should not be made to 
change or improve these processes, because there are sound pragmatic 
reasons for, and benefits frcm, their being just as they are (see, eg 
LeLoup, 1978: p493). Seme of these approaches will be shown to be 
mutually exclusive.
For the present purposes, incrementalism may be broken down into the 
following elements:
a) at least two descriptions of resource allocation outcomes:
- a focus on the size of monetary change between successive 
allocations. As outlined at b), below, incrementalism holds 
that this will not be great;
- a focus on relative change between spending priorities. 
Likewise, it is held that these will not in fact change 
greatly;
b) at least two categories of explanation of resource allocation
processes:
- explanations based upon various forms of 'satisficing', 
arising frcm the cognitive limitations of budgetary actors, 
as to why changes in allocation and priority will be 
relatively small, and as to why (it is held) large areas of
5
a budget (the 'base') are in effect taken for granted;
- explanations of largely these same features based upon 
aspects of the political and other interactions between 
resource allocation actors or groups of actors, and the 
constraints which these interactions impose;
c) at least three normative categories of argument:
- a claim that incrementalism produces 'better* decisions 
which, being relatively small changes frcm the status quo, 
can be reversed if necessary and which may in any case 
maximise the points of view represented;
- a claim that incrementalism is politically astute in 
maximising support and legitmacy and avoiding foci for 
opposition, and in easing the process of making choices;
- a claim that incremental processes are inherently fair and 
even, at the extreme, the essence of democracy.
The derivation and justification for this particular presentation and 
division of the incremental syndrome will emerge as the analysis 
unfolds. The intention here, to repeat, is simply to introduce the 
concepts involved: it may be seen, though, that if there is a theme 
running through the syndrome at all, it is a focus on 'what is' or 
'what must be' (eg Gershuny, 1981: pl95), and a general preoccupation 
with the individuals and groups in resource allocation processes.
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For the record, however, among the more notable problems and 
inconsistencies to emerge frcm these interlocking concepts and 
arguments are that:
- incremental outcomes are by no means reliable indicators of
incremental processes;
- incremental processes do not necessarily 'explain' (ie 
result in) incremental outcomes?
- the explanations offered for resource allocation processes 
are at times conflicting and even mutually contradictory 
regarding their implications for the all-important concept 
of the budget base;
- the normative claims of incrementalism similarly embrace 
confused and conflicting lines of argument.
Notwithstanding the threads of continuity from its focus on hew 
individuals and groups actually behave, one is tempted to conclude, 
even on the basis of this brief introduction, that even the term 
'syndrome' dignifies incrementalism with a coherence which it does not 
possess
All the themes and arguments outlined will be examined in due course. 
For the present, though, the inrnediate next step is to outline the 
dimensions of the rational pole of the dichotomy.
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(ii) (b) 1 Rationality* /1 Corporatenes s1
On turning to the rational pole, the initial impression of confusion 
is slightly less overv^elming, if only because of the presence of a 
reasonably coherent ideal around which the pole is centred. This is 
the 'rational choice model' of how organisational decisions, so to 
speak, 'ought' to be made. As set out by Haynes (1980: p78) the 
elements of this model - in this case as it applies to programme 
budgeting - may be summarised as:
the identification of needs and problems;
- the formulation of objectives meeting these;
- the identification of alternative means of achieving the 
objectives;
- the evaluation of consequences and impacts;
- decisions (ie choices frcm the alternatives available) taken 
and action initiated;
- monitoring results and adjusting frcm experience gained, as 
necessary.
It should be stressed that in the archetype it is held that these 
should be the formal and explicit stages of a cyclical process of 
decision and review. Pfeffer (1981: p21) would also add:
3
- maintaining internal consistency in terms of assumed 
cause/effect linkages;
- explicit identification of all value premises in each 
decision process.
A rational choice would be that which embodies all these elements to 
further most efficiently the solution of the problem in question more, 
with due allowance made for opportunity costs and side effects, than 
any other choice possible in the circumstances.
All of this may seem clear enough and, indeed, a relatively 'obvious' 
level to which to aspire. Where the confusion begins to set in, 
however, is where the rational pole of the dicdiotamy embraces the 
truly enormous range of organisational techniques and configurations 
designed to enhance the rationality of existing policy and resource 
allocation processes. Norton and Wedgewood-Oppenheim (1981: p57) list 
the following: corporate management; corporate planning; PPBS; O & M; 
work study; network analysis; cost effectiveness studies; value 
analysis; and operational research. Greenwood et al (1980b: p47) 
would expand the list to include the following budgetary techniques: 
multi-year spending projections; analysis of spending determinants; 
personnel forecasts; environmenta 1 analysis; objectives statements; 
issue analysis/review of opportunity costs; and position statements.
TO this already impressive set of prescriptions might also be added: 
ZBB; MBO; PAR; MINIS; OD; PERT; CBA; policy analysis; systems 
analysis, design, development and engineering; policy planning; 
efficiency audit; performance review; critical paths and so onl While 
seme of these items have more specific applications, we have here over 
thirty techniques without even attempting an exhaustive list. All of
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them, it is held, would in seme way alter organisational processes so 
as to improve decision-making and resource allocation, whether through 
assimilating more information, reviewing more options in more depth, 
making analysis more sophisticated and more explicit, enhancing 
feedback or whatever. The central cohesion of the rational choice 
model is not exactly lost, since it is usually possible to identify 
those aspects of it to which each technique relates (eg Haynes 1980: 
pp77-8), but the sheer variety must again prompt the term ' syndrome' 
to describe what has been laid out (cf also Dear love 1979: pll5).
A further note of confusion is introduced by the concept of 'bounded 
rationality'. This comes originally from the approach of Simon (1957) 
to delineating the level of rationality which might reasonably and 
pragmatically be expected in real life, as opposed to in the rational 
choice archetype (eg Haynes, 1980: p74), although as Haynes goes on to 
show (1980: p76), the ' full' rational choice model is quite capable of 
standing alone as a normative ideal. The issues raised by bounded 
rationality will be introduced very shortly.
To surtmarise this introduction to the rational pole, of the 
incremental/ rational dichotomy it may be seen as a prescriptive series 
of organisational techniques and configurations, aspiring to improve 
the quality of policy and resource allocation processes. It is 
sufficiently diverse once again to warrant the term ' symdrcme1.
(ii)(c) Summary
The incremental and rational poles of the dichotomy often used to 
analyse policy and resource allocation processes are each large and
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amorphous syndromes. The former focuses on what it holds that these 
processes actually are; the latter focuses on what it holds that they 
might be. Also, it may be seen that the former adopts its stance on 
resource allocation processes by reference to an analysis of the 
individuals and groups involved, whereas the latter opts for the 
organisational level. Beyond this, however, there is little coherence 
of focus or analysis, although the rational syndrome is perhaps 
slightly the better in this respect, having the benefit of a central 
'model' of its aspirations and prescriptions. Unsurprisingly, the 
relationships and linkages between the two poles of the dichotomy are 
confused and unclear, with further implications for its analytic 
utility. This introduction to the dichotomy now turns to outlining 
the areas where problems arise.
(iii) OVERLAP AND/OR OPPOSITION BETWEEN POLES
Because each pole of the incremental/ rational dichotomy is so 
ill-defined, according to usage they may either overlap to the point 
where separation becomes difficult or impossible, or be virtually 
mutually exclusive. On the one hand, we have an overlap between the 
descriptive and analytic aspects of each syndrome to the point where 
they appear to lay claim to the same features of resource allocation; 
on the other, taking a different view of the two syndromes we have in 
two areas a deep-seated and fundamental opposition between the 
normative claims of each. These conflicting aspects of the structure 




There is a series of areas where any distinction between the 
incremental and rational syndromes becomes blurred and difficult to 
maintain.
First, rational resource allocation or policy-making techniques may, 
as a simple matter of common sense, produce * incremental1 outcomes in 
the sense of 'marginal' or Relatively small* changes from the status 
quo (however these may be defined: see Chapter 2, below). Even at the 
theoretical extreme of, say, a full PPBS system, or a 100% Zero-Based 
budget, it must surely be possible by entirely rational means to 
re-affirm existing spending patterns and priorities. To expect that 
rational processes will always result in non-incremental outcomes is 
either to imply that all existing activity is a priori 'wrong', which 
is clearly absurd, or else it is to overlook the possibility of 
rationally thought-out programmes of action being implemented over a 
period of years either because of resource constraints or in order to 
minimise political opposition.
Rational techniques may also result in essentially incremental 
processes (ie, as well as incremental outcomes) through design flaws 
or malfunctions (eg Gershuny, 1981: p203). Thus, Wildavsky (1979a: 
pl96) doubts whether PPBS has ever worked as intended; equally, 
Greenwood (1983: pi63) notes how, behind a local authority's formal 
corporate apparatus, much of its business may be secret and so, 
inexplicit, 'political' and otherwise 'non-rational'. More generally, 
Bruns son argues that rational processes are in fact inherently more 
likely to produce incremental outcomes than non-rational processes, 
because the greater weight of analysis and consideration of options
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actually inhibits action from being taken. As he puts it:
"... the main problem for organisations is not choice, but 
talcing organised actions ... Thinking must be adapted to 
the purpose of action; and, in that perspective, irrational 
decision-making and narrow, prejudicial ideologies are 
necessary ingredients of viable organisations ... Actions 
are supposed to be initiated by rational decision procedures 
that integrate ... disparate viewpoints. Thus, proposed 
actions that involve major changes are rejected ... (T)he 
high degree of rationality in political organisations 
produces incrementalism ..." (1982: pp42-43).
It may be seen that even in the abstract, the implied separation 
between the two poles of the dichotomy is difficult to sustain.
The second area where the poles of the incremental/ rational dichotomy 
overlap at the descriptive level is with the competing claims made for 
the concept of 'bounded rationality1. From within the rational 
syndrome, bounded rationality represents the level of rational 
decision-making which one might ordinarily expect to achieve. 
Rationality, it is held, will necessarily be circumscribed because the 
costs and cognitive demands which it imposes mean that diminishing 
returns begin to set in before full rationality is achieved: 
decision-makers, faced with the competing pressures upon them, 
'satisfice' in that they search only for a solution to a problem, 
rather than for the best solution among possibly a great many (Haynes, 
1980: p74). In an analogy also cited by Haynes, the approach means 
that rather than "... searching a haystack to find the sharpest needle 
in it ..." one is only "searching ... to find a needle sharp enough to 
sew with" (Simon & March, 1958: ppl40-41). The rational choice model 
itself functions primarily as an ideal at which to aim (eg Self, 1981: 
p220; Haynes, 1980: p76); bounded rationality is a conception of how 
it should be operationalised, and as such is integral to the whole 
idea. As Goodin puts it,
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"... Simon's ... model of satisficing behaviour is not an 
alternative to rational maximising, but rather, a special 
case of it, ie, maximising subject to the constraints 
imposed by imperfect and costly information" (1982: p24, 
emphasis in original).
Similarly, Draper & Pitsvada (eg 1981: p78), and Gershuny (1981: p202) 
have argued that many of the organisational techniques within the 
rational syndrome were never actually intended to achieve 'full' 
rationality (cf also Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: plOO). Indeed even 
Pyhrr, in outlining zero-based budgeting for the first time, made it 
clear that some "cut-off" points would be necessary in the review 
process to keep it manageable (Pyhrr, eg 1970: pll2).
The problems of overlap occur, however, when arguments frcm within the 
incremental syndrome also arrive at the concept of satisficing frcm 
another direction. The arguments here are not so much ones of 
diminishing organisational returns on extending the search for ends 
and means, so much as arguments of practical necessity. Under the 
cognitive and political constraints within which they must work, 
individual budgetary actors are held in effect to 'satisfice' by using 
devices such as the status quo in the budget base, and marginal 
change, to provide a 'limited' range of alternatives to consider, 
rather than seek the 'optimum' solution to a problem (eg Wildavsky, 
1979a: ppl2-13; Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: pp56-7). Although the 
incremental argunent is couched in different terms frcm the 'rational' 
point of view above, the effect of 'satisficing' within the 
incremental syndrcme is clearly very similar. Indeed, Jones & 
Pendlebury (1984: p57) go so far as to ascribe bounded rationality 
explicitly to the incremental rather than the rational pole.
To surrmarise the descriptive overlap between the incremental and 
rational syndrarves, therefore, on one level rational processes and
incremental outcomes cure by no means mutually exclusive; on another, 
both syndromes embody the important concept of 'bounded rationality'. 
Any differences in this latter respect are of detail only - a matter 
of why the search for alternatives is limited and how satisficing 
occurs. Whether in recognition of this overlap or through the 
confusion caused by it, Haynes (1980: p76; pplll-12) and Pfeffer 
(1981: ppl9-22) formally ascribe bounded rationality to both 
syndromes. In this sense, therefore, the incremental/rational 
dichotomy appears partially to collapse, in that the separation which 
is Implied between its two poles cannot in fact be sustained. However, 
the position is then complicated by the normative opposition between 
the two poles, and accordingly it is bo introducing this that we now 
turn.
(iii)(b) Normative Opposition
The problems for the incremental-rational dichotomy arising from its 
partial collapse into descriptive overlap are compounded by the fact 
that, from the same descriptive base, each syndrome adopts normative 
stances and prescriptions which are deeply and fundamentally opposed. 
This opposition arises in at least the following two ways.
The first of these is the general attitude within each syndrome 
towards the status quo and change from it. We saw from Section (ii) 
above that insofar as incrementalism is anything at all, it is a set 
of approaches to policy and resource allocation based on describing 
and advocating aspects of 'what is' or 'what must be'. The rational 
pole, by contrast, was seen to represent a series of policy and 
resource allocation techniques aspiring to 'what might be' or 'what
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ought to be' (eg also Gershuny, 1981: p204). On the one hand there is
a concern to maintain the status quo and advance the merits of
marginal changes frcm it; on the other, there is the conflicting
concern to review the status quo and not take it for granted as fixed
or inviolable.
To take the incremental view of the status quo first, there are a 
number of claims made within the incremental syndrome that incremental 
processes and marginal change promote both 'better* decisions and 
those which are politically astute. It is argued that, rather than 
attempt explicitly to make comparisons of the utility of (possibly 
very different) policy objectives, or the formulation of over-arching 
goals, the interaction of multiple self-interests within the political 
process itself steers, and should be allowed to continue steering, 
policy and resource allocation (eg Wildavsky, 1979a: ppl29-131; 
Lindblcm, 1965: p3: passim). The cognitive problems associated with 
rational or synoptic decision-making (or even with any decision-making 
at all) are thereby avoided, in a way which also maximises the number 
of viewpoints taken into account in each decision. Given the 
political nature of the processes involved, marginal change and the 
lack of review and explicit goals will reduce potential areas of 
conflict (see, eg, Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: p57; Wildavsky, 1976: 
pl35-8) and avoid providing a focus for opposition, while maximising 
commitment and legitimacy (Quinn, 1977: pp25-34). At the same time, 
because marginal change therefore becomes more likely, this allows 
comparisons with the existing status quo (eg the budget base) to 
function as a heuristic in assessing any new developments (Wildavsky, 
1979a: p221). It is also claimed to allow the flexibility of being 
reversible should the change in question prove unsatisfactory or 
politically troublesome (eg, Gershuny, 1981: pl96; see also 8ogv*xxl & 
Peters, 1982: p228).
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The actual validity of these interlocking arguments is examined in 
succeeding chapters. However, it can be seen here that in its concern 
to be pragmatic and attuned to political reality, incrementa 1 ism 
mounts an essentially conservative argument in favour of the status 
quo and marginal or minimum change frcm it (Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: 
p57; Haynes, 1980: pl07). The 'status quo* refers here both to the 
structure and nature of policy and resource allocation processes per 
se:
"To an American, sudden change is suspect. American 
political beliefs preclude any drastic change in the 
political system and assume no final goal towards which the 
system should be moving ... Hence, political innovations 
must be marginal ..." (Brzezinski & Huntingdon, cited by 
Bunce & Echolls, 1978: p912),
and to the outcomes of these processes:
"... because our ability to foresee the full social 
consequence of any programme change is so limited, movement 
towards objectives should proceed by small steps. Radical 
actions take us beyond the realm of reasonable foresight.
We make progress by sequential steps, correcting ... as we 
go ..." (Schultze, cited by Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: p57).
Turning now to the opposing rational view of the status quo, we must 
recall first of all that notwithstanding the descriptive features of 
'bounded rationality', the 'pure' rational choice model is quite 
capable of standing alone as a normative or prescriptive ideal in its 
own right (Haynes, 1980: p76; Self, 1981: p220). It is held in effect 
that the status quo should have no inherent value just because it is 
the status quo (eg Midwinter, 1984: p478; see also Jones & Pendlebury, 
1984: p87), and that the widest possible search for means and ends is 
therefore a desirable thing in itself (eg Self, 1981: p220). Still 
less should that search be restricted by any preference for 
marginal change frcm the status quo (see Gershuny, 1981: pl98).
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Further, rational action is that designed to achieve a desired state 
of affairs: the rational pole formalises these desires as goals and, 
as such, rationality is held to be meaningless apart frcm these goals 
(Pfeffer, 1981: pl9). In contrast to the incremental view, goals 
should therefore be explicit (Self, 1981: p220; see also Dear love, 
1979: pl44) rather than emergent, and action in pursuit of them should 
also be expressly designed to maximise their attainment (Haynes, 1980: 
p73). It may be seen that the rational pole of the dichotomy is 
concerned to advance a more radical view of the ordering of policy and 
resource allocation processes and conceivably, given its specification 
of the widest possible search for alternatives, of policy outcomes as 
well.
To sunmarise the division of attitudes towards the status quo, the 
pragmatic and conservative stance of the incremental pole opposes the 
more radical and thorough-going reviews and changes proposed by the 
rational pole. This division relates both to the prescriptions of 
each pole for policy and resource allocation processes themselves, and 
also to what constitutes for each the "desirable" characteristics of 
outcomes. What is more, it can be seen that each syndrome bases its 
attack on the other on precisely the grounds which the other bases its 
own case. Thus, due deference to the status quo and a lack of 
over-arching goals are advanced by incrementalism as wise and 
pragmatic, whereas it is the removal of precisely this attitude which 
the rational pole sees as necessary for purposeful action. Gershuny 
takes a wry view of the overall position:
"There is a strange personal relationship between [the] two 
views; incrementalists are frequently rationalists who have 
got older. Rationality, or rather its adoption as a norm 
for the making of public policy, is certainly an ideal of 
youth, and may all too easily be dismissed as the product of 
high aspirations and inexperience. Incrementalism, on the 
other hand, is seen as an attribute of the wise and the 
experienced, who know how things work" (1981: ppl93-4).
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With the debate on the status quo cast in these terms it is suggested 
that at the extreme, advocacy on an 'either/or' basis of one pole to 
the exclusion of the other may be more a matter of ideological 
preference or instinct, much as conservative and radical stances 
(leaving aside entirely any party political connotation) are in other 
walks of life. No specific evidence is offered here for this belief, 
save the length and standing of the argument to date. However, in the 
course of succeeding chapters, it will be suggested that normative 
stances of this type do not do justice to the actual data frcm policy 
and resource allocation processes and that neither view of the status 
quo is actually entirely sustainable.
We move new to the second area of normative opposition within the 
incremental/rational dichotomy, which is the competing claims of each 
pole that it alone is 1 rational1 while the other - even the so-called 
"rational* pole - is 'irrational1. If rational behaviour is defined 
as that "... appropriately calculated to achieve a desired state of 
affairs" (Wildavsky, 1979b: p35; cf Pfeffer, 1981: pl9), then whether 
or not one formalises these decisions as ' goals', both poles of the 
dichotomy would in fact claim to meet this specification. At the same 
time, they would also claim to provide a priori reasons why the other 
is ' irrational1. The problem for any workable resolution of the 
argument, however, is that the claims of each pole are based at 
different levels of analysis.
Taking once again the incremental claims to rationality first, these 
are based on what is held to be a pragmatic analysis of the actual 
limitations, either cognitive or political (small 'p'), on individuals 
or in the latter case groups of individuals within the policy and 
resource allocation process (see, eg, Danziger, 1978: p204).
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'Rational' behaviour in such a context is that which recognises the 
constraints upon it and adjusts accordingly: thus with their limited 
and satisficed searches, inexplicit objectives and marginal change, it 
is held that incremental policies and resource allocation alone have 
the attribute of feasibility. As Wildavsky puts it:
"Every criticism of traditional budgeting is undoubtedly 
correct. Why, then, has it lasted so long? Because it has 
the virtue of its defects" (1979a: p221).
Within what are taken to be the fixed cognitive and political 
constraints on the individual actors and groups involved,
"traditional" (ie incremental) budgeting is therefore 'rational*.
At the same time, it follows frcm this argument that these 
individual-level constraints a priori render the organisational 
techniques and configurations prescribed by the rational pole either 
impossible or irrelevant (Wildavsky, 1979a: ppl35-8, 220-1; Tomkins, 
1980: pp3-10) or even, as we have seen, an actual hindrance to 
decisive action (Brunsson, 1982: p37). To paraphrase Van Gunsteren's 
(1976) argument, the problem with rational techniques is that people 
tend to be treated as things when intelligent and dedicated action is 
expected frcm them. Rational techniques will not work (or so it is 
held, thereby ignoring the concept of bounded rationality as it 
applies to the rational syndrome: see, eg, Gershuny, 1981: pl96) 
precisely because they assume the very conditions which at the 
individual level cannot be met: ie perfect knowledge of all options 
and consequences, and a willingness to subordinate political 
expediency to this knowledge (Van Gunsteren, 1976: p57). So-called 
'rational* techniques are therefore on this argument in fact 
'irrational'.
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The counter-claim to rationality from within the rational pole itself 
can be introduced by observing immediately that rationalists continue 
to generate and implement the very organisational techniques which 
incrementalists claim cannot function i Opinions vary as to Whether 
PPBS has merely fallen into disuse (Midwinter, 1984: p473), Whether it 
is actually discredited (Jablonsky & Dirsmith, 1978: p219), or Whether 
it may still have something left to offer (Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: 
p85; Puritano & Korb, 1981: passim). However, ZBB and other review 
techniques, (X), systems analysis and corporate management (to name but 
a few) continue in use in many organisations including local 
authorities, and in the latter may even be increasing along with 
review activities in general (eg Greenwood, 1983: pl59). It may of 
course be that these are merely cases of rational labels applied to 
What have in effect degenerated into incremental processes under just 
those individual-level constraints emphasised by incrementalists.
This possibility has already been hinted at and is more fully examined 
later.
The strict logic of the rational pole - or rather of the rational 
choice model - however, is that a priori, individual-level cognitive 
constraints cure not the problem that incrementalists assert (White, 
1982: p405), and that the inferior satisficing and political 'muddling 
through' of incrementalism can and will give way at least to some 
extent to organisational-level techniques of rational analysis (eg 
Greenwood et al, 1980a: pl71; see also Greenwood, 1983: pl67). The 
notion of bounded rationality as it applies within the rational 
syndrome does not weaken this argument. As we have seen it is held 
that the ' full' rational choice model Which is at issue here still has 
an entirely valid role to play as an ideal at which to aim. As Haynes 
puts it:
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"The model emerges as a regulative ideal against which 
actual decision processes and decision-making environments 
can be measured and if necessary improved. There is plenty 
of scope for enhancing the level of rationality in 
decision-making and one can move towards an ideal even 
though one may not be fully able to attain it" (1980: p76).
If progress can be made towards the ideal by organisational techniques 
for widening searches, making objectives more explicit and deepening 
the review of existing activities, then on this argument it is by 
definition rational to do so. Equally, to the extent that the 
individual-level prescriptions of incrementalism needlessly foreswear 
or even hinder such attempts, then on this same line of reasoning 
incrementalism is itself 1 irrational'.
To this extent, the rational syndrome is not just a set of opposed 
techniques but is specifically anti-incremental in its stance. As 
Dear love observes of rational techniques:
"No matter what particular system you study, they all embody 
an attack on incrementalism; muddling through; satisficing; 
fragmentation; specialist management; professionalism; 
vagueness of objectives and the failure to make policies 
explicit; the limited analysis of alternatives; short-term 
planning; the absence of monitoring and review of 
performance, and so on. Moreover, to a greater or lesser 
extent, they all seek to create some new system free of 
these faults" (1979: ppl44; emphasis in original).
It is many of "these faults", of course, which incrementalism advances 
as its own special virtues and which it advocates should not be 
changed (eg Wildavsky, 1979a: pp219-21).
To summarise the overall argument, it may be seen that the incremental 
and rational syndromes offer carpeting claims that they alone provide 
a 1 rational' approach to policy and resource allocation, while at the 
same time the other is by definition ' irrational'. However, the 
problem in assessing the relative merits of these claims is then that
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they are based at different levels of analysis: thus, instead of 
counter-arguments, we have counter-assertions. Either the 
individual level constraints specified by incrementalism are fixed and 
it is therefore rational to recognise them as such and irrational to 
ignore them; or, these constraints are not fixed, making it valid to 
aspire to higher rationality through the organisational techniques of 
the rational syndrome and irrational to erect those constraints as 
barriers to organisational improvement. It is suggested that as these 
normative arguments stand, neither seriously addresses the problems 
posed for it by the other.
(iv) THE INCRE2iEOTAL/RATIONAL DICHOTOMY’: OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS
The level of mutual exclusion just outlined is, arguably, no more than 
one might expect from what is after all a dichotomy, although it can 
be seen that the two poles are opposed in a way and to a degree that 
will make any discourse between them difficult. They cannot both be 
rational; equally, the almost ideological stances underlying their 
respective attitudes to the status quo may not be amenable to reasoned 
argument. Rather more awkward, however, is the tension which we saw 
between these opposing normative prescriptions of each syndrome on the 
one hand, and the descriptive base which we saw that to an extent both 
syndromes share, on the other. We saw that at the descriptive level 
the rational choice model gives way to 'bounded' rationality, which 
purports to specify the level of rationality which may actually be 
expected in practice. The problem was that bounded rationality in the 
rational syndrome is identical in principle to bounded rationality as 
it is applied in the incremental syndrome - the differences are in
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detail only. As a result, the dichotomy actually breaks down at the 
descriptive level while at the same time its normative strands 
stridently continue to diverge. The dichotomy therefore does not 
prescribe what it has described, and as an overall framework for the 
consistent study and advocacy of policy and resource allocation 
processes, it is to this extent undermined.
It was argued that these problems arise because of the breakdown in 
precision and coherence within each pole of the dichotomy: the 
implication is that if we are to have a satisfactory framework for the 
analysis and advocacy of resource allocation processes or techniques, 
it is to each pole that we should turn our attention. On the basis of 
what we have seen so far, the key questions which then need to be 
addressed would appear to be:
(a) What, if anything, of each syndrome remains valid or 
realisable?
(b) Can a defensible basis be found for advocating either 
incremental or rational processes once each syndrome is 
stripped down?
Arising frcm the answers to (a) and (b), we should then be able to 
answer,
(c) Can the dichotomy then be sustained and is it worthwhile to 
do so?
For the reasons noted earlier, the particular focus here will be on 
answering questions (a) and (b) as they relate to the incremental
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syndrome. The data here is therefore used, as set out in the 
Introduction and Appendix, to subject incrementalism to a lengthy and 
intensive examination of its claimed ability to 'capture' the 
'reality' of resource allocation. At the same time, however, given 
that the primary focus of incrementalism is on what is alleged 
actually to take place, this examination will highlight those aspects 
of 'the reality' with which rational aspirations must contend (cf also 
Wildavsky, 1979a: pl44). Important conclusions will therefore emerge 
about the tenability of the rational argument, from which in turn the 
tentative outline of the answer to (c) will also become visible.
On that note, we now turn to examining incrementalism itself.
Following the distinction drawn by LeLoup (1978: p491), we shall begin 
with probably the weakest area of the incremental syndrome, namely the 
different categorisations of resource allocation outcomes which it 
offers us. These are regarded as essentially a distraction frcm the 
treatment of resource allocation processes where the syndrome has more 
to offer, and are therefore best disposed of from the outset.
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CHAPTER 2: INCREMENTAL OLTTCOMES
(i) INTRODUCTION
To all appearances, incremental descriptions of resource allocation 
outcomes ought to be the simplest and most straight-forward aspect of 
the incremental syndrome. Two seemingly uncontentious categories of 
description were briefly identified in Chapter 1, above:
(a) the marginality of change - and in the context of resource 
allocation, the marginality of monetary change - in 
allocations in each succeeding year (eg Wildavsky, 1979a: 
pl4). The underlying argument is that:
"... many of the activities carried out in previous years 
are either mandatary, or are so fundamental to meeting 
organisational goals, that they will have to continue year 
in, year out. It seems sensible, therefore, to concentrate 
only on the changes from the previous year because these 
might be all that are controllable" (Jones & Pendlebury, 
1984: p56).
(b) The marginality of relative change as between priorities - 
again, with monetary change representing the most obviously 
available indicator, but not the object of focus in its own 
right. We have seen (pl6, above) that incrementalism holds 
that, because of the limitations upon review capabilities 
and upon knowledge of future events, and also because of the 
political expectations attached to existing spending, 
marginal adjustments to priorities are simultaneously the 
most desirable and only feasible outcomes.
Although monetary change in allocation is frequently taken as an
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indicator of priority change, as Natchez & Bupp (1973: p955) argued, 
the two should not be seen as entirely synonymous. A focus on 
monetary change in allocations alone may obscure really quite marked 
changes in priorities within those allocations; equally, very large 
monetary changes may leave an overall ranking of priorities unchanged.
This begins to hint that the issue of incremental outcomes is not 
quite as clear-cut as it initially appears. Outwardly, both 
definiticxis appear to be both sound and 'obvious' with the concepts of 
'marginal' or 'relatively minor' change finding ready use in 
day-to-day language. Unfortunately, however, the lack of precision 
surrounding their application in this context, and also a series of 
methodological problems, render them all but useless in any analytic 
capacity.
(ii) MARGINAL MONETARY CHANGES IN ALLOCATIONS
Perhaps predictably, apparent evidence in the data of marginal changes 
in allocations abounded. Thus, in Authority B's budget (both the 
authority and year taken at random), 6 out of 7 major caimittee totals 
show changes within a range of, say, +10% of the previous budget, 
apparently ending the argument almost before it has begin. An 
apparently similar picture could be made to emerge frcm Authority A 
or, indeed, probably from any other authority.
However, because marginal changes to allocations are apparently so 
carmen, questions are raised as to Irow useful it is to point them 
out. The description in effect refuses to discriminate (cf Schick,
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1983: pp2-3): as a result, when one probes further, a series of 
problems and issues ccmes to light which undermines its usefulness as 
an analytic concept, leaving the idea of ‘marginal' or 'relatively 
minor' changes in allocation valid only in general figure of speech 
terms.
(ii)(a) Problems of Definition
For a concept dealing with seme thing implicitly measurable, there is a 
remarkable lack of agreement as to how 'marginal' changes in 
allocation are to be defined (see, eg Leloup, 1978: p491). Wildavsky 
(1979a: pl4) implies an overall range of +30%, with 5% and 10% 
sub-divisions. Since, as Bailey & O'Connor (1975: p62) observe, +30% 
would allow the doubling or removal of a budget in just three years, 
it is scarcely surprising that Wildavsky found nearly three-quarters 
of his observations within this range I Bailey & O'Connor themselves 
(1975: p64) adopt a range of +10% with 11-30% as an "intermediate" 
category and, of course, found far fewer incremental outcomes.
Danziger (1974: pp337-8) only adds to the confusion. In attempting to 
reflect the "normal", "maintenance", "development" and "cuts" budgets 
identified by his interviewees (1974: p337) he proposes that the term 
incremental should apply to the range +5% to +15%; "relatively incre­
mental" frcm -10% to +4% and frcm +16% to +30%; and "non-incremental" 
to changes greater than -10% or +30%. The term 'incremental' not only 
does not apply here to cuts (see also Schick, 1983: passim), but also 
does not cover the smallest increases. Insofar as there is a received 
wisdom on the matter, then surely this contradicts it. Finally, 
Dempster and Wildavsky (1979, cited in Schick, 1983: p21) attempt to 
side-step the issue altogether by focussing on the regularity of
change in allocation rather than the size per se. Even so, seme 
concept of size would appear to be needed, because even allowing for 
differences of interpretation, there must ccme a point where large 
changes, even recurring ones, become 'non-incremental1.
Who, though, is to define that point? Each of the approaches listed 
is in effect an attempt to weight the concept of 'relatively small'. 
The wide range of proposals shows how subjective ultimately these 
attempts must be, giving the appearance of more or fewer incremental 
outcomes depending on who one cites. The problem, though, is that 
even if there was universal (ie intersubjective) mutual agreement 
among external observers as to which definition to use, it would still 
be no more than a quantification of external opinion, and thus of 
questionable relevance to the actual proceedings being observed. The 
figure of + 10%, for example, recurred in three or four of the 
approaches cited but this 'relatively snail' change could be treated 
as 'relatively large' in the eyes of those constructing the budget.
In Authority B, cuts of just 5.0% (£3.5m) were reluctantly imple­
mented, but when grant receipts turned out to be unexpectedly 
favourable, even this incremental cut was felt to be excessive and 
£l.Qm was reinstated. Equally, the figure of + 30% was also cited 
above. Since this would have included nearly 100% of all the 
budgetary allocations in Authorities A and B during the two year study 
period, we may infer that a 30% change was seen as infeasibly 'large' 
at that time I
It is admittedly just these problems which Danziger (1974) appears to 
have in mind. While his scheme of outcomes runs counter to aspects of 
what may be called the 'received wisdom' of attempting to fix a 
standardised figure, it does so because the categories he proposes are
29
generated from his actual study data. As he puts it,
"While seme writers continue to worry over a clear 
definiticn of 'marginal' the issue seems subjective and 
hence unresolvable. At the very least, any figure given 
must be time and environment specific ...
"If change and magnitudes must be categorised, the 
budgeter's subjectivity might be preferable to the analyst's 
subjectivity" (1974: pp336-7).
It is therefore suggested that a standardised conception of 'marginal' 
or 'relatively small' change in allocations is probably unattainable 
(cf also Haynes, 1980: pl07), but even if it was, it would lend a 
spurious objectivity and relevance to analysis. Except din specific 
applications, the generalised concept of incremental outcomes as 
'marginal' changes therefore has a value oily as a figure of speech 
rather than in any analytic role.
(ii)(b) Problems of Focus
Even if the problems of defining 'marginal' outcomes were solved in a 
way that actually informed the analysis, a series of methodological 
problems means that the size of actual change in allocation then 
observed is still at least as much a function of the focus of the 
observer, as of any factor 'in the field'. There are at least four 
areas in which such problems may arise.
First, much will depend upon the level of aggregation of focus (eg 
Bunce & Echolls, 1978: pp927-78; LeLoup, 1978: p497; Natchez & Bupp, 
1973: p955; see also Heclo & Wildavsky, 1981: p27). The Department or 
agency level outcomes studied by many incrementalists (LeLoup, 1978: 
p497) are likely to display a different range of changes to those
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at, say, programme level. Thus, while all but one 1982/83 service 
ccnmittee revenue budgets in Authority B were noted above bo have 
changed within the notional range + 10% over the preceding budget, 
Table 1 shows that the position was much less clear within each 
budget:
Table 1. Authority B; Change within Ccnmittee Budgets (source: Budget 
Documents)
Service Ccnmittee Major heading level within
+ 10% Net Change
Education 11 out of 11 (100%)
Health & Consumer Protection 3 out of 4 ( 75%)
Arts & Recreation 7 out of 10 ( 70%)
Housing (Revenue Account) 3 out of 5 ( 60%)
Social Services 6 out of 11 ( 54%)
Roads & Works 7 out of 13 ( 54%)
Planning & Development 3 out of 9 ( 33%)
It can be seen that on the same + 10% criterion applied earlier at 
service Ccnmittee level, the marginality of change in these outcomes 
was far more variable. Only one Department, Education, (admittedly 
the largest) conformed fully at this level of aggregation to the 10% 
stereotype employed here.
Second, much depends on the timescale used. A focus on annual change, 
while apparently obvious insofar as budgets are legally also annual, 
produces distortions of its own. A year may be just not long enough 
in which to spend a 1 non-incremental' amount (however defined) more 
than the preceding year. Either a budget implies an attainable - 
incremental - change frcm its predecessor, or it is unattainable, but 
will then either be over- or underspent, as the case may be. For 
example a Chairman in Authority A noted that:
"Local authorities rarely achieve their capital budgets. 
Ccmnittees are happy enough to get as much as they can in 
their progranme when at the end of the day they only have so 
much labour and so much ability to spend".
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On the revenue side, it seems likely that the very large GLC under­
spend in 1982/83 (£177m or 19.9%) was at least partially a case of 
"revenue slippage" - the original budget proved too large to spend 
with the staffing resources then available (see also LeLoup 1978: 
pp499-500).
The key point is that incremental theorists such as Wildavsky (eg 
1979a: pl3) recognise that change may well only happen slowly, but 
then insist on measurements by reference to a limited timespan that 
makes marginal change in allocation a self-fulfilling prophecy. A 
three or five year focus (say) would produce, frcm the same rate of 
spending, larger and so less incremental changes than would a 1-year 
focus. In this sense, therefore, apparently incremental outcomes are 
simply a by-product of the observer's choice of a one-year interval.
It may be felt that this is justified, given the legal requirement for 
a balanced annual budget: however, if incremental outcomes are only a 
by-product of what is effectively an historical accident, their 
usefulness as a statement about actual resource allocation may be 
doubted.
Third, even if the annual focus is accepted, as we have just hinted 
much depends upon whether one looks at annual budgets, or at budget 
execution through the year (eg revised estimates, outturn). Much of 
the work of incremental theorists examines US Congressional approp­
riations (eg Davis et al, 1966? Wildavsky, 1979a) or the UK PESC 
exercise (Heclo & Wildavsky, 1981), on the premise that these are the 
major declarations of intent for the coming year. However, what 
actually transpires may differ frcm the original intention (eg Hale & 
Douglass, 1977: p368; LeLoup, 1978: p499; Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: 
pp35-6), with the result that a focus on the original allocation may
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not entirely explain 'where the money actually goes':
- one post-budget determinant of the eventual destination of 
money is of course virement. Bale & Douglass (1977: pp371-2) 
imply a higher level of virement than was the case here, but the 
ability of virement to change the face of a budget, and thus 
perhaps the level of incremental ism displayed by the allocations 
concerned once virement has occurred, was one reason for building 
up anew frcm a 'base' each year:
"You've got the base there ... that is the spend for the 
next year, in effect, rather than not having anything and 
having to build up frcm this year's budget which because of 
virement is already looking different" (Chief Accountant, 
Authority B).
- A second area where a focus on budget execution may produce 
a different level of marginality of change in outcomes is where a 
budget is subsequently over- or underspent. The 1982/83 GLC 
underspend of £177m (19.9%) has been mentioned. The original 
1982/83 budget of £888m implied a 37.6% increase over its 1981/82 
predecessor. However, if the outturn figure for 1982/83 is used, 
the increase becomes 10.2%, only just outside the most ccranonly 
cited range for 'incremental' change of + 10%.
- The third area where a focus on budget execution may yield 
different results is closely related. LeLoup (1978: pp499-500) 
shows how a focus on budgets alone may give an illusion of 
incremental steps due to the annual gap between each measurement, 
whereas spending may increase in fact at a much more constant 
rate between budgets. Where budgets are enacted, and then 
rigidly adhered to up to outturn, the steps - representing the 
increase in spending at each budget - would remain. However,
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given the likely increases in the severity of penalties*, many 
local authorities allocate surplus balances to 'incur' additional 
current expenditure in the present year, when the spending in 
fact relates to the following year, in the knowledge of the 
likelihood that penalties in the present year will be lower than 
in the one following. This process of 'creative accounting' 
cannot, of course, be sustained indefinitely without budgeting to 
'top up' the balances or surplus funds as they are applied. 
Nevertheless, Where it happens, the precise level of expenditure 
in any one year becomes blurred, as the House of Cannons 
Oarmittee on Public Accounts recently pointed out (1985s paras 
16-17), and the pattern of marginal incremental steps in 
allocation between budgets in reality becomes much more of a 
'straight line* progression.
Spending therefore occurs continuously, both as a result of budgets, 
and 'around' budgets. There may be virement; there may be over- or 
underspending; there may be 'creative accounting'. As a result, while 
a focus on annual budgets may 'produce' marginal incremental changes 
in outcomes, these may well fail to describe the actual pattern of 
allocations and spending. A focus on budget execution (ie revised 
estimates or outturn) may 'produce' different outcomes than a focus on 
budgets per se, therefore, but it would appear on the criterion of 
capturing 'the reality' to be at least as valid.
Fourth, much depends upon the expenditure definitions in use. At one 
level an authority's current, 'total', and 'relevant' expenditure will 
vary throughout the year and between budgets at different rates,
(* ie reductions in block grant, operative until FY 1986/87 
exclusive, for exceeding expenditure targets each year).
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although these differences may not be large. At another level, 
though, the observed degree of marginality of change in allocation 
will depend greatly on whether one takes 'volume' (constant-price) 
spending, or 'cash terns' figures (see Rose, 1980: p208). All other 
things being equal, the two will differ by the rate of inflation over 
the period in question: as a perspective, this has been as high as 25% 
per annum in the last ten years, which could presumably allow one 
measure to remain 'incremental' while excluding the other. The 
classic mode of incremental budgeting is of course to update the base 
for any inflation under-allowed in the previous year and allow for 
that plus inflation in the corning year. A volume basis allows one to 
see which is base and which is increment, and therefore whether the 
level of activity has actually increased (eg Likierman & Vass, 1984: 
p28). A cash basis, on the other hand, in effect combines the two, 
which means that a cash increase of less than the rate of inflation 
may actually imply a volume cut; in any event, though, the main 
determinant of the size of change each year may simply be the going 
inflation rate, which of course tells us relatively little about the 
resource allocation process itself (see also Bailey & O'Connor, 1975: 
p65). Clearly, a volume basis is more useful in any attempt to assess 
the level marginality of change in 'real' spending levels but with the 
advent of the 'cash planning' of allocations in the public sector this 
will become decreasingly visible. As a corollary allocations will 
also be decreasingly meaningfully analysed in 'incremental' terms.
To surrmarise the problems of focus, in at least the four areas of 
aggregation, time-span, budget execution and expenditure definition, 
the main determinant of the observed level of marginality of monetary 
change in allocation is likely to be the perspective of the observer. 
Once again, therefore, it may be doubted that this measurement tells
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us or allows us to infer very much about the actual processes of 
resource allocation being observed.
(ii)(c) Marginal Changes in Allocations - Conclusions
We can now take an overview of the analytic usefulness of the incre­
mental definition of outcomes in terms of the marginality of change in 
allocations: for all the apparent grounding in 'ccnmon-sense' obser­
vation, very little. There is no consensus as to how the concept of 
'marginal* or 'relatively minor' is to be defined, and thus as to what 
this type of incremental outcome actually is. Depending on who one 
cites, a given marginal change in allocation may be 'incremental', or 
it may not. Even if a standardised definition could be agreed, 
though, there is no guarantee that it would be taken as valid at that 
particular time by those actually allocating resources in the pro­
cesses being observed. The application of the standardised definition 
would in effect be an external inposition by the observer of his cm i  
subjective (or intersubjective) preferences (Danziger, 1974: p336).
Yet further problems arise because, as well as depending on the 
definitions used, the level of marginality observed - however this is 
defined - is in at least the four areas outlined a product of the 
focus of the observer, rather than of 'what is actually going on'.
How incremental the outcomes of a resource allocation process appear 
to be depends on where one looks, how often one looks, what one looks 
at, and how one then categorises it. In conclusion, therefore, while 
the incremental definition of marginal change between allocations is 
intelligible as a day-to-day figure of speech, as an analytic 
yardstick it is an external imposition on resource allocation
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processes which tells us rather more about the observer than what is 
observed, and whose tolerances and inaccuracies may easily exceed the 
'relatively minor* change it attempts to measure.
(iii) MARGINAL CHANGES IN PRIORITIES
As in the previous section, there is again a strong element of 
apparent oontnon sense and 'obviousness' in pointing to the apparent 
marginality and relatively minor nature of much priority change. The 
Leader of Authority A provided an example:
"Your policy doesn't change that much. The main structure, 
so far as the .... Council are concerned is a known set of 
activities which are slowly improved".
However, to the extent that the main indicator of changes in relative 
priorities is again monetary change, we find once again many of the 
problems of definition and focus that occurred above in assessing 
marginal change in allocations, although some of them take further, 
new, forms.
(iii) (a) Problems of Definition
Since applying the description of marginal change in priority involves 
once again defining what is meant by 'relatively minor', we run into 
the same problems of subjectivity (even if the definition is 
inter subjectively held, ie in the sense of being mutually agreed 
between observers) that we saw earlier. Both Natchez & Bupp (1973: 
pp959-61) and, in a deliberate attempt to be comparable, Danziger
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(1974) compute a 'prosperity change score* for programme priorities, 
as "... the average yearly difference between the ratio of programme 
to total service expenditure and the mean of that ratio" (Danziger, 
1974: p339). While this may allow trends in relative prosperity to be 
highlighted as movements in the 'scores' obtained (Natchez & Bupp, 
1973: p960), in absolute terms Danziger himself notes that "the 
significance of the score must be interpreted subjectively" (1974: 
p339).
As a result, we are again left with the prospect of differing 
interpretations and definitions of what is or is not incremental, 
based on the same prosperity scores, but which could also in turn 
imply something different from the interpretations put on events at 
the time by those actually observed. As before, this appears to 
preclude the possibility of any standardised definition which is 
analytically useful, and even if it did not, it would preclude that 
standardised definition from any necessary relevance to 'what is 
actually going on'. The definition of incremental outcomes in terms 
of marginal change to priorities, like that relating to marginal 
change in allocations, appears only to be valid as a figure of speech 
rather than in any analytic capacity.
(iii)(b) Problems of Focus
Once again, even if these problems were not present, we have the 
series of methodological problems relating to the focus chosen by the 
observer. The extent of relative change in priorities found is 
largely dependent upon the observer' s own standpoint.
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First, much will again depend upon the level of aggregation of one's 
focus. The prosperity assessments of both Danziger and Natchez & Bupp 
were specifically applied at programme level, but in effect relative 
to the service mean. Clearly, therefore, service 'prosperity' is also 
a significant variable in programme 'prosperity' as much as the 
programme's own funding. Further, there is no reason why priorities 
within programmes should not also be assessed: the problem is that 
service, programme and 'within programme' may only arbitrarily be 
represented as 'the priorities' of the organisation.
Second, much will again depend upon the timescale of the analysis.
Once again, a year may not be long enough to allow a non-incremental 
change of priorities to occur, particularly in cases either where 
long-term programmes are being pursued and where one would not 
actually expect priorities involved to change greatly between 
allocations (LeLoup, 1978: p499) until the programme was completed, 
or where, given that resources are fixed, something must be 'wound 
down* to allow spending in another area to increase (Hogwood & Peters, 
1982: pp229-31). A three or five year focus (say) would again produce 
much less incremental results while measuring the same rate of change.
Third, much will again depend upon whether one focusses on budgets or 
upon budget execution - ie upon spending within the formally listed 
budgetary categories. Here, we run into a whole series of issues. 
Priorities may simply be initiated or re-arranged within the financial 
year rather than at budget time. Authority B, for example, 'found' 
£150,000 of revenue funding for a new unemployment programme in its 
area mid-way through the financial year. As the Leader put it at the 
time:
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"...we don't know how we'll get [the money] yet, but we 
will. I don't think any budget is so tightly drawn you 
can't muck around with the odd quarter or half million".
Besides virement in this way, over- or underspend on specific 
programmes could represent considerable de facto changes in prosperity 
scores and priority levels frcm those originally budgeted.
However, to go further, there are at least three levels on which 
budgets are not only superceded, but may be actively misleading about 
actual priorities frcm the moment they are written. At the first 
level, accounting definitions or service or programme categories may 
artificially inflate or reduce prosperity scores and apparent changes 
to priorities when these have not in fact occurred. For example, many 
authorities cost the revenue aspects of programmes to include debt 
charges from capital expenditure, which means that annual changes in 
the prosperity score and apparent priority of these programmes would 
be at least partially a function merely of the level of capital debt 
in that programme and of changes in interest rates. Another related 
example acmes frcm Authority A, where a specific activity (debt 
redemption) was always funded frcm a specific source of income 
(capital receipts): the level of redemption in any one year was thus 
entirely a function of receipts realised, which were prone to 
substantial year-on-year fluctuations. The priority of debt 
redemption remained unchanged, though, insofar as it retained the 
first and only call (amongst several possible alternatives) upon any 
available receipts.
On the second level, but closely related to the previous point, 
budgets may be misleading where expenditure is 'defined in' or 
'defined out' of programmes. Thus, in Authority A, certain revenue
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(current) expenditure was re-categorised as a means of avoiding grant 
penalties for exceeding targets. A programme of building restoration, 
for example, was apparently greatly reduced between 1981/82 and 
1982/83 budgets, when in fact some expenditure had been capitalised, 
and seme transferred to a trust fund outside the main budget. The 
underlying priority remained unchanged however. The Treasurer of 
Authority A provided another example:
"All the burden of advice, Cooper Lybrard, CIPFA and so on 
says that there should be a full allocation of central admin 
to users. We think differently. The DLO ... and trading 
services, if they cure to compete, have a lot of central 
expenses which no outside firm ever had to bear ... The 
Council, Committees, two lots of audit ... that is all set 
aside as a charge on the rate fund, even management 
services, the Chief Executive and so on ...".
The result of this would have been a prosperity score for DLO support 
- as defined here - that was artificially high, and therefore an 
apparently higher priority, simply as an expression of the decision 
not to diffuse or 'lose' the costs between enterprises.
On the third level, budgets can be misleading through active 
manipulation by those with the power to do so. One issue to be 
resolved here, for example, is exactly whose priorities one should 
assess as ' the authority 's', since the same activity or allocation may 
represent different things to people in different positions. An 
example of this was provided by Authority A's Planner, in connection 
with an inner city restoration programme:
"That policy started quite innocently, but [as] part of a 
programme to open up the whole [area], although we started 
with small packages of £10,000 at a time ... Most Members 
didn't know what that policy was ... they had no 
understanding when we started that it was a commitment, if 
you like, to build six or seven miles of quayside walkway. 
The plan was in fact ... an officer idea which had only 
limited political support ... There were officers in groups 
working corporately, but the aspirations were eventually 
expressed as individual budgetary allocations. We tapped 
four or five different Committees ... ".
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If one relied on formal budgetary categories, this programme would at 
this stage deliberately not have appeared as a priority at all. On 
the other hand, if one were attempting to analyse the budget of each 
Ccnmittee in terms of the prosperity score of each element, the 
results for the elements related to this particular programme would 
have been an inaccurate portrayal of the dynamics underlying the 
programme as a whole. In essence, it would have mistaken effect for 
cause, in focussing on purely tactical allocations in fact relating to 
a different 'whole' from the Gomnittee budget, and endowing them with 
an individual status which, in the eyes of the programme's 
originators, they never possessed. No doubt it was hoped by the 
Planner that the chairmen of the Gcrrmittees concerned would make just 
this mistake i
Eventually, however, the existence of the programme became public 
knowledge but it did so in a manner which only reinforces the point 
that a focus on the budget alone may be misleading. As the Planner 
continued:
"At the beginning ... you are always open to accusations 
that the whole thing will cost untold millions, and since 
you can't say what a programme will cost you would be damned 
silly to try ... Ihe make or break came when we got to an 
area where the Council had leased an area of quayside for 
999 years for car parking ... [The Council] now had an 
absolute impediment, and the programme became at that stage 
a rolling commitment because they had to take a deliberate 
decision to remove a use, ... to end the lease... They did 
it by facing up to the implications of our incremental 
approach to the thing and committing themselves to the whole 
policy initiative ...".
Here, the essentially privately-held objective suddenly acquired in 
public - and in the budget - the status and priority which in private 
it had held all along. A mere perusal of the budget itself would have 
given the impression of a wholly new programme. More generally, the 
whole approach was a very good example of what Wildavsky, (1979a:
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pplll-2) called the "camel's nose". What he does not point out 
though, are the considerable implications for the incremental/rational 
dichotomy as a whole. The example given was one of a corporately 
thought-out programme disguised as incremental, piecemeal allocat­
ions. The dichotomy comes close to being undermined because we would 
in effect have to apply both poles to the same behaviour. As the 
Planner himself put it, "When is a programme not a programme?".
(iii)(c) Marginal Changes in Priorities; Conclusions
To summarise this critique of the incremental description of resource 
allocation outcomes in terms of marginal changes in priorities, it may 
be seen that once again a generally recognisable and apparently 
' caimon-sense' description of change poses great problems in any 
specific analytic context. The problems are essentially similar to 
those which we saw with marginal changes in allocations, namely, that 
it is hard to define 'incremental' change to priorities in any 
consistently relevant way, and that the level of change observed is in 
any case a function of the observer's own standpoint and perspective 
rather than a statement about the actual resource allocation taking 
place. The tolerences and inaccuracies in such an exercise could 
again easily exceed the 'relatively minor' change being measured. 
Further, though, the problems arising from a focus on budgets cast 
considerable doubt on the extent to which the formal categories 
presented to the observer may actually reflect the 'real' priorities 
underlying the activity of those under study. This comes close in 
some ways to undermining aspects of the incremental/ rational dichotomy 
itself: as we noted very briefly in Chapter 1, differences between the 
two poles may be illusory, with apparently incremental outcomes
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disguising corporate/rationally thought-out and programmed activity,
(iv) INCREMENTAL OUTCOMES: OVERVIEW
We have examined incremental outcomes in terms of marginal changes in 
allocations themselves, and in the priorities implied by those 
allocations, and found that while the concepts behind them may be 
intelligible in terms of the day-to-day figure of speech expressing 
the notion of ' relatively minor', in any analytic ccxitext they are 
useless or even actively misleading. In both cases there are serious 
problems both in defining what is meant by 'incremental' in any agreed 
sense that is also relevant to what is being studied; and in both 
cases there are if anything more serious problems where the observer 
cannot help but materially influence the level of incrementalism which 
he finds. Incrementalism is about 'relatively minor* change, but the 
tolerances in attempting to measure it could easily exceed what is 
being measured. The two descriptions of incremental outcomes which 
have been reviewed should therefore play little further analytic 
role. Least of all, it might be noted in passing, should they be used 
as the basis for inferring process characteristics by means of eg 
regression analysis (eg Davis et al, 1966: passim; see also LeLoup, 
1978: pp491-2; Lars son 1982: p27), or even more tacitly by means of 
simple juxtaposition (eg Wildavsky, 1979a: ppl3-15).
This, though, is to hint at issues arising frcm incrementalist views 
of resource allocation processes, to which we now begin to turn. The 
first stage in this examination however, is to place those processes 
in their context, and it is this which is accomplished in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN CONTEXT
(i) INTRODUCTION
"I believe it is probably true that Fortune is the arbiter 
of half the things we do, leaving half to be controlled by 
ourselves. I compare Fortune to one of those violent rivers 
which ... flood the plains, [tearing] down trees ... 
everyone flees before them, everyone yields to their 
impetus, there is no possibility of resistance. Yet 
although such is their nature it does not follow that when 
they are flowing quietly one cannot take precautions, 
constructing dykes and embankments so that when the river is 
in flood it runs into a canal or else its impetus is less 
wild and dangerous ... I ... believe that a person who 
adapts his policy to the times prospers and likewise one 
whose policy clashes with the demands of the time does not" 
(Machiavelli, "The Prince", ppl30-l).
Having in effect dismissed the analytic value of incremental 
approaches to categorising resource allocation outcomes, what may be 
said of the syndrome's approaches to the nature of resource allocation 
processes? How incremental are these processes in local authorities? 
If they are incremental, how (if at all) does it help us to understand 
them by illustrating the fact?
The first step in answering these questions is to 'set the scene', by 
relating policy and resource allocation in local authorities to its 
external circumstances and to assess the impact which those 
circumstances in fact have. What role might incrementalism then be 
expected to play? If, for example, the nature of the processes 
studied could plausibly and unambiguously be ascribed directly to seme 
determining impact of those circumstances, then incremental 
conceptions of the processes would become redundant. Explaining their 
nature would simply be a matter of identifying the relevant external 
determinants, thereby leaving the incremental stress on the
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cognitive and political facts of local authority life with nothing 
left to 'do' save provide interesting but essentially diversionary 
supporting detail. In examining the role played by external 
circumstances, we are in effect seeking to identify the role (if any) 
which might in turn be expected of incrementalism, and the areas in 
which it might operate (leaving aside entirely, for now, the separate 
issue of whether it is actually valid or defensible). If there is 
still a role for incrementalism, we then need to know which aspects 
(if any) of the impact of external circumstances it will have to 
accomodate and be consistent with. These issues cure addressed here.
Potentially, of course, any aspect of their 'external circumstances' 
might be expected to have 'an impact' of seme sort on local 
authorities, but two fairly broad factors in particular were easily 
and consistently identifiable. The first of these was resource short­
ages, which were beginning to 'bite* as the research comnenced; the 
second was high levels of external turbulence and uncertainty 
surrounding resource levels in connection with the grant system and 
the use of local rate bases. This is not to claim that these were the 
only major factors, or that this is the only way of approaching the 
issues addressed here, but that these two factors quickly and clearly 
emerged from the data as it was gathered and remained prominent 
throughout the research. They are also of course corroborated in the 
work of a number of other writers. Rosenberg (eg 1983: pp5-6) is one; 
Wildavsky (eg 1975: plO) makes wealth and predictability the two major 
dimensions of his well-known comparative framework, and following him 
eg. Greenwood (1983: pl51). We now examine the general inpact of 
these factors in order to illustrate the position in which Authorities 
A and B found themselves: although much will become clear later, it is 
possible to outline the key elements in the overall position.
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(ii) LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN CONTEXT: RESOURCE SHORTAGE
(ii)(a) Resource Shortage: Scale and Nature
The resource constraints facing local authorities need little 
introduction. Hie two main sources of income open to local 
authorities are government grants and rates. Of these, the former 
have steadily been reduced by the government as a percentage of local 
authorities' expenditure, thereby placing an increasing burden on 
local rate bases which have long been inadequate for the loads they 
bear (eg Ashford, 1982: p258). This has enormously increased the 
political sensitivity of rates and rates issues (Ward & Williams, 
1986: forthcoming), and thus the pressures on local expenditure. The 
extent of the reduction in grant levels may be gauged from Thble 2:
Table 2.
Aggregate Exchequer Grant as a percentage of 'relevant' expenditure in 
England and Wales (RSG Settlements, 1975/76-1985/86)
Year % Year %
1975/76 66.5 1981/82 56.1
1976/77 65.5 1982/83 56.1
1977/78 61.0 1983/84 52.8
1978/79 61.0 1984/85 52.0
1979/80 61.0 1985/86 49.8
1980/81 61.0
(Source: successive years'
RSG ccmnentaries by the 
Local Authority Associations 
and the GLC).
It may be seen that grant levels as a percentage of 'relevant' 
expenditure have fallen by nearly one quarter over the ten-year period 
shown to 1985/86, and have fallen particularly steeply since 1980/81, 
just prior to the start of the research. While these figures are for 
England and Wales, the following comparison from England alone 
emphasises their impact. Grants in England in 1975/76 amounted to 
some 65% of 'relevant' expenditure. If this percentage had been 
applied in 1985/86 instead of the level actually planned of 48.8%, the 
total of grant would have risen from the 1985/86 planned figure of
£11.8bn, to over £15.7bn, a difference of nearly £4bn. This 
represents the impact of the government's progressive reduction in 
planned overall grant levels through the period: even excluding the 
effects of inflation, on 1985/86 rateable values it equates to a 54p 
rate nationally, thereby crudely but directly quantifying the pressure 
on rates which has arisen. As grant levels have fallen, then, they 
have at the same time made rates much more sensitive for local 
authorities to use because of the demands of acquiring extra income 
simply to make good this loss.
Further, these figures entirely exclude the impact of penalty block 
grant reductions for exceeding 'targets' since 1981/82. These 
targets themselves have been 'cash planned' to allow increases in 
spending of rather less than the RPI, having risen by only 17.8% 
between 1982/83 (when the practice began of basing them on 'total' 
rather than current expenditure) and 1985/86, while the estimated RPI 
rise over the relevant period (April 1982-March 1986) is 44.8%, thus 
leaving a shortfall of the rise in targets against that in the RPI of 
27%. At the same time, the penalties for exceeding these targets have 
increased drastically each year, as Table 3 shows:
Table 3.
Cumulative ratepayer-level penalty block grant reductions for 
exceeding target
_______________ Spend over Target_________________
+ per %
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% thereafter
1981/82 (Targets and penalties not directly comparable)
1982/83 3p 6p 9p 12p 15p NIL
1983/84 lp 2p 7p 12p 17p +5p
1984/85 2p 6p 14p 33p 32p +9p
1985/86 7p 15p 24p 33p 42p +9p
(Source: RSG Orders? penalties are always specified as rate 
equivalents, with block grant deducted equal to the rate poundages 
shown.)
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While these figures are at ratepayer level (that is, they give the 
total penalty liability at the overspends shown of all types of 
authority in any one area, eg shire county and shire districts, etc), 
the impact on any one authority, though less severe in absolute terms, 
would be at least as great relative to its size and ability to pay.
The only constraint on these penalties, should an authority spend high 
enough, is running out of block grant to be penalised, although at the 
time of the research this point had not yet been reached.
This, in crude terms, is the reality of the resource constraints which 
have faced local authorities. While the figures given here do not 
really do justice to what has become a whole complex of related 
issues, it may be seen that following the overall reduction in grant 
levels, together with very tight expenditure targets enforced by 
further penalty reductions in block grant, local authorities' rate 
bases and thus local expenditure have been put under great pressure, 
in particular frcm 1980 onwards and through the period of the 
research. One major source of income (grant) las partially dried up 
at origin, having the effect of making the other (rates) increasingly 
sensitive to anything perceived to be 'excessive' use. As these 
pressures have mounted, local authorities have been forced to call 
into question or even invalidate their earlier assumption, valid for 
many years previously, of an annual increment of growth in available 
resources. Wright (1980: p3), Hepworth (1980: pl3) and Hinings et al 
(1980: ppll3-4) were amongst the first to point to this change, 
although the theme has since been taken up by, eg, Rosenberg (1982: 
pp7-8? 1983: pp5-6); Greenwood (1983: pl51); and Laffin & Young (1985: 
p42); on a slightly wider level by Schick (1983: p4); and abroad by
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Kemp (1983: pl270) in the US, and Larsson (1982: pi) in Sweden. 
However, perhaps the clearest expression to date comes from Stewart:
"The post-war period to 1974 was a period of continuing 
economic growth, marked by set-backs but capable of 
sustaining continuing growth in local government expenditure 
... The economy and polity of local government have 
changed. The economic problems ... of 1974-79 led [the 
government] to call for cutbacks and standstill ... reducing 
grant accordingly. These policies were intensified by the 
succeeding Conservative government. Local government could 
no longer assume a climate of growth and had to face 
constraints .... (1983: pp41-2).
What is at issue, then, is a profound change in the whole financial 
climate within which local authorities operate.
Authorities A and B were no exception to this. Both were in penalty 
for spending above their respective targets from the moment these were 
introduced, and neither was exempted frcm the inpact of the fall in 
overall grant levels. Although much will emerge later, we can now 
examine in outline the impact which the data showed this change in 
climate was having. Already though, any directly deterministic role 
of resource constraints may to be questionable. We are talking here 
of a change in shared (if tacit) background assumptions about likely 
resource levels, presumably as held by those involved in the 
allocation of resources, reflecting what they saw around them. To 
this extent, therefore, rather than causing the further changes we are 
about to see, the inpact of resource constraints would already have 
been mediated (see also Greenwood, 1983: pi64 who similarly denies 
direct causation, in a change of emphasis frcm, eg, Greenwood et al, 
1977; 1980a). While the pressures outlined were real and inroediate 
enough, the issue then turns around the sense which the actors studied 
made of events through their shared revision of these background 
assmptions, and what they then took to be the 'appropriate' 
response(s). As we shall now see, these responses shared similarities
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in the general extent to which assumptions tended to be reviewed and 
also in sane of the effects which this appeared to have; but in other 
respects, such as their specific timing, style and actual effect on 
budgets, we shall also see that they varied considerably.
(ii)(b) Resource Shortage: Shared Responses
In his discussion of the invalidation of the growth assumption, 
Hepworth notes that while in overall terms the transition has been 
made to a 'decline' era, socialised attitudes from the period of 
growth will persist:
"Although there is a great deal of pressure ... to reduce 
expenditure ... there is also a countervailing pressure at 
least to maintain minimum standards .. Managers of local 
authority services are •.. the products of a society which 
has developed certain accepted standards of social behaviour 
and responsibility, as well as certain professional 
standards. Their whole approach is conditioned by an 
initial desire to maintain those standards ... these norms 
apply equally to politicians" (1980: p23).
If this is so, then it would indicate an implicit trade-off between 
'old' attitudes as to the role and desirability of the welfare state 
and services per se, and, now that their accompanying growth 
assumption has been invalidated, newer and more immediate attitudes as 
to how much of this it is proper and feasible to maintain. While 
ultimately this trade-off is a matter for each individual called upon 
to make it, the findings frcm Authorities A and B support Hepworth's 
contention (and also the conclusions of, eg, Levine et al, 1981: pl88; 
and Greenwood, 1983: ppl58-167). Although the older cultural 
attitudes to which Hepworth alludes were clearly strained, the change 
of thinking prompted by the invalidation of the growth assumption 
seemed in general to be taking place at the level of what was
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'expedient', rather than at the deeper level of the justification for 
services in themselves. As the Treasurer of Authority B put it:
"... in any set of circumstances you' ve got to take a 
balanced view. An accountant might say, 'Swiirming baths are 
a damned nuisance, they don't pay', but a lot of people 
enjoy swimning and Members of course are aware of that ...
My attitude would be, 'how can I keep various levies on the 
public to what I would regard as ... reasonable?' I would 
argue that I' ve successfully managed that ... but 
accountants are human beings as well and if it took seme 
swingeing cuts in a service, say withdrawing wardens in an 
old people's home, I probably wouldn't do it, as it's 
cruel".
The basic predisposition to retain 'a certain level' of services, 
therefore, remained intact.
Perceptions such as this of course affected the type and depth of 
review which it was felt necessary to undertake. As we shall see, 
although the timing varied according to the prevailing disposition in 
each authority towards spending levels relative to grant and rate 
-pressures, alternative ways of providing services and reducing 
existing costs were evaluated and reviewed:
"What you're asking [chief officers] to do is say 'Yeah, 
alright, there should be a recreation manager whose job it 
is to provide the most cost-effective recreation and 
entertainment .. • but is running the [name] Hall the best 
way of doing that, or building sports centres?'" (Treasurer, 
Authority A) ...
... but always under the assumption that the service would still be 
provided to the highest level permitted by available resources:
"No service will be entirely taken right away, we'll keep 
the basics so that when we can go ahead again, we've got a 
programme and we can build on that..." (Leader, Authority 
B).
This evidence that resource constraints were prompting a greater depth
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of review of efficiency and the means of service provision in 
Authorities A and B, but not generally of the rationale for services 
per se, is, as we noted above, broadly consistent with the findings of 
seme other writers in the field. It is also consistent, for example, 
with the recent privatisation of seme services in some authorities or 
with recent attempts by Hertfordshire and East Sussex County Councils 
to sack their school meals staff and re-employ them on lower pay: 
clearly, these cure radical solutions to perceived problems of cost, 
but ones which appeared to presuppose that services would at least 
continue to be provided, even if not to their previous levels. In 
this sense, we shall see that the incremental concept of the 'base', 
here representing an essentially political consensus of unchallenged 
'core' assumptions about the oontinuing validity of service ends, 
itself continued to be relevant, even if the margin around it of 
review and feasible change was perceived to be widening (eg Stewart, 
1983: p209; see also Kemp, 1983: ppl270-l, for an account of a similar 
experience in US local government).
Within this 'margin of feasible change', of course, given the obvious 
problems of providing at least minimum services with decreasingly 
adequate resources, it would be surprising if any dissensus was not 
more visible. Predictably, for example, the school meals cases above 
were attended by major political, legal and trade union arguments (see 
also Levine et al, 1981: pl98). Amongst those more directly involved 
in allocating resources, Rosenberg (eg 1982: pp8-9) has stressed that 
one of the political by-products of a dependable annual increment of 
growth is that consensus within each authority over resource 
allocation patterns can in effect be 'bought' with it. Room to meet 
modest new aspirations can be found without having to relegate or 
re-negotiate existing priorities, and concessions may more easily be
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gained because 'there is always next year'. Relationships between 
actors, as Rosenberg (1982: p8) points out, had in effect been 
structured around the assumption of this annual growth, and the 
effects of its removal were sometimes dramatic. Thus, he cites one 
Treasurer as follows:
"I don't know what's going on outside, but there is less 
co-operation here than there's ever been, simply because 
pressures are so great that each chief officer is obliged to 
defend his comer whether he wants to or not ...
Politicians on Ccmnittees are also clashing amongst 
themselves ..." (1982: p8).
This experience would have been a familiar one to the Authority A's 
Solicitor:
"More and more I'm co-ordinating decisions. This becomes 
more important at a time of not much money. People can live 
much more easily within their own departmental aims and 
objectives when there is more money ... Easy relations 
become strained. Sometimes you need to be able to step in 
and knock a few heads together. I find myself in that sort 
of position more and more, much more frequently than I used 
to".
Similarly, we shall see that in Authority B, a specific exercise to 
produce £3.5m in cuts to its revenue budget produced frequent 
accusations in the Management Team between chief officers that they 
were not 'pulling their weight* and finding 'their' share of 
economies.
This is consistent, therefore, with the picture which emerges from 
Rosenberg (1982) of increased dissensus. However, Greenwood (1983: 
pl58) arrived at a different conclusion, in that he found an increased 
willingness to 'pull together' after 1977/78, and much less political 
strategising between chief officers. It will become apparent from the 
data here, though, that the two trends to some extent co-existed. We 
shall see that treasurers' officials reported a greater departmental 
willingness to see the economising point of view (cf also Tomkins,
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1983: pll) thereby, it is suggested, indicating the depth of 
invalidation of the growth assumption. However, chief officer and 
Member strategising also continued, particularly in the attempted 
accumulation of slack resources as a response to uncertainty (see 
pp73-80, below), or when any new level of restraint was implemented.
No doubt they could see the 'need' for economies in general terms - so 
long as it didn't affect them directly 1
We can now summarise what has been introduced so far of the inpact of 
resource shortage on the authorities studied. Through forcing the 
invalidation of the assumption held by policy and resource allocation 
actors of an annual increment of growth in available resources, 
resource shortage was prompting (albeit with variations in timing 
during the research) greater levels of review and, indeed, a greater 
willingness to see the need for seme measure of restraint. However, 
the review appeared to have extended as far as service efficiency and 
means of provision, but not (at that time) to service objectives. At 
the policy level the incremental concept of a 'base', in this case 
around still-held carmitraents to the existence of services in 
themselves, therefore appeared frcm the data and also from, eg, 
Greenwood (1983) to have remained valid. At the same time though, the 
fact that the 'margins of feasible change* were perceived to be 
widening implied a questioning of the basis of previous assumptions 
and relationships as competition for resources increased, producing in 
turn a much increased level of dissensus. These were the more uniform 
and shared aspects of the responses of local authorities to their 
resource constraints to emerge frcm the data (and to be corroborated 
by other writers). However, we now turn to the variations in 
responses to resource shortage which have also been hinted at, 
whereupon it becomes rather harder to generalise in any positive way.
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(ii)(c) Resource Shortage: Variations of Response
Fran this point on, responses to resource shortage are far less 
uniform. While it seemed plausible to generalise about the level of 
review and search for efficiency savings, the response of individual 
local authorities to pressures on their resources seems to have been 
much more variable in terms of fixing their own spending levels.
To find out why, we might usefully return to Stewart's assumption 
above (p50) of the 'climatic* changes in local authorities' financial 
circumstances, and in particular his identification of the role of 
central government as the agent of this change. Certainly, the centre 
has sought to influence or control local spending levels, but in the 
revenue area, at least, it has not until very recently - and not at 
the time of this research - sought to specify in any binding way fixed 
expenditure figures (see eg Stewart, 1983: pp60-61). Father, we have 
seen briefly that the government's approach may be portrayed as one of 
deliberately forcing local authorities to put pressure on their own 
rate bases, in the knowledge that these are inadequate for the loads 
they bear. In this way, the hope was that local tax (rate)-payers 
would control local spending, as it were 'on behalf of' the government 
and force that spending into line with the Public Expenditure (PESC) 
figures (Ward & Williams, 1986: forthcoming). The instruments of this 
strategy have been seen already. Firstly, we have the steady but very 
substantial decline since 1975/76 in overall grant levels shown in 
Table 2, thus increasing levels of rate support of spending 
generally. Secondly, this has escalated to the block grant, and then 
target and penalty systems which as we also saw seek to translate 
specific spending levels into rate burdens, by matching increased
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spending over the target and GRE ' benchmarks' with increased rate 
poundages 'Weird & Williams, 1986: forthcoming).
There were always sound practical reasons for the government's choice 
of this approach, not least because the Treasury (Heclo & Wildavsky, 
1981: pp68-69) and DoE local government staffs (Ward & Williams,
(1986: forthcoming) are remarkably small for the volume and importance 
of their work. More direct methods of centred, supervision of the 
detail of local spending would have imposed unacceptable burdens on 
those staffs. However, there was never any proof that local taxpayers 
could be prompted to force local authorities to deliver the spending 
levels required by PESC, and it is apparent that this strategy has not 
entirely worked. With its falling overall grant levels, the block 
grant system, and targets and penalties - all working to increase the 
political sensitivity of rates - the strategy has been the means of 
visiting the national economic position upon local government, and is 
thus the source of the invalidation of local authorities' previously 
held assumptions of annual growth in resources - but it has still 
allowed discretion in local revenue spending. There is, for example, 
an overspend against the PESC plans in 1985/86 set to be just under 
£lbn cxi current expenditure in England alone. Some local authorities 
have now spent their way out of block grant altogether and cure thus 
more-or-less inmune to anything that the government's strategy has 
left to inflict upon them - it cannot pressurise the rate bases in 
these areas any further. In passing, therefore, it has been suggested 
(ward & williams, 1986: forthcoming) that we now have rate-capping as 
a tacit admission of this partial failure to control revenue spending, 
and as a sign that the government now feels forced to contemplate more 
directly supervisory methods.
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At the time of the research, however, rate-capping (or the threat of 
it) had not appeared. This meant that while the turbulence frcm grant 
and rates issues was undoubtedly a major factor with which authorities 
had to contend, those so minded appeared to have scope for negotiation 
of the resources constraints imposed (Goldsmith, 1984: p66). As the 
Chief Executive of Authority C put it:
Although in the last couple of years horizons have 
definitely been narrowed by national decisions, I think 
there is still room for initiative because one is always 
pushing to achieve what you think ought to be done within 
the rules laid down ... The government are taking the line 
that they are not telling authorities what to do, they sire 
giving than the choice within the guidelines laid down ... 
They sire saying that the decision is one for local 
authorities which means that you still have to decide
locally, in the context of local interests".
Clearly, much depends on the level of aspirations to be satisfied: 
Authority C was a small and fairly low spending district council, with 
objectives to match. However, not only will similar evidence emerge 
frcm the much larger and relatively higher spending Authorities A and 
B, but evidence suggesting discretion over overall spending levels may
quite easily be found among authorities at large. Rosenberg (1983:
p30) illustrated the range of discretion remaining in responses to 
resource shortage by reference to variations in spending per capita on 
a selection of English shire counties' services in 1980/81. Table 4 
(below) provides a similar analysis for 1984/85, showing the 
variations in spending after four more years of restraint to be as 
wide as ever, and in seme cases wider than in 1983/84. Tables 5 and 6 
(below) then expand Rosenberg' s analysis and that in Table 4 by 
showing how these variations have been maintained through time.
How much of the variation shown in the tables is plausibly 
attributable to the exercise of discretion per se? Of course, it is
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Table 4.
Variations in English Shire Counties' expenditure per capita 
(1984/85: November prices, £ per head)




















































































difficult to separate discretion over spending levels in the face of 
resource shortage from the effects of any other factors which may 
influence spending (because the net effect is still variation in 
spending levels) and to that extent our argument here has seme wider 
implications which will be discussed later. It could be, for example, 
that the authorities shown have inherited their spending levels frcm 
previous administrations (although the last elections were in fact 
four years earlier), and were desperately trying to raise or lower 
these. It could also be that the various 'fixed' or demographic 
factors (or lack of them) affecting the needs and costs of service 
provision in each area, rather than authorities' exercising discretion
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over spending levels, will 'explain' much of the range of outcomes 
shown. For example, the transport rankings in Table 4 are often cited 
(eg AGC, 1984) as evidence of the unavoidable costs of road 
maintenance and bus subsidies in very rural areas. Very sparsely 
populated counties occupy the top three placings shown with others 
such as Lincolnshire, Cornwall and North Yorkshire only just out of 
the picture.
However, Danziger (eg 1978: pll3) found demographic factors generally 
to be relatively poor at explaining outcomes; in a similar vein, the 
Audit Commission (eg 1985a: paragraphs 7-9) have found wide variations 
in service standards, even after local needs and efficiency or inef- 
ficency have been taken into account. We shall see therefore that 
concepts of need and (to some extent) costs are applied through the 
perceptions of those din the authority. Their permitted impact on 
resource allocation is defined in situ, along with the impact of 
resource shortage, in terms of perceptions held by the actors involved 
of what is feasible and proper. As a further example, the same 
transport rankings in Table 4 also show another sparsely populated 
county, Norfolk, second from bottom, thereby maintaining its overall 
position as a relatively low spender, and showing that however 
pressing they may be, transport needs and costs in sparse areas cannot 
be seen as fixed. Equally, though, densely populated Cleveland would 
in fact be seventh in a full ranking of transport spending, thereby 
maintaining a striking profile of very high service spending, almost 
irrespective of financial constraints nationally. Both instances are 
entirely consistent with the known political dispositions towards 
service spending in each authority, which appear to have voluntarily 
either 'enhanced' or to have overridden, to an extent, the impact of 
resource shortage itself.
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Tables 5 and 6 in any event then 'cancel out' the historical impact of 
demographic factors (except insofar as these may have affected 
spending levels since 1980/81) by standardising expenditure per head 
since then as factors of that year. Thus, Table 5 shows spending in a 
geographically varied selection of shire counties, and the shire mean, 
relative to their 1980/81 levels. Once again, Cleveland emerges as a 
high overall spender per head relative to its 1980/81 level, although 
with Nottinghamshire even higher. However, even arguing against 
Danziger and allowing for demographic factors such as increasing 
unemployment in Cleveland since 1980/81, the range of increases in 
overall spending per head since then is impressive, showing a 
variation exceeding 30% in both 1983/84 and 1985/86. The constriction 
of this range in 1984/85 is itself interesting, because for three of 
the authorities shown and for the shire mean it appears to mark the 
beginning of a downturn in service spending, perhaps as resource 
shortage was perceived to 'bite' - but not for Nottinghamshire which 
in fact increased its spending per head relative to 1980/81 levels. 
This, together with the fact that, for example, the 'bite1 in 
Authority B was perceived to acme in 1983/84, is further evidence of 
variation in the timing of responses (here in the shape of cuts) to 
resource shortage. Suimarising the main point, though, the overall 
trend in the graph clearly shows the progressive impact of the 
resources position - but the width of the band between the highest and 
lowest curves is equally further evidence, if not conclusive proof, of 
the variations in response which it has elicitied.
Table 6 makes the same comparison as Table 5, but for shire counties 
in the south-east of England, deliberately chosen as a more restricted 
sample. As one might expect, the variation shown is rather narrower 
than in Table 5 - but this is even less surprising given that these
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shire counties were all Conservative control led throughout the period 
(except in Berkshire where they were merely the largest party). Thus, 
'discretionary' factors such as political leaning may have an inpact 
(it may also be seen that the spending levels shown in Table 6 cure 
rather lower than seme of those in Table 5) although, within these 
broadly similar political parameters (and given also their relative 
demographic homogeneity) the range of responses exhibited by so 
restricted a sample is still impressive, reaching 20% of 1980/81 
levels by 1985/86. Once again, therefore, while the overall trend in 
the graph indicates clearly the progressive inpact of resource 
shortage as a factor to be taken into account in spending decisions, 
the range of responses within the overall trend would appear to 
indicate (if not prove) that resource shortage has not had a 
determining impact.
Now, it may be objected that having illustrated in the previous 
chapter the problems of definition and focus which beset incremental 
descriptions of resource allocation outcomes, Tables 4, 5 and 6 in 
effect repeat the same errors. The apparent range of outcomes shown 
here could easily prove as ill-founded as the incrementalist analysis 
earlier. In response, however, the tables are based on the 
standardised and carefully defined Return of Expenditure and Rates 
(RER), an annual collation by the DoE and CIPFA, known and familiar to 
local authorities over a period of years and where convention and 
practice will therefore have minimised problems of definition. There 
are of course tolerances in the RER, (and also in per capita 
measurements of spending) and ultimately the entire exercise is an 
imposition where categories may of themselves shape the answers, or 
may be manipulated by respondents. However, it is argued that even 
allowing for all these factors, the variances shown cure large enough
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to need further explanation, whereas with incremental descriptions of 
outcomes (ie, by definition small changes) the argument was that the 
various tolerances could be larger than what was being measured.
To sunrnarise, while it is admitted that we have not proved the point, 
fran their varied responses over time to resource shortage, local 
authorities appear still to have retained discretion over their 
overall service spending levels (as Rosenberg, 1983: p30 also 
concluded), notwithstanding the consistencies in other aspects of 
their responses to resource shortage noted in section (b) above. On 
the one hand it is possible to maintain a striking profile as a 
higher spender despite the financial pressures this imposes on local 
tax bases. On the other hand, it is possible to realise equally 
striking lower levels of spending, even within the basic assumption 
outlined in section (b) about service spending per se. Danziger 
(1978: p76) noted that each authority he studied had developed over 
time a "critical policy style": certainly, as this impacts on relative 
levels of spending (as opposed to the mix of spending, which has not 
been examined here), Tables 4, 5 and 6 suggest that even at a time of 
resource constraints, authorities have been able over time to maintain 
their own 'styles'. It is how they do this, and how those styles cure 
formed and held with which ultimately much of this thesis is 
concerned.
(ii)(d) The Impact of Resource Shortage: Overview
The resource constraints facing local authorities appear generally to 
have invalidated the key assumption once held within them of an annual
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increment of growth in those resources. This perception had in turn 
produced a relatively uniform impact of:
- widening the margin of feasible change and prompting a 
greater willingness to review efficiency and service means, 
but not (apparently) services per se; which in turn has
- prompted increased dissensus within authorities by 
undermining previously existing relationships, and 
increasing the importance to actors of 'defending their 
comer*, notwithstanding evidence of a greater overall 
appreciation of financial pressures.
Equally, though, resource shortage evidently had not
- entirely overridden authorities' own predispositions towards 
'desirable' spending levels (although in some low spending 
authorities, the response was in effect one of voluntarily 
'enhancing' its impact), or prompted any other uniformity in 
timing or style of response.
From a theoretical point of view, while resource shortage has clearly 
had a profound impact, it can be seen that the only point at which it 
comes close to a determining impact is at the initial stage of 
invalidating the growth assumption. Even here, though, the 'medium' 
would be the perceptions of the actors involved. Thereafter, as those 
actors define what they take to be the appropriate response, their 
perceptions themselves become the 'determining' factor of when, where 
and how resource shortage actually has its impact on budgets.
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If we are looking for a conception of how external factors such as 
resource constraints have an impact, therefore, the foregoing would 
appear to rule out the more deterministic approaches such as 
'contingency'-based models of structure and behaviour (eg Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967; and in local authorities, eg Greenwood et al, 1977; 
1980a). In these, behaviour is treated in many ways as the resultant 
(eg Colville, 1981: pplO-11) of the various forces and factors
(contingencies) in the environment which cure taken by the observer to 
be relevant. The independent roles of the actors themselves are thus 
effectively excluded from the analysis except as implicitly 'deviant' 
cases in sane form (eg Greenwood et al, 1980a: p8; see also Rosenberg, 
1983: pp8-12 for a critique of their 'model'). The problem, as we 
have seen, is that even at the aggregated level of general political 
dispositions towards service spending, this is not in fact a realistic 
representation, because features in local authorities' environments 
cannot apparently be said to cause the behaviour of the actors 
involved in any direct way (as, indeed, Greenwood - eg 1983: pl64 - 
would now appear to recognise).
What is therefore required is a conception capable of handling the 
likelihood of actors' generalised recognition of the factor(s) in 
question, but which avoids implying cause or determination - and which 
can then cope with the resulting variety of likely responses.
Tomkins, amongst others, talks of certain 'brute facts' with which 
authorities must contend,
"... which cannot simply be re-interpreted away. 
Nevertheless, the local authority is not completely 
powerless in interpreting and reacting to these 'brute 
facts' Consequently the truth of the matter is likely to be 
that the organisation is both affected by and manages to 
affect its environment with the ability to modify or 
re-interpret any environmental pressures..." (1983b: p3).
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The concept of 'brute fact* serves our purpose here well. Resource 
shortage is a brute fact in that it was seen virtually universally by 
resource allocation actors as compelling some form of response, 
through invalidating their assumptions of an annual increment of 
growth in resources. Thereafter, though, while these responses are 
related to it and even share common features, such as increased 
review, or increased dissensus, in other ways they diverge and it 
cannot therefore be said that the brute fact has determined them.
What can be said is that the brute fact, as a key point of the context 
within which an authority operates, has made 'a response' likely at 
some stage, and that given the nature of local authorities, some 
responses were therefore more likely than others - but that is all.
The brute fact of resource shortage has in effect been allowed a 
differential impact.
This theoretical stance will be developed with the aid of further 
case-study insights into processes of choice and definition within the 
authorities observed. Now, however, we turn to the impact of 
uncertainty Which, as we shall see, is the second brute fact in 
authorities' external circumstances.
(iii) LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN CONTEXT: ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY
(iii)(a) Introduction
The second major factor of relevance in the external context of local 
authorities' operations was the uncertainty experienced by resource 
allocation actors in their day-to-day operation of the authority. 
Uncertainty is of course a topic much discussed in work on resource
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allocation and organisations in general (apart frcm Wildavsky, 1975, 
we have eg Greenwood et al, 1976; 1977; 1980a; Hinings et al, 1980; 
Van Gunsteren, 1976; Greenwood, 1983; and Child, 1974; 1975; and the 
contingency approaches of eg, Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Miller, 1981; 
1982; and, to an extent, Scholl, 1981). Howsver the concept is used 
here in a particular sense.
In the simple conventional usage of 'not being sure what will happen' 
uncertainty might exist, but can in logic have no impact if it 
is perceived by the actors involved that there is no choice of 
avoiding or anticipatory action open to them, or if it is perceived 
that such choice as there may be is of little importance. By 
definition, there will ultimately be no uncertainty as to which 
actions to perform. The existence and impact of uncertainty is 
therefore entirely bound up with perceptions of ̂ discretion and 
significance. In the context of this research the key area of 
discretion giving rise to uncertainty is that which has just been 
introduced as the brute fact of resource shortage; indeed, exploring 
the impact of uncertainty will allow us to see more of the impact of 
resource shortage. Uncertainty existed within the authorities studied 
because resource shortage was not determining in impact but merely 
profoundly influential. With the government, as we have just seen, 
attempting to influence rather than control expenditure directly, it 
was perceived that there were still choices of action and reaction to 
be made, and that these choices were of critical importance; as 
Authority A's Chief Planner put it, "I owe ny job to uncertainty. I 
am here to advise on what to do next". We shall new outline aspects 
of the impact which uncertainty appears generally to have had, again 
so that we can appreciate the specific position in which the 
authorities studied found themselves.
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(iii)(b) Uncertainty; Scope and Nature
Thanks to their resource constraints, local authorities were (and are) 
faced with significant choices in plenty, and in circumstances of 
extreme ambiguity. One source of this ambiguity is the lack of 
precision inherent in the government's own expenditure planning 
process for the economy as a whole. As Meadows & Jackson found from 
their macro-level study on behalf of the Association of District 
Councils:
"... [there is] extreme variability in the level of planned 
expenditure between one year and another, and for the same 
year in different expenditure White Papers. The various 
spending authorities have, therefore, been faced with 
continuously changing and increasingly uncertain short-term 
targets against which they must formulate their own detailed 
plans" (1983: p2).
As typified by the resort to the so-called ' star chamber', it appears 
that the national plans themselves merely record the outcome of 
political debate within the government (eg Jenkins, 1985: passim; see 
also Heclo & Wildavsky, 1981: passim), and that they are therefore not 
entirely amenable to advanced disclosure or the maintenance of 
stability. As if to emphasise the uncertainty which this generates 
for local authorities as 'consumers' of these figures, within two 
weeks of the release of the 1984/85 Public Expenditure White Paper 
(Qnnd 9143) in February 1984, the Secretary of State for the 
Environment had indicated that in his view at least, the published 
figures were not the last word on the matter (House of Cannons 
Official Report, Standing Ccnmittee G, 21st Feb 1984: Cols 570-1).
One of the most frequently cited areas of uncertainty facing local 
authorities, albeit within the context of national economic 
objectives, is the capital allocation system (eg Audit Gomnission,
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1985b: passim). While capital spending may be easier to adjust or 
curtail than revenue spending (eg Meadows & Jackson, 1983: p3), the 
incompatibility of the present year-on-year allocation system with 
capital projects having a lead-time of up to six years can be acute.
As the Chief Executive of Authority C put it:
"That's whats wrong with this year-to-year thing. You have
to have same expectation that the rules will be operated
reasonably ... Theoretically, we can' t operate on how we do 
it now, we've no assurance that we will get a HIPs [housing 
capital] allocation next year".
These problems have been exacerbated by the recent annual adjustments 
to the proportion of their capital receipts which local authorities
are allowed to apply in support of that spending, and also by the late
notice given of capital allocations, often only one or two months 
before the start of the financial year to which they relate.
However, a more pervasive source of uncertainty to emerge from the 
data here was the workings of the block grant system (eg Goldsmith, 
1984: pp66-7; Audit Ccmnission, 1984: passim; Rosenberg, 1983: p29).
As we have seen, most of local authority revenue spending is supported 
either by government grants or by rates. At a time when the latter 
have become increasingly sensitive as a source of income (see above, 
pp48-50), the former have varied widely for individual authorities, 
making it difficult for them to plan just how much pressure will have 
to be put on local rate bases. For example, each authority is told 
its provisional block grant receipt around Christmas each year, just 
three months before the financial year to which it relates. It is 
almost always unrealistic to assume that previous years' block grant 
figures are a reliable guide to the forthcoming year's. They may be 
realistic: equally though, in 1985/86 shire counties' provisional
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block grant entitlements varied though a range of rate equivalents of 
-12.Ip to + 5.8p over the 1984/85 figure.
And then we have the influence of local authorities' actual budgets. 
Two particular aspects of relevance here are known as ' clawback', and 
'holdback', the latter being the penalties Which we have already 
seen. Clawback concerns the role of the block grant system in 
reconciling the total of authorities' individual grant claims to the 
total available nationally (also known as 'close-ending'). This is 
not done pro rata, but through a process of computer iteration in 
Which the key determinants are each authority's budget, rateable 
values and 'multiplier' mechanism, and population - but in effect as 
related to those of every other local authority, within the finite 
amount of block grant available. This mechanism is exceedingly 
complex, and also works retrospectively on the basis of authorities' 
budgeted, revised and final outturn spending figures. Given the 
finite grant total, if these vary significantly for large authorities, 
the impact through clawback on other authorities may be substantial. 
Thus, when the GDC reported its £177m underspend noted earlier (p34) 
on its 1982/83 budget, it became entitled to an extra £100m in block 
grant, thereby costing shire counties and metropolitan districts up to 
£5m off their own grant receipts to pay for it (see also Audit 
Commission, 1984: pl8).
As if to add insult to the injury of the other authorities caught in 
this way, the GDC's £100m was in fact returned directly to the 
Exchequer. This is because it was still liable to holdback - penalty 
block grant reductions - for exceeding its target. While targets have 
tended to undershoot then-current rates of inflation, the penalties 
for exceeding them were shown in Table 3 (p48) to have increased
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annually in severity. Attempts by local authorities to balance these 
trends and judge the increased burden to be put on their rate bases 
have not been helped by the fact that once again, the schedule of 
penalties for each financial year has generally only been released 
with the relevant RSG Settlement, three months before it starts. The 
first exception to this rule was 1985/86 and with, for example, up to 
£9n in block grant depending on a single percentage point increase or 
decrease in spending for some shire counties, their relief at having 
eight months' notice may be imagined I
The cunulative effect of 'clawback* and 'holdback' is therefore 
repeated and severe fluctuations in grant levels, often long after the 
end of the financial year to Which they relate. While penalties may 
fairly easily be calculated by each authority for itself cnce the 
relevant penalty schedule is known, other aspects of the block grant 
system do not offer this possibility and are in any case beyond the 
control of any individual authority. The GLC case is an example, with 
the resulting grant adjustments made well over a year after the end of 
FY 1982/83. This and other factors were identified by the Audit 
Ccximission (1984: pl3) in their case study of Trafford MBC's 1982/83 
block grant receipt, which at the time of writing has so far varied 
six times over a range of £13m. A better example still comes from FY 
1981/82 where the account was finally closed in January 1985 after, in 
the case of Hampshire, TEN separate block grant adjustments over a 
range of £9.5m, or 5% of the figure first notified.
The acute uncertainty within local authorities' revenue budgeting is 
thus clear enough, and at the time of the research would have included 
the added factor of the relative 'newness' of the block grant system.
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It is perhaps little voider that the Treasurer of Authority A felt 
moved to complain that:
"You can look at the way the government is viewing pay 
claims and come to seme consideration ... its not all that 
difficult to came to sane percentage around the right area 
and the fact that you might be one or two per cent out 
either way is not going to throw out any forecast you are 
making of the total rate picture. The rate support grant is 
a much more serious imponderable though. You don't know 
where the hell you cire. If the Secretary of State allowed 
the system to operate we could probably do a fair guess of 
what we would get next year, but you get clawback and 
targets and penalties and all the bit, and you don't know 
what he's going to cane up with next".
It is suggested that financial uncertainty represented the second 
major brute fact within local authorities' external environments.
As we shall now see frcm the data, it was taken by the authorities 
studied to carpel some form of response, although it is of the essence 
of uncertainty that there is some area of discretion perceived as to 
what that response should be. Otherwise, there would be no 
uncertainty as to 'what to do next'. Two particular strands in the 
responses to uncertainty to emerge consistently from the data were the 
creation or retention of 'slack' resources, and the use of the budget 
base as a 'holding' position pending further information on events. 
Both responses were also of course relevant in the context of the 
brute fact of resource shortage, through the government's attempts to 
influence rather than control expenditure, which generated the 
uncertainty observed. However, we shall now see in introducing these 
approaches that their applications and thus their implications in each 
authority depended upon the tactical perceptions and definitions of 
the actors concerned. Once again, therefore, we shall see that whilst 
the brute facts set the context, they cure not the determining feature.
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(iii)(c) Responses to Uncertainty: The Accumulation of Slack
Resources at a time of Resource Shortage
'Slack' is the accumulation or retention of resources in excess of 
expenditure specifically anticipated or strictly thought to be 
necessary (although it would exclude a certain level of working 
balances set aside to meet ad hoc contingencies as they arise during 
the year). In the authorities studied, the motive for creating slack 
was always a desire to reduce the impact of uncertainty by making it 
matter less what actually transpired: it represented for each actor 
the provision of 'emergency' reserves. Given the brute fact of 
resource constraint, the implication of continuing levels of slack is 
that the ad hoc demands of immediate survival cure sufficient reason to 
divert scarce resources away from the provision of services 
themselves, although in the authorities studied these implicit 
priorities were not observed to be directly weighed against each 
other. Levels of slack nationally cure difficult to judge, by its very 
nature and because the distinction between 'slack' and 'legitimate' 
spending may be a matter of opinion. Thus, Rosenberg (1983: p32) notes 
that the more visible forms of slack may if carried to excess incur 
the displeasure of the District Auditor. However, although it is not 
undisputed, the Audit Commission* s estimate of what is in effect one 
form of visible slack (increased levels of balances) in response to 
uncertainty, at £400m per year (1984: p7), would imply that the 
District Auditor in this context is not a very pressing constraint. 
This is of course leaving aside the less visible forms of slack 
altogether.
Howsver, to begin with perhaps the most straightforward use of slack, 
one might point to the 'fat' or 'padding* in service estimates as a
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cushion against unforeseen demands (eg Wildavsky, 1979: pp22-3; Jones 
& Pendlebury, 1984: p35). A Chief Officer in Authority B provided an 
indirect illustration:
"I have instigated certain savings which others came in on 
later on, which annoyed me because I reckon they could have 
made them earlier. I implemented them twelve months ago and 
declared them, although I could have played their game and 
sat on them" (Chief Officer, Authority B).
In their attempts to generate slack, service departments' main 
obstacle was the Treasury scrutiny in the time-honoured 'guardian v. 
advocate' manner (eg Lars son, 1982: p2? Jons son, 1982: p65; Wildavsky, 
eg 1979a: ppl8-62; Heclo & Wildavsky 1981: pp42-3). Thus, Authority 
B's Chief Accountant provided an instance of his 'guardianship':
"The chief officers were told to produce reductions which 
came to their share ... Now, we' ve got problems where the 
figures are not cn. One thing was the ... News at a £10,500 
reduction. But what that didn't take into account was same 
£3,000 in advertising income, so that the net cut is only 
£8,000 or so. There have been several examples of that" 
(Chief Accountant, Authority B).
To this extent, the picture presented was quite clear and even 
'orthodox'. However, the 'guardian v advocate' conception began to 
break down when Treasury staff themselves were observed to permit 
service departments a certain level of slack as part of their own 
response to uncertainty:
"We've had an establishment and there is an annual budget 
based on that. Its fair to say that until now the budget 
was prepared year by year on establishment, not people in 
posts ... There's no harm to my mind in having a very thin 
layer of fat so long as you are prepared to dig into it from 
time to time. Alright, its a very pragmatic attitude, but 
Christ, one's got to be pragmatic" (Deputy Treasurer, 
Authority A).
Thus, Treasury staff also hoped to maintain ' reserves' of slack 
resources which could be called upon if needed to produce any level of
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reduction suddenly becoming necessary.
Leaving aside their acquiescence in service departments' 'fat' or 
'padding*, though, it also emerged that Treasury staff actually 
pursued the accumulation of slack in other forms for themselves. 
Thus, in Authority A, much as Wildavsky (1975: pl41) predicted for 
budgeting in "poor and uncertain" circumstances, the Treasurer 
outlined how he acquired his slack both by over-budgeting for 
anticipated expenditure and under-budgeting for anticipated income.
"In a different climate, so to speak, we'd have left working 
balances at £2m, [but] we allowed it to come up to £3m.
That gave us £lm. When we did the inflation, again there 
were uncertainties . •. Miners, the water authorities, 
they've all been breaking Mrs Thatcher's 6%, so we did it at 
6% and in the end I put in £^m as a cushion against the 
forecast being wrong. That made it £l^[m]. I put in 
another £*311 in revcons* which may not be used that way 
unless the Council goes for a bigger capital programme than 
they appear to be anticipating. Then, when we did the grant 
our first go was £14.8[m] so I said 'There's bound to be 
sane clawback or other, lets knock a bit off' so I reduced 
it to £14.3[m]. In the event our grant claim went in at 
£15m and clawback reduced it to £14.8[m]. Thats another £?gn 
to the good as our budget says £14.3[m]".
While the political sensitivity of rates issues is a major factor in 
the brute fact of resource constraints, it is clearly not overriding 1 
By the means outlined Authority A's Treasurer either 'salted away' 
sums or concealed income totalling £2%n in a revenue budget of just 
£30m. A similar picture emerged from Authority B with even larger 
sums (although relative to a larger budget):
"The Council could absorb a £4m grant loss without too much 
trouble, which is to say I made the budget anticipate a 
certain amount of penalty ... by contingencies and not 
allowing for savings. We have to work in mysterious ways 
because if it were known that we had something that could 
come out [Members] might not put the rents up or something 
like that" (Treasurer, Authority B).
(* Revenue Contributions to Capital Outlay (RCOO)).
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Within the constraints imposed by the brute fact of resource shortage, 
therefore, it emerged that both Treasury and spending department staff 
were prepared at times to defend or actively acquire slack resources. 
In sane respects, given that both groups were after all operating 
within the same financial constraints and uncertainties, this is not 
perhaps surprising. In other respects it is more striking, part­
icularly because it sits so uneasily with the 'guardian v. advocates' 
dichotomy often used to characterise Treasury-departmental inter­
actions. This begins to suggest that the dichotomy itself is capable 
of being overextended (cf also Rosenberg & Tomkins, 1983: p28), and 
further evidence will confirm this in due course. However, frcm a 
closer inspection of the data it also emerged that there was a part­
icular pattern to the applicability of 'guardians' and 'advocates', in 
that it was necessary to distinguish between 'above the line' current 
spending on goods and services largely by service departments; and 
'below the line' spending on financial items such as debt charges,
R000, balances, and also interest receipts, which were largely admin­
istered by the Treasurer' s Department.
With 'above the line' spending, it appeared that so-called guardians 
and advocates in fact came rather closer to their archetypes in their 
respective attitudes to slack. Spending departments, as we saw, 
padded their estimates while Treasury staff, also prompted by the 
demands on them of resource shortage, were anxious to review spending 
and reduce the level of padding. Certainly, there were seme 
exceptions to this tendency, notably where Treasury staff were 
observed above to acquiesce in a limited level of padding in service 
spending for reasons of their own handling of uncertainty or, as we 
shall see later where the Treasury acted as its own 'advocate' for its 
projects involving above the line spending (see also Rosenberg, 1982:
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ppl7-19; 1983: p34-5). Nevertheless, the point still stands: if the 
'guardian v. advocate' dichotomy had any relevance at all to the 
observed accumulation of slack resources, it was on ’above the line' 
spending.
On 'below the line1 spending, by contrast, we saw that Treasury staff 
in each of the authorities studied sought much more directly and 
consistently to build slack into the authority-wide items which were 
in effect 'their' budget heads, for which they were responsible. This 
included under-budgeting for grant income, in the knowledge that grant 
'surplus' to budgeted levels would swell 'below the line' resources.
To this extent the behaviour of Treasury 'guardians' had little to 
distinguish it from that of spending 'advocates' elsewhere in the 
budget process. Indeed, we shall see that the extra sums involved in 
Treasury slack were often rather larger than anything they ultimately 
saved in their role as 'guardians' by scrutinising service spending. 
With the 'advocates' out-advocated by the 'guardians' on some 
occasions, the guardianship role was then in fact filled by leading 
Members, mindful of the demands of balancing their budgets with the 
political pressures from an increased load on local rent- and 
rate-bases.
It might be argued that the accumulation of slack, whoever it is by, 
presents a basic contradiction. On the one hand we have attempts to 
economise in response to the brute fact of resource shortage, whether 
or not in the more confrontational 'guardians v. advocates' manner.
On the other hand though, in response to the brute fact of uncertainty 
we have here attempts by both parties to accumulate as slack 
additional resources to those which were strictly 'needed' to maintain
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services, or (implicitly at least) to divert resources away fran 
actual service provision to create slack in the first instance. To 
sane extent, this impression is justified: in many ways the 
perceptions and actions prompted by the brute facts of resource 
shortage and uncertainty are indeed contradictory, notwithstanding the 
close relationship between the brute facts themselves (see also 
Wildavsky's account of budgeting in "poor and uncertain" external 
circumstances, 1975: ppl36-188). There is a discernible theme, 
however. Within the general recognition arising from the invalidation 
of the growth assumption that a level of econcmising is necessary, we 
shall see that there appeared to be a desire by the actors observed to 
control the implications for themselves of uncertain events and of any 
response taken to be necessary (cf Greenwood, 1983: pl57). The 
accumulation of padding or slack was one means to this end, through 
its ability to make it less important what actually transpired 
externally.
It was around this theme that the highly complex set of interactions 
between actors perceiving and reacting to the two brute facts of 
resource constraint and uncertainty took place. The range of 
permutations revealed by the data was considerable. Sometimes, the 
need to economise was perceived to be paramount by all actors involved 
and to this extent there was a general unity of purpose, if only, as 
we have just seen, because service departments wished to retain 
control of where any necessary cuts were to be made. In other areas 
of the budget or at other times, though, where it was perceived that 
the brute fact of resource constraint did still leave room for choice, 
both guardians and advocates responded in similar ways to uncertainty 
by amassing padding or slack resources 'above' or 'below' the line. 
Much depended here on the Treasury* s view of what it was expedient
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to tolerate. In some areas of the budget 'above the line', a certain 
level of padding was felt by Treasury staff to be pragmatic, in which 
case any review which took place was presumably designed as much to 
'know what was there* as to exact actual reductions in spending. In 
other areas 'above the line' or at other times, however, the relative 
importance of economising and uncertainty avoidance was not agreed 
within the authority, in which case the picture was one of Treasury 
'guardians' exerting pressure on spending department 'advocates' to 
economise, whether through the removal of padding or deeper cuts. 
Finally, the Treasury also had a view of what was expedient in its own 
'below the line* spending, and would if necessary initiate reductions 
in these areas as well. It should be emphasised that none of these 
possibilities were mutually exclusive within any single authority or 
even at any one time, but that they depended on the defined promptings 
of the 'brute facts' involved.
Further examples of the use of slack resources will be given in due 
course, but the position as we have seen it so far may now be 
summarised. Already, we have clearly come seme way from any directly 
determining influence of uncertainty (and resource shortage) as, for 
example, would be implied by viewing these within a framework of 
action resulting from environmental 'contingencies'. As brute facts, 
uncertainty and resource shortage formed the context within which 
slack was consistently accumulated, but they cannot of themselves 
explain how and to what extent slack occurred where it did. Of 
course, ultimately if resource constraints were severe enough it seems 
likely that levels of slack would decrease (eg Levine et al, 1981: 
p212; Schick, 1983: p22) as areas of choice and discretion were also 
perceived to decrease - but in that event there would by definition be 
less uncertainty to which slack would have been the response. Where
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there is uncertainty, as in the authorities studied, it is because the 
brute fact of resource shortage was less than determining and was 
perceived to have left areas of discretion. Once again, therefore, if 
we cure to explain how this discretion was used, and if we cure to 
explain how resource allocation processes operate to 'generate' slack, 
our attention is turned to the perceptions and interactions of the 
actors involved. This, though, is to jimp ahead somewhat. The next 
step is to examine the second of the two responses to uncertainty bo 
emerge consistently from the data, namely the use of the budget base.
(iii)(d) Responses to Uncertainty: The Budget Base as a 'Holding* 
Position
A budget is an expression of what it is intended should happen in the 
coming year (Wildavsky, 1979a: pi) yet, as we have seen, the 
constraints of the process are such that budgets in local authorities 
must largely be made without knowing what will happen to the finances 
on which they rest (eg Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: p63). The use of 
the budget base as a 'holding' position pending better knowledge of 
external events was a consistently observed response to the problems 
which this created.
The budget base is the re-priced and updated agglomeration of previous 
spending 'rolled forward' into the present year, and as such is the 
most important single concept within the incremental syndrome. It 
will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the syndrome posits as one set of 
reasons for having a budget base the cognitive limits of budgetary 
actors, which mean that a large area of existing activity will of 
necessity be taken for granted and left unreviewed, in effect because
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it is simply asking too much of people to expect otherwise. However, 
as a description of the constraints upon budgetary actors, we have 
seen that the focus of the cognitive argument is predominantly upon 
the internal problems of budgeting arising from the sheer complexity 
of the task itself (eg Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: pp56-7? Wildavsky, 
1979a: pp8-18). Here, though, the observed use of the budget base as 
a 'holding' position pending the impact of uncertain events owss less 
to the internal complexities of budgeting than to what cannot be known 
about what will happen externally to those allocating resources. 
Therefore, while this is still in its broadest sense an observation 
about the cognitive (ie as opposed to the other strand of incremental 
descriptions of resource allocation, namely the political) features of 
local authority life, it is of a different nature to the 'main' thrust 
of the overall cognitive limits argument. As such, it is relatively 
unusual. Perhaps its closest counterpart is the normative argunent 
discussed by Jones & Pendlebury (1984: p57) that, given our difficulty 
in foreseeing those external events, incremental change is therefore 
'best'. The difference here, though, is that once the base had been 
constructed in the authorities observed as the 'holding' position, and 
once more was known of external events, we shall see that change of 
any magnitude could in theory have resulted if events were perceived 
to allow it. *
Leaving aside whether it would be cognitively or politically feasible, 
budgeting without a base each year would ordinarily involve 
anticipating two sets of unknowns. As well as external events such as 
block grant levels, there would also be the scale and shape of the 
authority's set of activities in the process of being constructed. 
Taking existing activities - the base, in this case in the form of a 
'standstill' parameter for the construction of estimates - obviously
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allows this second area of uncertainty to be avoided. Subject to the 
final outturn for the base year, it allowed the actors observed to 
begin budgeting from the known or knowable position of what their 
authorities already did. However, in so doing, these actors then also 
enabled themselves to negotiate the first area of uncertainty, namely 
events external to their activities. In using the base they provided 
themselves with a criterion or reference point for evaluating these 
events as they occured, in terms of their implications for this known 
set of activities.
The data suggested that the use of the base in this way was routine 
amongst the officers of the authorities studied, but that in each case 
the implications differed because it occurred under different 
perceptions of external events. Authority B in the first year of the 
research provided the most straightforward example. Thus, the Chief 
Accountant noted how:
"Block grant is in one sense irrelevant in that the budget 
is only what you need to finance your services. We've got 
to have our basic spend prepared so we can see what the 
grant looks like, but you could quite easily say, 'that's 
what we want for services so we'll rate for it and to hell 
with block grant'. Having worked that out then you've got 
the question of financing it ...".
Accordingly, Authority B's budget base - its 'spend' in the Chief 
Accountant's terminology - was drawn up as the 'holding' position 
until what he termed 'the rules of the game' became known:
"We got round to closing the accounts by the end of June, 
the earliest ever ... Having balanced earlier we could 
obviously start [the new budget] earlier ... You can 
prepare your budget more or less any time and the service 
estimates cure not going to change a lot. What will change 
is the contingency and so on, and you can be fiddling around 
with that sort of thing right up until the rate meeting" 
(Chief Accountant).
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Thus, with the outturn figure for the previous year fixed (and updated 
by the present year's estimates of oomnitments, although the quote 
does rot show this), the budget base was fixed. At this point, the 
political parameters framing the overall budget were fed in and 
'growth' items added to this base where these were decided upon. 
External events such as the new year's RSG Settlement were then 
assimilated as they occurred by manipulation of the estimates for the 
contingency fund and other reserves (and also, as we saw earlier on 
p75, by the accumulation of sufficient hidden slack to allow the 
Treasury to cover any grant penalties of up to £4m) to derive the 
required rate level to fund the overall budget. (For further details 
of the actual budget cycles in Authorities A and B, see pp97-9, 
below.) The role of the budget base underlying this process, both for 
officers and Members, is clearly visible. It should also be stressed 
that if for example the RSG Settlement had proved worse than 
anticipated, the 'growth' items in the budget could have been stripped 
off the base to allow this to become the reference point for deciding 
what further action was necessary, be this a standstill budget or 
actual cuts (see also Greenwood, 1983: pl53).
Turning now to Authority A, a standstill budget also came about, in 
the same year as the above observations from Authority B, but from a 
rather different set of perceptions involving even more clearly the 
use of the base as a 'holding' position. Authority A was a rather 
lower spender in relation to its target (but still spending above it), 
which meant that the relative inpact of additional or reduced block 
grant penalties - and thus the significance of the RSG Settlement 
itself - was perceived politically to be much greater. This was 
despite the success observed above (p75) of Authority A ’s Treasurer in 
accumulating slack resources. The result was that the original
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'holding' position around the budget base passed from the officer 
arena into a political 'standstill' budget parameter in its own right.
The Deputy Treasurer articulated the perception beginning this chain 
of events. Such was the perceived significance of, and thus 
uncertainty around grant levels, that
"... given the grant situation, we have got to go on a 
standstill. Certainly for the present it cannot be 
countenanced to look at anything else ..."
The officer-level work of rolling forward the budget base was 
accordingly carried out car this standstill basis. The perception was 
then put by the Treasurer to Authority A's Leader. Whereas at this 
stage Authority B had in fact agreed some growth from its base budget, 
the Leader apparently balanced his views of the uncertainties around 
the grant system and the political demands of the situation as 
follows:
"We said, 'we den't know what's going to happen next year 
...' Hie guideline was going to be that Ocmuittees should 
produce lists of things they would like to do, given the 
resources ... but because of the uncertainty on the revenue 
side what we said was, 'do it on a standstill'. That 
doesn't always ... end up at a standstill, when we get it 
all together Resources [Caimittee] might even have to say, 
'it can't be a standstill, it'll have to be a minus', and 
then the agonising would start, but we're not in a position 
to say that at the moment. I've spoken to the Leader, when 
we got half-way through one set of guidelines and suddenly 
felt we couldn't go along that road and raise hopes and all 
the rest of it. He said, 'You'd better go away and write a 
standstill ... '" (Treasurer).
Accordingly, as the outcome of the political balance struck between 
raising hopes and the uncertainties inherent in the situation, the 
October budget guideline reoaimendations from the Treasurer (but 
endorsed by the Leader) were framed as follows:
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"In the circumstances, the [Resources] Cbranittee will 
realise that a final decision about the level of rates and 
spending cannot be taken until later. In the meantime, 
however, it is suggested that the guidelines set out will 
produce an information base on which the Comnittee can 
consider the financial options.
"(i) Draft estimates to be on a strictly 'standstill' basis
II
• • •
The 'holding' role of the base, allowing uncertain events to be 
awaited from a position of known strengths and weaknesses (the 
'information base') may be seen. Among the strengths, of course, were 
the slack resources which we have seen Authority A's Treasurer was 
able to accumulate in the base 'above the line' and in the financing 
items 'below the line', although these clearly did not entirely remove 
the perceived uncertainty of the situation.
However, the RSG Settlement for the year in question was particularly 
late, with the result that the "final decisions" referred to in the 
guidelines report just cited were never in fact taken in the form then 
envisaged. The standstill passed from being an essentially interim 
measure to being the channel into which Members' thinking about the 
budget was forced until it was perceived to be too late to change 
course. In this, though, it was helped by a factor entirely uncon 
nected with the brute fact of uncertainty itself, namely the 
autocratic style of political leadership in Authority A. In effect, 
the authority found itself with little option but to accept the 
Leader1s definitions of external events and the required action (cf 
Green 1980: p36). One dissident backbencher gave the view from his 
position:
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"The first budget is always drawn up on a standstill, which 
is a simplification we could talk about if we got the 
opportunity, but we never do. The directive then went out 
to all Comnittees to prepare their estimates on the 
standstill basis, and that virtually became the budget, 
except for the last-minute fiddling around. That's the way 
it works. To a certain extent that's fair enough at the 
moment, they're under financial pressure but ... by taking 
the attitude they do they prevent other people having any 
involvement and by default they take the decision that 'this 
is all we can do, same as last year'".
The Deputy Treasurer later indirectly corroborated these ccmnents:
"The budget went through on a standstill and the adjustments 
were made centrally, afterwards ... When we go [back] to 
Ccnrnittee we have the drafts ready printed and if there's 
too many alterations we're buggered when we go back to the 
printers".
Politically reinforced in this way, the standstill parameter played 
its role in the negotiation of uncertainty right up to the 
rate-making:
"The 6% [rate rise] emerged fairly late on, actually. We 
had this terrible dithering on what the grant was going to 
be. We said a standstill, but if the RSG had been 
disastrous there would have been seme agonising about 
whether to press cn with it ... The rate rise emerged fran 
a series of options about what course the RSG took - 'what 
do we do if it's this much, or this much, or this much?' 
Eventually we got a likely RSG figure and that along with 
the standstill figure produced the 6%" (Treasurer).
As in Authority B, it may be seen that the budget base was a major 
feature of Authority A's response to the brute fact of uncertainty. 
However, aided by features of the political configuration in Authority 
A, the use of the base went rather beyond what we saw in Authority B. 
Because of the greater relative political significance of grant issues 
arising from Authority A's spending level closer to its target, and 
thus the greater perceived level of uncertainty surrounding grant 
outcomes - the base was not merely an officer-level device or even the 
'starting' point to which an increment of growth was then added: it
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survived as the standstill parameter framing the budget which was 
eventually enacted.
We may now summarise the uses made of the budget base. Once again, we 
have come a long way from the brute fact of uncertainty itself. Both 
budgets studied here were in the same financial year operating under 
the same constraint of late notification of grant levels, yet, while 
the use of the budget base in seme way to negotiate uncertainty was 
consistent, the actual role it was made to play by the actors involved 
varied greatly between the authorities. We saw that in each case, 
this role was governed by a series of political perceptions.
Authority B, as a higher spender by political inclination, perceived 
the impact of additions or decreases in penalties as relatively less 
severe:
"A lot of councils aren't being penalised ... and want to 
still be just under their target or whatever, so they need 
that figure before they can work out what they are going to 
spend. As it is, we're so far above target ws might as well 
work out what we want to do, then take account of the rules 
of the game" (Chief Accountant).
Authority A was much more like one of the authorities referred to by 
the Chief Accountant (although it was actually paying a certain level 
of grant penalty). A greater perceived significance of grant penalty 
levels - and thus the uncertainty experienced - was a function of its 
own political predisposition towards more cautious spending, but in 
this case also reinforced by the entirely separate matter of the 
autocratic style of leadership practised. It is therefore concluded 
once again that while the brute fact of uncertainty provided the 
context for the use of the budget base in each authority, the actual 
impact of this tactic on resource allocation in each authority was not 
determined by the external ' contingency' of uncertainty, but arose
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from the perceptions of those actually allocating the resources in 
uncertain circumstances.
(iv) THE BRUTE FACTS IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES' CONTEXT: OVERVIEW
We have seen that for all their undoubted importance, the two key 
factors in the external circumstances of the authorities studied - 
resource constraints and uncertainty - did not determine action or 
outcomes. Indeed, uncertainty existed because the government's 
attempts to influence, rather than control, expenditure meant that 
resource constraints were in effect less than determining. Local 
authorities retained substantial discretion as to their actual 
spending levels (and objectives) and it was in exercising this 
discretion that the observed uncertainties arose. Accordingly, 
conceptions of organisational responses such as contingency models 
where action is seen as the direct caused, outcomes of external factors 
do not appear to be realistic or appropriate. It was suggested that 
resource shortage and uncertainty were in Tomkins' (1983: p3) and 
others' terminology "brute facts". They set the context within which 
activity took place, and were undoubtedly 'taken account of' by the 
actors involved, often in ways that were consistent between 
authorities, but which left sufficient scope for variation such that 
they could not be said to determine that activity.
Thus, a greater willingness to review service means and efficiency, 
but not the justification of services per se, and the greater level of 
dissensus within authorities were consistent responses to the brute 
fact of resource constraint; the accumulation of slack resources and
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the use of the budget base as a 'holding' position were consistent 
responses to uncertainty. However, levels of expenditure vary 
substantially between authorities, and as we shall see so did the 
forms of review and dissensus in the authorities studied, in response 
to resource shortage. Equally, the use of slack was often directly in 
the face of resource shortage and it also varied within and between 
the authorities studied, as did the role which the budget base was 
made to play in response to uncertainty. In each case these areas of 
variation were attributable to highly complex interactions around the 
brute facts by the actors observed actually allocating resources, with 
the result that, through the medium of those actors, the actual 
contingent impact of the brute facts on outcomes was itself 
effectively a variable (cf also Tomkins, 1983: p62).
In a nutshell, these cure the features with which incremental 
conceptions of resource allocation must live. They must explain how 
the observed variations in both processes and outcomes (eg Wanat,
1974: pl221) actually arise. At the same time they must acobnroodate 
the observed consistencies within these processes, and also the role 
of the perceptions of the actors involved in fixing the precise impact 
of external events within each authority. With these criteria in mind 
we now turn to examine the incremental syndrome itself. In many ways, 
the omens cire not promising - for example, we already have one 
explanation for the presence of the budget base capable of standing 
apart from those usually advanced, and we have seen that review of 
budget bases in general has deepened. We are also trying to explain 
variations in processes and outcomes when, in its cognitive limits 
variant at least, the logical inpact of incremental processes would be 
uniformity and marginal change (eg Danziger, 1978: pi44). In many 
ways, these misgivings will now be seen to be well-founded.
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PART II. COGNITIVE FACTORS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
CHAPTER 4: INCREMENTTALISM AND COGNITIVE LIMITS
(i) INTRODUCTION
Echoing, eg, Bailey & O'Connor (1975: p65), Danziger (1978: pl25) 
notes of incrementalism that:
"It is useful to distinguish between two streams of 
reasoning which cure often fused into a single explanation. 
The first concerns the nature of the budget and the limits 
of cognitive capacity; the second deals with the content of 
budgetary allocations relative to matters of realpolitik".
There is of course an element of arbitrariness in this division. 
'Politics', in a sense, occurs because there are seldom answers which 
are universally and obviously 'right', and still less is there an 
agreed overview of an organisation's - particularly a local 
authority's - range of activities. People are able to offer only 
partial answers or solutions as their 'points of view', and it becomes 
necessary to reconcile these. To this extent, politics is of itself a 
'cognitive limits' phenomenon: indeed, we shall see in Chapters 6 and 
7, below, how actors in the authorities studied actually used 
political interactions with each other to derive an answer where none 
- or several - were inmediately apparent. Nevertheless, following 
Danziger, the two strands are separated here, thereby giving greater 
ease of coverage and also allowing us to see important areas of 
inconsistency between them. Reflecting the sequence in which the 
writer1 s attention was engaged by the emergent themes in the data (see 
Introduction and Appendix), it is the first strand, cognitive limits, 
which concerns us here.
As we saw briefly in Chapter 1, an emphasis on the cognitive limits of
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policy and resource allocation actors is an emphasis on how they cope 
with the physical and intellectual denands of budgeting. It is held 
that actors cure hindered by their cognitive limitations relative to 
the sheer magnitude of making and reviewing a budget, particularly 
were they to attempt this from scratch (Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: 
pp56-7). It is also held to be impossible to decide objectively 
between competing service priorities (eg Wildavsky, 1975: p318? see 
also Self, 1975: pl53), let alone form an overview of an authority's 
entire set of priorities (eg Wildavsky, 1979a: ppl5, 62).
Accordingly, rather than attempt to optimise, consciously or 
unconsciously and by a variety of means, the actors involved 
'satisfice* (see below).
It has to be said irrmediately that it is difficult to see how this 
cognitive argument may usefully be said to apply to - ie influence - 
resource allocation outcomes. It is an argument primarily about the 
nature of resource allocation processes rather than their content (eg 
Danziger, 1978: p204), and hence does not directly address the issue 
of outcomes at all, except to specify that these will not be more 
than marginally different from their predecessors. This does not sit 
at all easily with the variations in outcomes between authorities 
which we have already observed on pp58-63: while these variations have 
arisen over time, and perhaps even in incremental stages, the 
cognitive argunent nevertheless does not explain how they have come 
about, and how different trends have emerged in different (though 
similar) authorities. Danziger (and others) make the point as a 
criticism of the cognitive argument, but leaving this aside for now, 
it is therefore with the ability of the cognitive arguments to explain 
the nature of resource allocation processes that this chapter is 
overwhelmingly concerned. Here, if the cognitive argunent is to be of
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value, it is to the various allegedly satisficing techniques actually 
in use that we must look. Of course, a great many actions or features 
of resource allocation could be made part of a satisficing strategy, 
whether consciously or not, or they could themselves be satisficed. 
Howsver, the data from the authorities studied provided evidence of a 
number of features specifically cited in work on resource allocation, 
and it is on these that we concentrate here.
Thus, rather than the rational pursuit of optimised and explicitly 
thought out objectives, it is held by incrementalists that the purpose 
of action is in effect simply to satisfy the 'criteria of the 
moment*. The aim is to pick the first available course of action 
which allows one to 'get by', or as Wildavsky (1979a: pll3) puts it, 
to "avoid trouble" or "make the best of it", and there is therefore 
scope only for "... remedial rather than Utopian objectives"
(Archibald, 1970: p76). In many ways, from what we have just seen the 
creation or retention of slack resources and the use of the budget 
base as a 'holding' position pending better knowledge of outcomes also 
fit into this category, in that they are not ideal practice but allow 
those allocating resources to 'get by' in the face of uncertainty 
which would otherwise be disabling. However, (and this underlines its 
inability to explain the variation in outcomes observed in the 
previous chapter), the cognitive strand of incrementalism is concerned 
not so much with external events, as with the internal constraints on 
resource allocation. Thus, in the face of the size and complexity of 
their tasks, it emerged from the data that resource allocation actors 
appeared to satisfice either by using heuristics (aids to 
calculation), or by using other devices to restrict the range of 
options to be considered and work needing to be done. These arose in 
the following areas.
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Devices for dealing with the physical size of workload, or with the
body of knowledge required to perform a function. In effect, these 
would have been responses to the physical scale of the cognitive 
requirements of allocating resources, and in the authorities studied 
they included:
- factoring problems over time, by sequential or serial 
'bit-by-bit' approaches rather than a 'once and for all' 
application of effort (see, eg Wildavsky, 1979a: ppll-12,
60; Danziger, 1978: pl27);
- factoring problems through the organisation by using the 
hierarchy and the division of labour to permit selected gaps 
in one's own knowledge (see, eg Argyris, 1977: ppll5-117).
It might also be noted that Wildavsky (eg 1983: p34) would 
see pluralist interactions between actors as achieving the 
same result, although this raises separate political issues 
and is discussed later.
Devices for dealing with value decisions. In effect these would have 
been responses to the nature of cognitive requirements - to the 
intellectual demands of assessing and comparing often very different 
priorities or levels of activity - if only by avoiding having to do 
so. In the authorities studied they included:
' line-item' budgeting, focusing on budgetary detail thereby 
losing the priorities embodied in that detail (eg Jones & 
Pendlebury, 1984: pp51-6; Danziger, 1978: pl83; Wildavsky, 
1979a: pp59, 135, 221).
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The use of suras of money (eg Danziger, 1978: pl83) and 
measurements of percentage change, reified as indicators of 
service levels, both as a heuristic to make budgeting itself 
easier and to allcw a 'cannon currency' between differing 
services so that debate on resource allocation may actually 
take place.
The use of the budget base, embracing aspects of the above as a 
response to problems both of the scale and of the nature of the 
cognitive requirements of allocating resources. Here, we cane to the 
heart of the 'classic* incremental view. Within the cognitive strand 
of incremental ism it is held that areas of the budget pass each year 
as an unreviewed, taken-for-granted 'runp' of expenditure, on the 
tacit or explicit understanding that the priorities it embodies 
continue to remain valid. Attention may then be focused on the 
greatly narrowed range of options at the margin rather than on the 
entire area of the budget (see, eg, Schick, 1983: p3; Danziger, 1978: 
pl9; Gershuny, 1981: pl96; Haynes, 1980: pl04? Wildavsky, 1979a: 
ppll-14, 62, passim? Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: pp56-7).
There is a certain amount of overlap between these categories: thus, 
line-item budgeting might conceivably also be a simple cognitive 
'short cut' to oope with problems of workload, and sequential 
approaches to problems could also quite conceivably be employed to 
avoid having to make explicit or make at all the value decisions 
underlying them. However, the categories used here will be seen to be 
the most helpful in presenting what actually emerged from the data.
Further, although these categories are described above for convenience 
as 'devices' or 'responses' to the cognitive problems of allocating
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resources, it is important to remember that relatively few writers if 
any (Danziger, 1978 is a notable exception) have sought to show that 
the behaviour in question is explicitly related to these cognitive 
problems. Rather, the connections are advanced more in the nature of 
'plausible hypotheses' put on behaviour on the basis that it appears 
to play a particular cognitive role. Until these connections are 
established as a matter of fact, therefore, there remains the risk 
that the supposed cognitive role is no more than an external 
imposition. Fran the point of view of the actors involved, of course, 
the role might in any case be unrealised or unspecified - but worse, 
it might not actually exist, in which case we would not be explaining 
the resource allocation processes observed but merely putting our own 
construction upon them.
As we shall new see, it would in fact have been possible apparently to 
'verify' these plausible 'hypotheses' (although it should be stressed 
that they were not of course 'tested' as such during the research, and 
thus in no way structured the actual collection of data), from the 
behaviour observed in Authorities A and B. The problem was, though, 
that they frequently did not stand up to a more detailed examination 
of the data, or that there were other equally plausible explanations 
which emerged from the data at the time, and which also fitted the 
observations. While it is not disputed that there must ultimately be 
some upper limit on human cognitive abilities, this suggests at the 
very least that the 'cognitive connection' is in need of further 
investigation. To this end, we now examine in turn each of the three 
areas outlined above, showing first the apparent support for the 
'hypothesis' and then the evidence which emerged from the data causing 
doubt to be cast on them.
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(ii) COGNITIVE PROBLEMS OF SCALE
(ii)(a) Plausible Hypotheses
Incrementalisra bolds, in effect, that budgetary actors would in an 
ideal world know more about their organisations' internal activities 
than it is in fact humanly possible to know. Accordingly, it is 
argued that they adopt certain techniques for making their workloads 
bearable to allow themselves to 'get by'. The apparent obviousness of 
such a statement is in many ways overvfoelming, and predictably enough 
many of the actors studied displayed their own particular responses to 
the problem:
"At the time of the budget sane of us are here until 
11 o'clock at night".
"I throw away as much as possible".
"You get more aware of the sort of things you are looking 
for".
"It canes back to a concept I remember John Stewart saying 
at INLOGOV, 'If a job's worth doing, it's worth doing badly
• II 
• • • •
"I speed-read, that's very useful, and I've got a good 
memory".
"It's a matter of having set criteria of what you are going 
to deal with".
"I get to know each Caimittee' s reaction and therefore I 
gauge the amount of mugging up I do beforehand".
More specifically though, we saw in the introduction to this chapter 
that there were two particular aspects which, following apparent 
corroboration by other writers such as Wildavaky, (1979a: ppll-12), 
might plausibly be 'hypothesised' from the data as responses to 
cognitive problems of scale. The first of these was introduced as the 
factoring of problems through time, with repeated and sequential
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initiatives in pursuit of a particular problem rather than a 'once and 
for all' application of effort. Thus, in Authority A, there were 
clearly defined perceptions that one 'had a first stab' at solving any 
large-scale organisational problem, rather than trying to solve it in 
one effort:
"Like anything else, it's one step at a time" (Assistant 
Treasurer).
"Last year's budget was a first stab at our new format. We 
used to do a subjective split on IPFA recommended headings, 
but the government have been pushing for unit costs so we 
tried it. While being far from perfect, I mean, we wouldn't 
pretend they were ideal, at least they were a start ... sane 
were good, sane were a bit nebulous as cost centres. Sane 
items are there because in the time we had available we 
couldn't think of anything else. Next year they won't be" 
(Chief Accountant).
"You always have a pecking order and the really bloody 
difficult bits you don't go at first, so your policy [is 
one] of building up a process ..." (Planner).
Similarly, in Authority B, an experiment with what was labelled 
'zero-base budgeting* (of which more later) was initiated, in the 
words of the Chief Accountant, "on a suck-it-and-see basis" involving 
at first just two budget codes, partly to gain experience for a wider 
application.
On a slightly different note, a very good example of factoring an 
overall task through time in this way, albeit within one year, might 
be the budget process itself. Both Greenwood (1983: ppl52-66) and 
Jones & Pendlebury (1984: pp62-3) provide a detailed breakdown of 
either observed or 'specimen' budget cycles in local authorities, 
albeit concentrating on different aspects. The salient features of 
the cycle in Authorities A and B were as laid out in Figure 1 below. 
The emphasis here is possibly slightly more on the pivotal role in the 
process of the RSG Settlement than in either Greenwood (1983) or
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Derive outturn for the previous year and 
assess implications in the present year of 
known inflation (pay and prices) and 
ccnmitments within this base, to bring it 
into the present year.
July-Sept "Crystal ball time" as Authority B's 
Treasurer put it: A forecast of events (eg 
inflation on pay and prices, interest 
rates) in the remainder of the present 
year and that forthcoming is arrived at, 
and applied to the updated base in order 
to assess the implications for the present 
year's projected outturn and beyond.
Sept-Oct
Sept-Dee
Consultations with leading Members to set 
the budget guidelines and parameters on 
the basis of this forecast. In Authority 
B, as we saw earlier, in the first year of 
research, a certain amount of growth was 
permitted although always with the 
assumption that the base could be returned 
to if necessary; in Authority A, perceived 
uncertainties surrounding the grant 
outcome dictated that the standstill 
parameter be maintained.
Preparation of draft estimates on the 
guidelines formulated. Even in Authority 
A, with its standstill in the first year 
of research, there was some 
redistribution within this.
Dec-Jan RSG Settlement assimilated: as we saw, it 
was fervently hoped, by prior provision of 
slack or the manipulation of balances, 
rather than by adjustments to service 
spending itself.
Jan-Feb Committee deliberations on their 
estimates? any necessary adjustments made 
and forwarded to the central Finance 
Committee.
March Budget passed and rate made accordingly.
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Jones & Pendlebury (1984), although the differences are not great. In 
very simple terms it is plausible, therefore, to view the budget 
process as the allocation of parts of the overall task throughout the 
year, about this point, in order to make it manageable. Rather than, 
say, attempting to construct the entire budget after the RSG 
settlement, ccrrmon-sense dictated, to the point where it was never 
even questioned, that as much as possible should be done before the 
settlement albeit in a form where it was hoped that any necessary 
adjustments subsequently aould be made with a minimum of fuss or 
dislocation.
The second specific approach observed Which, on the basis of apparent 
corroboration of other writers (eg Argyris, 1977: ppll5-17), might 
plausibly be 'hypothesised' from the data as a response to cognitive 
problems of scale was introduced as that of factoring through the 
organisation. In effect, the tactic was one of actors coping by using 
the organisational structure and division of labour to allow 
themselves not to have to know about certain areas:
"In my first few years I was trying to knew more than I 
could know. Now I trust people and they are on their own.
If there are clangers, I don't know about them, which is 
probably just as well for my health I" (Solicitor, Authority 
A).
"The engineer's finance officer knows his section better 
than we do, so he obviously goes into it in sane detail and 
we, to a large extent, take what he says. Really, we've got 
to use his judgement. Hopefully he does a bit of 
investigation first" (Chief Accountant, Authority B).
Once again though, a particularly clear example of this response would 
be in the budget process itself. Wildavsky (1979a: p59) for example, 
noted that the US budget process may be seen as a set of interlocking 
specialisms and we may see what he means in relation to local
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authorities in this country from Figure 1 above. Thus, of the stages 
shown, stages 1, 2, 4 and 5 primarily involved the officers' side of 
the authorities studied, with stages 6 and 7 involving the Member 
side, and stage 3 was something of a joint effort. Further, within 
the officers' side, stages 1 and 4 involved lower level technical work 
while stages 2 and 3 involved higher level chief officers, with stage 
5 again being in the nature of a joint effort. While these 
distinctions are admittedly crude, in the diagram form shown in Figure 
2 below, they allow one to see very clearly the division of labour and 
allocation of tasks within the cycle as a whole.
Figure 2: Budget cycle in Authorities A and B - interlocking tasks
Stage from Figure 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(a) Member X X X
(b) Senior Officer X X X
(c) Technical X X X
Concentrating a little further on the division of tasks within the 
officers' side of the authority (rows (b) and (c) in Figure 2), it 
emerged that to a considerable extent this revolved around the role of 
'accounting' and 'strategic' information within the budget process. 
Clearly, any budget demands a combination of both functions, with the 
technical details of constructing estimates guided by a wider 
strategic view of events within and outside the authority. The result 
of this division of labour was that in many cases senior (first and 
second tier) officers were enabled to escape almost entirely from the 
technical detail:
"I am in charge of the accounting division, but I'm not a 
book-keeper. I'm kept aware of the major items that I 
should be aware of. I'd much rather [chief accountant] 
sorted out a problem, he knows where to look and where the 
records are" (Assistant Treasurer, Authority A).
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"I would say about 75% of this game is having a feel for 
things ... for personal relationships, the idiosyncrasies 
... the political sensitivities of each item" (Solicitor 
Authority A).
"Accounting feeds and provides information for strategic 
considerations ... I' m a strategist, I take the accounting 
side for granted" (Treasurer, Authority B).
"I would think about the strategic side, and then say to 
someone 'If we did so and so, what's the financial effect?' 
and they would do the accounting side" (Treasurer, Authority 
A).
Further details of the respective uses of accounting and strategic 
information will emerge shortly.
Once again, therefore, at this fairly simple level observed features 
of activity in the authorities studied - in this case the basic 
division of labour and allocation of tasks, particularly within the 
budget process - might plausibly be seen as responses to cognitive 
problems of scale. This is not of course to imply that these 
responses were actually consciously thought out, although that 
remained a possibility where, for example, new procedures were set ups
"... in future [name] will ... build into the process ... a 
niche for me to interview chief officers... The idea would 
be that I would be briefed by my fellows about where the 
likely weaknesses would be and I would question ..." 
(Treasurer, Authority A).
On balance, though, it seemed more usual that actors inherited and 
largely accepted, rather than shaped for themselves, the division of 
labour which of itself represented for them the factoring of problems 
through the organisation in the manner outlined.
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(ii)(b) Cognitive Problems of Scale: Plausible Doubts
While admittedly in fairly elementary terms, it may be seen that a 
plausible 'hypothesis' might be arrived at frcm the data, with 
corroboration frcm eg, Wildavsky (1979a), Argyris(1977) and Jones & 
Pendlebury (1984), that the practices of factoring problems through 
time and through the organisation represented responses to cognitive 
problems of scale. The actors observed had too much to do or know and 
therefore, it might appear, they knowingly or unknowingly used tactics 
which allowed them to spread the load through time and through the 
organisation.
For all the plausibility and apparently straightforward nature of the 
argument, though, there are a series of equally plausible alternative 
explanations for much of the behaviour observed and a series of doubts 
about the accuracy of a cognitive limits 'hypothesis' of the reasons 
for this behaviour. Thus, much of the behaviour observed might 
equally plausibly be explained in terms of other, ccmuonplace facts of 
organisational life. To illustrate this, let us suppose that the 
actors in question could in fact run their authorities and in 
particular their resource allocation processes without recourse to 
either of the two factoring strategies outlined. The key question 
then becomes whether that behaviour would continue to occur, and there 
is substantial evidence to suggest that it would.
To take the factoring of problems through time first, at the simplest 
level, while we saw frcm Figure 1 that the final adjustments to the 
budget process took place in February and March, it would obviously be 
nonsensical to expect them to occur before the RSG Settlement was 
assimilated. Or again, we saw frcm Figure 1 that the first stage of
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the budget process - compiling the previous year's outturn - took 
place by June or August at the latest. One non-cognitive explanation 
for this would have been the statutory requirement to fill out the 
Revenue Outturn (RO) series of statistical returns for the government, 
and to close the year's accounts by September 1. Originally, the
timing of the demand for ROs and closure may have reflected
then-existing practice, but the statutory constraint they now 
represent would be sufficient to determine for any authority wishing 
to remain within the law the latest possible date for assessing its 
outturn. A third non-cognitive constraint upon the completion of 
particular parts of the budget by certain times might have been where 
estimates have to be prepared to allow bids for certain specific and 
supplementary grants such as that for transport (TSG, which at the 
time of the research was still a revenue grant).
Moving beyond the budget process itself, there cure further plausible
non-cognitive explanations for the sequential pursuit of policy 
objectives from budget to budget. We saw in Chapter 2 that the 
artificial inpact of a one-year budget period is more than sufficient 
to ' explain' an apparently gradualist approach to long-term 
objectives, particularly at a time when resources may not be 
sufficient to realise those objectives as single projects. Is the 
factoring of problems through time which is at issue here, as a 
'hypothesised' response to cognitive problems of scale, any different 
frcm this? Without probing further to see whether each increment of 
activity is simply a piece of ad hoc satisficing, or whether it is 
coherently related to the overall objective, it would be difficult to 
know. Only in the former case, though, would the cognitive limits 
'hypothesis' be explaining something which the artificial impact of 
the one-year budget period or even the brute fact of resource
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constraints could not. Even then, though, the cognitive 'hypothesis' 
does not have the field to itself, because we shall see in due course 
that satisficing behaviour and the factoring of problems through time 
may very easily be explained by political (big and small 'p') factors 
likely to be operating within any local authority.
Turning now to the organisational factoring of problems by means of 
the division of labour, similar considerations apply as those with the 
time aspect. Even if one actor could construct a local authority 
budget on his own there are relatively obvious reasons why he would 
not. As Wildavsky (1979a: passim) grasps so clearly, budgeting 
involves allocating insufficient resources between competing and often 
very different demands. A single overriding system of values 
unambiguously but consensually guiding resource allocation is 
therefore highly unlikely (cf also Gershuny, 1981: pl95). This means 
that our single actor, leaving aside entirely the likelihood of the 
situation, would become in theory an arbitrator between these claims, 
which would present cognitive problems of an altogether different 
order, as we shall see in Part III of this thesis. As a result, as 
Wildavsky puts it in another context:
"Intellectual cogitation - putting people through their 
paces guided by a single intelligence - would give way to 
social interaction as each bid and bargained with the other 
..." (1983: p34).
The point is, of course, that local authorities already have elected 
fora for just this purpose, which would then 'explain' at least the 
basic officer-Meriiber division of labour within them. It might be 
argued that, viewed in the round, the basic political structure of a 
local authority is still a response to cognitive problems, in this 
case of making value decisions, by allowing the political process to
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'nake' those decisions as it were on behalf of the actors in it. We 
shall see that there is sane truth in this - but it is a separate 
issue and explanation from that offered by the 'hypothesised' 
cognitive problans of scale examined here.
However, the argunent concerning the factoring of problems through the 
organisation may then be taken a step further because, leaving aside 
the presence of alternative explanations of the division of labour, 
there are doubts about the cognitive 'hypothesis' itself. On one 
level it emerged that the willingness of each actor to pass on, or 
'factor' what might otherwise be his workload or the knowledge 
requested of him varied considerably. This will become apparent in 
succeeding chapters: nevertheless, as one inmediate example while we 
saw (pi00 above) that Authority A's Deputy Treasurer had relatively 
little exposure to the minutiae of accounting, his counterpart in 
Authority B was in an altogether different position, being much more 
of a 'mainstream' accountant. Further, as a more general observation, 
we shall see that the degree of centralisation of both detailed work 
and policy decisions was greater in Authority A than Authority B 
(notwithstanding the respective roles of their Deputy Treasurers), 
indicating a lesser willingness to factor problems through the 
organisation. Of itself, the cognitive hypothesis of problems of 
scale arising from workload and knowledge requirements has little to 
explain these variations.
What we have seen raises the possibility that cognitive problems of 
scale may be negotiable. These suspicions were strengthened where the 
applicability of the cognitive hypothesis appeared to rest not 
entirely with the innate capacities of each actor (which we have seen 
are at the core of the whole cognitive limits argument), but at least
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partially with the level of resources made available to meet any 
problems posed. Without implying that given sufficient resources all 
cognitive problems including those of scale cure a priori solvable, 
there appeared to be a range where cognitive constraints and the level 
of resources made available traded off against each other. By 
' resources', ultimately one is usually talking of money, but the 
trade-off can happen in a number of ways, staff time being one 
example. While we have seen that there were certain 'fixed' points in 
each authority's budgetary process which could of themselves explain 
why it was spread through much of the year, it also seems relatively 
obvious that additional staffing resources could make managing the 
demands of the process easier for those involved. As another example, 
we saw earlier on p97 that incremental modifications were made to 
Authority A's budget presentation. After the first attempt some of 
the unit cost data was still less than ideal, by the admission of the 
actors concerned, but these areas were scheduled for improvement in 
coming years:
"Some of the items are there because in the time available 
we couldn't think of anything else. Next year they won't 
be" (Chief Accountant, Authority A, emphasis added).
As things stood, this was an example of factoring a problem through 
time in preference to a 'once and for all* effort - but the 
implication is clearly that, given sufficient staffing resources a 
much 'better' job could have been done at the first attempt.
Another instance of the trade-off between resources and cognitive 
constraints revealed by the data was the application to resource 
allocation of computers (eg Greenwood et al, 1977: p27). There were 
potential implications here for both the time and organisational
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dimensions of the factoring 'strategies' observed. Now, the precise 
potential of computerisation is somewhat contentious, with Wildavsky 
(1983), for example, expressing considerable scepticism as to its 
value. He makes an important distinction between mere data, and 
information as "[d]ata arrayed so it makes a difference to what we do 
..." (1983: p30), arguing that to be usable as information, data must 
somehow be regulated, filtered or presented in precis (1983: pp33-39; 
cf Bruns sen, 1982: pp34-35). The problem, though, (Wildavsky argues) 
is that with no internal ' market' to establish and define a demand 
because data is seldom charged for, it 'just keeps on coming' as data 
processing sections seek to justify their existence by the volume of 
their output (1983: p35), when in fact less rather than more data may 
be what is needed (1983: p39). Small wonder then, cn this analysis, 
that organisations have "failures of power" (Desai & Crow, 1983: pi95) 
or "failures of learning" (Etheridge & Short, 1983: pp55-6), where 
they fail to use the information available to them: there is simply 
too much of it, and it may well not be in usable form. This is a 
valid point. Tomkins (1983: pll), for example, shows how in one 
authority both the police force's and the social services department's 
accounting systems supplemented the formal computerised accounts 
system, to make up for shortcomings in its output.
However, the experience from the authorities studied here suggests 
that Wildavsky then overstates his case. He goes on to argue that 
even where precis are made available, as for example in the more 
interactive rrdcro-ocmputer based information systems, the demands of 
tailoring such installations to individual requirements and 
interpreting to the user the omissions and value premises inherent in 
the precis offered him, will soon offset any advantage gained 
(Wildavsky, 1983: p33). We shall see shortly though, that in the
107
preparation of estimates in Authority B, a computer system was used to 
present accounting information on-screen in suinnary form, often 
compared with a profile for the relevant code, as and when that 
information was required. The principle user observed - the Chief 
Accountant - needed no support in tailoring or interpreting the 
summaries provided because he had helped to design the system and 
construct the profiles, which in any case operated in terms of the 
known and familiar categories - and value premises - in Authority B's 
budget. Further, the data did not 'just keep coming' because it was 
not controlled by a data processing section but by the Treasury 
itself: the Chief Accountant used the screen to gain the necessary 
information as and when it was needed. While the rationale and shape 
of the actual profiles used was not observed to be reviewed - which of 
course places the scope and limitations of the system in same sort of 
context - the Chief Accountant gained a more rapid and comprehensive 
access to the information he would have needed even had the computer 
not been available. Budgeting was speeded up, and at the same time 
the depth of review and questioning routinely achieved was rather 
greater. The cognitive constraints arising from the scale of 
constructing that budget and the amount of information required were 
to the same extent negotiated.
(ii)(c) Cognitive Problems of Scale: Overview
We have seen that certain features of the activity observed - chiefly, 
the factoring of problems through time with the sequential or serial 
pursuit of objectives, and the factoring of problems through the 
organisation with the division of labour - emerged from the data and 
were apparently corroborated in the context of the cognitive limits
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argunent by other writers in the field. On this basis, a plausible 
'hypothesis' could have been constructed that these types of behaviour 
were responses to the cognitive burdens inposed on those allocating 
resources by the physical scale of their task and the body of 
knowledge required. In particular, the budget process itself appeared 
on this cognitive 'hypothesis' to offer clear examples of both 
factoring responses in operation.
However, it was also shown that there were equally plausible 
nan-cognitive explanations for the behaviour observed, based on 
ccnrnonplace features of local authority life or even on the direct 
impact of the brute fact of resource shortage. At the minimum, this 
suggests that the precise role of the cognitive limits of individual 
actors needs to be examined more closely: on this evidence, as an 
explanation of their behaviour it may be somewhat redundant. Further, 
though, it then emerged that there were variations in response to 
cognitive problems of scale which suggested that they were to an 
extent capable of being negotiated. These suspicions were increased 
by the evidence that the level of cognitive problems of scale 
experienced may be a function of resources made available to overcome 
them. That there are ultimate limitations on cognitive abilities is 
not questioned, but the scope for negotiation within this picture 
begins to become clear.
(iii) COGNITIVE PROBLEMS OF VALUE DECISIONS
(iii)(a) Introduction
Having discussed the cognitive problems which are held by the
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incremental syndrane to arise from the physical scale of the 
requirements made of budgetary actors, we ncm turn to the second area 
outlined in section (i) above, that of making value judgements between 
policies and priorities. It is important - though often not easy - 
to maintain a distinction here between the political impact and 
problens of value judgements, and the cognitive constraints upon 
making them. It is the latter which are at issue here, with the 
political dimension discussed at seme length in later chapters. The 
distinction is necessary because very different conclusions about each 
of these strands of the incremental syndrcme will emerge.
Two particular types of behaviour appeared from the data to be 
corroborated - although in one case only partially - in a cognitive 
context by other writers, and these are therefore treated here as the 
'plausibly hypothesised* responses to the cognitive problems of making 
those value judgements. The first of these was a focus on the 
concrete detail of the budget rather than on policy alternatives, 
often held by other writers to occur through the use of a ' line-item' 
budget format. The second is the use of suns of money and 
calculations of percentage change, reified as a 'cognitive shorthand1 
for actual service levels to provide a camnon ' currency' for debate on 
allcx^ation priorities, and as a means of avoiding value decisions in 
the routine officer-level process of rolling forward the budget base 
and preparing estimates. These are now discussed in turn. Once again 
though, we shall see that, while the cognitive role of these devices 
could have been ' plausibly hypothesised1 frcm the data and on the 
basis of corroboration by other writers, on closer inspection there 
emerges some equally plausible doubts.
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(iii)(b) Cognitive Problems of Value Decisions: Line-Item Budgeting
It is held that one aspect of budgeting is the systematic losing of 
the wood for the trees. The focus of budgeters is on the detail of 
the local authority's activities rather than on policy decisions or 
value choices (eg Danziger, 1978: pl83; Wildavsky, 1979a: ppl36-7) 
thereby, it is held, allowing these latter to be perpetuated almost by 
default, within and across the 'line-item* categories often used 
(Wildavsky, 1979a: pp59, 221). To adopt a useful distinction made by 
Jones & Pendlebury (1984: p51) the focus of ' line-item' budgeting is 
on the nature of expenditure rather than its purpose, presumably 
because this is easier to define and rather more 'obvious' to 
budgeters. Line-item budgeting may conceivably occur for political 
reasons and certainly has a political significance, but the cognitive 
argument is that line-item budget categories are easier to construct 
because they are concrete and somehow more 'objective', being 
pre-given as existing and visible features of an authority's 
accounts. The contrast, especially in Wildavsky's usage (eg 1979a: 
pp59, 187-9), is with essentially subjective programme categories 
whose objectives may be disputed and thus, to budgeters, not 'known' - 
even while the existing activity in question is occurring.
Taking this argument as the ex post facto 'hypothesis', the data again 
appeared, at first sight, to offer supporting evidence. Thus, in 
their very broad summary example of line-item budgeting, Jones & 
Pendlebury (1984: p51) list such categories as "Employees", "Running 
Expenses", "Grant Income", and so on. Figure 3, below, shows that 
this is a similar format, again at summary level, to that adopted by 
Authority B, albeit with the addition of committee sub-divisions. 
However, it may be seen that even with this very basic addition of
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ccmnittee sub-divisions the presentation begins to move away from the 
•pure' line—item format, in that it allows a certain amount to be 
inferred about the purpose of the expenditure shown, just from the 
column headings. Given that the ccmnittee structure is axiomatic in 
local authorities, notwithstanding Wildavsky's observations of the US 
budget process (eg 1979a: p59) it therefore seems unlikely that,
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except perhaps in more general summary analyses, a 'pure' line-item 
format will be cannon in this country (see also Jones & Pendlebury, 
1984: p52). Certainly, there were no examples in the authorities 
studied here.
A second reason why budgets are unlikely to retain a 'pure* line-item 
format - or indeed, except as a summary, the format in Figure 3 - is 
that without identifiable responsibility centres any form of financial 
control would be difficult or impossible (Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: 
p52). At the very least, therefore, as in Authority B, authorities 
aure likely to adopt the CIPFA standard format or something close to 
it: this is more detailed than the presentation in Figure 3 and moves 
further away from a 'pure' line-item basis by giving more information 
cn the purpose of expenditure (Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: p52). An 
example, this time from Authority B's detailed budget, is given in 
Figure 4, below. Here, while the line-item categories remain, the 
allocation of responsibilities for various items and areas of 
expenditure may be seen from the major headings on the left, and the 
purpose of the expenditure becomes clear from the heading of the 
example, in this case relating to an Advice Centre. One might 
describe this format as an 'enhanced line-item' budget: while, to 
repeat, its purpose is to allow financial control of the 
responsibility centre rather than, say, any specific prioritising, the 
fact remains that as a responsibility centre the Advice Centre is 
allowed to emerge from its constituent line items as a separate area 
of provision in its own right, thus distancing the presentation 
further from 'pure' line-item budgeting. Indeed, although it was not 
the intended purpose, it is worth noting in view of the 'hypothesised' 
role of line-item budgeting that this analysis could, in principle, 
allow the relative fortunes of the Advice Centre or advice centres
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Figure 4; (Truncated) Format of Detailed Budget, Authority B 
[NAME] ADVICE CENTRE Environmental Planning Comnittee (cont'd)




































generally to be assessed (leaving aside the doubts in Chapter 2 about 
the validity of such an exercise 1), crudely, by comparing the trend 
between (say) the estimates in the second and fourth colurms with the
authority's norm.
Authority A's budget format was a variation on the same theme. The
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basic analysis again owed much to the CIPEA standard format, but as 
Figure 5 below shows, the information on responsibilities was set out 
separately, wherever possible together with a set of unit costs 
relating to the activity - ie to the purpose of the expenditure - in 
question. These unit costs, as we saw earlier (p97), were in fact 
being introduced and refined at the time of the research: it may be 
seen that while they accompanied the 'enhanced line-item' CIPEA 
format, they represented still a further step away from the line-item 
archetype.
A third reason why budgets in local authorities are unlikely to retain 
a 'pure' line-item format is that it is inpossible to relate line-item 
budgets to any programne categories which may exist within the 
authority (Haynes, 1980: p92? see also Jones & Pendlebury, 1983: 
p23). Accordingly Haynes suggests that for medium-term planning 
purposes, many authorities will in fact run a prograrrme-based budget 
simultaneously with the line-item [or enhanced line-item] one (Haynes, 
1980: p92), thereby making explicit the value choices which it is held 
that line-item budgets are usually designed to avoid making explicit, 
or to 'lose' in their detail. Authority A again provided an example 
of this in its Annual Report, an extract from which appears in Figure 
6, below. Although this publication in itself was more of a public 
relations exercise than a strategic document (it will be observed that 
it concentrates on outturns), and although some headings such as 
'administration' remained vague, a programne structure may be seen 
quite clearly. Authority B made a virtually identical presentation in 
its 'abstract of accounts', again on an outturn basis. However, the 
fact that the ' budget' figures for each programne are also shown 
indicates that these presumably existed at the time of budget, even if
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Figure 5: Example of Cost Centre and Unit Cost Data, Authority A




Planning & Traffic Gomnittee
Budget Analysis 19xx/xx 
Cost Centres and Unit Costs
Building Regulations
[left hand page 
based on CIPFA 
format similar to 
Figure 4 above]
Responsible Officer
Expenditure: Planning Officer £
Treasurer £ 
Total £ 
Income: Planning Officer £
£ Net Expenditure £
Number of Building Regulations 
applications and inspections xxxxxx
Gross cost per application £
Average cost per application £
Net cost per application £
the authorities studied chose not to present them in the budget 
documents as such.
It becomes clear that a line-item budget document need not imply that 
the budget process which produced it operates in exclusively line-item 
terms. As Haynes suggests, there are sound operational reasons for 
adopting the approach in same circumstances and not in others:
"... basic information on costs and performances needs to be 
presented in different ways for different purposes. One 
budget is departmental and itemised, and is used for 
internal control purposes, while the other is based upon 
objectives, follows the format of programme structures find 
is largely an aid for medium-term plan-making. Both 
presentations concentrate on those areas of information 
which are potentially most relevant and helpful to 
particular levels of control" (Haynes, 1980: p92).
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Figure 6; Sample Programme Categories, Authority A's Annual Report


























A budget would be line-item based, on this argument, if its sole 
purpose was financial control around political priorities decided 
elsewhere in the policy-making process, rather than to help form those 
priorities (albeit that the 'enhanced line-item' format allovs some 
information on priorities to be derived, even if this is not its 
actual purpose). Manifestly, though, in local authorities, a budget 
is also a policymaking document (hence, presuimbly, the alleged 
cognitive problems in making value judgements in the first place), 
which would then explain the apparent availability of non-line-item 
data even if this was not actually presented fully in the budget 
documents in Authorities A and B. This places Wildavsky's own largely 
cognitive limits-based presentation of line-item budgeting in some 
difficulty because it appears from the data here and from fc&ynes that 
despite the layout of the formal budget documents, it is but one 
aspect of the overall resource allocation function.
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If this is so, then the cognitive 'hypothesis' which might have been 
advanced of the role of line-item budgeting - of avoiding or obscuring 
policy choices in favour of an analysis of concrete detail - must be 
called into question. If these choices cure in fact made elsewhere in 
many budget processes, then presumably any problems in making them may 
be negotiated, and it is not these which necessarily prompted the 
line-item budgeting where it actually occurred. At the least, if 
cognitive factors do play a part we are left with explaining why they 
apply selectively, not only in seme authorities and not others (where 
non-cognitive factors such as the resources available for budgeting 
might conceivably have played a part), but in seme aspects of one 
budget process and not others. The 'cognitive limits' strand of 
incrementalism is of relatively little use in explaining these 
variations.
As a final Garment, it is also a fallacy to assume that line-item 
budget categories, Whatever the reason for their existence, are 
themselves 'value-free' or objective. Where policy choices cure 
obscured, of course, then in effectively defending those choices from 
intervention a line-item budget is highly value-laden. The categories 
themselves may also be manipulated to 'create' or 'lose' spending on 
particular codes or headings to avoid over- or underspends on them as
tactics cure perceived to dictate. We shall see, for example, that it
was the discovery of this type of manipulation on a substantial scale 
which led Authority B to experiment with a form of ZBB. Wildavsky 
(1979a) would probably accept many of these points, given the overall
'political' tenor of his book, but as noted earlier we still see
line-item and programme budgets contrasted with only the latter deemed 
to be highly subjective, (eg 1979a: pp59, 187-8) and it is this which 
should not be allowed to give a misleading impression.
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This, though, is to hint at political (big and small *p*) issues 
beyond the scope of the cognitive limits strand of incrementalism 
which is at issue here. To summarise what we have seen here, it may 
just be said that in overall terms the actual budgets in the 
authorities studied were line-item based, but that there were 
apparently sound non-cognitive reasons for this relating to their 
Ccmnittee structures and their financial control functions. Even 
then, this was never 'pure' line-item budgeting, but the 'enhanced' 
line-item presentation, or something very close to it, reoomnended by 
CIPFA. In Jones & Pendlebury's terms, while the main focus was on the 
nature of expenditure, much could also be learned about its purpose. 
Moving beyond the formal budget document itself we saw that the trend 
away from line-item budgeting was more marked, with analyses presented 
around distinct programme categories. This clearly implies that 
non-line-item information was collected and available to budgeters 
even not presented by them in budgets: the 'hypothesised' cognitive 
constraints prompting line-budgeting can if necessary be negotiated or 
overcome by the actors involved, therefore, although there is nothing 
in the cognitive limits argument itself to suggest when this will or 
will not happen. (Non-cognitive factors such as resources available 
for budgeting may of course play a part, although since both 
authorities displayed non-line-item tendencies the data provided no 
clues on this •) Accordingly, rather than viewing line-item budgeting 
as a response to cognitive problems of value judgments, following 
Haynes (1980: p92) it seems more helpful to view it as but one aspect 
of the overall budgeting and resource allocation function. In this 
perspective, it is possible that the largest single determinant of the 
incidence of line-item budgeting is the esteem with which treasurers 
regard CIPFA's adviceI
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(iii)(c) Cognitive Problems of Value Decisions: The Role of Figures
It is held by incrementalists that budgeting and resource allocation 
takes place largely in terms of the figures and sums of money which 
eventually appear in the budget book or statement of accounts, rather 
than in terms of the service levels which those sums of money are 
actually buying (see, eg, Danziger, 1978: pl83; Jones & Pendlebury, 
1984: pp61, 74). In effect, the figures are reified (Danziger 1978: 
pl83) as indicators of service activity: at its most basic, as 
Wildavsky points out, a budget may be seen as a series of goals with 
price tags attached (1979a: p2), but in compiling it the emphasis is 
held to be on the 'price tags' to the point where this replaces 
analysis and coverage of the 'goals' themselves. The use of actual 
allocations in this manner, it is argued, helps to meet the cognitive 
problems of making value judgments in preparing the budget by allowing 
there to be a ccnnon 'currency' with which differing areas of activity 
may be assessed, relative to each other, through simple measurements 
of percentage change or difference between allocations (eg, Davis et 
al, 1966: p530). It is then because the emphasis in budgeting is held 
to be restricted by cognitive factors to the increment separating each 
allocation from its predecessor that these percentage and monetary 
calculations are applied to ' vertical' changes between years rather 
than to the horizontal spread of activity within any one year, (eg 
Danziger, 1978: pl83; see also Wildavsky, 1979a: pp219-20). The need 
for direct comparisons of the utility of often very different service 
objectives is thereby avoided by using the allocations to fund them as 
a ' cognitive shorthand'.
Taking the overall argument as the plausible 'hypothesis' which could 
have been constructed from the data, the distinction between vertical
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and horizontal foci is a useful place to begin. In many ways, the 
concept of a vertical focus canes close to the heart of 
incrementalism, insofar as this is a collection of explanations and 
recommendations of marginal change. A vertical focus on that change 
would then follow almost by definition: all the attempts discussed in 
Chapter 2 to define incremental outcomes are cases in point. As an 
accountant in Authority A illustrated:
"You're looking along the lines of previous expenditure 
patterns. Basically, we have a sheet ... showing actual 
costs for the previous year. We then show the present 
year's budget. We then get departments to fill in what they 
want their estimates to be for the coming year. We will 
then have regard to whatever variations have happened in the 
current year ..." (Accountant, Authority A).
We saw from Figures 4 and 6 above (and see also Figure 7, below) that 
the budgets and accounts of Authorities A and B were both laid out 
with columns illustrating this vertical progression from outturn 
figures to estimates, to revised estimates, to the budget for the 
coming year. It might be that, as Pendlebury & Jones (1983: ppl5-16) 
have observed, this cycle in itself has a heuristic status for 
budgeters as their 'model of reality' within which resource allocation 
takes place - certainly, nothing from the data here disproved this.
In any event, though, the role of percentage measurements in assessing 
these changes, even if unpublished, followed as a logical consequence:
"Hie things we look for are, 'what's the general 
[percentage] rate of inflation on that item?' ... basically 
you're looking at things which don't ring true" (Accountant, 
Authority A).
Thus, the use of the figures themselves in the budget extended at 
least as far as being a means of financial control by reference to the 
fixed percentage allowance being made for inflation.
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If we now move to the higher level of political argument and debate 
about the allocation of resources we again find, for example, that 
vertical percentage changes in monetary comparisons were the 
'■currency' of the historically based assessments underlying 
Wildavsky's notion of fair shares (eg, 1979a: ppl6-18). For example, 
the ACC assessed its members' increases in expenditure targets frcm 
1984/85 to 1985/86 as follows:
"... even the shire counties who have benefitted from both 
changes [in the rules of target construction] are still left 
with a 4.6% average increase in target for 1985/86 compared 
with a national average of 6.8%. The figure for shire 
counties as a whole is 5%. It remains the case that lower 
spending authorities receive lower than average target 
rises. This is inequitable" (ACC, 1985: p5).
Fran considerations of priority and equity, vertical monetary and 
percentage measurements can easily become political yardsticks for the 
assessments of spending, thereby in effect reifying the service levels 
underlying them:
"We ought to look at the budget without worrying about what 
we spent last year and the year before, but we've been 
forced into a position over the years of having to say ... 
'we haven't cut x', if we have cut it, 'because we're 
spending x% more this year on that cxximodity than we did 
last year'" (Housing Chairman, Authority A).
"We know what our basic expenditure is, and it's been shown 
over the years that that's the right level, so you're 
putting on inflation increases ... therefore I think you've 
got much greater control because if something is over that 
rate, they've got to come and tell you why" (Leader, 
Authority B).
The way in which the figures came to stand in for discussion of actual 
service levels may clearly be seen from these two vertical 
comparisons.
To summarise so far, then, a plausible 'hypothesis' could be advanced 
from where the data appeared to corroborate the work of other writers,
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that vertical comparisons of monetary allocations and percentage 
change figures were substituted for discussion of actual service 
levels and the relative merits of these, as a response to the 
cognitive problems of making value decisions. At this point though, 
the now-familiar doubts begin to appear. For all the ease and 
frequency with which vertical comparisons were made, it has to be said 
that this was in no way to the exclusion of the horizontal. It was on 
the basis of a simple horizontal comparison, for example, that the 
Chief Education Officer of Authority B assessed the outcome of a cuts 
exercise:
"I started by being apprehensive and critical of the 
decision to share the burden of cuts pro rata ... [but] when 
it came to deciding how to restore the £lm [of cuts 
originally proposed] I was of course rather pleased that it 
was not done pro rata but by bids. With our £700,000 we 
haven't dene too badly at all".
Similarly, the ACC made a further horizontal comparison of target 
increases in 1985/86:
"The 18 authorities due to be rate-capped ... alone have 
taken sane 43% of the total increase in targets available" 
(ACC, 1985: p6).
Simple comparisons of this type appear to present no specific 
cognitive problems at all, in that they might routinely be expected of 
any actor or organisation taking stock of their own positions. Once 
again, though, the role of the actual sums of money and percentages in 
allowing these comparisons to be made may be seen.
A further example of a horizontal comparison with altogether more 
profound implications would be where an authority used the service 
components of its Grant Related Expenditure (GRE) assessment of need 
to spend to provide or influence the set of relative priorities for 
its service spending. Evidence other than the purely anecdotal is
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hard to find, but on this basis it seems likely that the practice 
occurs, irrespective of whether an authority actually spends at the 
level of its total GRE or not. Now, GREs are specifically not 
designed for this purpose, being no more than a yardstick for the 
distribution of block grant (eg DoE, 1985: p26), and for this reason 
the GRE used in each case would be the previous year's, since the 
service components of those for the budget year cure deliberately not 
made available by the DoE until April, after budgets have been fixed. 
Nevertheless, the point still stands. As a given set of service 
proportions, the service components of the GRE could be used to 
influence the allocation of resources, as it were to 'make' the value 
decisions between priorities on the basis of a single prior judgment 
about its validity for this purpose. Variations (or lack of) in 
service spending levels will then be a function not of any vertical 
assessment but of the horizontal 'comparisons' represented in the GRE 
itself - even though, once again, these will be in terms of the sans 
of money specified by its service components.
The evidence from the authorities studied and elsewhere, then, is that 
far from vertical comparisons predominating, they co-existed with 
horizontal ones. Indeed, in the GRE case above, at the extreme it is 
theoretically possible to fix the entire set of an authority's service 
priorities with no reference to vertical comparisons (or even to the 
base or increments) at all. While no examples of horizontal compari­
sons were found at the level of the detailed rolling forward of the 
budget base or preparation of estimates, it could be argued that this 
is scarcely surprising since allocations between carpeting service 
priorities do not tend to be made at this level anyway. It is 
therefore clear that any cognitive problems of making value decisions
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may be sidestepped or negotiated when it comes to the type of 
comparison, vertical or horizontal, actually made.
However, it will be noticed that both types of comparison were made in 
money or percentage terms rather than by reference to actual service 
activity, and to this extent the 'hypothesised' cognitive role of the 
figures themselves as a reification of that service activity is more 
plausible. Even here though, there are problems because there are 
grounds for asking hew much of this is due to the nature and focus of 
what is observed rather than to any cognitive problems per se of 
making value decisions. Thus, as a basic fact of local authority 
life, one of the purposes (on the basis of their survey, Pendlebury & 
Jones, 1983: ppl2-13, would say the primary purpose) of a budget is to 
raise revenue sufficient to cover the authority's anticipated 
expenditure. In its capacity as the set of 'price tags', in 
Wildavsky's terms, to be put on the authority's activities, one might 
therefore reasonably ask how a concentration on suns of money in the 
budget could be avoided - despite the fact that we shall see, even 
here, that more directly service-related information was also not 
ignored. If a monetary focus is always likely to occur for 
non-cognitive reasons, there seems little point in emphasising the 
cognitive 'hypothesis': the role of the cognitive problems of value 
decisions cannot positively be proven, and we may in any case be left 
with explaining those occasions where it does not in fact occur I
At the same time, at an equally basic level of organisational life, a 
budget may be a planning and policy-making tool (eg, Pendlebury & 
Jones, 1983: pll), and in this context it would be rather more 
surprising if a focus purely on monetary outcomes was allowed to 
exclude or replace more directly service-related data and analysis of
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priorities. In the remainder of the thesis, we shall see that the 
interaction between service and financial data is a highly complex 
one, which may change over time, through the organisation and 
according to the personal predispositions of the actors concerned. 
Certainly, we have seen and will see further a tendency for argument 
and discussion of priorities at the political level of resource 
allocation to take place in monetary terms, and to this extent the 
'hypothesised' role of those suns of money in providing a ccmnon 
'currency' between services and allowing that debate to happen, 
remains finally to be disproved. In other areas though, the use of 
sums of money as a 'cognitive shorthand' for service levels and 
priorities will be shown to depend on where and when one looks.
As an interim conclusion, therefore, the 'hypothesised' role of 
vertical comparisons between sums of money, reified as service 
indicators, in meeting the cognitive problems of making value 
decisions, begins to look somewhat at odds with the data, for all its 
initial apparent plausibility. Horizontal comparisons are evidently 
not precluded by cognitive factors; prioritising is not done purely in 
monetary terms? and where monetary analysis does and does not 
predominate may be no more than a reflection of the operational 
realities of local authority life and the purpose of the budget 
itself. It remains plausible that sums of money and percentages were 
used as 'cognitive shorthand' for service levels and issues in 
discussion on resource allocation, but the overall picture will emerge 
as rather more complex than a simple cognitive 'hypothesis' would have 
allowed.
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(iii)(d) Cognitive Problems of Value Decisions; Overview
For all the general lack of hard evidence (see above, p95), two 
particular types of behaviour - line-item budgeting, and the 
reification of sums of money and vertical percentage change levels as 
service indicators - could plausibly have been hypothesised from the 
data as the responses to the cognitive problems of making value 
decisions facing resource allocation actors, a role which is 
apparently corroborated by other writers. (It must be stressed again 
that the gathering of data during the research was not actually 
structured by these hypotheses.) In each case, however, much as we 
saw with cognitive problems of scale, despite the initial plausibility 
of these 'hypotheses' the data in fact indicated that they were open 
to considerable doubts. With line-item budgeting, we saw that while 
an 'enhanced' type of this presentation was used in the actual budgets 
of the authorities studied, sound non-cognitive reasons could be 
advanced for this; and it did not preclude the use of programne-based 
analysis elsewhere in their resource allocation processes. This 
latter finding suggests that the data must have been available in 
non-line-item form, and therefore that the cognitive constraints which 
were ' hypothesised' as prompting line-item budgeting could quite 
easily be overcome. It was suggested that rather than viewing 
line-item budgeting as a cognitive phenomenon - and thereby having to 
explain why those cognitive constraints sometimes did not apply - it 
is at least as plausible to see it simply as one part of the overall 
resource allocation function in the authorities studied, with 
progranme-based activity as another part. Similar conclusions have 
just emerged with the use of vertical change measurements and from the 
reification of sums of money. While it remains possible that these 
functioned as a Garmon 'currency' between services and priorities to
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allow assessments of their relative merits to be made at all, this was 
not universally the case, and once again their use or non-use was as 
easily explicable in terms of the actual role and nature of the budget 
process as in 'cognitive' terms.
It is not denied that there must be some upper limit on human 
cognitive abilities, but the data here indicated once again that there 
might be substantial scope for negotiating the constraints imposed by 
the cognitive problems of making value decisions. The cognitive 
limits strand of incrementalism purports to build these limits into an 
explanation of resource allocation, or at least to inform analysis of 
it. Following the similar conclusions reached on cognitive problems 
of scale, we are seeing more and more clearly that it does not do 
either very accurately. In short, introducing a key theme, the 
cognitive limits strand is deficient because in implying what is 
effectively a 'standardised' impact of cognitive constraints, it 
underestimates the {often unthinking) proactivity of resource 
allocation actors in meeting and negotiating the cognitive constraints 
upon them.
This theme is now developed in a study of the best known and most 
apparently 'obvious' of all the incremental responses to cognitive 
problems, namely the budget base.
(iv) THE BUDGET BASE
(iv)(a) Introduction
The use of the budget base as a heuristic for coping with the
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cognitive problems of budgeting embodies aspects of both the problems 
of physical scale and of making value decisions discussed in sections 
(ii) and (iii) above. It is treated separately and at seme length, 
though, because it raises a whole series of issues in its own right, 
and - perhaps as a result of this - because it is one of the most 
widely known and discussed features of budgeting. Remembering 
Danziger's distinction between the cognitive and political strands of 
incremental ism (1978: pl25), writers who discuss the budget base in 
its cognitive role at issue here include Gershuny (1981); Bailey & 
O'Connor (1975); Bunce & Echolls (1978); Danziger (1974; 1978); 
Greenwood et al (eg 1977; 1980a); Haynes (1980); Heclo & Wildavsky 
(1981); Pendlebury & Jones (1983); Jones & Pendlebury (1984); Pfeffer 
(1981) and of course Wildavsky himself (1975; 1979).
The budget base, as we have seen, is the re-priced and updated 
agglomeration of previous spending 'rolled forward' into the present
year. It is held by proponents of cognitive limits explanations of
resource allocation that the base makes the task easier by embodying 
the assumption that each previous year's spending is prima facie valid 
(see, eg, Danziger, 1978: pl83) and in need only of the updating for 
cannitments and repricing just outlined. In this way, it is argued 
that the volume of work is reduced to manageable proportions (eg Jones 
& Pendlebury, 1984: pp56-7), and that previous tacit or explicit 
priority decisions and value choices remain undisturbed. As Wildavsky 
observes,
"The beginning of wisdom about an agency budget is that it
is almost never actively reviewed as a whole every year"
(1979a: pl5).
The search for alternatives may then be restricted to the small area 
of marginal increases or decreases actually feasible in any one year
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(eg Wildavsky, 1979a: pl5). To no great surprise given the weight of 
other literature on the issue, this cognitive conception of the role 
of the budget base vis-a-vis problems both of the physical scale of, 
and value decisions in, budgeting and resource allocation could once 
again plausibly be 'hypothesised' from the data, and it is therefore 
around this that our examination of the issue will be structured.
The apparent plausibility of the argument is helped by the observation 
in Chapter 3 that for all the severity of the brute fact of resource 
shortage, there appeared to be a certain level beyond which reviews 
were not pushed and solutions were not sought. This would tend to 
support the proposition that there is at minimum an area of core 
assumptions about what the authority actually does and should do, 
which will not be questioned and which might therefore underpin any 
'base' of routinely unreviewed or unchallenged expenditure. As 
against this, however, we saw that levels of review generally have 
increased, which would to tend to point to any 'base' being perhaps 
smaller, as a proportion of its budget, than hitherto. Already 
therefore, it appears that any cognitive constraints tending to prompt 
the use of the budget base have to this extent been negotiated. 
Further, we also saw in Chapter 3 that, leaving aside any cognitive 
factors, the use of the budget base as a 'holding' position in 
negotiating the brute fact of uncertainty would of itself be 
sufficient to explain the use of a base. While this is not synonymous 
with that base remaining unreviewed, as in the cognitive limits 
argument, it is clear that considerable care will be needed in 
isolating the specific effects of cognitive factors from other aspects 
of the overall situation.
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With this rote of caution in mind, we now turn to examining the data 
frcm the authorities studied.
(iv)(b) The Budget Base and Cognitive Limits in Authority A
Predictably, it is very easy to advance and plausibly support frcm the 
data a cognitive 'hypothesis' of the role of the budget base in 
Authority A. The existence of the base is clear enough frcm the 
extract frcm its budget book in Figure 7, below, whose columns betray 
a good deal. Reading frcm the left, in column 3 we have the 'base' of 
the present year's budget, with columns 4 to 7 giving details of the 
'rolling forward' process - inflation (pay and prices), and 
commitments - with the final budget in column 8. The heading 'Other' 
in column 7 refers to growth items: this being a standstill year in 
Authority A, there weren't any I The relative ease of presenting the 
budget in this form, with calculations apparently only relevant to the 
minor part of it, may be appreciated.
The actors studied in Authority A also appeared initially to offer 
considerable support for the 'hypothesis' that the base as outlined 
would then remain substantially beyond review. The issue was 
acknowledged by one Chairman as follows:
"Its too easy for Carmittees to look down and say, 'Well, we 
ought to spend at least that amount this year,' as opposed 
to looking for new sources of spending or to see whether it 
was needed. I give you a very simple example if I may. It 
may be there's seme land alongside someone's house and we've 
always cut the grass. Maybe the person who lived there 
would have liked to have taken it over. What's wrong with 
that? But if the money's there to cut it then we continue 
to cut it ... We tend to wait until the budget is being 
prepared and you immediately see what you did last year 
because its easier".
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Figure 7: Incremental Build-Up from the Budget Base, Authority A






































Thus at this political level 'existing policy' appeared in effect to 
be taken at face value, in this example, for lack of ability to do 
much else in the time made available; this theme was also echoed at 
the officer level in Authority A by the Chief Accountant in connection 
with the actual preparation of the authority's estimates:
"You take the figures at face value unless they vary wildly 
from the previous year or unless they are a particularly big 
budget. You eliminate the 'last year +10%' business where 
you've got the knowledge to do so".
On this evidence the role of the cognitive limits of these actors in 
defining their responses to areas of the budget base seems clear 
enough.
Further, as this last quotation hinted, such officer-level review of
132
expenditure as there was appeared to consist of examining the vertical 
changes proposed from the previous year (ie the increment - columns 5, 
6 and 7 of Figure 7), and exploring the variation from the pattern 
implied by the parameters laid down at the start of the budget process 
for the year in question. In effect, reviewers then applied their own 
criteria as to which variations in the increment warranted attention 
and which did not. One key criterion in this review was the size of 
the variation itself:
"Wide variances from the [previous year's] estimates prompt 
closer attention. You go deeper if you find the thing 
really is in a state" (Chief Accountant).
A second key criterion was the size of the item itself. As Gershuny 
(1981: p202) noted, there comes a point where diminishing returns set 
in on the likely benefits of any additional review:
"If it's on £50 to £100 or so, we probably don't take too 
much notice, but if it's on, say, £5-£10,000 or so, we may 
say 'you aren't having it'" (Assistant Treasurer).
The third key criterion for investigating areas of the increment, 
which in some ways governed the application of the first two, was the 
expectations of reviewers of the 'norm' in particular areas of the 
budget based on their ' local knowledge' of those areas:
"We don't object too strongly if we're not talking of 
thousands and thousands, but we'll say, 'okay, fair enough, 
but if you*re going to buy micro-film gear that' 11 save you 
on printing and stationery, so we'll knock that off a bit'. 
It's not laid down, but I think most of us work on those 
lines" (Accountant).
"... the things we look far, are, 'what's the general 
[percentage] rate of inflation on that item?' ... if it's 
gas or electricity, it tends to be higher. Basically, 
you're looking at things which don't ring true. You go back 
to them [the Department] and say, 'Look, we think this is a 
bit high, why?'. There may be a good reason for it. Some­
times, rather than ask for more they may keep the thing at 
the same level or a low increase. If there's a major 
variation down as well as up, we will say 'What's the 
reason, is it a mistake?'" (Chief Accountant).
133
To this extent, therefore, review merely of the increment seemed a 
fairly detailed and specialised activity, leaving aside any thought of 
approaching the base itself. Thus, in sunmary, the data provided 
plausible grounds for the budget base to be seen as a heuristic used 
by the actors in Authority A in meeting the cognitive constraints upon 
them. Large areas of its budget were rolled forward apparently 
unreviewsd - and acknowledged as such - and such reviewing activity as 
there was appeared to be focused on expectations concerning the shape 
and size of the increment allowad. However, we shall see from 
Authority B that as far as the cognitive 'hypothesis' of the role of 
the base itself is concerned, the application of 'local knowledge' in 
the manner outlined is something of a two-edged sword: indeed, echoing 
this theme generally, it was here that the now familiar doubts about 
the cognitive 'hypothesis' of the role of the budget base began to 
emerge. As a preliminary observation, the extract from Authority A's 
budget book in Figure 7 apparently conclusively showing the role of 
the base in its budget process was in fact the 'left-hand page' 
referred to in Figure 5 (on page 116 above), which showed Authority 
A's analysis of unit costs. That is to say, the incremental analyses 
of the type in Figure 7, and the unit cost analyses of the type in 
Figure 5 were printed beside each other in the budget book. Clearly, 
a certain amount of 'background' data on the budget base was 
available, indicating perhaps that there is no necessary connection 
between an apparent lack of review of the budget base, and an 
inability to review it.
However, we may then develop these doubts to the point of speculating 
whether the cognitive problems apparently prompting the use of the 
budget base in Authority A were actually as serious as they might 
appear. For example, we saw earlier (pi06) that there tended to be a
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trade-off between cognitive problems arising from the physical scale 
of the task of budgeting and the level of resources made available to 
do it. To the extent that the budget base is a response to the same 
cognitive problems of scale, then that conclusion applies here, also. 
While the brute fact of resource shortage tended to prompt a greater 
readiness to review activities (eg Greenwood, 1983: ppl66-7), as, eg 
Tomkins (1981: pl3) pointed out, reviewing is itself an expenditure of 
resources. In Authority A, there were times when it was felt that 
these could not be made available:
We've been frustrated because we've had to divert people 
... but we've got the cost investigation group who are part 
of audit. At the moment, they're fully stretched 
[elsewhere] but the idea is that ... [they] select areas of 
the budget for the most intensive investigation. That has 
now more or less come to a halt, but hopefully it will 
resume" (Treasurer).
When the resources for review were not available, existing routines 
and expenditure simply remained unchanged by default:
"There are times when you've got so much on, you sit back 
and think, 'sod it, I'm blowed if I'm going to change this, 
I'm just going to get on with it' because you're absolutely 
bogged down" (Chief Accountant).
However, if the apparent cognitive problems of budgeting are really a
function of the resources available, then when the resources are
present in other forms, the problems may be negotiated in other ways. 
One major alternative 'resource' in this sense is potentially the
attitude of the other actors in the process:
"Environmental health actually give us a working paper on 
each budget head, which is the best I've come across. It 
saves a lot of questions ... and I know they split their 
budget down" (Accountant).
Also, supporting the findings of Greenwood (1983: pl58) and Tonkins 
(1983: pll), the Assistant Treasurer noted how:
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"To a certain extent, the Treasury role has been diminished 
because everybody is now far more aware of and bothered by 
major financial affairs. That applies both to Members and 
other officers of this authority ..."
Equally, a lack of review in an area such as those outlined may be 
because resources have been redeployed in other ways. In Authority A, 
while the cost investigation unit was caught up with other work (see 
above), there were developments in reviewing the budget in other ways, 
at other levels. For example, it was planned to establish what 
Greenwood (eg 1983: pl62) called a 'Spanish Inquisition' phase in the 
budget process. As we saw on plOl, the Treasurer saw it thus:
"I have in fact sent a memo to [name] who manages the 
estimates saying that in future will he build into the 
process before agenda conference or Caimittee a niche for me 
to interview chief officers to go through the thing. The 
idea would be that I would be briefed by my fellows about 
where the likely weaknesses would be and I would question
II
• • • •
Another departure in Authority A, also noted by Greenwood to be 
increasing, as
"... a very real attempt to probe more explicitly, albeit in 
an ad hoc manner ... into the budget base ..." (1983: pl58),
was the use of manpower budgeting:
"One aspect of digging about is manpower budgeting. We've 
camprcmised on that, year on year. We had an establishment 
... and there was an annual financial budget based on that 
... Now, the Personnel Committee eliminates posts remaining 
vacant" (Assistant Treasurer).
From observations like this, it became apparent in Authority A that 
perceptions of effectiveness - or even a form of 'political 
cost-effectiveness' - governed where and when review of the budget 
base was attempted. While these alternative areas of review were
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limited in scope, and did not challenge the 'core' assumption 
identified earlier as to the desirability of services in thenselves, 
within these limits the effect was that the degree to which the budget 
base was observed to be an unreviewed ' lump' of expenditure depended 
on where one looked.
This issue will be returned to. However, to develop further the 
observation of the selective deployment of available reviewing 
resources, it emerged that for a number of reasons it was perceived in 
Authority A that a thoroughgoing review of the overall service 
expenditure base was not actually necessary. Review may have been an 
end in itself (we shall see later that an element of this remained), 
but the focus of effort was on achieving savings, and it was felt that 
these could be achieved to the level necessary to meet the resource 
constraints then applying, or the need for them avoided, by other 
means. These other means arose in three areas. First, although we 
saw in Chapter 3 just how influential was the inpact of uncertainty, 
the high level of 'slack' resources accumulated as a response to this 
successfully ensured that although a standstill budget was seen to be 
necessary, actually reviewing or cutting the budget base was not. 
Second, even if service expenditure in the base was not reviewed 
greatly, the income in it was:
"What's happening in the area of direct savings is not so 
much spending reductions as income increases on a number of 
fronts. We review ccmnercial rents wherever possible and 
achieve receipts. We've been renegotiating leases. One 
that comes to mind is Marks & Spencer's. We've talked them 
into giving us £1.6m now and £5,000 per annum [thereafter]. 
Or again, the District Auditor has been after us for years 
to get more from trade refuse. That income went up by 
£100,000 last year and £100,000 again this year" (Assistant 
Treasurer).
Third, and in Authority A most significantly of all, it was perceived
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that the greatest potential for reducing expenditure lay not with 
service expenditure per se, but in reducing its historically very high 
levels of debt (amongst the highest in the country) and debt charges. 
In the first year of research the latter amounted to £50m in a net 
revenue budget of sane £30m. On the one hand, and this relates to the 
Marks & Spencer's example just cited, attempts were initiated to 
reduce the level of debt itself:
"We went up to [the Leader] and said 'We anticipate receipts 
of £2m'. His response was, 'Well, we're not going to incur 
further revenue charges beyond the allocation' [capital 
receipts when realised carry their own permission for 
further, capital expenditure, which would incur revenue 
running costs]. This was new to us. He asked us what we 
could do with the receipts. [The Treasurer] said, 'Well, 
you could pay off seme debt*, so we did a quick exercise to 
find out what it was worth in revenue terms, and we've been 
doing it ever since" (Assistant Treasurer).
On the other hand, as in many other authorities but with a particular 
emphasis in Authority A, resources were also applied to maintaining 
the lowest possible rate of interest in its loans pool by replacing 
higher interest loans with lower interest stock. The rationale for 
this was expressed as follows:
"The thing is, you can say 'alright, let's do a great big 
exercise and save £200,000'. Cane the end of the year 
though, your pool rate might be one or two per cent under 
what you'd budgeted, and that's an immediate saving of half 
a million quid" (Accountant).
As a corollary of this focus on interest rates, similar efforts were 
expended on maximising the interest on revenue balances held.
In all three of these areas, therefore, other than the continuing 
assessment of vacancy rates and charges which we have seen, it was 
generally perceived that there were easier ways of achieving savings
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than a review of the service expenditure base itself. The brute fact 
of resource shortage was sufficient at the time to prompt an active 
pursuit of these other means in Authority A, but without actually 
turning the focus of review on much of the budget base itself. Thus 
when, in the year after the standstill budget examined earlier, the 
budget parameter was set as a £1.5m cut to minimise increased grant 
penalties, the Treasurer was able to call on these three sources of 
savings just listed:
"... there was roam for getting the overall budget down [by 
£1.5m] without the trauma of sending estimates back ...
Most of that £1.5m will be found by financing measures. We 
have a lot of receipts in the pipeline which, if used to 
repay debt, will make a major difference. We're looking at 
our charges and it may well be that our income is greater 
than expected ... We also run a fairly successful overall 
financing policy, you knew, playing with balances and all 
the rest of it ..." (Treasurer).
Indeed, with resource pressures at the level then obtaining, it may be 
seen that the budget base was actively protected by such perceptions 
of alternative sources of savings.
The pattern of review in Authority A, then, was the result of a fairly 
clearly defined set of perceptions about the most effective and 
'painless' deployment of available reviewing resources to achieve a 
desired level of savings. While we cannot say on the basis of what we 
have seen here that the base could have been reviewed, it may also be 
seen that there was a sound nan-cognitive reason for the fact that it 
was not actually reviewed: review was not an end in itself and 
therefore was not felt to be necessary, because easier means of 
achieving the necessary level of savings were available. It may be 
objected that this is in itself a cognitive limits argument, inasmuch
139
as the other means outlined of achieving savings were easier precisely 
because of the cognitive problems of reviewing the base. There are 
two responses to this, however. First, by 'aiming off' before the 
point of attempting to review the base was actually reached - ie, on 
the grounds that this was unnecessary - the actors in Authority A were 
never actually observed to best the cognitive feasibility or otherwise 
of reviewing it. The 'hypothesised' cognitive role of the budget base 
therefore remained unproven and, even, improvable. Second, and 
ultimately more conclusively, however, we shall see later that 
'problems' experienced in reviewing the budget base in both 
Authorities A and B were at least as much political (big and small 
'p') as cognitive in nature.
Before leaving Authority A, though, more may be learnt from the 
response to the issue of debt and debt charges. As we have seen, debt 
charges amounted to a very substantial portion of the overall budget. 
(Even in Authority B, a more 'typical' authority in this respect, they 
amounted to nearly a quarter of its gross revenue expenditure and 37% 
of its net expenditure in the first year of the study.) While 
relatively few authorities have questioned the existence of capital 
debt per se, within the constraints of existing debt and the 
semi-statutory requirement from the 1981 Voluntary Code of Borrowing 
Practice of a minimum average debt maturity of seven years, debt 
charges themselves may be mathematically verified as the directly 
attributable effects of historical fact. Consequently this, coupled 
with a policy of continuously 'turning over' higher interest debt with 
lower interest stock, perhaps with the aid of a computer optimum 
rescheduling model, means that the base of unreviewed or unquestioned 
expenditure in this major area of the budget could quite easily as a 
matter of routine be very small.
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Now, as Stewart (1983: pl99) paints exit, ultimately efforts actually 
to reduce expenditure in this area are likely to be constrained by the 
historical profile of the debt itself and the state of the money 
markets (cf also Pendlebury & Jones, 1983: p9). However, while the 
following example from Authority A was surely a unique 'one-off', it 
shows that with a sufficiently proactive stance even the constraints 
to which Stewart refers may to sane extent be negotiable:
"Somebody casually rang us up one day for a chat, the sort 
of thing that's happened every six months for the last five 
years. [Authority A] tends to be one of the national high 
spots outside London ... They cane to us and [offer] us 
special terms, better than ... the market, but you pay a 
front end fee. The only time we will ever offer a bond from 
this authority is when we've got the cash in our hands. Now 
... this deal could give us $800m, at 4% below the market 
rate. We'd pay off all our debt and invest the rest at 
other local authorities at a rate which is favourable to 
them but which gives us income. If it did come off ... at 
the end of twelve or twenty years we'd achieve a complete 
redemption of our debt by using that income. The main 
problem with all this is we're not allowed to do it. We're 
not allowed to borrow foreign currency. We have to ask the 
Treasury, and they said 'No'. So we hope to have [the 
money] brought into Britain already in sterling to be lent 
to a major British bank who will lend [it] on to us. There 
is a company in Switzerland who will be prepared to issue at 
a fee of 10% - £4Cm, so we'd only get £360m - a promise to 
pay the bearer in twelve years, £400m. That note would be 
accepted by the lender as payment ... So on Day 1 we'd 
receive £360m, we'd give £40m to this company who would give 
us a piece of paper ... We'd give that to the lender and 
he'd say 'Thank you, I've got my £400m [$800m] back. Then 
we would pay him interest at the agreed rate. All the debt 
would pass through this middle company ... They would be 
prepared to accept £40m and turn it into £400m in twelve or 
twenty years time" (Assistant Treasurer).
The deal did not in fact transpire. Since terminating the research 
however, it is understood that a similar - albeit smaller - 
transaction has successfully been completed with a British clearing 
bank.
This examination of the debt issue shows two things. First, even 
leaving aside the flamboyant nature of the example cited, to talk of
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'the base' as a blanket term may fran a cognitive point of view be 
rather sinplistic. There are clearly different levels of review, 
ranging from 'pure incrementalism' to a 'zero-base', but it emerged 
that in major areas of the base such as debt charges, it may actually 
be relatively easy to achieve a rather higher level of review than 
others. Second, while it remains the case that Authority A would 
never have escaped its ultimate dependence on trends in market 
interest rates, it had negotiated them and had come close to doing so 
even more substantially. Thus, although the particular example given 
may be unique, its general significance should not be missed. Much as 
Stewart (1983: ppl46-9) and Greenwood (1983: pl60) also argue, we 
shall see that many of the factors such as 'existing ccmnitments' or 
supposed statutory constraints which are usually taken as 'fixed* in 
the general run of events may prove not to be if the need is perceived 
to negotiate them. Hie 'fixing', therefore, however consciously or 
unconsciously must be in the perceptions of the actors dealing with 
them.
For the present, however, we may summarise that the experience in 
Authority A not only left the cognitive 'hypothesis' of the role of 
the budget base unproven, inasmuch as non-cognitive reasons could be 
found for the lack of review, but it raised certain doubts about its 
validity. We saw fleetingly the review potential of actors' 'local 
knowledge' even if only applied in this instance to the increment. We 
saw also that decisions about the deployment of reviewing resources, 
and the relative ease of review of sane areas of the budget such as 
debt charges, may mean that there is no 'overall' base in the 
cognitive sense: the lack of review found may vary, depending on where 
one looks. These suspicions will be sustained and developed by the 
experience frcm Authority B.
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(iv)(c) The Budget Base and Cognitive Limits in Authority B
The initial impressions of the use of the budget base in Authority B 
are rather similar to those from Authority A, lending once again 
initial plausibility to the cognitive 'hypothesis' of its role which 
might have been advanced. For example, at some levels, areas of the 
budget base were again taken as prima facie valid, even if in the 
following example the effect was actually to restrain spendings
"Revenue subsidy has been determined historically here, not 
on a zero base but on historical patterns which cure updated 
for inflation. There's nothing wrong with that, really, 
where it hits reasonable levels, but here it's incremental 
updating of a base which was never adequate anyway" (Housing 
Chief Officer).
Equally, as in Authority A, it often appeared that such review as did 
occur was by reference simply to variations in the increment from the 
expected norm:
"Certain strategies cure laid down before we start, like what 
to put in for pay awards, for interest, what rates of 
inflation can be allowed on cash limits ... When the 
figures come through I look down and if anything seems 
strange I ask for explanations ..." (Treasurer).
However, also as in Authority A, there was observed an active 
reluctance to review areas of the budget base, which made the 
cognitive 'hypothesis' of the role of the base difficult to prove or 
disprove from the data gathered. This reluctance made itself apparent 
even though Authority B had a rather lower proportion of debt charges 
and so less scope for their manipulation to produce any desired level 
of savings. Possibly, this reflected Authority B's greater 
disposition towards maintaining service spending levels: we saw above 
(p83), for example, that in the first year of the research even the 
prospect of grant penalties was not sufficient to deter seme growth in
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Authority B's budget. However, when in the second year £3%n cuts were 
deemed to be necessary, these were made in the service expenditure 
base but on a strictly pro rata basis, thus, against the trend 
identified by Greenwood (1983: pl61), maintaining existing priorities 
intact. The lack of review and refusal to prioritise cuts, and 
therefore the willingness to take as valid the proportional 
composition of the base, was justified as follows:
"Broadly speaking, our existing expenditure pattern 
represents a set of priorities and that's good enough in 
terms of cuts. How you spend is how you cut" (Chief 
Executive).
To a certain extent though, the level of review of areas of the budget 
base found in Authority B would have depended, as in Authority A, on 
where one looked. Once again, review of the base in Authority B was 
much less an end in itself than simply one of the available means of 
restricting spending. Fran the Treasury's point of view, one of the 
most cost-effective ways of achieving this was to apply strict cash 
limits to sane areas of the budget, reinforced by a control of 
virement, thereby effectively farcing spending departments to 
undertake any necessary review of their budget bases for themselves:
"Normally, there would have been supplementary estimates, 
but we said 'The budget as it's printed [ie at the previous 
November's prices] holds, and it's a cash limit'. We knew 
there was slack in the budget and there would be a need for 
cash limits. We knew there was fat in there which could 
come out. If cash limits are going to be breached, they've 
got to come to us for virement. We've got to apply 
Financial Regulation 5 [governing virement] firmly ...
Slowly it squeezes the fat out" (Chief Accountant).
Clearly, the cash limits themselves could be (and were) updated 
incrementally to match the level of restraint perceived by the 
Treasury to be necessary, and the level of review then prompted would
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depend greatly on the strictness of the cash limit imposed. 
Nevertheless, as a means of restricting spending, it was often implied 
that cash limits were preferred to other budgeting techniques such as 
detailed scrutiny of the base. Figure 8 (below), provides one example 
of this in the case of "Fuel, light and etc". A better example, 
though, which would not show in the 'subjective' categories in Figure 
8, was the capitation allowance on primary and secondary education, 
where cash limits were preferred to possible attempts to 'Zero-Base' 
that part of the budget:
"A lot of education ZBB things are swept up in the 
capitation allowance ... [Tjhe Headmaster has his capitation 
allowance • •. per head of child, which he is not to 
overspend but what he does with that, we're not going to 
argue too much ... Things like telephones were in that as 
well. It gives the Head seme freedom, but at the same time 
we would have the control, they would have the freedom and 
we would have the control. Now the ZBB cuts rather against 
that ... and we took the capitation ... [It] was after all 
brought in for a purpose seme years back. The Treasurer saw 
seme advantage in terms of overall control" (Chief 
Accountant).
This, of course, begins to hint at what Danziger (1978: pl25) 
identified earlier as the "realpolitik" strand of incrementalism:
"... there would be some resistance, without a doubt, to 
making the Head Teachers define how they were going to spend 
the capitation, because it's contrary to previous 
agreements" (Chief Accountant).
It may therefore be seen that substantially for nan-cognitive 
reasons, cash limits remained the primary means of control over areas 
of Authority B's budget in preference to a deeper review of the 
purpose of the spending involved. The 'politics' of budgeting will 
concern us later: it may be noted here though, that an assessment of 
the degree of incrementalism in terms of the depth of review under the 
capitation system would have given misleading results if applied at 
the Chief Accountant's level, compared to what might or might not have
been the case (in this example) in each school.
A further area where any apparent cognitive role of the budget base 
actually found would depend on where one looked - and a further area 
of similarity with Authority A - was again that sane areas of the base 
proved easier to review than others. Thus, the Architect observed 
how, in his department,
"... we can account for time. We can ... demonstrate by 
relatively simple equations, what numbers of staff cure 
needed to do what work. We don't say, 'We are the Town 
Clerk's department, we need 200 people' - we say, 'You've 
given us a workload of so many jobs. So many jobs involve 
so many man hours at a certain level of professional 
capability".
Variations in the ease and level of review may also be seen fran 
Figure 8 below, which is an extract from a report on the budgeting 
techniques used in Authority B, put by the Treasurer to its Management 
Team. Nowhere did the level of review listed reach a Zero Base. 
Nevertheless, it may be seen that of the subjective categories 
(line-items) listed, "Building Maintenance", "Rent and Rates", "Agency 
Services" and "Debt Charges" (totalling between them sane 33% of 
Authority B's gross budget in the year the report was produced) were 
all capable of a substantially greater level of review than the 
incremental archetype would imply. Indeed, the latter three were 
verifiable on a mathematical basis without the need for further 
'digging' at all. Once again, therefore, the implication is that to 
talk of the cognitive role of 'the base' in a blanket sense was 
somewhat simplistic. Even with those areas of the base not listed 
here, such as wages, we again find ourselves caning back to the
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'political', rather than cognitive features of local authority life if 
we are to explain relative lack of review:
We've steered well clear of wages because until we've got a 
wages establishment, we're not going to get anywhere. We've 
never had one. Wages cure a sacred cow ..." (Chief 
Accountant).
So far in this account, however, we have dealt with exceptions vhich 
may be pointed out to the 'normal' operation of the budget. Now, 
though, we turn to examining the review achieved as a matter of 
'routine' by central treasury staff, if 'routine' is a definable 
category, when none of the many exceptions listed so far actually 
applied. What level of review does 'normal' budgeting routinely 
achieve? It may be seen fron Figure 8 that work was in hand to 
strengthen the procedures used to ccrnpile the budget under the 
subjective heading "Maintenance of Grounds". The following extracts 
are taken from observations of treasury staff reviewing this area - in 
their 'archetypal' role as 'guardians' of expenditure - before these 
improvements were made. The example is of a large park and recreation 
facility as the major code, although this was in fact chosen at 
random. An invitation was accepted to observe the reviewing process 
during a particular week, but at any time during that week, and it was 
not known in advance which area of the budget would be dealt with. 
There are therefore no specific reasons why the extracts presented 
should be in any way 'abnormal', although this retains a possibility 
subject to verification from further research. The conversation is 
between Authority B's Chief Accountant and a budget assistant 
(labelled respectively CA and BA), taking place around a VDU giving 
access to the computerised budget database, code by code.
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Extract 1
BA "Licences. What are we going to have licences on? Has the road 
fund licence gone up in the past year?"
CA "Er, no it hasn't."
BA "So it could stay at around £200, although they didn't spend
II
• • • •
CA "Well, if they're parks staff, they're not going to want a 
licence for it, are they, because they don't operate on a 
highway. So it's only the stuff they've got that goes out on the 
road, the two tractors. Yeah, keep it at £200".
BA "RScR [renewals and repairs] fund contributions. I assume it
stays at the original estimate because they're not having any new 
vehicles are they?".
CA "We'll think about that one, put it as a query".
Extract 1 appears to confirm the incremental stereotype: 'when in 
doubt, the same as last year', with the sums of money in each 
allocation as the indicator of need. Note, though, the level of 
detailed 'local knowledge' of this - randomly chosen - code, which 
even the Chief Accountant responsible for budgeting throughout the 
entire authority brings to bear on the problem. This echoes the 
finding noted briefly in Authority A - even if, in both cases, local 
knowledge is applied to reviewing the increment as much as the base. 
The R&R fund contributions were in fact formula-based, according to 
the value of existing vehicles and hence relatively easy to fix 
precisely.
Extract 2
This extract is of the review of fee income:
CA "Fishing ..."
BA "[Name] thinks we'll get £3,000 but I'm not so sure...".
CA "Well, [name] goes fishing and they sit there all night and do
it, so ... [goes to VDU to check winter income]. Yeah, there's a
couple of hundred quid ...".
BA "So it looks as if it will be £3,000 this year ...".
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CA "Okay, so keep it at that .... Tennis. Does that happen all 
year? [goes to VDU] There's seme there".
BA "We might get a little, but not much before the end of the year".
CA "He could go a bit higher, though, couldn't he? I mean, we're
already above £8500. Go to £8800. That's fair enough. Is that 
pitch and putt? Gosh, that's down [goes to VDU]. That's a bit 
poor. And yet I see they still manage to lose as many golf 
balls. Sod that ...".
BA "Football ... We've still got the winter to ccme. It looks
pretty realistic, that £15,000".
CA [Goes to VDU]. "I don't think they'll get quite that far. I
think we'll query it, its a hell of a lot".
Once again, the activity here was, at the broadest meaning of the 
term, 'incremental' insofar as the two officers were constructing the 
base cn which the budget estimate rested. Nevertheless, it can be 
seen that the level of 'local knowledge' applied to the task meant 
that the existing figures were never taken as prima facie valid in the 
manner of the incremental stereotype, but were challenged and amended 
as this was perceived to be necessary. It may be argued, rightly, 
that the charging structure in each case remained beyond review, but 
it has to be questioned whether this would be an officer-level 
function anyway. If not, then the cognitive limits 'hypothesis' - ie 
whether or not it was cognitively possible to review the charging 
structure - remained untested: it was not the officers' job, and 
accordingly they didn't tryl It is also interesting here to note the 
ritualised 'guardian v. advocate' roles played by the two actors, as a 
means of arraying their 'local knowledge' to apply it to the task at 
hand and how these roles alternated as one or other of than acted as 
the 'devil's advocate' (cf also Danziger, 1978: pl65). This was a 




BA "This is an interesting point, actually. Since [name] left, a
lot of their administration is done here at the Civic Centre, so
their stationery and other admin expenses will be reduced. Also, 
I was wondering about our own admin charge [re-charge], if we 
should think of putting that up to match?".
CA "Yeah, okay".
BA "Postage. Now, they won't have that any more".
CA "Right, so we'll take it out then".
BA "Yes, that's all done through here, now. This 'other
travelling'. I knocked it down because fares were going down.
We don't know where we are on that do we?".
CA "They never spend it. Knock it down anyway".
Extract 3 shows once again, even at this micro-level, the extent of 
'local knowledge' which budgeters bring to the task, and the level of 
review which this allows them. In this case, as a result of knowledge 
of the effect of the Parks' Department's move to the Civic Centre, one 
code was reduced and one code was deleted. The Treasury's own income 
was also boosted by the corresponding increase in the re-charge.
Again, it is not claimed that this represented the maximum possible 
depth of review, since the existence of the service at issue remained 
unquestioned, but we have seen that this would scarcely be an 
officer-level task anyway, which leaves the ' hypothesised' impact of 
cognitive factors untested. Nevertheless, it may be seen that, with 
the existence of one code questioned along with the level of another, 
the incremental definition of existing spending as prima facie valid 
did not apply. The decision on 'other travelling' was interesting, in 
that the allocation was reduced virtually on the basis of a lack of 
knowledge: the Chief Accountant almost refused to allow himself to be 
distracted by the detail of the issue. An actor's cognitive limits, 




CA "Ah, wash and inspection time. Now
BA "This is mostly v^ges".
CA "Where's this got with you, John, at the Engineer's?" [calls
across to accountant concerned].
J "Nowhere. They're suggesting deleting it as a cut, it's
inoperable".
CA "What are they going to ccme up with instead?"
J "Staff - early retirement. Apparently they've applied en masse".
CA "Not so, actually. So, anyway, we'd better make a note of that.
The idea was that other Committees would also partake. It looks 
like it's going to be impossible, because if the Engineer is 
going to drop the idea of the [vehicle] pool, it's obviously not 
going to happen elsewhere".
BA "Delete it from the budget altogether, you mean?"
CA "No, that was the idea, if you remember, the ending of this
pre-start check, but there' s been union opposition to it ...
They used to get overtime to do it, and the idea was that they 
would do it in the normal day ... It's another one of these 
rip-offs. I think we're stuck with this one ...".
The three previous extracts were progressively less 'incremental's 
echoing the theme introduced on pl45 above, this extract shews, thus 
foreshadowing issues to ccme later, that even at the officer-level 
where a lack of review does prevail, this may be in recognition not of 
the cognitive but of the political facts of life in the authority.
The generalised political reluctance to address the issue of wages, at 
least as seen through the eyes of the Chief Accountant, was noted on 
pl48, above. Similarly, in Extract 2, where a lack of review of price 
structures was noted, this was also due to a political lack of 
willingness to undertake the task, rather than to any officer 
emission. One cognitive feature to emerge from Extract 4 however, was 
the 'use' of the organisation - in this case the accountant dealing 
with the Engineer's Department, to gain further insight into the 
matter at hand.
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On a general note, the role of the VDU attached to Authority B's 
mainframe canputer budget database was interesting, in that although 
Extract 2 reveals this most clearly, it was continuously in use. It 
provided a rapid source of information and projection, thereby 
allowing each code to be examined more rapidly and thoroughly, as the 
need arose. Even Wildavsky, for all his scepticism, notes how:
"At the simplest levels, involving clear goals and 
calculable resources like writing cheques, the 
ever-increasing capacities of computerisation have relieved 
organisations of much drudgery..." (1983: p29).
It may be that at the level of drawing up and reviewing estimates the 
task of budgeting fits this description, thereby allowing computing to 
have its undoubted impact. If this is the case, though, then the 
cognitive 'hypothesis' is further weakened: as Greenwood et al (1977: 
p27) also observed, by their application computers do allow cognitive 
constraints in cases such as these to be genuinely negotiated.
We can now summarise the experience of reviewing the budget base in 
Authority B. As in Authority A, the initial impression is of the 
plausibility of the 'hypothesised' cognitive role of the budget base. 
However, also as in Authority A, review of the budget base was never 
an end in itself, so much as one of a series of possible means of 
economising and one which, furthermore, there was again a considerable 
reluctance to use. Thus, Authority B adopted a policy of cash 
limiting areas of the budget, thereby leaving spending departments to 
undertake their own reviews of spending as this was perceived to be 
necessary. Where cuts were made, this was done on a strictly pro-rata 
basis, maintaining the structure of priorities in the base at depart­
ment level untouched. In each case, non-cognitive reasons involving 
either personal or political dispositions were cited for the lack of
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review, thus leaving the cognitive 'hypothesis' used to structure the 
discussion at the very least unproven.
At the level of detailed preparation of estimates, it again emerged 
that some areas of the budget base were intrinsically easier to review 
than others, which fact cautions against using 'the base' in any 
overall sense: the level of review of the budget base actually found, 
even leaving aside the role of cash limits in shifting the burden of 
review, depended to a great extent on where in the base one looked.
The extracts cited confirmed the problems of applying the incremental 
concept of an unreviewed budget base at this level. Although suns of 
money continued at times to be reified as output indicators, and 
although in none of the extracts was the theoretical maximum depth of 
review even approached, in some cases this was no more than a reflect­
ion of the actual role of the budget and of the broad 'officer/ 
political' division of labour, much as we saw on plOO in Section (ii) 
above. As Authority B's Arts & Recreation Chief Officer put it,
"I know if I'm going to cut the grass x times this year, the
same as I'd done last year, I'd need, say, £lm for a wages
bill. Hie Treasurer knows that as well and ... he may say 
to me, 'Right, do you think you can cut back?', and I say 
'Look, if that's 15 cuts instead of 17, I could, but that's 
a policy decision'".
This of course hints again at the political facts of life in the
authority, which cure to be discussed later: at other times, these
impinged to limit the level of review undertaken even more directly 
and visibly than in the examples here.
However, and this is equally damaging for the cognitive 'hypothesis' 
of the role of the budget base, the extracts shoved that even where 
the incremental stereotype did apply to any extent, this still
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demanded a detailed knowledge of what was in the budget base. The act 
of constructing estimates was not simply the blanket application of 
vertical percentage changes - although this certainly occurred - but a 
fairly painstaking examination of each code, if only for variations 
from an expected norm, in which the actors observed displayed 
considerable 'local knowledge' of their areas of the budget. Only 
comparatively rarely were sums of money taken as prima facie valid - 
yet seme of the suns in the extracts above were as small as £200 out 
of a revenue budget of £70m. It would appear that in order to budget 
incrementally, therefore, the actors in Authority B displayed a good 
deal of the allegedly impossible levels of knowledge which proponents 
of incrementalism claim it avoids. Whatever role the budget base did 
play, on this evidence it is hard to see how at the officer level it 
functions as a cognitive heuristic in the manner incrementalism 
describes.
(iv)(d) The Budget Base: Levels of Review
It is argued that the findings from Authorities A and B, while they do 
not actually disprove the cognitive 'hypotheses' of the role of the 
budget base around which the discussion was structured, nevertheless 
cast very substantial doubts upon their usefulness and accuracy as an 
explanation of resource allocation. One point still remains to be 
addressed, though. Part of Wildavsky's original specification of the 
budget base concept was that it is "... almost never actively reviewed 
as a whole ..." (1979a: pl5, emphasis added), and it is this aspect 
which is examined here.
The ultimate validity of Wildavsky's observation is not denied. We
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have already seen, for example, how the budget process is effectively 
factored through the organisation to different parts of the authority, 
which take all or seme of the budget from their own 'points of view'. 
Wildavsky is himself keen to promote the virtues of overlapping 
sources of review, both internal and external, of different US policy 
areas, whether these be different congressional carmittees (1979a: 
pp47-58), or different review agencies such as the Bureau of Budget or 
Government Accounting Office or even spending departments themselves 
(1979a: pl8-47). In this way, any cognitive problems of reviewing the 
budget base would at least be circumvented to the point where each 
area of it could be sure of seme form of review "... once in every 
four or five years ..." (1979a: pl50).
Where the task of constructing or reviewing the budget was factored 
through the organisation in Authorities A and B, though, we saw that 
this could plausibly be ascribed to nan-cognitive features of local 
authority life - such as, at the simplest level, the basic officer- 
Member division - as to any cognitive factors. The key point here is 
that, clearly, one can review - ie, examine - a budget for different 
reasons. As Stewart (in Hopwood & Itamkins, eds, 1984: ppl5-19) shows, 
governments and local authorities may be held to account at different 
levels and on different grounds, whether these be probity, efficiency, 
congruence of spending with progranme objectives, morality, or 
whatever. One part of the authority, such as one of its spending 
departments, may also be held to account in this way by another part 
such as its Treasury. Consequently, not only may different bonds or 
links of account requiring some form of examination of their 
activities be placed on different parts of the authority; those parts 
and even some outside bodies may have their own interests in reviewing
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and examining the spending and activities of other parts.
The effects of this can be illustrated from Authorities A and B where 
at least the following individual or group sources of review were, in 
theory, separately interested (ie in requiring or owing account - or 
both - to or from other parts of the authority) as the budget was 
constructed:
(a) Departments and Departmental (g) Leader/leadership;
Budget Officers; (h) Chairmen;
(b) Treasurers' Budget Officers; (i) Resources Oomnittee/Policy Group;
(c) Chief Accountant; (j) Party Groups;
(d) Treasurer; (k) District Party;
(e) Chief Executive; (1) Service Oomnittees;
(f) Management Team;
The budget process itself was in essence a set of complex interactions 
between these various actors both within each authority and also 
vis-a-vis external groups such as the District Party. Coverage of the 
budget base in different forms and with different objectives in mind 
therefore overlapped both across this list and up or down it. In 
addition though, there was also a series of ' non-budget' sources of 
review such as vacancy panels, performance review sub-groups, value 
for money groups and an array of internal and external audit 
functions, each with their own interests and to which account was 
owed.
The cognitive issue in all this is in effect the counterpart of the 
'factoring' strategies observed in Section (ii) above in the 
discussion of cognitive problems of scale (although value decisions 
play a part, also) and is sunmarised by Wildavsky as follows:
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"Instead of the enormous burden of calculating consequences 
for others being placed on one man or organisation, the 
fragmentation of influence insures that the task will be 
factored out to many participants ..." (1979a: pl55).
However, Wildavsky himself seems to equivocate over the chain of 
causation. It is unclear whether the fragmentation he describes is a 
consequence of or reaction to cognitive problems, or whether the 
easing of cognitive problems is simply a side-effect of fragmentation 
which would have occurred in any event. The argument adopted here is 
the latter. Because of the presence of all the groups and interests 
listed, each with their demands or obligations of account, a single 
over-arching source of review would have been both superfluous and 
probably, politically (big and small 'p') unacceptable - irrespective 
of any cognitive factors. The easing of cognitive burdens, if indeed 
this occurred, was therefore more a consequence of the fragmentation 
rather than a cause, although we shall see that political interactions 
of themselves were (sometimes knowingly) used in a heuristic role as a 
means of allowing value choices to be made. The arguments here will 
be expanded later: once again, though, any cognitive 'hypothesis' of 
the role of the base (or at least the fragmentation of its coverage) 
would be open to suspicion of redundancy as an explanation of the 
behaviour in question. Once again, also, we have been forced to look 
beyond the cognitive limits strand of incrementalism to the politics 
of budgeting and resource allocation.
(v) THE BUDGET BASE, AND COGNITIVE LIMITS: OVERVIEW
Such is the centrality of the budget base to the cognitive limits
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strand of the incremental syndrome that we may reasonably form an 
overview of them together.
This examination of the cognitive limits argument rested on the 
observation that relatively little of what is often put forward under 
this heading appears to have been the subject of empirical observation 
of the behaviour involved (Danziger, 1978 being something of an 
exception). Accordingly, aspects of the argixnent were treated as 
'plausible hypotheses' which, superficially at least, could have been 
apparently 'verified' from the data gathered and in terms of 
corroboration by other writers. (It is stressed again that the actual 
gathering of the data was not structured around these 'hypotheses'.)
It is not then claimed that we have disproved these 'hypotheses' s 
indeed, it is accepted that there must ultimately be cognitive limits 
on human behaviour. It is claimed, however, that on a closer 
examination of the data there are often equally or more plausible 
explanations for the behaviour often ascribed to these cognitive 
factors, and that the constraints which the latter are alleged to 
impose may frequently be at least partially negotiable.
Accordingly, the cognitive 'hypotheses' examined either provide 
unsatisfactory explanations of the behaviour observed, or at times 
simply do not stand up to the data:
- entirely non-cognitive - and extremely basic - features of 
life in Authorities A and B could equally plausibly explain 
the apparent factoring of problems through time and through 
the organisation, and also the fragmentation of coverage of 
the budget base;
apparent cognitive problems of scale, to which in effect all 
three of the above features were 'hypothesised' responses,
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may in any case be greatly negotiated given the availability 
of sufficient resources;
budgeting was not exclusively line-item in the authorities 
studied, and neither did vertical comparisons in any sense 
replace horizontal ones, even if the latter tended still to 
be in monetary or percentage terms. In both cases it seemed 
easier to view these features where they occurred simply as 
part of an overall finance function, with each fulfilling a 
particular role, rather than representing the 'hypothesised' 
cognitive response to problems of making value decisions; 
an apparent lack of review of the budget base should not be 
confused with a cognitive inability to review it. Lack of 
review may be no more than a reflection of efforts to find 
the most cost-effective application of resources for 
economising, always a more likely expenditure of resources 
than review for its own sake. Equally, in the case of an 
apparent lack of review of actual priorities in drawing up 
the budget, this may reflect no more than the officer/Member 
division within the authority. We have also hinted that 
levels of review may be politically, rather than in any 
direct sense cognitively, influenced or determined; 
the budget base in its cognitive role should not be taken as 
a 'blanket' term because in the authorities studied certain 
- sometimes large - areas of it proved intrinsically easier 
to review than others;
even incremental budgeting, at the detailed estimate stage, 
seemed routinely to involve 'local knowledge' to a degree 
which incrementalists claim would either be avoided, or is 
impossible.
160
In summary, therefore, the allegedly incremental impact of cognitive 
limits upon resource allocation in the authorities observed was either 
mis-specified in that it oould not be found, not provable given the 
presence of other explanations for the behaviour observed, or highly 
variable without offering reasons as to why. These flaws are wide 
ranging: however, it will be argued here that the cognitive limits 
argorient fails primarily because in effect it is too general in what 
it implies about human behaviour. Whilst it is intuitively obvious 
that there is a sense in which their cognitive capacities must form 
part of the (relatively general) context in which budge ter s, like 
other human beings, have to operate, in no sense may these be said to 
determine and thus explain budgeters1 behaviour. The cognitive limits 
argument of itself, like brute facts, cannot directly explain the 
variations already observed in resource allocation processes, because 
it cannot explain how and why the constraints which it held to be 
imposed came to be negotiated, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
by the actors involved. (Still less can it explain or even fully 
address the related issue of why sane programmes do or do not receive 
funds (eg Schick, 1983: p3) and to what level, as lies behind, for 
example, the variations in critical policy style (Danziger, 1978: p76) 
observed in Chapter 3. We therefore need a conception of resource 
allocation that is accurately grounded in the diversity of human 
activity - even when acting in concert - rather than one which seeks 
effectively to 1 standardise1 aspects of their behaviour.
As a final ccmnent, however, possibly the one significant contribution 
of the cognitive limits strand of incremental ism is the indirect one 
noted at the start of the chapter: insofar as a universally agreed 
point of view is unlikely, it may be seen as the root cause of the 
politics (big and small 'p') vhich, we have already begun to see, may
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be invoked to provide explanations where the cognitive limits argument 
itself in its direct capacity fails. The superiority of a 'political' 
approach - suitably modified - over the cognitive limits strand will 
be developed in caning chapters. Before that however, we need to 
apply what has been learned to our original remit in Chapter 1 of 
using the lessons learned in restructuring the incremental/rational 
dichotomy. Accordingly, in the next chapter, we begin to build from 
what we have seen a theoretical framework of individuals' activity, 
for this purpose. The cognitive limits strand of incrementalism is 
deficient ultimately because its 'model of man' is deficient. We 
shall now begin a theoretical framework which learns from the 
deficiencies.
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CHAPTER 5. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT: INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR
CIRCUMSTANCES
(i) INTRODUCTION
This chapter turns to applying the lessons which have emerged so far 
from our examination of the brute facts of resource shortage and 
uncertainty in Chapter 3, and frcm the cognitive limits strand of 
incrementalism in Chapter 4. As reflected in the quotation frcm 
Machiavelli's "Hie Prince" at the beginning of Chapter 3, the key 
theme to emerge from what we have seen is that although the two brute 
facts and, in a rather different sense, cognitive constraints formed 
part of the context within which the actors observed actually 
operated, they nevertheless left those actors with choices of reaction 
open to them. If these choices were - consciously or unconsciously - 
made 'correctly', then the external or cognitive factors in question 
could be offset or negotiated. Thus, in sunmary, we saw how 
allocation levels continue to vary in the face of resource shortage; 
how the impact of uncertainty can be cushioned by 'slack* resources 
and by the use of the budget base to the point where its impact may be 
attenuated; and in particular how cognitive constraints - where these 
were identifiable separately from other possible influences cxi the 
behaviour observed - were frequently capable of being offset or 
overridden. However, the brute facts, and cognitive constraints (such 
as they cure), are not of themselves capable of explaining how or why 
this negotiation occurs, and cannot therefore be said to have 
'determined' the outcome. We therefore need a theoretical approach
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capable of rectifying this emission and in so doing of addressing the 
issue of how far individuals may 'make a difference' for themselves in 
the face of the constraints upon them; at the same time, it will 
eventually be seen that we are laying the foundations of a framework 
capable of superceding the contradictions and inconsistencies of the 
incremental/rational dichotomy.
Framed in this way, much as we have hinted already, and indeed as we 
suspected would be the case before the research began (see Appendix), 
such a remit appears inmediately to rule out, for example,
'contingency'-based conceptualisations of what we have seen so far. 
Whereas behaviour in the authorities studied was characterised by a 
variety of responses to, and negotiations of constraints by the 
individual actors observed,
"Research [within the contingency school] snacks of 
deterministic assumptions. The organisation is said to 
adjust to the environment. This entails a problem ... of 
adopting a simple, unidirectional causal assumption where it 
does not appear to be warranted" (Miller, 1981: p7, emphasis 
in original).
A similar point may be made of cognitive constraints, although these 
do not acme within the range of factors which Miller has in mind. 
Nevertheless, although his overall stance remains within a modified 
contingency 'view*, the sentiments he expresses here in some respects 
fit the data rather well. Clearly, a certain amount depends on what 
is understood by "adjusting to": an element of passive acceptance of 
events and constraints was present on seme occasions, but we have 
begun to see that much the stronger theme to emerge was one of actors 
reacting to these events and constraints, on their own terms. They 
were not merely accepted: steps were taken to minimise or steer their 
impact and perhaps, as we shall see, even to turn them to positive 
advantage, much as Machiavelli envisaged over 450 years ago.
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However, and here Miller's own analysis reveals its shortcomings, not 
only are contingency approaches too deterministic to capture 
realistically what was observed, but in seeking to explain 
organisational behaviour and structure they are based at the wrong 
level of analysis. We are trying here to explain the nature and 
operation of resource allocation processes, and have seen evidence 
that the key features in this respect are the perceptions of the 
individual actors involved as to the 'best* course of action in the 
circumstances - judged by whatever criteria consciously or 
unconsciously were taken to be relevant. If resource allocation is 
viewed in this way we shall see that the object of the explanation is 
no longer the organisation itself or its various structures, so much 
as the processes by which actors' views come to be formed and 
enacted. The organisation and its structures themselves become, 
rather, the arena within which the activity of interest takes place.
There are, though, further problems with contingency-type analyses. 
Miller's own approach in fact uses 'internal' contingent factors such 
as "strategy" or "decision-making style" (eg 1981: p9) which might be 
thought partially at least to meet the point just made. However, in 
operationalising these factors as 'variables', his approach 
effectively isolates areas of human behaviour from their context in a 
way which is unrealistic, and which comes close to reifying these 
factors by bestowing upon them direct causal powers which they do not 
have. This can be seen frcm the example in Chapter 3 where, initially 
as a response to uncertainty, Authority A constructed and enacted a 
standstill budget largely reflecting its Leader's autocratic pursuit 
of his own view of the 'right' course of action. Miller would 
presumably focus upon this autocratic style, albeit as part of a 
'gestalt' (1981: pp9-15), ie, a coherent set of internal and
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external contingent factors. In contrast, it is argued here that the 
nature of the Leader's perception of events and (as we shall see 
later) his active use of the tradition of autocratic decision-making 
in Authority A to strengthen and justify his position are at least as 
important in explaining the enactment of the standstill as the 
autocratic style in which it was in fact enacted. Hinings et al (eg 
1980: ppl6-18) and Greenwood et al (eg 1977: pp30-2) seem to make a 
similar mistake with their concepts of "values" and "interests" which, 
as ' variables', apparently help to explain the presence or otherwise 
of rational management structures, somehow independently of any action 
or application of them by the people whose values and interests they 
actually are I Indeed, Greenwood et al (1980a: pl71) explicitly 
foresee that the role of individual actors in determining structures 
may actually decrease.
The real problem with all this is that "strategies" and 
"decision-making styles", and also "values" and "interests" are to a 
greater or lesser extent figure of speech abstractions frcm aspects of 
individuals' behaviour or views. Hence, although it may be 
intelligible to talk for example of the role of the decision-making 
style in Authority A in arriving at the standstill budget, as a figure 
of speech it should not then be taken as a logically identifiable and 
analytically sound explanation separately frcm the actors involved. 
Accordingly, the focus here is not cn abstracted 1 variables', whatever 
their shorthand value, but on the individual actors whose views and 
behaviour actually 'formed' the internal 'variables' immediately at 
issue, and which as we have seen also formed the mediating response to 
external brute facts.
A c co rd in g ly , fo llo w in g  th e  in c re a s in g ly  obvious prom pting w hich began
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to arise from the data, we now begin the oonstruction of an 
individual-level framework to meet the requirements which it 
suggested.
(ii) INDIVIDUALS' ACTIVITY: THEORETICAL BASIS
The starting point for theoretical development is very broadly (and, 
as the account progresses, much more broadly) the symbolic 
interactionist school of thought derived largely frcm the work of 
GH Mead, and perpetuated and developed by, eg, Blumer (1962); Rose 
(1962); Hall (1972); and Ashworth (1979). It will also become clear 
that much is owed in particular to the work of Mangham (1979). We 
have seen that prior knowledge of the ideas of this school had 
influenced the basically 'individualist' predisposition of the writer 
in his data collection and analysis: clearly, it would be implausible 
to expect a total absence of preconceptions 1 Nevertheless, in the 
"retroductive" manner outlined by Bulmer (1979: p659), the framework 
developed here emerged frcm, and is therefore justified by, the data 
inasnuch as it is 'realistic' and appears genuinely to enhance our 
understanding of resource allocation processes, for all the fact that 
its emergence then served to 'verify' the preconceptions referred 
to. (For further details of the theoretical development process, see 
the Appendix cxi methodology.)
(ii)(a) Basic Concepts: The 'Definition of the Situation'
The initial premise from which the framework arises, taken both as
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axiomatic and justified by the data, is expressed by Mangham as:
"The specifically human powers that we have related to our 
capacity to think, to plan and to monitor our own 
performance ...".(1979: pl4)
Thus, we saw for example the various individual responses to cognitive 
constraints (see pp96-7) above, and the various perceptions of the 
actors involved as to the best means of negotiating uncertainty. 
Without going too deeply into the psychological and sociolinguistic 
underpinnings of symbolic interactionism, the basis of these 
'specifically human powers that we have' is the self-awareness, for 
want of a better expression, enjoyed by human beings deriving 
ultimately from their ability to represent a situation and their role 
in it to themselves through the use of language:
"... the capacity to use language enables the actor to 
conceive of himself as an object unto himself; as a factor, 
that is, in his own environment ...
An organism which has some level of awareness of itself as
part of the world has the potential for mastery of its own
acts... Such an organism can anticipate the behavour of 
others of its species and anticipate, monitor and justify 
its own behaviour ..." (Mangham, 1979: p26).
This capacity to anticipate and to form a view of one's own and
others' behaviour is central to an individual's ability to function in
a context containing other people:
"... each individual must be able to interpret his intended 
actions and the actions of others. In other words, the 
actor must be able to assign meanings to the acts of the 
other in such a way that he can act appropriately for 
himself"(Mangham, 1979: p30; second emphasis added).
Here we have the 'definition of the situation'. The term is usually 
ascribed to W I Thomas who captured what is meant with the epigram "if 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences"
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(cited in Ashworth, 1979: p28). People do not react directly to each 
others' actions and to events and trends around than but on the basis 
of the meanings or definitions which they came to put on those 
actions or events: hence the importance noted above and which emerged 
in Chapters 3 and 4 on the perceptions of the actors studied in 
explaining the activity observed. However, we saw enough also to 
grasp that as well as embodying a perception element, definitions of 
the situation also embody a prescription, and are in effect a 
combination of the two. An event or events are perceived and meanings 
are ascribed to them by the perceiver: that meaning, though, will also 
prompt, consciously or unconsciously, a view as to the 'appropriate' 
response (even if this is 'no response') and it is this which is the 
prescriptive element of the definition of the situation in question. 
The twin elements of perception and prescription are scarcely 
separable in practice and are frequently simultaneous. Nevertheless, 
it is on this basis that two actors could perceive the same 
interaction, but each from their own viewpoint, and arrive at 
different prescriptions of the 'appropriate' action.
Now Mangham - and symbolic interactionism generally - are concerned 
mainly with definition-forming processes between individuals. Thus, 
both Mangham's own work, and that of, eg, Hall (1972) are overtly 
concerned with the interpersonal activity in the political (big and 
small 'p') arena, and in this context we shall see later that they are 
extremely valuable. However, we have not yet directly addressed the 
political and interpersonal aspects of resource allocation at all, but 
merely (usually following an examination of the responses observed to 
the brute facts of resource shortage and uncertainty, or in the light 
of the inadequacies of the cognitive argument) noted their existence. 
Consequently, the data examined so far is of interest here not so
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much for what it reveals of interpersonal processes, but for prompting 
the emphasis that, often as a prelude to those interpersonal 
processes, actors also attach meanings as individuals to, and form 
definitions of these non-interactive features of their circumstances, 
even if on the basis of observing or learning others' behaviour 
towards them or on the basis of past interactions (Mangham, 1979: 
pp30-l). Many of the inadequacies of the cognitive strand of 
incrementalism, and the lack of a directly determining influence frcm 
the brute facts arose partly because, outside the more usual 'remit* 
of symbolic interactionism, consciously or unconsciously, actors also 
perceived these in their own ways and defined them 'accordingly', 
thereby mediating the impact of the factors in question on themselves 
and explaining in part the variations observed in their responses.
On this basis there are two specific levels of consequences of these 
definitions of non-interactive features. On the one level we saw that 
actors may form for themselves definitions of external events learnt 
about non-interactively (eg from the press) or aspects of their own 
environments, such as uncertainty, and arrive at their cwn conclusions 
prior to any interaction with other actors on the issue. These would 
then, subject to revision, form the basis of their stance on that 
issue. An example here might be each relevant actor's prescriptions 
as to the 'necessary' level of slack resources to maintain in the 
budget, given his perception of the possible range of future events. 
The level finally fixed would of course reflect discussions between, 
say, the Treasurer and his subordinate technical staff before it 
became 'the authority's' or 'officers'' response to the uncertainty 
defined to be present. Nevertheless, it remains possible that the 
initial definitions or standpoints which each actor brought to these 
interactions were formed on the basis of meanings attached by each 
alone to external events as he saw them. On the second level, though,
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such definitions of non-interactive features m y  then actually shape 
the interpersonal and political definition-forming processes which 
occur. Thus, we saw frcm the extracts frcm the budgetary review 
process in Authority B cited on ppl49-52, that each actor clearly had 
his own definitions of what the figures presented actually 'meant' in 
themselves, and thus of any corrections which were necessary. It was 
these largely non-interaction-based definitions held by each officer 
which then formed the basis of their discussions to define whether 
action was needed, or perhaps whether more information was required 
frcm the department in question, and which also thereby initiated 
further interpersonal or political interactions, or not, as the case 
may be.
Notwithstanding the emphasis here on definitions of non-interactive 
features, it should be stressed that the basic process of actors 
attaching meanings to their perceptions of events and then acting, as 
they took it to be, 'accordingly', remains similar to the 
interpersonal processes between individuals which are the more normal 
'remit' of symbolic interactionism. The lack of stress so far on 
these latter, to repeat, merely reflects the preoccupations of the 
thesis so far, and this balance will be redressed shortly. However, 
for the present, we now have the basic outline of the concept of 
definition of the situation which the data examined so far suggested 
ought to apply. There cure though, a number of refinements to the 
basic proposition and it is to these which we now turn.
(ii)(b) Process, Change and Stability
It is held that the process of forming definitions of the situation is
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ro o ted  in  th e  v e ry  essence o f  human a c t iv ity  -  we have seen fo r  
exam ple th a t Mangham saw th is  a b i l i t y  as th a t which makes us 
d is t in c t iv e ly  human. R e fle c tin g  th is , th e  concept does n o t a p p ly  a t  
any one le v e l o f  a c t iv i t y  b u t u n iv e rs a lly  and a ll-p e r v a s iv e ly  a t  every  
le v e l o f  human b e h av io u r. 'A  s itu a tio n * is  s im p ly  a s e t o f  
circum stances w ith in  an a c to r 's  -  o r an o b s e rv e r's  -  focus a t  a g iven  
tim e : th e  s itu a t io n  is  d e fin e d  by th a t fo cu s . A c c o rd in g ly , bo th  
observed and o b server form  d e fin it io n s  a t  a l l  le v e ls  and to  d if fe r in g  
degrees o f  a b s tra c tio n , b u t w hich m ight e a s ily  o v e rla p  o r  be 
co m p le te ly  subsumed w ith in  o th e r d e f in it ia ls ,  o r  even where th e  mean­
in g s  a tta c h e d  to  w hat is  observed a re  c o n flic t in g  o r c o n tra d ic to ry . 
From th e  p o in t o f  v iew  o f  th e  a c to rs  observed h e re , d e fin it io n s  o f  
aspects  o f  b u d g etin g , fo r  exam ple, may be c o n d itio n ed  by o verla p s  w ith  
o th e rs  concerning th e  f in a n c ia l c lim a te  o r  th e  a t  tim es c o n tra d ic to ry  
p e rc e p tio n  o f th e  need to  m eet u n c e rta in ty  w ith  s la c k  reso u rces, th e  
n a tu re  and f in a n c ia l s ta tu s  o f  th e  a u th o r ity  i t s e l f ,  how th e  a c to r  
fe e ls  th a t  day, o r  w h atever. F ran  th e  p o in t o f  v ie w  o f  th e  o b server, 
th e  ta s k  is  th en  to  form  d e fin it io n s  which a re  'a c c u ra te ' and 
c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  s tru c tu re  and n a tu re  o f  those -  o r th o se o f  them  
d e fin e d  by th e  o b serve r as 's ig n if ic a n t ' fo r  h is  purposes -  formed by  
th e  observed. O n ly  th en  do we p ro v id e  a t r u ly  r e a l is t ic  e x p la n a tio n  
o f  w hat is  observed.
However, n o t o n ly  do d e fin it io n s  o f  th e  s itu a t io n  o v e rla p  a t  a l l  
le v e ls  and in  a l l  c ircu n s ta n ces  b u t, ag a in  r e f le c t in g  i t s  b a s ic  ro le  
in  human a c t iv i t y ,  d e fin itio n -fo rm in g  is  a continuous process as each 
a c to r  p e rce iv e s  and a tta c h e s  meaning to  each new s itu a t io n  in  w hich he 
fin d s  h im s e lf o r to  w hich he s h if ts  h is  fo cu s. A g a in , th is  happens a t  
a l l  le v e ls  a t  w hich d e fin it io n s  a re  formed -  w hich is  to  say , a l l  
le v e ls , from  say, e n te rin g  a room, to  m eeting a c o lle a g u e , to
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finalising one department's estimates and beginning another's, to 
beginning a new budget cycle, or whatever. As Hall (1972: pp39-41) 
puts it,
" . . .  th e re  a re  numerous a m b ig u itie s , c o n s tra in ts , problem s 
o r c o n flic ts  w hich re q u ire  new o r  changing d e fin it io n s  . . .  
[A ]c tio n  emerges frcm  th e  meaning g iven  to  th e  s itu a tio n  by 
th e  in d iv id u a l as a  r e s u lt  o f  th e  in te r p r e ta t iv e  process  
which occurs co n tin u o u s ly  and c o n s ta n tly  as th e  in d iv id u a l 
moves frcm  s itu a tio n  to  s itu a t io n " .
Mangham (1979: p27) effectively makes the same point.
Frcm a purely analytic point of view, though, such scope and fluidity 
would be highly problematic for any attempt to build a discriminating 
framework. Fortunately, running through the continuous and universal 
processes of definition-forming there cure strands of consistency and 
recurrence. On one level, individuals define situations in ways which 
for whatever reason are distinctively 'theirs' (eg, Ashworth, 1979: 
pl2), as in the observation, "I might have known so-and-so would do 
that", or in Mandy Rice-Davies' famous quip, "Well he would, wouldn't 
he?". It is this feature which allows people to form definitions of 
others' characters and views, and to learn a type of behaviour towards 
them which appears to be ' appropriate', be that to satisfy them or to 
realise seme other objective of the actor's, or both. On another 
level, but closely related, these identifiable consistencies arise 
directly frcm individuals' abilities to learn and remember. For 
example, Mangham stresses that:
"Actors do not interact in a void and construct their world 
ab initio on each and every occasion, but they approach 
interaction already influenced by past social experience 
and, to a marked extent, their choices (insofar as they are 
aware of them at all) are limited, if not determined, by the 
pattern of behaviour most frequently utilised by other 
social actors past and present, in what are taken to be 
similar circumstances" (1979: p70).
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Each definition formed is therefore substantially the outcome of the 
application by the actor to the circumstances in question of 
preconceptions consciously or unconsciously constructed from his past 
experience - that is, from remembered definitions of the situation 
're-applied' to present circumstances.
Once again, the main interest of symbolic interactionism itself 
appears to be with consistencies and themes in interpersonal 
definition-forming processes Which, for reasons we have seen, will 
interest us more at a later stage. Here, however, the data from our 
study of the impact of cognitive constraints and from what we have 
seen so far of the environmental brute facts emphasise that 
definitions formed of non-interactive features could also be 
remembered, to be re-applied as ' preconceptions', to subsequent events 
as these were consciously or unconsciously perceived to dictate. One 
very basic example would be the learning of 'workable' responses to 
constraints such as those arising from cognitive factors or 
uncertainty: thus, the use of percentage change comparisons and the 
provision of slack resources are not one-off occurrences, but recur 
year after year as fairly standard approaches. Certainly, 
particularly in the latter case, there would also be an interactive 
aspect, as the slack 'strategy' came to be applied to the 
circumstances as defined for the year in question, but the point still 
stands. The creation of slack resources was one of a range of 'stock' 
responses to uncertainty, in effect, and so it is likely that each 
actor involved, as for example in the quotes on p75, would have had 
his own definitions of the potential and scope for slack to ease the 
problems of uncertainty with which he saw himself or the authority to 
be faced. As such, these learned definitials of the non-interactive
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feature of uncertainty would have had a substantial impact on outcomes 
and on the interactions which then occurred.
A second example would be with the preconceptions which budgeters 
brought to the task of reviewing the budget base, about which figures 
were, say, 'tight' or 'slack* estimates. Clearly, there is an 
interactive element present here, insofar as responses to the figures 
were defined partially in interaction - and the figures themselves 
could be construed as part of an interaction with service departments 
- but again, the point still stands. We saw, for example, frcm the 
quotation on pl44 above how the Chief Accountant expressed a strong 
preconception about the level of 'slack' in Authority B's budget as a 
whole, as a justification for cash limits: it seems improbable that 
such a position was defined without reference to characteristics of 
the budget itself, as a set of figures experienced and defined 
non-interactively, notwithstanding the interactive elements through 
which this preconception may then have been reinforced, channelled or 
modified.
It would now be useful to summarise what we have seen so far. Actors 
do not react directly to events which may then be said to determine 
those reactions, but form definitions of the situation based on 
meanings they attach to their perceptions of those events. As part of 
the meanings attached, these definitions also prescribe or imply to 
each actor a particular course of action, hence the variations 
in response noted in previous chapters to the environmental brute 
facts of resource shortage and uncertainty, and to cognitive 
constraints, where these could be said to apply. The use of the 
concept of definitions of the situation in this non-interactive 
context represents something of a divergence from the 'mainstream'
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of symbolic interactionism which is itself primarily concerned with 
definition-forming processes between individuals. These, though, will 
be of greater concern later, in the context of the political strand of 
incrementalism and the interpersonal aspects of resource allocation 
which we have not yet directly addressed. However, we have also seen 
that whether interactively or not, the formation of definitions of the 
situation is a continuous, all-pervasive and very basic human activity 
- consciously or unconsciously it occurs at all levels, with 
'situations' defined simply by the focus at the time of the person 
defining, and changing as his focus continually changes to new
*
interactions, events, trends and constraints. Fortunately frcm an 
analytic point of view, we saw that there are also identifiable 
consistencies and themes which run through this defining activity, 
based largely on the learning and retention of particular definitions 
of the situation.
( i i ) ( c )  B asic  Concepts: Roles and P ro a c tiv ity
Continuing with this theme of learned and recurring definitions, one 
crucial area already hinted at but demanding separate coverage, is the 
conception maintained by each actor of his own role. Mangham (1979: 
pp33-6), following Mead, speaks of each individual as acting through a 
' self', representing the dialectical process between the ' I', which is 
his basic view of himself and his dispositions, and his 'me', which 
represents the individual's 'response to himself' in terms of what is 
required of him in each situation - frcm his own standpoint and that 
of 1 the other'. As Mangham puts it,
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"The self ... emerges from the process of interaction as the 
individual responds to and internalises others' definitions 
of him. Thus, in a very real sense I am what I take myself 
to be, but what I take myself to be is strongly influenced 
by what I take to be the attitudes and behaviours of others 
as I engage in the daily round of talking, competing or 
whatever" (1979: p34).
As the term is used here, roles then consist of those remembered 
definitions of the 'self' - ie, relating to the actor's view of 
himself, and to his stock of learned 'scripts' (Mangham, 1979:pp37-38) 
for particular types of situation - which are consciously or 
unconsciously applied to each new situation which he defines himself 
to be in and updated as this is taken to be necessary. Roles, it must 
be stressed, are not things but processes.
Once again, it may be seen that in symbolic interactionism itself the 
primary focus is on the application of the concepts of self to 
interactions between individuals. Thus, the ability to recognise the 
appropriate 'script* for the situation in which he defines himself or 
construct a role is integral to individuals' ability to interact with 
others (Mangham, 1979: p38) inasmuch as only then can the actor 
interpret the behaviour of others as it affects him, and then define 
what is required of him. This process of interaction is known as 
'role-taking' (eg Ashworth, 1982: ppl2-15; Mangham, 1979: pp35-8): in 
effect, the actor defines to himself the requirements upon him by 
attributing an identity to the other - eg, crudely, 'Treasurer seeking 
savings', or 'chief officer hiding padding' - and adjusts his " ... 
own actions in the light of this attribution" (Mangham, 1979: p38? 
see also Ashworth, 1979: pl3).
Again, though, these more iimvediately obvious applications of the 
concept of role to interpersonal and political aspects of resource
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allocation are beyond the coverage of the cognitive limits strand of 
incrementalism, and will therefore be of greater concern later on. 
However, to the extent that any definition of the situation has, as 
well as a perceptive element, a prescriptive side (see pl69 above), it 
has potential implications for the actor's view of his own position 
and purposes in the world and may therefore consciously or 
unconsciously be remembered by him as part of his role conception. 
Continuing our earlier theme, the data examined so far suggests that 
our emphasis here should be on definitions which may be formed of, or 
greatly influenced by perceptions of non-interactive features in 
actors' circumstances including, for our purposes, brute facts and 
cognitive constraints where these apply. Clearly, role-taking between 
people is an interactive process: nevertheless, actors were also 
observed to take what they defined as 'cues' for their own behaviour 
frcm their perceptions of these non-interative factors, which then 
recurred, so adding to their stock of definitions of their role. An 
example of this would again be the "pragmatic" role, in his own words 
which we saw on p74 above, that Authority A's Deputy Treasurer defined 
for himself in allowing a certain level of known padding in service 
estimates.
A second example o f th e  p a r t p layed  in  r o le -  form ing by a  
n o n -in te ra c tiv e  fe a tu re  was th a t o f  th e  budget i t s e l f .  Thus, an  
accountant in  A u th o rity  A noted how he saw h is  ro le  in  term s o f  
"p o lic in g "  th e  budget:
" . . .  you c a n 't  ju s t go o u t and spend, yo u 've  g o t to  produce 
budgets and adhere to  them. I f  you c a n 't , th e re ' s g o t to  be 
seme reason ing . The budget is  th e  b ib le , i f  you l ik e
C le a r ly , in te ra c tio n s  w ith  o th e rs  would have helped  th e  accountant to
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define for himself the significance of the budget, and then his 
application of this definition to his scrutinising role through the 
authority. Nevertheless, the importance in his role conception of the 
non-interactive feature of the budget itself, in providing what he 
came to define as cues for further activity, may also be seen.
Roles, then, are used here as the culmination at a given point in time 
of the process by which individuals form, maintain and, if they take 
it to be necessary, update their definitions of themselves as they 
relate to what they see as their positions and purposes in the world. 
Given the basic part played by definition-forming processes in human 
activity and interaction, any definition may consciously or 
unconsciously be memorised by the actor as part of his role conception 
to be redeployed at a later stage to allow him to form a response as 
events are perceived to dictate. In this sense, it must be stressed 
that roles are not a 'sub-set' of definitions formed, but simply a 
particular perspective on the overall process of forming and 
re-forming them. However, although this makes it scmewhat arbitrary 
to separate out any particular aspects of role playing, there is one 
characteristic which the data suggested it would be useful to 
synthesize. This is the extent to which actors1 role conceptions lead 
them simply to react to events as they perceive them, or to proact 
with them and attempt to negotiate their impact.
It will be recalled that what was in effect the ability of actors to 
proact with their circumstances was advanced as a major reason why the 
cognitive limits strand of incrementalism was not actually very good 
at explaining the resource allocation processes studied. Our 
examination so far of the impact of the brute facts of resource 
shortage and uncertainty, and of cognitive constraints, has suggested
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that any determinist view af those brute facts and also the cognitive 
limits argument itself cure at once both too rigid and too general in 
overlooking the scope for negotiating these factors, and thus the 
variations in response which were observed. Ironically, Wildavsky, 
perhaps the principal exponent of the cognitive limits argument, 
himself recognises the proactive aspects of role-behaviour, noting 
that in approaching budgets and resource allocation we need,
"... to examine the orientation of the participant who 
considers the factors affecting his present position as 
given, and seeks to adjust his actions accordingly, versus 
the participant who views at least part of his environment 
as subject to change ... One person acts as if he was 
hemned in on all sides, and the other, referring to much the 
same conditions, tries to alter [them]" (1979a: p20).
Presumably, given that he advances the cognitive limits argunent in 
the first place, that part of the environment Wildavsky views "... as 
subject to change..." is less than in the stance taken here. 
Nevertheless he puts the point well: the proactivity or otherwise
with which actors define their responses to events around them may of 
itself affect, and help to explain, outcomes.
We have seen that the data offered considerable evidence on which this 
proposition rests. Firstly, we saw for example how the inpact of 
resource shortage has prompted seme authorities to economise more than 
others, as reflected in the wide variations in spending levels beyond 
the extent which could realistically be portrayed as arising from 
demographic factors (see pp58-63 above). The actors involved in each 
authority, in other words, have in some cases been minded to reduce 
spending more or less, for political or other reasons, than in 
others: the level of proactivity towards the brute fact of resource 
shortage has therefore made a direct impact on outcomes, for all the
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fact that resources have continued to be ' short'. Indeed, one of the 
criticisms of expenditure targets based on previous years' budgets has 
been that it is possible to inflate then through systematic 'tactical 
overspending' over a period of time, (A!3C, 1985: p5), thereby directly 
and proactively negotiating the resource shortage actually 
experienced.
As a second example of how proactivity or the lack of it may have an 
impact on outcomes, we saw that the level of review of a budget is to 
same extent a function of the resources which the actors concerned 
have made available to overcome cognitive problems of scale. Clearly, 
at a time of resource shortage these are not unlimited: equally 
clearly though, we saw that in Authority B the stance adopted on 
review, particularly by the Chief Accountant with his computerised 
database, was more proactive than in Authority A. A third example was 
in fact the reasoning for this position in Authority A itself: we saw 
that rather than review for its own sake, a more proactive stance was 
taken instead by Treasury officers, with the Leader's sanction, 
towards reducing the level of capital debt and its revenue impact, 
culminating in the remarkable and highly proactive attempt to secure a 
massive low-interest foreign loan as a means of re-scheduling that 
debt.
Further examples of the significance of the proactivity 'dimension' of
role behaviour will become apparent, particularly in the context of
the political strand of incrementalism and the interpersonal aspects 
of resource allocation. However, we have gone as far as is feasible,
in terns of theoretical development, on the basis of the data which
has been examined so far and accordingly, we now conclude for the 
present our efforts in this direction.
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(iii) CONCLUSION: WHAT WE HAVE OMITTED
On the basis of the data examined so far on the impact of the 
environmental brute facts of resource shortage and uncertainty, and of 
our examination and critique of the cognitive limits strand of 
incrementalism, we have been able to construct the beginnings of a 
theoretical framework capable of genuinely explaining 'what goes on* 
in budgetary and resource allocation processes. However, one might be 
forgiven for thinking that the picture portrayed is, as it stands, 
somewhat unreal, with individual actors apparently single-mindedly and 
with dedication striving to define and negotiate the brute facts of 
resource shortage and uncertainty, and their cognitive constraints 
such as they are - but very little else. In a sense, this is a 
reflection of the limitations of any deterministic view of the brute 
facts involved, but above all it reflects the limitations inherent in 
the cognitive limits strand of incrementalism, not in terms of its 
overall accuracy as such, which has already been examined and fairly 
severely criticised, but in terms of what it omits of the activity in 
the resource allocation processes observed. In effect, we are 
criticising the cognitive limits strand for what it is not, and 
perhaps was never designed to be, which may or may not be unfair: 
nevertheless, the point remains that even if it were accurate, there 
would still be large gaps in our understanding of the resource 
allocation processes it is supposed to explain, because as we saw it 
serves effectively to 'standardise' the input from the individuals 
involved in a way which ignores their capacity to 'make a difference' 
within their surroundings.
As we have stressed, we have not yet addressed the 'political' strand
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of incrementalism and interpersonal aspects of resource allocation, 
and for this reason we have yet to examine the data allowing us to 
apply the concepts of symbolic interaction!sm and above all, aspects 
of Maugham's "micro-political" (eg 1979: pl6) approach, to resource 
allocation. For example, we have not yet addressed the possibility 
that actors will have their own 'private' objectives and definitions 
independently from what has hitherto been taken as 'the main 
business', that is to say, resource allocation and budgeting, but 
which can condition or entirely dominate their definitions and role 
conceptions as those relate to budgeting itself (eg, Wildavsky, 1979a: 
ppl9-29). As a second example, we have yet to address the possibility 
that actors may actually disagree as to their favoured course of 
action (whether 'unselfishly' pursuing the task of budgeting and 
resource allocation itself as they see it, or whether pursuing their 
own objectives) and that these disagreements will need to be 
reconciled, even if to the exclusion of one or other points of view.
A third area yet to be addressed is the possibility that actors will 
not act in pursuit of their definitions as individuals, but as groups: 
we would then need to examine the processes by which these groups come 
to define themselves or be defined as such, and how they then 
interact.
Moving to  a  more g e n era l le v e l, th e  fo u rth  a re a  y e t to  be addressed is  
th e  fa c t  th a t , g iven  th e  p o s s ib ility  o f  d isagreem ent o r c o n f lic t ,  
th e re  is  going to  be an 'outcom e' w hich may o r  may n o t fa vo u r one o r  
o th e r (o r  n e ith e r) group b u t w hich may th e re fo re  d ir e c t ly  in flu e n c e  
th e  d e s tin a tio n  o f  reso u rces . V h at fa c to rs  in flu e n c e  th is ?  In  s h o rt, 
we need a  conception  o f power lin k e d  to  a c to rs ' o r groups' a b i l i t ie s  
to  have th e ir  d e fin it io n s  o f  th e  s itu a t io n  enacted . T h is  w i l l  le a d  us 
to  two o b s e rv a tio n s . F ir s t ,  outcomes may be compromises b e arin g  th e
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imprint of all parties to the negotiation, while representing the 
preferences of none; second, and notwithstanding the first 
observation, not only do some individuals and groups routinely ’have 
more power* to enact their definitions than others, but this is in 
some measure influenced by the cultural rules and patterns of 
interaction which these individuals and groups ccme to allow to 
regulate their conduct. This in turn leads us to the concept of 
negotiated order, and to the power resources necessary to negotiate 
oneself into a position in the order where one's definitions of the 
situation are more likely to be enacted.
Only when we have reached this point will we be in a position to meet 
our original remit of providing a framework capable of making greater 
sense of resource allocation processes than the present incremental- 
rational dichotomy. Having been built out of our examination of how 
incrementalism caters for what it alleges is 'the reality', this 
framework will then allow us to outline the chances and potential of 
'rational' prescriptions in the 'real world' of the interactive and 
political processes of allocating resources. However, the next 
stage in this process will be our examination of the political strand 
of incrementalism, and it is to this that Part III of the thesis now 
turns.
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PART III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND POLITICS
CHAPTER 6. POLITICS AND INCREMENTALISM
(i) INTRODUCTION
In the last Chapter we laid the foundation, from our examination in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of the impact of environmental brute facts and 
resource constraints, of a framework for analysing resource 
allocation. Building loosely on the symbolic interacticnist concept 
of the definition of the situation, this framework is designed to 
accomodate the processes by which brute facts and cognitive 
constraints alike were routinely assimilated, by the actors observed, 
in ways which made a significant difference both to resource 
allocation processes and outcomes.
As we noted though, the account so far and theoretical developments 
from it are both 'unreal' and incomplete. Brute facts set the context 
within which resources are allocated, but contrary to the 
'contingency' view do not explain what occurs because they have little 
to say about the variations in response which they were observed to 
allow. The effect is that their influence is itself variable. For 
its part, the cognitive strand of incremental ism is also responsible 
for much of this incompleteness because of its own narrowness of 
scope. We saw, first, that it likewise has little to say about the 
observed variations in outcomes because it is concerned mainly with 
the nature of resource allocation rather than its content (if 
anything, in their theoretical role of prompting marginal changes, 
cognitive constraints would tend to standardise outcomes). Second, we 
saw that the cognitive argument's coverage of the nature of resource 
allocation is itself either redundant where other explanations of what
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was observed were available, or faulty and incomplete. in general 
terms, although our examination of both brute facts and cognitive 
constraints allowed us to see the scope for individuals to 'make a 
difference' in defining and negotiating their own responses to events 
and constraints around them (see also Danziger, 1978: p204), we have 
as yet emitted any direct account of resource allocation as an 
interpersonal, political process.
Accordingly, it is to the second, 'political' strand of incrementalism 
identified by Danziger (1978: pl25) that we now begin to turn. In so 
doing, however, we need to have a clear idea of what incrementalism 
actually means by 'politics', and outlining this is therefore the next 
stage to be accomplished. We shall then see that the incremental view 
of politics, although embodying a wide-ranging and macro-level theory 
of political behaviour, is seriously flawed in many respects, leading 
incrementalists to a restricted view of what 'politics' actually 
involves. As these flaws are laid out, we shall be able to outline 
the conditions which our own view of politics will need to satisfy in 
terms of accuracy and congruence with the data.
(ii) THE INCREMENTAL VIEW OF POLITICS
(ii) (a) Pluralist Bargaining
The political strand of incremental ism rests heavily on a generally 
pluralist theory of political action (eg LeLoup, 1979: p489), and as 
such contains a number of far-reaching implications which need to be 
clearly set out. This theory derives ultimately from the work of 
writers such as Dahl (1961) and Polsby (1963), however, taking
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Wildavsky (eg 1975, 1979a) as the most notable 'political 
increraentalist' (in parallel with his interest in the cognitive strand 
of incrementalism), his clearest direct antecedent is Lindblcm (eg 
1965) and the latter's concept of pluralism as "partisan mutual 
adjustment" (1965: passim). Here, multiple but essentially 
self-interested actors and groups pursue their own objectives and 
points of view, in effect providing what from a global view are a 
series of 'partial' solutions to the issues at stake (eg Lindblcm, 
1965: pl56; Wildavsky, 1979a: pl66). To a pluralist, 'politics' is 
then the bargaining of compromises between these partial views and 
self-interests to produce, in this case, allocations of resources. 
These outcomes may actually represent the views of no particular party 
to the bargaining, but in reflecting their competing and opposing 
pulls in effect become the 'resultant' of (ie the compromise between) 
the pressures which each is able to exert (eg Lindblcm, 1965: 
pp206-7), and as we shall see are thereby likely to be 'incremental' 
changes (however defined) from the status quo. As a corollary, the 
more pressures there are brought to bear on the 'resultant* outcome, 
the more interests there are reflected in it - and hence the greater 
the 'quality' of that outcome as a decision, in terms of the numbers 
of points of view it has taken into account and the satisfaction it 
will thereby have engendered (eg Lindblcm, 1965: ppl51-7, 240-2; cf 
also Jonsson, 1984: pl32).
This last point is important: it should not be forgotten that the 
pluralism and partisan mutual adjustment underlying incrementalism are 
intended to be taken as political theories and processes of government 
at the highest level. It is the "... interests, preferences Landj 
values ..." (Lindblcm, 1965: p207) in society around which the 
'partisans' in question (eg government departments and personnel,
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legislators, ministers, advisers, pressure groups etc) bargain their 
incremental compromises and reconciliations, in the national political 
process itself. As such, pluralist bargaining is then capable of 
attracting allegiance for its own sake (eg Lindblcm, 1965: p264), as 
the means of government which a 'democratic' polity might be expected 
to choose:
"The danger of omitting important values is much greater 
when participants neglect the values in their inmediate care 
in favour of what seems to them to be a broader view. •."
"The partial approach is more efficient for resolving 
conflict, a process which lies at the heart of democratic 
politics... Hie formation of alliances in a political 
system that requires them is facilitated by the expression 
and pursuit of demands by those in closest touch with the 
social reality from which they issue forth" (Wildavsky, 
1979a: ppl66-7).
Again, the greater the number of partisans involved, the further the 
legitimacy of the pluralist political system is reinforced.
It might be asked how this relates to budgeting in local authorities! 
Pluralist bargaining is relevant at less exalted levels, however. 
Wildavsky himself makes much of the actual tactics and strategies of 
the partisan representatives of social values - in this case the 
agencies and individuals in the US federal budget process - in gaining 
or guarding funds (eg 1979a: pp63-126). Similarly, Danziger (1978: 
pl25) also characterises the political strand of incrementalism as 
organisational "realpolitik", as in effect do Bunce & Echols (eg 1978: 
p919). Or again, nearer to our interests here, where Wildavsky talks 
of "guardian v advocate" bargaining (a metaphor often applied in UK 
local government - eg Greenwood 1983: pl51; for a critical 
examination, see, eg Rosenberg & Tomkins, 1983: passim - and local 
government elsewhere, eg Lars son, 1982: p2; Jons son, 1982: p65), in
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pluralist terras it would seem plausible to view guardians and 
advocates as savings and spending 'partisans' within the budget 
process itself (see, eg, Wildavsky, 1979a: ppl60-5), with incremental 
outcomes held once again to be the result of their bargaining.
In its own terras therefore, the political strand of incrementalism 
offers a description of resource allocation processes, and specifies a 
mechanism - ie bargaining - where their content and thus outcomes are 
also decided. Our focus would then fall on the definitions and role 
behaviour which each participant applied to bargaining to secure 
resources (eg Wildavsky, 1979a: p20), and on how 'allocated resources' 
eventually emerged from this. However, we have so far only seen a 
part of what the pluralist view of politics actually implies. When we 
explore further, we shall see that it is rather less suitable for our 
purposes than it might prematurely have appeared.
(ii)(b) Pluralism: Countervailing Power
Pluralism and partisan mutual adjustment, to repeat, originated as 
theories of the political system at the macro-level. As such, a 
mechanism is specified whereby in effect the system is capable of 
seeking and holding its own equilibrium which, loosely following 
Galbraith (eg 1977: pl20), one might term "countervailing power".
While Galbraith applies the concept in the specifically economic sense 
of competition across markets (eg 1977: pl20), a similar mechanism is 
a key aspect of the claims of pluralism to legitimacy and allegiance, 
and it has substantial implications for attempts to apply the concept 
to the data here. It is therefore explored in some detail.
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Pluralism views political interactions in aggregate as 
self-balancing. The many competing partisans in the political process 
create rival centres of power through which it becomes diffused and 
fragmented. Incremental changes are promoted because it is therefore 
relatively unlikely that any one partisan will consistently dominate 
either an issue or the system as a whole; rather, if a partisan looks 
set to gain a more general superiority, his rise is likely to be met 
by the countervailing power of other partisans with interests in 
coalescing in opposition. Countervailing power, in Galbraith's 
definition, is therefore
"the tendency of power to be organised in response to a 
given position of power" (1977; pl21).
Thus, Wildavsky, for example, notes that his pluralist 'model*
"... permits each participant to go his own way until he 
discovers that the activities of others interfere ..."
(1979a; pl67).
Accordingly,
"Since ... no one group of men •.. can necessarily impose 
their preferences upon others in the American political 
system, special coalitions are formed to support or oppose 
specific policies" (1979a; pl31).
Each partisan will therefore very likely have to compromise or 
moderate his stance, either to attract a coalition in support, or to 
bargain with an opposing one. Indeed, in the knowledge that this is 
likely, partisans will often proceed by compromise in the first 
instance (it is held), rather than even attempting to 'go it alone'
(eg Lindblcm, 1965; p209).
As we have hinted, this approach to power fuses pluralism and 
incrementalism together. It implies that marginal changes from the 
status quo at any one time are the only ones which will "... lie
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within the range of possible choices" (Bunce & Echols, 1978: p914; cf 
also Guth, 1976: p378), given the demands for concessions or even the 
veto of other partisans. Political feasibility, in short, then 
becomes the key determinant of outcomes:
"... [There is j a practical recognition of ... the power 
structure din a pluralist society ... Incremental ism as a 
strategy is more likely to ccrrmand agreement and to meet the 
requirements of political feasibility" (Haynes, 1980: pl05).
(see also Guth, 1976: p378.) Once again, the more partisans there 
are, the more this will be true as the impact of the countervailing 
power of 'other* partisans increases. Progress towards any objective 
is more likely to demand concessions; with increments in pursuit of an 
objective easier to 'sell' as a compromise than its realisation in one 
move, that pursuit will also become sequential (eg Lindblcm, 1965: 
pl47; Wildavsky, 1979a: pl36 and others). Lindblcm (eg 1965: ppl47, 
268-9) holds this to be beneficial because small steps in any one 
direction imply remediality: those interests which 'lost out' with one 
increment may be able to redress the balance subsequently. Benefit is 
held to accrue because incremental changes are implied by counter­
vailing power to be reversible should sufficient partisans be per­
suaded that this is desirable (see, eg, Gershuny, 1981: pl96; Hogwood 
& Peters, 1982: p228). As an aside, resource constraints would then 
increase these tendencies, because as allocation becomes increasingly 
zero-sum, progress towards one objective would be dictated by the 
compliance of others in foregoing resources for their own objectives.
In  p ass in g , however, Lindblcm  and W ildavsky appear h ere  to  be in  
c o n f lic t ,  because th e  la t t e r  adopts a  concept o f  th e  budget base as a  
p o l i t ic a l  c o n s tru c t w hich is  a t  odds w ith  r e v e r s ib i l i t y .  In  
W ild avsky ' s approach, th e  budget base stands in  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  n o t
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as a response to uncertainty as observed in Chapter 3 above, nor yet 
as a testament to the cognitive limitations of budgetary actors, but 
as the historical accumulation of previously bargained outcomes.
Here, we have incrementalism*s 'political* explanation for the lack of 
review which it claims. Particularly in Wildavsky*s "fair shares" 
argument, the base comes to represent a source of precedents and 
priorities which, far from being reversible, tend to be protected by 
the expectations and opposition of those with a stake in the 
particular status quo which it represents:
"The base is the general expectation among the participants 
that programs will be carried on at close to the going level 
of expenditure ... Having a project included ... in the 
base thus means more than just getting it in the budget for 
a particular year. It means establishing the expectation 
that the expenditure will continue, that it is accepted as 
part of what will be done and therefore, that it will not 
normally be subjected to intensive scrutiny" (Wildavsky, 
1979a: pl7).
Accordingly, debate and scrutiny take place not in the base but at the 
margin where change is actually politically feasible, and it is 
therefore only here, if at all, that the reversibility argument would 
apply.
Leaving aside this tension between Lindblcm and Wildavsky (it is 
returned to shortly), the claim that countervailing power renders 
overall domination either of an issue or of the political system 
itself unlikely is clearly a key factor in the inherent legitimacy 
which pluralism claims (see pl88) as a means of running a polity. 
However, in emphasising their claim pluralists assert that this 
even-handedness applies not just to those who are already 'in' the 
political arena but also that any external groups or partisans will 
gain entry to the arena, and a voice in it should they mobilise to 
defend or advance their interests. As Lindblcm claims,
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"... almost any value that any even relatively small number 
of citizens moderately or strongly wishes to see weighed 
into the policy making process will be weighed in at seme 
value significantly above zero" (1965: p229).
Wildavsky echoes this directly:
"... the ... political system works to fissure that every 
significant interest has representation at same key point 
..." (1979a: pl30);
"... it is not a matter of a kind of noblesse oblige that 
assures that rival demands are considered. It is, rather, 
that the articulators of those demands insist on being heard 
and have the political resources to compel a hearing"
(1979a: pl67).
This claim to equality of access to the political system is not 
egalitarian as such, but is governed by a concept of fairness based on 
the breadth and strength of feeling behind the view expressed (eg 
Tiindblom, 1965: pp242-7).
However, the key feature of this claim from our point of view is that 
it is based on a particular view of the nature of power. In equating 
access to the political system and a political voice with strength and 
breadth of feeling, the argument underlying countervailing power is 
'one dimensional1 (Lukes, 1974: pl5) in assuming that all those who 
'deserve' access to the political arena will gain it, and that 
'politics' then consists of visible conflicts of those articulated 
interests; hence for example the stress on bargaining even if this is 
not necessarily face to face. Although Galbraith himself acknowledges 
that countervailing power may break down (1977: pl30) and that it 
demands "... a certain minimum opportunity and capacity for 
organisation ..." (1977: pl32), to incrementalists, far from groups 
not having "... the political resources to compel a hearing" as 
Wildavsky put it, a failure to be heard simply becomes a matter of 
omission:
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"Those who claim that values are neglected but who are not 
willing bo undertake the political work necessary to give 
them expression should not be surprised if they do not 
accomplish much" (Wildavsky, 1979a: pl57).
We can now summarise what we have seen so far by observing that 
pluralism, underlying the political strand of incrementalism, implies 
a series of normative stances with implications much wider than any 
specific application of the latter concept. Leaving any view of the 
validity of these implications until we have further examined the 
data, we have: the faith that all those interests warranting it will 
gain a political voice and in the ultimate fairness of pluralism 
through countervailing power (presumably reflected in similar or 
' self-balancing' trends in resource allocations); the "bias" (Self, 
1975: pl54) towards decisicn-making dispersed across multiple 
partisans and sources of power; and the 'conservative' view of the 
status quo and the suitability of marginal changes fron it. If one 
then adds the specifically 'American' or 'Western', or even 
anti-Conmunist overtones (eg Lindblcm, 1965: p87; Wildavsky, eg 1979a: 
ppl30-l; see also Bunoe & Echols, 1978: pp912-4) of the concept, then 
it becomes clear that pluralist theory has very wide-ranging 
ramifications indeed. Once again, it may rightly be argued that all 
this is a long way from incrementalism in a small sample of English 
local authorities, but that is exactly the point: as a preliminary 
conclusion, therefore, it needs at least to be appreciated that in 
employing political incrementalism we would be applying a concept of 
politics very much wider than the specific role envisaged for it here.
( i i ) ( c )  Problem s w ith  P lu ra lis m
There a re  th e n , how ever, a  s e r ie s  o f fo u r a n a ly tic  problem s in
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relating what we have seen of the pluralist view of politics 
underlying incrementalism to the data gathered here. These will now 
be outlined, not as a departure from our 'inductive' approach used so 
far of allowing theoretical developments to be prompted by the data, 
but simply as a presentational, 'ground clearing' device to illustrate 
more of the view of politics which we will take, and to structure the 
subsequent discussion. Where they are not based on what we have 
already seen, the outline conclusions which follow cure fully 
substantiated in due course by the data from which they cure derived.
The first and most obvious problem is the supposition that pluralist 
bargaining will tend to promote caily marginal changes in allocations 
and priorities from the status quo. We saw in Chapter 2 that the 
marginality of change actually found will depend on where and when (ie 
over what time period) the observer looks, to an extent which probably 
introduces tolerances greater than the - by definition - relatively 
small movement being measured. We then saw in Chapter 3, however, 
that outcomes in fact appeared to vary due to the exercise of local 
discretion by much more than any likely tolerances in measuring them. 
This leaves us to explain hew such variations occur - that is, why any 
countervailing power of overlapping feasibilities should apply more in 
some cases than others.
This is not difficult, but we shall see that pluralist theory as 
outlined here does not necessarily provide the answer. We shall 
observe instances, for example, where some 'crises' were almost 
universally defined to demand major change, and thus where marginal 
change was the one option not politically feasible at that time. In 
each case, the defined need was for drastic changes in allocation 
levels or priorities, but the debate (and thus any compromise or
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c o u n te rv a ilin g  o f  in te re s ts ) was n e t so much about th e  s iz e  o f  change 
(w hich was e f fe c t iv e ly  'a g re ed ' b e fo reh an d ), as about co n te n t and 
means. We may sum narise th e  p o in t by n o tin g  th a t 'm a rg in a l change*, 
however d e fin e d , may l ik e  any o th e r s iz e  o f change r e s u lt  from  
resource a llo c a tio n  processes, indeed i t  may even be th e  most l ik e ly  
outcome, b u t i t  does n o t n e c e s s a rily  r e s u lt . P o l it ic a l  f e a s ib i l i t y ,  
in  s h o rt, is  n o t u n ifo rm  in  im p act. The o u tlin e  c o n c lu s io n , to  be 
s u b s ta n tia te d  la t e r ,  is  a cc o rd in g ly  th a t we need a  concept o f  p o lit ic s  
w hich makes no a  p r io r i  c la im s  about th e  s iz e  o f  any changes from  th e  
s ta tu s  quo w hich i t  prom otes.
The second problem area with the pluralist/incremental view of 
politics, related to the first, is its treatment of the budget base.
We saw above the internal tensions between Lindblcm' s claim for the 
reversibility of incremental outcomes arising from pluralist 
decision-making, and Wildavsky's view of the budget base as a source 
of precedent and priority protected from review or adjustment by the 
weight of mutual expectations. Clearly, the tenor of Lindblcm's 
argument is that any reversals which occur will be as marginal as the 
increments they are reversing (eg 1965: pp268-9), but the tension 
remains: to what extent is the budget base, or is it not, protected?
In fact, Lindblcm's argument is rather over-stated if only because, 
irrespective of political considerations, some increments will be 
difficult to reverse for reasons of sheer practicality (eg, dogwood & 
Peters, 1983: p228). Gershuny (1981: pi98) cites 'small' additions to 
a motorway as an example, and we also saw in Chapter 2 (pp41-3) how a 
"camel's nose" (Wildavsky, 1979a: pplll-3) was used in Authority A as 
a political tactic to initiate a larger programme of spending, 
presumably on the premise that disguised ' foot-in-the-door' increments
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such as these do rot, in fact, tend to be reversed. The problem here, 
though, is then that if the base is protected frcm review as Wildavsky 
claimed, this is at odds with the concept of countervailing power 
because it implies that the major area of the budget - the base - is 
not easily countervailed at all. VJherever the base stands, bargaining 
is held to move to the margin, so reducing the area open to dispute 
(eg Wildavsky, 1979a: pl36; Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: p57), and to 
this extent at a given point in time the budget base is the negation 
of pluralist bargaining, even if its content was itself once bargained 
into being. Exactly how far we are meant to qualify the pluralist 
principle to accomnnodate the concept of the base (or vice versa) 
remains as vague as the definitions of 'incremental' changes from it 
reviewed in Chapter 2.
There are also problems with Wildavsky's political view of the budget 
base as it relates to resource constraints. We saw briefly in Chapter 
3 that at the time of the research these were prompting the 'margin 
of feasible change' perceived in the authorities studied and perhaps 
generally to widen, albeit within the limits of continuing 'core* 
definitions about service provision per se. Where the former 
political infeasibility of reviewing the base rested on a lack of will 
at the time to question its content, that constraint may now be 
diminished. In other words, following from the problems noted above 
with the a priori assumption of marginal changes in priorities, we 
shall see that the boundaries set by political feasibility have 
widened, thereby reducing the role of precedent in forming spending 
patterns.
This is not to deny that it remains harder, politically, to prioritise 
cuts than, say, growth because this would involve going directly
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a g a in s t th e  g ra in  o f  e x is tin g  p r io r it ie s  in  the  base. Thus, a cu ts  
e x e rc is e  in  A u th o rity  B was operated  p ro  ra ta  to  spending, th ereb y  
le a v in g  p r io r i t ie s  u n d is tu rb ed . As A u th o rity  B 's  Leader e x p la in ed :
"I said to the [Party] Group, 'there's two ways we can do 
this, you can either have an across the board cut when you 
might be cutting things which frankly we think are 
important, or you can say, 'right, we're going to make 
heavier cuts in these areas than we are in that ...''
There's no way they'd take the second one, no way. The 
Tories quite rightly said, 'You're not looking at 
priorities', and I find it difficult to argue".
However, much as we saw in Chapter 2 the perceived salience of 
priorities in the base would again depend here on where one looks: 
within departments, perhaps even guided by the outcome of formal local 
debate in Committees, cuts were far more likely to have been 
prioritised. At the same time we saw in Chapter 3 that, as Rosenberg 
(eg 1982: pp8-9) also found, with the disappearance of the annual 
increment of growth in resources, debate and dissensus in local 
authorities have tended to increase, and with this has come a greater 
readiness to question assumptions behind the structure and means of 
service provision. Accordingly, we shall see that it has became 
easier to 'lose', and possibly to lose more than incrementally. If 
resource shortages become more severe, on the argument (to be returned 
to) here the priorities in the base may count for less and less as the 
demands of survival cure perceived to take over.
Wildavsky - and pluralism - have little to say about the role of 
resource conditions in the varying political significance of the 
budget base. His concept of the budget base as set out in Wildavsky 
(1979a) is in any case based on US federal budgeting in circumstances 
which he earlier (1975: pp26-67) characterised as "rich and certain", 
neither of which adjectives readily applied to English local
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authorities during the research period. (Indeed, in the same book he 
goes on to ascribe variations in the political role of the base to 
uncertainty rather than resource shortage - 1975: ppll4-64) - whereas 
we saw in Chapter 3 that reviewed or unreviewed, the budget base such 
as it was actually formed a response to uncertainty). It is therefore 
concluded in outline that even leaving aside the internal tension 
between the concepts of the base and countervailing power, a view of 
politics such as Wildavsky uses to argue for the budget base as a high 
and relatively fixed proportion of the budget is not well suited to 
our needs (cf also Schick, 1983: ppl3-17). Much as we saw with the 
pluralist prediction of marginal change, and as will become clear in 
due course, we shall need a view of politics which must certainly 
acocnnodate the base where this is relevant, but which makes no a 
priori assumptions of its existence or size as a proportion of the 
overall budget.
The third problem with the pluralist/incrementalist view of politics, 
relating to the second, is the assumption that all political activity 
is 'bargained'. Clearly, 'bargaining' may be defined very widely 
indeed, to cover tacit, unspoken or even proxy interactions. However, 
as 'exchange' theorists such as Scholl (eg, 1981: pp282-3) recognise 
in various ways, the central thread is that one or both parties to a 
bargain want something, however intangible, that the other has to 
offer, or as Georgiou (eg, 1973: p300) has it, the 'other* party 
possesses or offers an "incentive" to the first party to interact. 
Typically in pluralism, 'other' parties possess or offer the incentive 
of support for an objective, or a sanction or veto which they may be 
prepared to drop if the 'price' - ie their own ' incentive' - is right, 
with the outcome then having overtones of a barter. Wildavsky, for 
example, notes that:
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"Dependence upon the support of clientele ... implies some 
degree of obligation and the agency may have to make seme 
compromises. The interests involved may also have to 
canpranise because they cure dependent upon the 
administrators for access to decisions ..." (1979a: p72)
In principle, however, even within resource allocation processes there 
is no restriction on What may be the object of bargaining - allocat­
ions thanselves cure an obvious possibility, but typical non-raonetary 
objectives might include information or Cortmittee places.
Now, we have just seen that in Wildavsky's 'political-incremental' 
view of the budget base is that where the budget stands, political 
activity is deflected to the margin where incremental changes become 
possible. At this margin it seems plausible that bargaining may be a 
realistic description of what takes plaae. Certainly, we shall see 
that in many of the higher officer and political-level interactions 
observed, where any resources were allocated over and above those 
claimed by the demands of the base, or where any re-allocation or cuts 
were made, it seemed appropriate and useful to talk of 'bargaining', 
particularly if one took the term at its widest meaning. Unfbrtunr- 
ately, though, even with interactions within what corresponded to the
margin of bargained change around the budget base identified by
incrementalists, we shall see that 'bargaining' was by no means always 
a satisfactory label. Thus, when a particularly notorious report 
advocating changes to Authority A's DUO appeared, the Deputy Treasurer 
noted how
"... I kept myself away from that. I didn't want to know at 
the time ... It was printed on a particular yellow paper 
and I began to see people with little or no possible 
connection walking around with copies. I remember there was 
a copy in [name's] rocm, he told me it was there, and I
deliberately kept away from it. I didn't want to look at
it, I solid, because I thought it had been leaked".
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I t  may be seen th a t , w ith  th e  " in c e n tiv e "  o f  h is  d e s ire  fo r  'a  q u ie t  
l i f e ' ,  in  e f f e c t  th e  respondent was d e lib e ra te ly  p u ttin g  h im s e lf in  a  
p o s itio n  where he had n o th in g  to  exchange o r  b a rg a in  had he been 
c a lle d  upon to  do so, as p a r t  o f  h is  d e f in it io n  o f  th e  a p p ro p ria te  
response to  th e  s itu a t io n .
As a further example, increraentalists' over-rigid conception of the 
base, as noted immediately above and in Chapter 4, prevents them from 
even addressing the interactions which go on 'within' it - ie within 
the process of rolling forward and repricing the base for each year. 
(Although Wildavsky alludes to this, his references are rather more in 
the context of the cognitive limits argument which he also expounds - 
eg 1979a: pl5). These interactions, in their way as much as more 
overtly 'political' ones, may materially affect the destination of 
resources, but are much less frequently in any meaningful sense 
' bargained', even at the widest definition of the word. As an 
example, one might take the extracts cited in Chapter 4 (ppl49-52) of 
the two budget officers in Authority B reviewing estimates. While 
each of the two had something the other vented, such as support, 
advice or information, representing the incentives for them to 
interact, it may still be asked how useful or accurate it is to 
describe them as 'bargaining' in the pluralist sense, with its 
overtones, however diffuse, of 'bartering'. In the extracts, 
information was sought and freely given, with no particular terms 
attached to receiving it that could be ascertained: a barter or 
bargain as such therefore did not really occur.
This may be seen frcm the use which the two actors also made of the 
VDU terminal. Thus in Extract 2 (pl49), while at sane points (eg 
while discussing "fishing") the VDU was used by one actor to support
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nis own preconceptions, at other points (eg while discussing “tennis" 
or "pitch and putt") the VDU was used because in the first instance 
neither actor was sure of the position, and therefore had little to 
'exchange' until the facts were known. Once again therefore, the term 
'bargaining' with its implications of exchanges and incentives does 
not really apply. An approach which performs better, of course, is 
provided by what we have seen already of symbolic interactionism: with 
the help of the VDU, the two budgeters were 'negotiating' in the 
symbolic interactionist sense of the word their joint definitions of 
the situation with which the estimates were perceived to present 
than. Exchanges and incentives, and bargaining were in a residual 
sense seme part of this negotiation, but they were not all of it.
To summarise, pluralist 'bargaining' may adequately describe seme of 
the interactions observed, but even enriched by notions of "exchanges" 
or "incentives" it does not necessarily do so. Bargaining, exchanges 
and incentives may be prominent in definition forming, but they do not 
supercede or replace it and they may not feature at all. It is 
therefore concluded tentatively that we shall need a view of politics 
which makes no a priori assumptions about the type of interactions 
which will occur, but which must be capable of accommodating 
bargaining where this happens.
The fourth problem area with the pluralist/incremented, view of
« *
politics develops the argument from the thirds it arises from the 
assumption of countervailing power (as it is used in the pluralist 
sense) itself. The issues here relate not so much to the normative 
implications of the concept (which are discussed later) but its 
analytic application. Countervailing power, as an economist might 
say, is a ' long run' concept. Its claim is not that interests are
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iiimediately countered by other interests, but that over time opposing 
coalitions will form as an interest becomes increasingly successful in 
putting its own point of view. The question then is just hew long 
this takes, and here the concept is vague, mirroring a similar lack of 
precision (see Chapter 2) about what constitutes an 'incremental' 
outcome. These two areas are in fact linked, in incremental terms, 
inasmuch as the size of change in priorities would presumably be 
related to how fast the balance of power is changing as interests are 
countervailed.
This lack of precision is a serious weakness. Any balance of power 
may be changed at some stage, but there comes a point where the 
realism of expecting this to happen is questionable. We shall see for 
example that resource allocation in Authority A in particular has to 
an extent tended to occur within a series of ten year 'vogues' in 
favour of diverting resources to particular policy areas. Vogues have 
changed, but within the period that each was current, any potentially 
countervailing interests or initiatives remained less successful or 
even dormant. Clearly, ten years waiting for a vogue to change 
implies a very long-run view indeed, making it statistically unlikely 
that this will have an impact in any one budget cycle (or even in any 
one research period). Even if the vogue is eventually countervailed, 
therefore, the relevance of countervailing power in the majority of 
resource allocations may be questioned.
To return to the nature of the concept itself as it is employed within 
pluralism, however, it has been challenged on its home ground (the US) 
by, eg Bachrach & Baratz (1963) and Crenscn (1971), and more generally 
by Lukes (1974), who argue in effect that there is no necessary reason 
why countervailing power should apply at all. Bluntly, as Galbraith
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(1977: pl30) acknowledges, sane groups inay alvsiays be better placed 
than others, irrespective of Lindblcm's theorised power determinants 
of numerical strength and intensity of feeling (eg 1965: pp242-6), and 
even in the long run the balance of interests claimed by pluralism may 
not in fact result. This is not simply a matter of 'losing' bargained 
arguments: rather, groups and interests may be "organised in" or 
"organised out" (Schattschneider, 1960: p71) of political discourse or 
the political system by those with the ability to manipulate the 
agenda of political debate (eg Rosenberg, 1983: p39) so that argunents, 
far from being won or lost, never really arise. Thus, Dear love, 
following Newton (1976) notes from his own study of Kensington & 
Chelsea that
"... groups which challenge the existing order either ... 
become more moderate to gain acceptance with 
decision-makers, or else they preserve their policy but 
remain relatively powerless ... [Propositions from 
pluralist theory fare poorly against the empirical evidence" 
(1979: p48).
We s h a ll see th a t  s im ila r  "o rg an is in g  in "  and "o rg an is in g  o u t"  o f  
p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t y  a ls o  o ccu rred  w ith in  th e  a u th o r itie s  s tu d ie d .
These omissions arise from what we have characterised, following Lukes 
(1974: ppll-15) as the "one-dimensional" view of power on which 
pluralism rests. It may be that if one concentrates as pluralism does 
on visible conflicts of interests (ie ' bargaining') within the 
political system itself, recording the ostensible 'winners' and 
'losers' over time would produce evidence of countervailing power.
Such a claim though, would be based on only a partial view of how 
political interactions do and equally inportantly do not take place. 
Following Lukes, we shall see that we need a concept of power capable 
of being extended beyond the 'first dimension' to the 'second
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dimension' where a group or interest may be denied the chance of 
expressing a view or access to the political system and so no conflict 
as such actually takes place. As well as looking at decisions and 
whose values these reflect, therefore, we need also to look at 
"non-decisions" (Bachrach & Baratz, eg 1963: p641), meaning not merely 
'decisions not to act', but rather, less explicit exclusions frcm 
politics arising from the "mobilisation of bias" (Schattschneider, 
1960: p71) inherent in the political process.
Beyond this, though, we then have Lukes' 'third dimension' of power 
(eg 1974: pp21-5) where conflicts of interest are not so much diverted 
and suppressed as subverted and moulded, to the point where the 
conflicts themselves remain latent and unperceived by those affected. 
The mechanism of 'third dimension* power is of direct relevance 
because resource allocation actors may use the effects of the 
conditioning of other actors' definitions in 'third dimension' power 
processes. For example, a Treasurer, without actually doing anything 
or even omitting to do something he might otherwise have done, might 
consciously or unconsciously benefit from perceptions of resource 
shortage not merely prompting spending departments to moderate their 
demands for resources, but also prompting the definition that their 
present funding levels were perhaps the best that could reasonably be 
expected in the circumstances. Those departments might therefore 
define their position as one of relative 'satisfaction' with their lot 
and thus be more amenable to economising even though their finances 
remained under severe pressure. We saw evidence of just this effect 
in Chapter 3 (p54-5), notwithstanding the increases in dissensus also 
observed, and further evidence of it and other examples will emerge 
later.
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We can now summarise the problems posed by the concept of 
countervailing power underlying the pluralist aspects of 
incrementalism. Mirroring incrementalism itself, the pluralist use of 
countervailing power is vague, with no real definition of when a 
particular group or interest will be 'countervailed'. Further, there 
is sane doubt as to the extent to which countervailing power should 
necessarily apply at all, because in its pluralist usage it rests on 
an incanplete and "one-dimensional" view of the nature of power.
Beyond visible and bargained conflicts of interests there are further 
areas of interaction involving more tacit and less visible processes 
of suppression or subversion of interests and grievances which 
pluralism effectively ignores. It is therefore concluded that we need 
a view of politics which makes no a priori assunptions of 
countervailing power (but which can accomodate it where it occurs), 
and which is capable of accomodating all three 'dimensions' of power 
as these become relevant.
(ii)(d) The Incremental View of Politics: Sixnnary and Conclusions
In order to approach the 'politics' of budgeting and resource 
allocation, we need to have some clear idea of what is meant and 
understood by the term 'politics'. Accordingly, we have examined the 
incremental view of politics, noting that it is based on the wide- 
ranging and normatively 'loaded* theory of pluralism, which bestows it 
with implications very much broader than budgeting and resource 
allocation in local authorities. It would therefore not be surprising 
if the incremental view of politics did not prove especially accurate 
when applied to the much more specific data here, and so, in a 
preliminary way, it has indicated. We have outlined a series of
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analytic problems in relating it to the data, with interim conclusions
(to be verified in what follows) that the view of politics which we
adopt should:
- avoid any a priori assumption about the size and marginality 
of the changes in allocation and priority which will result;
- avoid any a priori assumption about the extent to which a 
budget base will be politically sacrosanct, or the proport­
ion of the budget itself which this will represent, but
remain capable of accommodating the base where this appears;
- avoid any a priori assumption that 'politics' consists 
merely of interactions which may be characterised as 
'bargaining', but remain capable of accommodating bargaining 
where this occurs;
- avoid any a priori assumption of countervailing power and 
remain capable of accommodating all three dimensions of 
power where these occur.
In effect, these conclusions amount to a preliminary rejection of the 
infallibility of the pluralist view of politics underlying incre- 
mentalism, while accepting that seme political activity, seme of the 
time, may exhibit seme of the features which pluralism emphasises.
However, while rejecting the incremental view as a reliable basis on 
which to proceed tells us what our view of politics will not be, this 
does not help in the more positive sense of meeting our objective of 
entering the 'politics' of budgeting and resource allocation knowing 
what we mean by the term. Accordingly, we now begin to outline the 
view of politics around the position just set out which met the 
criteria of accuracy and realism imposed by the data.
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(iii) REPLACING THE INCRtKflsJTAL VIEW OF POLITICS
The view of politics to be adopted builds on the theoretical 
developments in Chapter 5, following Maugham's "micro-political" 
perspective. Echoing Allison (1971s pl45), he sets the scene thus:
"... since the conduct of organisations ... implies a degree 
of choice about direction, reasonable men are likely to 
differ about it ...
... [I]n circumstances in which men share power, differ 
about what must be done and where these differences are of 
some consequence, decisions and actions will be the result 
of a political process. .. • [Sjometimes one group wins, 
sometimes another; sometimes one individual is able to 
impose his definitions and his solutions, sometimes he is 
defeated by another more powerful, more forceful or per­
suasive challenger. Perhaps more often than is acknowledged 
openly, the actual decision and resultant action is an out­
come of the struggle itself, something which no one 
individual or group initially preferred . •. Decisions and 
actions in organisations may be seen as the consequence of 
the pulling and hauling that is politics..." (1979: 
ppl6-17).
As we saw in Chapter 5, actors define the situation in which they 
perceive themselves to be, and also trends and events around them as 
reported in conversation, the press, working documents, etc, in terms 
of the meanings they attribute to what is perceived; they thereby form 
a view of the implications for their own behaviour. These definit­
ions, as we also saw, may relate to non-interactive features of the 
actor* s frame of reference at that time, such as his workload or the 
financial position of the authority, etc, and to what these imply for 
the role which the actor defines and constructs for himself. On many 
more occasions, though, or when he is attempting to enact his definit­
ions of those ron-interactive features, the actor's definitions will 
relate to how he should define, or apply his earlier 'learnt' definit­
ions of role vis-4-vis other actors: ie, how he should behave towards 
those other actors and what their behaviour means for him. In short,
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in defining his course of action (even if this is 'no action') the 
actor interacts with those around him. Interaction is likely to be 
necessary whether he defines his role in terms of pursuing sane 
private objective; or in terms of a wider and less 'self-centred* 
definition relating perhaps to what his department or authority 
'should be doing'; or, perhaps the most likely, sane combination of 
both.
This type of activity is taken here as 'politics': in a nutshell, it 
is the interactions between actors attempting to pursue their own 
definitions of the situation on the terms in which they define their 
roles. Its permutations, so defined, sure literally limitless, because 
politics arises fran the basic processes by which individuals relate 
to each other. Thus, according to the definitions he forms of his 
role, the actor's political behaviour may embrace the entire spectrum 
of 'behaviour* in general: from conversation and humour through 
discussion and persuasion to bargaining and negotiation, and thence to 
coercion, manipulation or deceit. Hie 'objectives' may involve 
cooperation with, securing the support of, obtaining the permission 
of, out-manoeuvring or whatever, the other actor with whom he is 
interacting. (The term 'interaction' itself is defined as the outcome 
where courses of action have mutual consequences: it need not imply 
face-to-face contact or even specific mutual recognition and, indeed, 
it need not actually imply intent, although clearly there are limits 
beyond which it is not meaningful to stretch the term.) All the time, 
those 'others' may be engaging in similar behaviour(s) towards the 
first actor, perhaps prompting him to define the situation to require 
a range of 'responsive' or even 'defensive* behaviour. He may at any
time fail to enact his definition, redefine the situation accordingly, 
and perhaps initiate a whole new set of interactions.
Further, because politics stems from the basic feature of human 
interaction, it occurs in any and every setting where interaction 
occurs. As Mangham puts it, his political model
"... has its foundation in what can be observed in every-day 
behaviour ... [Tjhere is no discontinuity between behaviour 
in families, in clubs and in voluntary associations and that 
observable within organisations. In short ... all behaviour 
at all levels and in all circixnstances may be regarded as 
political ..." (1979: pl8).
Consequently, contrary to the view of politics implied by, eg,
Danziger (1978: p204) and others (eg Hofstede, 1981: ppl95-8) it is 
not something which can be adduced to explain sane features of 
processes involving human interaction - in Danziger* s case 'deviant* 
resource allocations - and not others. Politics as it will be viewed 
here cannot be 'switched on' or 'switched off', except insofar as the 
same thing happens to the individuals' interactions on which it is 
based, which does not appear to be Danziger's claim and which is in 
any case implausible.
A further consequence is that the range of dimensions of 'political 
behaviour' - eg conscious or unconscious, trivial or non-trivial, 
overt or covert, face-to-face or tacit interactions, or conflicting or 
coinciding definitions, etc - which the observer could apply, is 
virtually limitless. The restricted typologies proposed by, eg 
Greenwood et al (1980a: pl20), Farrell & Petersen (1982: pp405-7); and 
even Wildavsky (1979: ppl7-19) only begin to explore the issue, 
notwithstanding the claims of, eg, Farrell & Peterson (1982: p407) to 
have covered most of the possible options. On the view of politics to
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be adopted here, therefore, it is effectively up to the observer to 
apply a typology, not in the belief that it is all-embracing, but 
simply to provide a set of categories which seen to him to illustrate 
the area he is observing. To this end, one dimension Which 
consistently emerged from the data here, already introduced in Chapter 
5, is the varying proactivity with Which actors defined their roles 
and other features of their surroundings, and pursued these 
definitions through their interactions with others. We saw earlier 
that What an actor tries to achieve - and thus, to an extent, is 
personally able to achieve - depends on Whether, in defining or
applying his role, he views the factors and in this case people around
him as 'fixed* and simply 'to be lived with', or amenable to change, 
persuasion or manipulation.
Viewed from another angle, proactivity is one determinant of an 
actor's power, defined here as his ability to have enacted his 
definition of the situation (cf also Benson, 1977: pl3) in whatever 
the circumstances in which this is attempted. As the 'currency' of 
politics, power is likewise as wide in its scope as human interaction,
and indeed beyond: thus, as well as having power in relation to
others, it is also intelligible to speak of one's ability (power) to 
enact definitions of non-interactive features, such as having the 
strength (ability/power) to lift a weight Where this was defined to be 
necessary, or likewise the capability (ability/power) to review a 
whole budget. However, while proactivity was identified as one 
determinant of actors' power, others will be drawn from whatever 
feature of their circumstances they (or those with Whom they are 
interacting) are further able (have the poster) to use or create (eg 
Hall & Bucholz, 1977: p8) or from Which they may knowingly or 
unknowingly benefit. Quite literally anything in a given context (eg
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Macmillan, 1978: pl8), from personal attributes and qualities to 
external and apparently independent features of actors' circumstances, 
and including apparent handicaps, may be a power resource in this way, 
but critically depending on the use that is made of it.
As an example of this, we shall see that on occasion Chairmen used 
their relatively inferior knowledge of their subject compared to that 
of Chief Officers, which might ordinarily have been thought a 
considerable handicap (eg Gy ford, 1976: p44), as a power resource in 
enacting their definitions by allowing them to avoid becoming 
embroiled in technical arguments where the Chief Officer was always 
liable to win. Conversely, of course, the apparently 'obvious' power 
resource for Chief Officers of their expertise in these cases remained 
ineffective. (In this context, although it is more besides, 
proactivity itself may be taken as the ability or willingness to use 
the features in one's circumstances in enacting one's definition.) 
However, we shall see in what follows that certain features and 
trends, in particular, consistently emerged from the data as at least 
available to resource allocation actors to attempt to deploy as power 
resources: these (together with the attempts to use them) will provide 
recurrent themes through our account, as part of the relationship 
between resource allocation and the organisational and wider contexts 
in which it took place.
More imnediately though, one objection to the concepts of politics and 
power/power resources as outlined here is that in refusing to 
distinguish between behaviour in a family (as in Mangham's earlier 
example) and, say, a resource allocation process, they are at once 
everything and nothing. In their breadth and generality, they are
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simultaneously too Machiavellian for every-day family life and too 
anodyne and inconsequential to capture the 'politics', as the term is 
conventionally understood, of resource allocation. On this argument, 
the analytic utility of either concept would then be questionable.
In response, recognisable types of interaction (in Mangham's terms, 
recognisable "scripts" which actors make use of in constructing their 
roles - eg 1979: pp37-44) will of course always be more likely in some 
settings than others: hence, it is for example (generallyI) 
appreciated that 'politics' in the conventional sense and family life 
are clearly not 'like* each other and that people behave 'differently' 
in each. The types of power resources typically available in each 
will also be distinctive. Hie point, though, is that the basic 
'mechanism' in each setting, of actors interacting in pursuit of their 
definitions of the situation, is the same in each case. In both, 
definitions may, eg, conflict or coincide, be conscious or 
unconscious, and more or less trivial, 'self-centred' or proactive; 
and, in both, actors will have different resources and thus vary in 
their ability (power) to have their definitions enacted. Further, in 
both, there may well be tacit or explicit 'rules' as part of the 
situational "script" guiding actors' applications of their roles and 
thus the interactions which take place, such as the family's choice of 
TV programme being allocated between children in turn, or Standing 
Orders governing the local authority's enactment of the budget, which 
actors may attempt to use as power resources, or redefine or interpret 
for the consumption of others but to suit their own objectives. Thus, 
someone might argue that as 'a special case' they should choose a TV 
programme out of turn, just as politicians attempt through using 
'points of order' to establish their own definitions of standing 
orders as the basis for the conduct of business. And so on: each
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setting is reoognisably distinct, but the essence of what occurs in it 
is in both cases here - and in all others where interaction occurs - 
the same.
One could continue at much greater length. However, we have now seen 
sufficient to begin to understand what will be meant by 'politics'; 
further details, for example relating to the patterning of political 
interactions and to the power resources which actors are able to apply 
in enacting their definitions, will need to be supplied in due course, 
but to do so now would pre-empt the data even more than has been 
necessary already. We now begin to turn to the data, though, to allow 
a final series of points to be made, about the role of 'politics' as 
defined here. Having seen what politics is, we new examine briefly 
with the aid of the data what politics, so defined, does.
(iv) THE ROLE OF POLITICS
Politics is interaction between people in pursuit of their definitions 
of the situations it consists of people seeking to have their views of 
what is right and best for them, or for their families, professions, 
local authorities or the world in general, translated into action 
wherever they attempt this. Politics occurs because with the inherent 
subjectivity of the attribution of meanings through definition-forming 
processes, we have seen that there are seldom if ever 'answers' which 
appear to all to be so universally and obviously 'right' as to require 
no interaction to establish the fact, and therefore because 'partial' 
answers - ie actors' own views and definitions, however considered and 
well thought out - are all that is possible. It is then the presence
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of other actors with partial answers of their own in the form of their 
own definitions and views which means that mutual implications are 
likely, and that account may directly or indirectly, and willingly or 
unwillingly, have to be taken of them before action (even if this is 
'no action') results.
In this sense, while the attempts within the cognitive strand of 
incrementalism to link specific features of budgeting to cognitive 
constraints were virtually dismissed in Chapter 4, as we also noted 
briefly (p90), at the widest level politics is itself 'a cognitive 
limits' phenomenon (with Danziger's original distinction between the 
two strands of incrementalism - 1978: pl25 - for all its usefulness, 
becoming at the extremes rather arbitrary). As differing definitions 
of the situation are brought to bear on the issue at hand, represent­
ing competing or complementary partial answers, political interactions 
in effect combine them to provide an 'overall' - ie, agreed - answer 
as to the 'choice' to be made. This is not to claim in any way that 
this overall answer will be 'objectively' correct, but simply that in 
combining subjective viewpoints, politics provides an answer where 
none - or many - had presented themselves. Politics, in short, is a 
means of making (value) decisions.
For all the flaws in the pluralist grounding of his work, the 
cognitive role of politics is grasped especially clearly by 
Wildavsky. Thus, as we have seen, he notes that, rather than pursuing 
the possibility of an 'agreed' view or 'right' overall answer in the 
first instance, a more sensible approach is where:
"Intellectual cogitation - putting people through their 
paces guided by a single intelligence - would give way to 
social interaction din which each bid and bargained with the 
other until they had done the best they could" (1983: p34).
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This is because:
"The process we have developed for dealing with 
interpersonal comparisons ... is ... political ..." (1979a:
pl30),
w here,
"It is much simpler for each participant to calculate his 
own preferences than for each to try to calculate the 
preferences of all ..."
"Because the approach is partial .. • [i]t permits each 
participant to go his own way until he discovers that the 
activities of others interfere" (1979: ppl66-7).
I f  we amend th e  u n d e rly in g  p lu r a lis t  b ia s  h e re , so th a t  each a c to r 's  
view s a re  p a r t ia l  answers n o t ju s t  because th e y  a re  s e lf - in te r e s te d , 
b u t because w hether th e y  a re  s e lf- in te re s te d  o r  re la te d  to  a  much 
w id er focus th e y  a re  based cn th e  s u b je c tiv e  a t t r ib u t io n  o f  meanings 
to  w hat is  p e rc e iv e d , i t  may be seen th a t  W ild a v s k y 's  v iew  o f  th e  ro le  
o f  p o lit ic s  is  m e ch a n ica lly  v e ry  s im ila r  to  th a t  advanced h e re .
Examples of the cognitive role of political interactions were 
abundant, although there were seme which were particularly explicit in 
illustrating how this role was 'played' • The first of these was the 
extracts presented in Chapter 5 (ppl49-52) from the two budget 
officers in Authority B in the process of reviewing estimates. A key 
feature of what was observed was that it was the interactions 
themselves (cf Mangham, 1979: pl7) between the two officers which 
helped to fashion the 'answers' which materialised, as can be seen for 
example from the discussions of road fund licences and fee income from 
fishing or tennis in Extracts 1 and 2. Neither officer began with a 
clearly defined definition of his own of the correct level of 
allocation, but rather, a definition emerged from the interaction 
between them and the pooling of meanings attached to what was 
observed. These interactions occurred within an ad hoc framework
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arising, as we noted earlier (pl50), from the two officers defining 
their roles in stylised 'guardian' v 'advocate' terms (although within 
the usual meaning of the metaphor, both were of course 'guardians'), 
as a means of arranging their discussion around the estimates with 
which they were dealing (cf Danziger, 1978: pl65). In this way, their 
respective 'partial' answers were combined to fora, for them, an 
agreed definition of the situation as the basis on which to proceed.
The area of guardians and advocates, in particular, offers further 
examples of the cognitive role of politics, with actors' definitions 
and role-playing almost literally combining as "calculating 
mechanisms" as Wildavsky (1979a: pl60) puts it, and where 
"problem solving by confrontation" (Janssen, 1982: p79) was very 
clearly the response to the demands of combining 'partial' answers to 
produce a definition of the situation on which to base further 
action, However, the guardian and advocate roles were often not 
played by the actors concerned in the manner which Wildavsky and, 
apparently, Jons son, envisaged, particularly in instances where the 
Treasury might otherwise have been cast as the 'guardian*. Rather, as 
we have already seen in the context of budgetary 'slack' (pp74-9) and 
as the following examples show, the precise configuration adopted 
depended on actors' definitions of the interests at stake and of the 
nature of the issue concerned.
Thus, in  A u th o rity  A , th e  d e s ire  fo r  th e  Housing Revenue Account (HRA) 
budget to  'y ie ld ' a  c e r ta in  le v e l o f  re n t r is e  prom pted a  s e rie s  o f  
n e g o tia tio n s  between T reasu ry  s t a f f  and th e  Housing Chairm an to  
balance th e  budget so as to  'a r r iv e  a t '  th e  d e s ire d  ra te  r is e  to  fund  
i t  w h ile  m eeting th e  fu r th e r  p o l i t ic a l  w ish  fo r  a b reak -e ven , ra th e r  
th an  a  subsidy o f  th e  HRA from  th e  R ate Fund, H ie  C hairm an's d e s ire d
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rise was £1.50 per week, large enough as he saw it to leave a surplus 
to subsidise rents in the next year, which was an election year, but 
not so large as to raise protests in the coming year. When the budget 
was completed for this caning year, though, the rent rise which was 
implied to supply sufficient income to maintain a break-even on the 
HRA was £1.60. The nature of the resulting balancing act was set out 
by the Treasury's Housing Accountant:
"... we bring [the budget] together and say 'Right, that's 
it, that's the deficit, that means a rent increase of what­
ever to break-even'. The Chairman ... looks at our 
contingency for inflation and says, 'Is there any slack in 
there?' We usually say 'No'. The other two big items are 
repairs and maintenance, and debt charges. They used to use 
repairs as the balancing account, but they've had a bit of 
stick over various repair jobs. So it's down to debt 
charges ..."
Accordingly, as the Deputy Treasurer continued,
"When we went through [the Chairman's] budget with him, he 
and we decided ... we needed a bit less spending or a bit 
more income to make possible the £1.50. In the event, we 
rounded dcwn our interest rate prediction, I think it was by 
half a per cent ...".
Thus, the figure of £1.50 was realised by using the prediction of 
interest rates built into the budget as the ' balancing' item. The 
half-per cent adjustment was in fact worth £lm, a sizeable sum.
It may be seen how, with the two 'partial' answers available - '£1.50' 
and '£1.60' - a figure, and how to achieve it, were agreed through the 
interaction itself. The two positions served in effect to produce as 
a resultant the final outcome: the Chairman's figure, but on the 
Treasury's definition of which figures (ie not the inflation con­
tingency) could be manipulated to produce it. The Chairman and 
Treasurer themselves confirmed the 'bargained' nature of this 
particular set of interactions and the definition eventually arrived 
at. Thus, the Chairman cannented that:
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"You can vary predictions as much as you like, but you have 
to accept you're taking a political risk and you have to 
make it clear that you've had advice from the Treasurer 
which you' re not rejecting ... but taking a risk in not 
accepting as such ... But, knowing Treasurers, they're 
always over-cautious, aren't they, they're bound to be. I 
think one tries to balance that closely ..."
The Treasurer, on the other hand, seemed willing enough to confirm 
this, thereby disclosing his own tactics:
"[The Chairman] had a problem and asked what my forecast of 
interest rates was going to be, and knocked half a per cent 
off. I'm not too heart-broken to be honest, because our 
estimate tended to be cautious ... I believe what went in 
this year was half a per cent on the high side".
The effectiveness, on this particular occasion, of such bargaining in 
its ' cognitive' role of fixing a view of outcomes that were as then 
unknown, is attested to by the fact that the outturn expenditure on 
debt charges was almost exactly that implied by the compromised 
figure1
As a final ccranent on this example, the highly 'situation specific' 
nature of guardian v advocate role-playing in fixing their definition 
of the situation and making the decision on the basis of which, action 
was to proceed, may again be seen clearly. Having found a divergence 
in possible answers to the rent rise issue of lOp per week, negotiat­
ions to close this gap centred on reducing the service estimates them­
selves, or reducing the area for spending for which the Treasury was 
responsible, namely the estimate of debt charges. The Chairman 
ostensibly 'won', but all the time guessing correctly that the 
Treasurer had built sufficient ' slack' into his estimate to be able 
to stand the reduction without undue discomfort. In negotiating the 
outcome both actors, in effect, were guardian and advocate
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s im u ltan eo u s ly , accord ing  to  lo w  th e y  d e fin e d  th e ir  in te re s ts  in  
■f s p e c ific  aspects o f th e ir  n e g o tia tio n s  to  f i x  th e  f in a l  fig u re s .
A further illustration of how guardians' and advocates' roles, as 
defined, combined to play a cognitive role in allowing budgetary out­
comes to be negotiated where the desirable level is not immediately 
obvious - and also, once again, of the fluidity in the way those roles 
are played and by whom - comes from Authority B. Following its £3^n 
cuts exercise noted earlier, a series of fortuitous windfalls left the 
authority with a higher level of funds than anticipated. It was 
therefore decided by the leadership to restore £lm of the cuts and 
hold the rate levy for the coming year at a standstill despite the 
Treasurer's view that:
"Uiey've left us with a very tight situation which you could 
consider wasn't really necessary. They called it an over- 
assessment of need to cut, but one way or another that's 
placating people, isn't it? If they want to put a million 
back, we should have left the contingency at £4^n, more in 
balances, and put about 3% on the rates ..."
The Leader's rejoinder to this was:
"We're only putting £3m in contingency, but £3.2m in 
balances, £6ra in all. With the balances, anyway, the 
Treasurer always consistently under-estimates. Over the 
years you get to know your Treasurer, and I reckon that that 
£3.2m is £4.5m in anyone else's money I mean, this year we 
reckoned to finish with £3m and get £&n. Apart from that, 
we do have a capital reserve with about £2m in it if we 
really get stuck".
Once a g a in , th e re fo re , th e  T re a s u re r cou ld  be observed s im u ltan eo u sly  
a c tin g  as a  'g u a rd ia n ' tow ards s e rv ic e  spending, where he e v id e n tly  
f e l t  th a t  th e  £lm  re s to ra tio n  o f  cu ts  should n o t have been made, and 
as an 'a d v o c a te ' tow ards th e  contingency re s e rv e  and balances w h ere in  
la y  h is  own m argin fo r  e r r o r . A gain , a ls o , we saw how th e  p o lit ic ia n s  
were conscious o f  th e  T re a s u re r as an advocate as w e ll as a  g u a rd ian ,
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and allowed for the slack which they suspected he would have built 
into the estimates, in order to support their own desires for a 
certain level of spending. By such means did the guardian and 
advocate roles fit together in Authority B as Wildavsky's "calculating 
mechanism" to fix the eventual outcome, albeit in a much more fluid 
manner than he appeared to envisage, in each particular situation 
according to each actor's definition of his own interests in balance 
with those of the authority.
These guardian v advocate interactions are of course particularly 
explicit examples of the cognitive role of politics in negotiating an 
'order' from the competing definitions offered by the actors con­
cerned: because political interactions are the basic mechanisms which 
combine value preferences, the range of other ways beyond those 
illustrated here in which they may determine outcomes is huge. How­
ever, having outlined our view of what politics is, and consequently 
what it does, it is to illustrating the trends and features which were 
revealed within this range by the data that we now turn. For con­
venience, the area may be split broadly in two, in terms of the 
political interactions around the review and revision of the 
expenditure and existing comnitments within the status quo, and those 
around the actual allocation of resources. Equally broadly, there is 
an extent to which the latter of these two areas corresponds to the 
'orthodox' view of politics in local authorities as something carried 
out between 'politicians' and perhaps Chief Officers at the 'margin' 
(however defined); whereas the former comes into the picture having 
been recognised as 'significant' following our broadening of the 
concept of politics to include (in this case) interactions within what 
would be delineated by incrementalists as 'the budget base'. Clearly, 
this division is highly arbitrary, with each aspect overlapping and
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meaningless without the other, although to an extent it is similar to 
that made by Greenwood (1983: ppl57-63). For our purposes, however, 
it does allow particular issues to be highlighted, and the short­
comings of political incrementalism which emerged frcm the data here 
to be attributed in full. Chapters 7 and 8 therefore illustrate the 
'politics of budgetary review', while Chapter 9 covers the 'politics 
of resource allocation'.
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CHAPTER 7. THE POLITICS OF BUDGETARY REVIEW: THE STATUS QUO
(i) INTRODUCTION
The 'politics of budgetary review' is the interaction observed around, 
and concerning the choices arising in, reviewing and revising the 
budget base, viewed here as the existing financial structure of 
activities in each of the authorities studied. As incrementalists 
such as Wildavsky recognise, (eg 1979a: pl3), the subject is therefore 
connected intimately with 'the status quo', as defined, applied, or 
appealed to as a precedent. In this chapter therefore we look in 
general terms at the issues of review and revision which the data 
revealed, in order to ascertain exactly what 'the status quo' in the 
authorities studied actually represented. Was it something fixed and 
universellly defined, or was it capable of interpretation and 
redefinition by those with the ability/power to do so? If the latter, 
how did this acme about, and what impact could 'the status quo' itself 
then be said to have had? What then would be the consequences for the 
politics of budgetary review (or, as we shall often call it here, the 
'politics of the status quo')?
We can introduce our exploration by recalling a number of observations 
from earlier chapters. We saw in Chapter 3 that resource shortage had 
over time effectively undermined the shared assumption in local 
authorities of an annual increment of growth in resources. Although 
on the evidence of the authorities studied the actual timing varied, 
this had prompted the questioning and revision in turn of further 
acrrmonly-held definitions of the means and nature of service 
provision, and a greater willingness to review efficiency and
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effectiveness in meeting service needs (eg Greenwood, 1983: 
ppl58-167), albeit not in the authorities studied, at that time, a 
willingness to reconsider 'core* definitions of the desirability of 
services in themselves. While, as we also noted, this inevitably 
produced tension and dissensus, there was also promoted nonetheless a 
greater awareness of financial issues and the financial position of 
the authority. Formerly this had been the preserve of the Treasurer 
but now:
"I think financial stringency and greater financial 
reporting even in the junk press has made everybody more 
aware, and therefore the Garments which used to come only 
from the Treasurer now come from other officers and even 
Members and the Chairman" (Deputy Treasurer, Authority A).
This combination of financial pressures, and the greater awareness of 
and willingness to respond to them, meant that rather less was taken 
as fixed or given, and that, as we also noted earlier, the margin of 
feasible change within the authorities studied was effectively, even 
if not simultaneously, widening.
Approaching this from the inverse point of view, it also implies that 
the budget base in its political role as a source of precedents and 
priorities had become a smaller component of the overall budget, as 
those precedents and priorities began to be questioned. (This is of 
course quite distinct from the role of the budget base - reviewed or 
unreviewed - observed in Chapter 3 as a 'holding' position in the 
negotiation of uncertainty). The logical extension of this trend is 
that if resource shortages became severe enough, then the pressures of 
survival would prompt a review of the priorities and precedents in the 
base, leading perhaps to the wholesale rescheduling of the budget as 
these survival pressures were defined to dictate, much as Wildavsky 
(1975: ppl36-165) foresaw in some conditions of resource shortage.
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If so, this arguuent would also suggest that an authority's existing 
activities and cxximitments, which cure often held to restrict available 
options and thus the level of activity around, and review of, the 
budget may not be as 'fixed' in the final analysis as they usually 
appear. Here, however, writers in the field and indeed those 
interviewed divided into two camps: those who would dispute the 
proposition, and argue that any view of an entire budget as, eg, a 
politically negotiated construct and hence open to re-negotiation is a 
"reductio ad absurdun" (Pendlebury & Jones, 1983: p7), and those who 
would agree with it. The dispute is of critical importance to 
understanding the nature and politics of the status quo and we 
therefore examine each position in turn.
(ii) THE POLITICS OF BUDGETARY REVIEW: THE NATURE OF THE STATUS QUO
(ii)(a) The Nature of the Status Quo: Opposing Arguments Outlined
Turning first to the incremental argument that much of the budget is 
de facto 'fixed' and for all practical purposes something to be taken 
as given, we find once again that Wildavsky is as clear an exponent as 
any:
"The budget may be conceived of as an iceberg with by far 
the largest part below the surface, outside the control of 
anyone. Many items in the budget are standard and are 
simply re-enacted every year unless there is special reason 
to challenge them" (1979a: pl3).
Jones & Pendlebury make the same citation, in arguing that:
"Perhaps the most obvious reason for using incremental 
budgeting is that many of the activities carried out in 
previous years are either mandatory, or are so fundamental 
to meeting organisational goals, that they will have to 
continue year in, year out. It seems sensible, therefore, 
to concentrate only on changes from the previous year 
because these might be all that are controllable" (1984: 
p56).
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Similarly, Wanat (eg 1974: pl225-8) extends the theme of mandatory 
spending as an explanation of incremental change, as he sees it, in 
its own right, and Lars son (1982: pi) argues frcm incremental premises 
to the conclusion that "... drastic measures are normally inpossible 
to carry through". Hogwood & Peters also feel that:
"... current politicians have little latitude except to try 
to pay for the ocmnitments made by their predecessors ...
The alternative is to undertake the difficult task of 
terminating or replacing these oaimitments" (1982: p227).
Accordingly, any claims for the reversibility of even incremental 
policy changes, such as we saw earlier that Lindblam - in conflict 
with Wildavsky's notion of the budget base - advances, "...[fail] to 
take into account .. • the extent to which future options are shaped by 
incremental changes" (Hogwood & Peters, 1982: p228).
The argument that for practical purposes much of an authority's budget 
is 'fixed' and therefore beyond revision or review, then, points to 
statutory or practical realities as the reason for this, and for the 
lack of scope for more than marginal change. As such, it receives 
same support frcm the data. We saw for example in Figure 7 (pl32 
above) how the budget document in Authority A showed the present 
year's budget as the fixed base, with 'other' expenditure - ie 
genuinely 'new' items - shown simply as one increment among 'increased 
costs' and 'ocranitments' to arrive at the new budget. As a Chief 
Officer in Authority B reflected,
"When you look at the average departmental budget, look at 
the headings the Member has a real choice in ... He's got 
no choice in ... capital debt, wages, the salary bill, the 
fuel bill ... When you take all those away he's got very 
little left".
Similarly, the Leader of Authority A observed that:
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"There is  no re a l freedom to  in n o v a te , th e  lim its  a re  v e ry  
sm all indeed . You can in flu e n c e  th e  way money is  spent b u t 
you c a n 't  c re a te  a re v o lu tio n . Each yea r you a re  p ic k in g  up 
th e  p ro d u ct o f  th e  previous y e a r. Your p o lic ie s  d o n 't  
change a l l  th a t much".
Finally, the Chief Executive of Authority C, perhaps unintentionally, 
underlined the possible role of legal constraints (see also Pendlebury 
& Jones, 1983: p7; Jones St Pendlebury, 1984: p56) as follows:
"We don't do anything we can stop doing. We're right on the 
legal level. You can always cut out a little bit, but 
that's insignificant. We've stopped seme services, minor 
canes, but again, we didn't do a great deal in the 
discretionary line. Ours are mostly mandatory anyway".
The data therefore appeared to lend seme support to what may be termed 
the 'fixed budget* argument, with respondents emphasising both the 
legal and practical constraints underlying to stress the 
irreversibility, as they saw it, of much of the budget. The 
implication of this is that a study of the politics of budgetary 
review and revision really need only concentrate on the margin where 
change is possible, because the bulk of the budget in the 'base' 
constitutes a block of faits accomplis effectively outside or 
irrelevant to the political interactions which make up the budget 
process. As Pendlebury & Jones succinctly put it:
"Clearly, when programmes have to continue year in year out 
(because of either legal requirements or practical 
realities) the politics of maintaining a substantial portion 
of the status quo are trivial ... [It] is only for marginal 
changes in the status quo that political processes become 
important" (1983: p7).
However, we now turn frcm the incremental/' fixed budget' argument to 
putting the various counter-arguments.
The argument we shall in fact adopt here is extremely similar to that
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of Friedman (1975), cited and rejected above by Pendlebury & Jones as 
a "reductio ad absurdum":
"Hie continuation of the past into the present and the 
acceptance of proposals frcm one budget-making stage to the 
next is most assuredly a selection frcm among alternative 
courses of action. The absence of change is itself a policy 
choice ... There is nothing ' natural', ' accidental' or 
'straightforward' about the incremental character of 
government spending. Consequently, there is little 
justification to interpret the stability and regularity of 
spending as the consequence of an apolitical ... process 
instead of as the result of the political policy-making 
process it actually is " (cited in Pendlebury & Jones,
1983: p6).
Similarly, Natchez & Bupp note that:
"... if there is any 'normal state of affairs' in the 
policy process, it is one of intense competition between 
programs for public funds ... There is nothing simple or 
automatic about [policies] continuing" (1973: p956ff).
Turning again to the data, a senior Chairman in Authority A observed 
that:
"Hopefully, I've managed to make some inroads, because I 
don't accept that 70 or 80% is fixed and you've only got 
20% to manoeuvre. I don't accept that. Local government is 
one of the most dogged of institutions and it's like trying 
to move a bloomin' mountain, both to change the attitudes of 
Members and officers, but I think - I hope - I've got things 
going a bit ..."
Outwardly, at least, this respondent's attitude appeared rather more 
proactive than that quoted above of his Leader 1
As we have hinted in earlier Chapters, though, proactivity and 
'attitude* - as these arise from definitions of role in relation to 
events and other actors - are in many ways the key to the argument. 
Actors act on the basis of definitions of the situation which they 
form as they perceive the world around them. If some thing or some 
expenditure is taken as ' fixed', therefore, it is through being
228
defined as such. The 'fixing' resides in the definition itself, 
either in the first instance or after a (defined) failure to enact a 
definition that it was amenable to change; and either consciously or 
unconsciously, perhaps by the actor absorbing the most cannon or 
salient definition of that item made available (perhaps tacitly) by 
those around him. That is, the actor may be socialised into the 
culturally-based preconception that much of the budgetary status quo 
is or is not beyond any practiced, aspiration to alter it and that 
certain activities cure effectively sacrosanct. This would happen as 
part of the basic fabric of shared experience and outlook which, at 
the 'background' and probably unconscious level, underpinned the more 
specific definitions which actors in each authority tended to form of 
events, trends and each other as these were experienced. To the 
extent that the margin of feasible change, as defined, was widening in 
response to the brute fact of resource shortage, it may have been 
socialised definitions of this type which were undermined or revised. 
Whatever their provenance though, it is those definitions of the 
situation themselves, through which the application of the status quo 
is 'enacted' through time, which are the key to the degree of change 
which will be possible.
(ii)(b) The Politics of Budgetary Review: Legal Constraints
The significance of the argument outlined may be seen, first, in the 
context of the legal constraints upon authorities (of which as we saw 
the 'fixed budget* argument makes much), which are held to impose 
mandatory spending requirements thereby either ' explaining' spending 
patterns directly, or dictating a restricted range within which
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'politics' may have an impact on the status quo. At once, though, the 
data showed it to be easy to over-eraphasise the uniformity of the 
impact of legal constraints. Authority A's Solicitor observed that:
"When everyone's trying to economise, people tend to do 
things of more questionable legality. Certainly, people are 
more litigious. Chief Officers or Gcmrdttees keep trying to 
chop things out which as I see it they have a legal duty to 
perform. It's all a bit two-sided. On the one hand, I as a 
senior central officer of course back [the Treasurer's] 
efforts, but at the same time I feel I have to read the law 
for them all and maybe rein then in a bit".
Outwardly, of course, this supports the argument in favour of the 
fixed nature of legal constraints upon budgetary discretion, with the 
respondent in effect defining his role as maintaining those 
constraints despite pressure upon them. The crucial clue, though, is 
the words "as I see it": the implication is that the respondent's role 
was one of interpreting the law and supplying his definition of the 
situation for the consuription of the authority.
The theme of interpretation is developed considerably by Stewart in 
his discussion of "the myth of statutory constraint":
"Hie belief is widely held that the local authority's 
existing activities are largely required by statute and that 
the local authority has no discretion in carrying out those 
activities ...
... The myth has a basis in reality. The local authority is 
a law-bound organisation. It normally carries out 
activities only when specifically authorised by statute.
Many of its activities are seen as mandatory ..." (1983:
pl46).
Similarly, Greenwood notes that local authorities tend to have 
"blindspots", where their activities, and often the level to which 
they carry them out are perceived to be legally defined (eg 1983: 
pl60). However, as Stewart then adds:
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"That is the basis of the myth. It does not follow, however 
... that the local authority has no or very little choice 
over those activities. In many instances, the legislation 
laying duties on the local authority does not specify the 
level of activity or the way the activity should be carried 
out. There cure rarely even clear minimum standards which 
have to be met ... In the final resort a local authority is 
responsible for its interpretation of the law, and therefore 
its level of expenditure" (1983: pl47).
Following Stewart & Greenwood, therefore, and also consistent with 
Danziger' s observation (1978: p40) of the very broad constraints 
imposed by ‘ultra vires' and 'mandamus', our proposition is that the 
impact of legal constraints upon a local authority in maintaining its 
status quo is not 'direct' or 'objective', but rests upon their 
interpretation and definition. Legal constraints cannot of course be 
defined away entirely, but they can be defined into budgets with 
widely varying results.
Now, even those inclined to the incremental/' fixed budget' argument 
might feel able to some extent to agree with this, although they would 
then argue that for whatever reason, re-interpretation or 
re-definition on any but a marginal scale remains so unlikely that the 
possibility is for practical purposes irrelevant (eg Pendlebury & 
Jones, 1983: p7). It has to be said, though, that the variation 
between authorities in the levels and methods of service provision 
within such statutory frameworks as exist, indicating the lack of 
determining influence by those statutes, is impressive. We have 
already seen (pp58-63) the variation, over time, in spending levels 
per head between shire counties, which may to some extent be taken as 
indicative (cf also Audit Ccnmission, 1985a: paras 7-9). Stewart 
himself, however, cites the rise in education standards within the one 
framework provided by the 1944 Education Act, and also the variation 
in refuse collection standards and practices (1983: pl47). Similarly, 
Bell & Klemz rote that the 1970 Chronically Sick & Disabled Persons'
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A ct la id  co n sid erab le  d u tie s  upon lo c a l a u th o r itie s  to  p ro v id e  fo r  th e  
w e lfa re  o f  d is ab le d  p eo p le , b u t even so:
"Different criteria for interpreting the Act have given rise 
to wide variations in the way that services are given in 
different local authorities" (1981: p71).
Definitions of need may also vary greatly between authorities in 
housing, even with its extensive statutory framework (at the time of 
the research, parts of the 1936, 1949, 1961, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1975, 
1980 and 1982 Housing Acts were still in force), as evidenced by 
variations in the basic 'points' assessments for eligibility for 
council housing and transfers between dwellings. Roads are 
demonstrably maintained to differing standards in different areas. 
Transport subsidy levels vary greatly between areas and concessionary 
fare schemes are wholly discretionary. There is even variation at 
present in the assessment of apparently fixed categories such as 
fire-risk areas such that, for example, the AOC recently objected for 
this reason to a proposal to base the Fire Services' GRE assessment on 
this measurement (eg, DoE, 1985b).
On this reading, the politics of defining the meaning of such legal 
constraints as there are, and thus responses to then can scarcely be 
dismissed, as Pendlebury & Jones (1983: p7) assert, as "trivial": even 
if tacit and socialised, the choices involved quite clearly have a 
profound impact. It is not claimed (and neither did Stewart claim) 
that major redefinitions of what is implied by a given statute are 
necessarily easy to enact, because of the expectations and 
self-interests within each authority which attend the existing 
definitions (eg, Stewart, 1983: pl49). As Schick (1983: pl7) puts it,
" . . .  e xp e c ta tio n s  d r iv e  budgets . . . "  -  b u t in  many ways th is  
emphasises o ur p o in t. L eg a l c o n s tra in ts  have n o t o f  course ceased to
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apply, but neither have they ever applied in an ’objective' sense so 
much as through the cultural and socialised expectations outlined 
earlier which in turn condition what 'the law' is defined to imply.
The significance of all this is that these expectations are changing. 
As both Greenwood (1983: ppl60-l) and Stewart (1983: ppl46-9), and 
also the respondent fran Authority A cited on p230 above, showed, the 
tacit and socialised definitions through which, previously, statutory 
constraints were 'translated' by each authority into duplications for 
its spending patterns, have become harder to sustain in the face of 
the brute fact of resource shortage. While 'core* definitions about 
the role of services themselves had been retained, we have seen that 
at the time of the research the margin of feasible change as defined 
around these was widening, and it is plausible that at least part of 
this has occurred as the implications of statutes were, perforce, 
re-examined and re-defined. The Housing Chief Officer of Authority A 
supplied an example of how, within the many statutes governing 
housing, he was able to manipulate his authority's definition of 
medical housing need into line with the resources he had available:
"Because the GPs outside would imnediately sign a 
certificate, we had thousands come in, and in no way could 
we handle it. Right now, it would have taken years for some 
of these people to be dealt with. I had to call the 
oomnunity physician and say 'Look, this is ludicrous, I just 
can't do it. Here's all the cases we've got, sort them out 
into some priority', because I knew the problem was [that] 
with the lack of resources I could only deal with priority 
1. Well, he sorted them out into priority 1 and 2, and we 
were getting along with that. Then the cuts really came in, 
and nearly everyone was moving into medical priority 1, 
because the medical profession soon gets to know ... So, 
again, we had a discussion and we've now got three medical 
priorities ... "
Similarly, Greenwood (1983: pl60) notes an increase in explicit
233
analysis within local authorities of the extent to which their 
activities really should be defined as mandatory.
It is therefore concluded frcm this brief examination of legal 
constraints that Friedman's view of the budget, cited above, as 
irredeemably a process of choice is much more valid and useful than 
Pendlebury fc Jones allow, and is probably more accurate at a time of 
resource constraint when culturally based expectations within local 
authorities cure under pressure, than their own 'fixed budget' view. 
Legal provisions cannot of course be defined away, and there may come 
a point where they provide an unambiguous prohibition upon a 
particular course of action (or lack thereof), but the potential scope 
in the authorities studied for political interactions to define, or 
rather, redefine, and order choices and responses before that point 
was reached appeared to be substantial. If 'legal factors' were a 
discernible constraint on the level of revision to the status quo, 
therefore, this arose from the way in which consciously or 
unconsciously they were defined by the actors concerned, rather than 
frcm any 'objective' impact on expenditure levels.
(ii)(c) The Politics of Budgetary Review; "Existing Conrnitments'1
This general line of reasoning about the status quo may now be 
developed further. So far, we have discussed the legal constraints 
which, as we saw, the incremented./' fixed budget' argument cites in its 
own support. It will be recalled, however, that notably in the hands 
of Wildavsky (eg 1979a; pl3) but also of, eg, Hogwood & Peters (1982; 
p227), Pendlebury & Jones (1983; pp6-7) and Jones & Pendlebury (1984; 
pp56-7), this argument also rests upon the bulk of other ccrrrriitments
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in the shape of existing activities and expectations that these and 
their funding, and thus the promises and proportions represented in 
the budgetary status quo, will be maintained. Once again, the key to 
the issue is not these ccmnitments in any 'objective' sense, but how 
they came to be defined as such by the actors involved, individually 
and collectively, and how those definitions came to be adopted as a 
course of action. Here, the data indicated that the issue has two 
broad, if overlapping aspects: the scope for varying definitions of 
what is implied by 'an existing ccmnitment' and, whether or not this 
definition is shared, the scope for terminating it. The former is 
discussed here, the latter, in the next section.
The politics of the status quo is at its most obvious in terms of 
defining what the status quo actually is. As Heclo & Wildavsky (eg 
1981: pp217-19) demonstrate, a precise definition of 'existing policy' 
at least at the national level is by no means obvious and will, at 
least at the margin, be the focus of considerable negotiations. On 
our definition of politics, it would be unlikely that aspects of the 
budgetary process at the local level were somehow 'excluded' frcm 
politics, as, for example, the incremental/' fixed budget' argument 
implies. As we saw earlier (p210), the nature of political 
interactions is such that politics cannot be taken as an 'on-off' 
process. This is not merely a quibble about definitions, although 
Pendlebury & Jones (eg 1983: p6) evidently have a fairly 
'conventional' view of the term 'politics' in mind. One effect of the 
very wide definition adopted here is that it sensitises us to 
interactions which would not normally cane within the scope of this 
conventional definition, but which may nevertheless have a 
considerable hidden impact on outcomes. In short, we need also to
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examine the 'politics' that the 'politicians' seldom see, at the lover 
levels of the process.
Thus, the extracts in Chapter 4 (ppl48-52) of the budget review 
process in Authority B show that existing activities of the type which 
sane might take as 'fixed* (in this case the maintenance of a park and 
recreation facility) may in fact routinely be reviewed for 'padding' 
and the need to spend the sums stated, simply as part of the 
essentially administrative work of rolling forward the budget base 
each year. As we saw, estimates could be, and were, altered, and in 
sane cases deleted, as part of the application of the status quo to, 
and its definition for, the caning year. The process was self- 
evidently one of (as defined here, political) choice, resting on the 
power resources of what was termed 'local knowledge' available to the 
reviewing officers, of whether to accept the estimates presented 
(either due to their appearing sound, or as we saw in Extract 4, for 
further Member-level reasons which the two officers were unable - ie, 
had insufficient power - to circumvent), or whether to reject or 
revise them. On this evidence there cure no inherently 'apolitical' 
areas of the budget; any area may be the subject of choices which 
affect the definition of the status quo actually adopted. The fact 
that the 'politics' here was undeniably low-level does not mean that 
it was trivial: we saw that allocations of resources were examined, 
amended or deleted, not just marginally but to the full extent of each 
detail scrutinised, with the meaning of the status quo progressively 
negotiated and emerging as the outcome. At this level, therefore, 
Friedman's view of the budget as essentially a process of choice is 
once again far more justified than Pendlebury & Jones' dismissal of it 
as "a reductio ad absurdum".
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What these extracts did not really show however, but which was one 
area where the negotiated nature of the 'existing ccrnmtments' in the 
status quo emerged especially clearly from the data, was the 
negotiation surrounding the imposition in both Authorities A and B of 
a standstill budget parameter, as a 'holding' response to uncertainty 
(and then in Authority A as the guideline within which the budget was 
actually enacted for the ooming year). The negotiating and defining 
processes around the meaning of the standstill were attested to by 
actors in Authority A:
"You've got a problem with a standstill, because it doesn't 
always mean what it says. The standstill budget is 
generally taken to mean the same as last year, plus 
inflation. But let's say you've got £60,000 for supplies.
To a large extent that's not specific and if you like with a 
standstill, you should say, 'Alright, what did you buy last 
year, which of those have got to be replaced?', but in most 
cases you find you get pushed to last year's budget level 
which is not ideal ... The amount you can show to be 
available or the controls you need to operate it affect the 
political thinking, but it's also vice versa ..." (Chief 
Accountant).
"The definition of a standstill you cannot give absolute 
rules for, because there've been decisions taken by Council 
or Comnittees during the year ... You arrive at a figure 
which, although the ruling is a standstill, can incorporate 
decisions which in effect have been taken over the last 10 
or 15 months ... We do exercise a restraining influence on 
anyone's desire to slip something through that wasn't in 
last year's budget. If a department insists, we go to the 
Chairman, but in most cases we come to a reasonable 
compromise on interpretation" (Deputy Treasurer).
The use of the budget base - as outlined by the 'standstill' budget 
parameter - as a 'holding' response to uncertainty did not of course 
depend on whether it had actually been reviewed. Nevertheless, it may 
be seen from these quotes that the standstill was defined within what 
are hinted to be Member-level constraints which evidently prevented 
Treasury staff frcm enacting as tight a definition of it as they felt 
was warranted. It was the lack of ability (ie power) to enforce the
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s p e c ific a tio n  o f e x a c tly  which item s th e  s ta n d s t il l  embraced, as 
re ve a le d  by th e  f i r s t  quote, w hich prompted in s te a d  th e  use o f  
p revio u s  budget le v e ls , and i t  was around th is  th a t th e  n e g o tia tio n s  
and b a rg a in in g  re ve a le d  in  th e  second quote w ere necessary to  d e fin e  
what was o r was n o t meant by 'budget le v e ls '.
W ith in  th e  fram ework w hich th is  p ro v id ed , how ever, even i f  th e  o v e ra ll 
param eters w ere lo o s e r than  th e  T reasu ry  m igh t have w ished, th e  b ru te  
fa c t  o f  resource shortage continued  to  p ro v id e  th e  p re te x t ( ie  a power 
resource) fo r  a  rig o ro u s  enactm ent o f th e ir  d e fin it io n s  in  th e  
n e g o tia tio n s  re q u ire d  where th e  co n ten t o f  th e  s ta n d s t il l  was 
d isp u ted :
"You've got to bear in mind the overall state. I mean, if 
somebody came along and said 'We're going to restructure and 
save £50,000 this year, we can do this, that and the other', 
although they would be in their budget limits at present 
that £50,000 has got to be surrendered in the first instance 
to Resources [Ccmnittee]. With things as they are, if they 
want those extra things at all, they've got to give a report 
... Hie Environmental Health people had a restructure and 
saved about £25,000. lirmediately ... they said they wanted 
to do an industrial survey, which they had been talking 
about for years. I said, 'Well, fair enough, you've given 
up £25,000, but you'll have to get Resources to approve it 
because it not in your original budget . . . (Accountant).
Even i f  savings were o ffe re d  as a  means o f  paying  fo r  'new ' a c t iv it ie s  
th ese w ere s t i l l  o u ts id e  th e  d e f in it io n  o f  th e  s ta n d s t il l  being  
a p p lie d , because th e y  were n o t in  th e  o r ig in a l budget, and thus  
re q u ire d  a  s p e c ia l h earin g  a t  th e  Resources C cm nittee -  where th e  
T re as u re r was a b le  to  e x e rt more in flu e n c e , as we s h a ll co n firm . The 
n e g o tia tio n  o f  th e  s ta n d s t il l  thus becomes c le a r , and once ag ain  th e  
im pact o f  resource shortage in  underm ining th e  s o c ia lis e d  o r  c u ltu ra l 
a ttitu d e s  w hich underpinned d e fin it io n s  o f  th e  s ta tu s  quo may a ls o  be 
seen. I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  im ag in e , fo r  exam ple, T reasu ry  s ta f f
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succeeding (or indeed wanting to succeed) in enacting their 
definitions of the status quo even as far as shown at a time when, as 
the Accountant put it, "the overall state" was one where resources 
were more plentiful and where their pretext and major power resource 
would therefore have been absent. Perhaps the most important point, 
though, is that the negotiation and definition-forming around the 
meaning of the standstill was seldom as explicit as this example. We 
shall see shortly from data gathered frcm Authority B that much of 
considerable importance, was tacit, involving no necessary contact, 
but with actors trading as much in terms of anticipated actions.
Turning now to Authority B, a further aspect of the politics of the 
status quo revealed by the data was the manipulation of price bases to 
achieve 'hidden* economies within it. Argument about 'cash' and 
'volume* (ie constant price) budgeting at the national level, notably 
between central and local government, is an established phenomenon (eg 
Heclo & Wildavsky, 1981: pp221-2), but the choice of approach at
local level has considerable implications for our purposes. We saw in 
Chapter 2 that the measurement of one or other could markedly affect 
the level of incremental change observed: here, the inpact is on what 
the status quo was actually defined to include. Defining it on a 
'cash* basis at outturn prices incorporates an allowance for inflation 
up to the outturn, and thereby assesses the actual cost of the status 
quo over the period in question; a volume basis, by contrast, makes no 
allowance for inflation, but thereby provides a closer measure of what 
activity is actually occurring. A volume 'standstill* implies a 
further cash increase equivalent to the rate of inflation; conversely 
a cash * standstill*, because inflation has to be accommodated within 
that figure, implies a volume cut equal to the rate of inflation.
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This latter was exactly what was imposed in Authority B:
“[Members] made a decision they were going to cash limit 
things. They're not that bright, as it were, and they 
hadn't realised the implications of what they were doing. 
The Leader knew, but none of the rest did. The whole point 
about cash limits is that no-one can follow the price 
bases. We said, 'One way we can hold spending back is to 
say, 'The estimate as it's printed holds to the end of the 
year'' and therefore it's a cash limit, and they agreed to 
that. Normally, there would have been supplementary 
estimates, but we said, 'The budget as it's printed holds'. 
We knew there was fat in there which could cane out ...
Last year we did the same thing, we did the budget at the 
previous November price base and quickly turned it into a 
cash limit, and still they never really twigged on this 
year" (Chief Accountant: part of this quote appeared on 
page 144 above).
For each of two years, therefore, 16 months' inflation (ie from the 
November in the preceding financial year, to outturn - March - of the 
financial year in question) had to be acccmnodated within budgets 
originally fixed in anticipation that inflation would be allowed as an 
'extra' allocation. Inflation frcm the 'first' November in question 
to the outturn of the second year, on the basis of the RPI, was 
approximately 40%. Allowing for the 20% uplift permitted to construct 
the November price base for the second of the two years and also some 
special exceptions to the cash limit agreed in advance, this implies a 
volume cut of 15%, which is a substantial hidden redefinition of the 
meaning, in volume terms, of the status quo within its 'cash' 
definition. (These figures show the impact before allowing for the 
cuts exercise in the second year of the research discussed in detail 
on pp286-91 below). The elasticity of the concept of the status quo 
becomes clear. As a further consequence, the Treasury were able by 
means of this tactic to spare themselves the trouble of reviewing the 
service expenditure base for themselves, because to some extent the 
onus for doing this was transferred to the service departments 
themselves, as they sought to live within their enforced cash limits.
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Once a g a in , re p e a tin g  th e  lessons o f e a r l ie r  c h ap ters , i t  may be seen 
th a t th e  le v e l o f  re v ie w  a c tu a lly  found depends on where one lo o ks .
On this evidence, therefore, the politics of the status quo arises 
because 'the status quo' and 'existing ccranitments', as well as the 
legal constraints examined earlier, did not in fact have an 
'objective' impact upon budget levels so much as an inpact through 
definitions formed of than, and these in turn had been conditioned by 
expectations arising frcm further definitions of the resources 
position. Wildavsky (eg 1979a; pplll-15) shows how even in the 
wealthy (eg 1975: pp26-67) conditions of the US Federal budget, 
'existing ccmnitments' are defined and manipulated so as to attract 
further funds; indeed, we saw in Chpater 2 how Authority A's Planner 
adopted a "camel's nose" tactic of securing incremental allocations 
until conmitment to his much larger overall objective became 
inescapable. Nevertheless, the evidence in general from the data here 
was that under conditions of resource shortage, definitions of what 
really was implied by, and what really was negotiable within, the 
status quo were being revised (see also Greenwood, 1983: ppl60-l; 
Stewart, 1983: pp208-9), if only as part of attempts to meet existing 
objectives more cheaply.
As our argument stands, of course, proponents of the incremental/ 
'fixed budget' argument might still ask how this is relevant to those 
parts of the budget not affected by the negotiations shown: even, eg, 
Pendlebury & Jones (1983: p7) concede the scope for negotiation at the 
margin, and what we have seen by definition remains within the (albeit 
widening) 'margin of feasible change'. However, while we have not 
disproved the 'fixed budget' argument, we have seen enough at least to 
suggest, particularly at a time of scarce resources, that arguing that
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the politics of the status quo is irrelevant or trivial offers a 
substantial hostage to fortune. The margin of feasible change has 
widened because it is based on expectations governed by resource 
levels Which in turn are generally 'inadequate'; both inasmuch as old 
definitions and preconceptions of 'existing ooninitments' from further 
within the status quo cure new caning under closer scrutiny, as the 
cultural underpinning of perceptions of the status quo as a whole are 
placed under increasing pressure, and inasmuch as the degree to which 
these ccrnnitments are likely to be redefined has also increased. At 
the very least, therefore, the politics of the status quo is a great 
deal more relevant and less trivial than hitherto; the interesting 
questions then concern the politics of how some ccrnnitments and not 
others remain inmune from redefinition, if indeed they do I
(ii)(d) The Politics of Budgetary Review; Terminating Commitments?
In a sense, of course, our failure so far to disprove entirely the 
'fixed budget' argument is to be expected because we have not yet 
looked at the possibilities of actually abandoning ocrnnitments rather 
than merely redefining their impact. The logic of our argument is 
that if resource shortages increase further still this is indeed what 
will happen, even if they cure not, as Lindblom erroneously implied 
would be easy, actually reversed. There cure many examples of where 
this point has cane close; thus, hospitals have been built and 
immediately 'moth-balled' - even if not demolished - for lack of 
resources to run them, and the Transport Expenditure Group recently 
warned of the threat of enforced road closures if maintenance 
expenditure was not increased (Dip; 1985). Equally, as we have noted, 
school meals staff have been fired and re-hired on lower rates of pay
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to break contractual cxarmitments to pay them at existing rates. This 
example is especially significant because it appears to represent an 
inroad into the barrier of labour resistance which even Stewart (1983: 
p200), and others have sought to emphasise, and because it is an 
example of precisely the drastic change which Pendlebury & Jones 
(1983: p6) dismissed as merely a hypothetical possibility.
While the data frcm the authorities studied does not provide instances 
of major ccmnitments actually being abandoned, there were several more 
minor ones, an example being a seaside holiday home maintained within 
Authority B's social services budget. Further, a major ccmriitment in 
Authority A only narrowly escaped termination when a very large, but 
massively loss-making trading undertaking was saved frcm being shut 
down after a prolonged and extremely bitter argument (of which more 
shortly). As Ingelstam (1981: p213) and Jons son (1982: p41) observed, 
sudden crises, such as the worsening position of this undertaking, 
make innovation and drastic response easier even if not, in this case, 
easy enough to close it. Although these writers themselves appear to 
have increases in spending in mind, it would seem at least as 
plausible that 'drastic' responses could include the opposite, in this 
instance the abandonment of significant ccnmitments. The logic of 
what we have seen so far is also that, say, a sudden fall in grant 
levels could provide the necessary 'crisis'.
The answer to our question of whether commitments could or should be 
abandoned is therefore a probable 'Yes', even if not (quite) in the 
case of major ccnmitments in the authorities studied. As we have 
seen, while the margin of feasible change was widening as the 
socialised and culturally-based expectations underpinning definitions 
of the status quo were placed under pressure, at the time of the
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research certain core definitions of the desirability of service 
provision per se remained intact, hence the relatively minor 
terminations of ccrnnitments which were actually observed. The trend 
in resources, however, and the reduced expectations which this will 
prompt, should keep us alive to the possibility of increasing areas of 
authorities' budgets coming to be defined as expendable, and of the 
possibility of those definitions then being enacted.
(ii)(e) The Politics of Budgetary Review; Interim Suimary
Concluding this general examination of the politics of the status quo, 
therefore, Friedman's view of the budget base as irredeemably a 
process of (political) choice emerged from the data yet again to be 
much closer to the truth than Pendlebury & Jones and other exponents 
of the incremental/' fixed budget' argunent would allow, and probably 
rather closer than the 'fixed budget' argument itself. The politics 
of the status quo is extremely relevant: it is the tempering, at 
present, of socialised and culturally-based expectations that existing 
legal or other ccranitinents will be maintained in their present form, 
with the reduced horizons defined in response to the brute fact of 
resource shortage. Benson notes that:
"Many of the conventional ly understood features of 
organisations ... have a fictional character. The 
consensual understanding of these is so loose as to permit 
wide variations in responses" (1977: p7)
This alone suggests that the incremental concept of the budget base in 
its political guise should not be viewed too rigidly: however, the 
situation we are faced with here is one where the "consensual 
understanding" itself was being recast. Since the outcome could not
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be guaranteed to maintain the status quo, but is rather more likely to 
prompt much closer attention to the previous tacit and socialised 
definitions of existing camnitments and activities as 'fixed', it 
cannot be ignored.
Certainly, this response has varied in terms of economies actually 
sought and gained - both as we shall see below and as evidenced by the
variations in spending patterns shown in Chapter 3 - but this only
serves to emphasise the crucial truth running through our account: at 
the root of this variation lies the fact that resource shortage, and 
following from this, legal and political constraints and also those 
represented by 'existing ccrrmitments', have their impact in terms of 
how they are defined by the actors involved. We have begun to see 
that 'the status quo' is not something which is 'fixed' or 
'objective': it is negotiated, sustained or modified through tine, 
often tacitly or unconsciously, as a pattern of continuous definitions 
and mutual expectations by those actors. 'The status quo' - the
budget base - is in effect a process: it is a part of what in symbolic
interactionist terms is the 'negotiated order' (eg Day & Day: 1977: 
pl27; Mangham, 1979: pp69-93) of definitions of which organisations 
are actually made up, in this case within what may be delineated as 
the financial structure of each authority. 'The politics of budgetary 
review', on this reckoning, is the negotiation of order (ie, the 
continuing formulation, combination and patterning of definitions) in 
relation to the status quo: that is, the day-to-day application by the 
actors involved of the ' status quo', as defined to that point, to 
trends and events such as resource shortage, as these in turn were 
defined to affect the position from within or outside the authority.
F u rth e r, w h ile  th e  b ru te  fa c ts  o f  resource  shortage and u n c e rta in ty
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ensured that this process was more problematic than hitherto, and that 
the negotiation processes themselves therefore took on an added 
significance, it should be stressed that even had the budget base been 
entirely routinely reaffirmed, as Mangham recognises this would have 
been beside the point:
"In a number of routine circumstances there is roan for 
improvisation and innovation ...
... Both the routine and standard responses to circumstances 
as well as improvised ones depend upon ... processes of 
interpretation" (1979: p73).
The negotiation of order is frequently routine and mundane, but the 
social and political processes which enact through time and reaffirm 
'the routine* are therefore nonetheless real and relevant, and it is 
this which lies at the heart of the failure of the incremental/' fixed 
budget' argument to capture adequately what was observed. That the 
negotiation of order around the allocation of resources may take on 
routine and 'incremental' forms is itself a phenomenal in need of 
rather more explanation and analysis than political incrementalism 
would allow.
With these conclusions in mind, we now turn from the general theme 
outlined to developing the argument by examining the particular 
patterns in the politics of budgetary review revealed by the data in 
Authorities A and B.
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CHAPTER 8. TOE POLITICS OF BUDGETARY REVIEW: CASE STUDIES
(i) INTRODUCTION
It may be gathered from what we have seen in the previous chapter and 
also frcm the treatment of the cognitive limits argument in Chapter 4, 
that the level of review of the status quo found in each authority is 
a function of aspects of the political configuration (ie 'political' 
in the very wide definition adopted here), in terms of whether areas 
of expenditure are 'open' to scrutiny, and also in terms of the 
resources defined to be available for reviewing activities. In this 
chapter we shall develop our argument by outlining the particular 
configurations in the authorities studied with a view to showing how 
the negotiated order in each which those configurations represented 
was sustained and redefined through time, as events presented 
themselves for assimilation, thereby giving each authority a 
distinctive pattern of reviewing activities and ocmnitments. We have 
seen that maintaining and 'operating' this ordering of definitions, 
and revising it where necessary (ie where the definition of necessity 
could itself be enacted) was, in effect, 'the politics of budgetary 
review' in each authority.
(ii) THE POLITICS OF BUDGETARY REVIEW IN AUTHORITY A
(ii) (a) Background: Cultural Parameters
The background for our examination of the politics or negotiation of 
order around budgetary review in Authority A is once again the
247
boundary between the impact of the brute fact of resource shortage, 
and the retained 'core' definitions of the desirability of services 
per se. As we saw briefly in Chapter 3, for all the fact that the 
margin of feasible change was widening, those definitions continued to 
set the boundaries in Authority A beyond which solutions were not 
sought:
"What you're asking [Chief Officers] to do is say, 'Yeah, 
alright, there should be a Recreation Manager whose job it 
is to provide the most cost-effective recreation and 
entertainment'. What they must then ask is, 'But is running 
the [name] Hall the best way of doing that, or building 
sports centres?' I think, though, that the ultimate 
assumption is still that there will be a service. Take 
entertainments. You might be tempted to think that the 
private sector provides all the entertainment you need, but 
we provided the Concert Hall. If you left it all to the 
ccrrmercial sector, [name] Theatre would disappear because 
it's only there because us and the Arts Council fund it, and 
the [name] Hall would be a bingo palace. Similarly, the 
Council is the only agency in a position to supply swimming 
baths. Financial pressures may yet bring us to the point 
where we have to look again, but not yet, and it would be a 
major political decision" (Treasurer: part of this quote 
appeared on page 52).
To recap, therefore, in practical terms the inpact of the brute fact 
of resource shortage in Authority A was such that means of reducing 
overall expenditure levels were actively sought and were the primary 
impetus for examining aspects of the status quo, but that the 
existence of services themselves had quite clearly not been 
questioned.
The search for means of reducing expenditure, however, was observed in 
Chapter 4 (ppl37-9) to take a particular form. Leaving aside the 
routine work of rolling forward the budget base or of defining the 
meaning of a standstill in specific instances (although even here 
review and definitions, certainly of the meaning of the standstill, 
were not always as rigorous as Treasury staff might have wished - see
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p237), there emerged from the data a distinct reluctance to examine 
separately the base of service expenditure itself:
"We may want to try to get within the Government target, 
which would save us the loss of £lm in RSG. That was what 
[Tory Leader] was getting at in the Council with his 
amendment [to the budget guidelines], but in fact there are 
better ways of doing it than having great arguments about 
reducing Oomnittees' estimates" (Treasurer).
We saw in Chapter 4 that the level of review actually achieved was to 
a considerable extent a function of the resources made available for 
the task, and that in Authority A, as this quotation also implies, it 
was perceived that there were rather easier ways of achieving the 
desired level of savings, for example by the manipulation of budgetary 
income and debt charges, which were examined. While there were seme 
exceptions, these accordingly became the focus of effort, with 
significant effects on how Treasury staff then came to define their 
roles.
Indeed, in evaluating the desirability of the review of service 
expenditure, where this did occur the prospect of inmediate savings 
was consciously relegated to a lesser significance than the virtue of 
such activity for its own sake:
"The business about finding the odd £20,000 or £30,000 ... 
may not produce dramatic results but on the other hand it's 
very important if you're working corporately for every Chief 
Officer and department to be made aware of the need to pull 
together ... It makes them acutely aware of the need for 
efficiency. It' s of psychological significance really ... 
What it does is have an inpact on the performance of 
departments " (Treasurer).
Indeed, one review exercise which did take place in this area ended as 
a statement not about activity financed by the budget, but more about 
Authority A's means of classifying it:
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"We've been attempting to look at heads of expenditure which 
are habitually underspent. One of the things that comes 
out is that if you pull out the underspends you should as 
the opposite side of the coin pull out the overspends, and 
say at some point ’our analysis of expenditure is going 
wrong. In order to be more accurate we should redefine. Of 
the [instances] I've looked at recently there are a number 
where one account shows an underspend and the inmediately 
adjacent one shows an overspend. We'll have to take a look 
at that sort of instance and perhaps make seme adjustments" 
(Deputy Treasurer).
Thus, what began as an exercise in locating slack resources (itself a 
means of reducing the size of a budget without affecting the activity 
being carried out) became instead an exercise in organisational rather 
than budgetary review.
The significance of this last point will be seen shortly. However, on 
the evidence so far, the politics of budgetary review in Authority A 
embodied the definition that in terms of the primary objective of 
achieving savings, review of the service expenditure base was 
relatively less important than debt manipulation, and that insofar as 
the former was worthtfiile this was more for its organisational 
benefits. Leaving aside any review arising from the routine annual 
roll-forward, the service expenditure base itself remained relatively 
untouched: in terms of the order negotiated around the issue, the 
margin of feasible change had widened, but was as we shall see 
apparently defined in the particular direction of reducing the debt 
burden. The reasons for this state of affairs were complex, and put 
what is admitted to be a highly unusual overlay on the overall 
picture. Faced with a unique problem, actors within Authority A had 
negotiated an idiosyncratic set of responses to it and the status 
quo. While in seme ways this reduces the applicability of the 
specific conclusions derived, as a general illustration of the 
negotiation of order around the status quo (as defined) it is all the
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more vivid. Accordingly, we now explore the position by examining 
officer and Member contributions to it in turn.
(ii)(b) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority A: Officer-
Side Configuration
Turning first to the officer side of Authority A, the first issue to 
be noted was the impact of the Authority's debts: the quest to reduce 
indebtedness noted above and in Chapter 4 was perhaps the single most 
dominant feature of the role definitions of many of the budgetary 
actors observed, for reasons which will shortly become clear. We 
shall see that the scope for reducing debt charge payments tended 
entirely to overshadow any realistic expectations of savings from the 
review of other areas of the budget (see, especially, the second quote 
cxi pl38: above). At this stage, however, we shall simply note the 
fact in order to be able to examine the issue fully in due course. 
There are a number of other aspects which need to be addressed first.
The second issue - or rather, set of issues - related to the position 
of the Treasurer himself, and his department. As, eg, Rosenberg 
(1983: pl7) and others predicted, the Treasurer's role had expanded 
following the inpact of the brute fact of resource shortage, as 
evidenced, for example, by the enhanced attempts at income generation 
noted on pl37, and also of course with the activities vis-a-vis debt 
charges. Similarly, it had expanded as a result of the brute fact of 
uncertainty and in particular the peculiar uncertainties posed by the 
block grant system:
251
"I don't believe the membership of local authorities will 
ever understand it ... They will have to take their 
Treasurer's word for what the actual financial effects of 
the statements frcm the Secretary of State are going to be.
I really can't see how the lay Member who is not a 
statistician or a mathematician is really going to get to 
grips with it ..." (Treasurer).
(See also Tomkins, 1983: p58). However, while the two brute facts may 
be seen here as potential power resources, we have also noted that, as 
such, their actual impact would have depended upon the use that was 
made of them. As Rosenberg (1984: p61) also observed, this expansion 
of roles should therefore not automatically be equated with an 
increase in power, that is, in our terms an increase in the 
Treasurer's ability to have his definitions enacted.
Thus, we have seen for example the negotiations between the Treasurer 
and Housing Chairman (on pp218-9 above) over the estimate of interest 
rates to be used to balance the housing revenue account at a 
politically desirable level, rather than the straightforward 
acceptance of the Treasurer's view. While financial pressure and 
uncertainty meant that the Treasurer's view was increasingly sought, 
paradoxically there was also a reduced inclination in Authority A to 
accept it carte blanche, perhaps as a natural reaction to what was 
often 'bad' news:
"Once upon a time, the Treasurer would answer 'No' or 'Yes' 
if he thought something could be encompassed, and that would 
be the end of it. Nowadays, the Chairman will want to know 
more about it, that maybe this is a priority choice that is 
having to be made ... The Treasurer has to know a lot more 
about it, and the Members will have to know more before they 
take 'No' or 'Yes' for an answer" (Deputy Treasurer).
It may therefore be seen that, notwithstanding the increased salience 
of the Treasurer arising frcm the brute facts of resource shortage and 
uncertainty, the power of the Treasurer and his department to have 
their definitions enacted was by no means a foregone conclusion.
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Further, there were occasions when the Treasurer's view was not only 
overruled or closely questioned, but was actually suppressed, as for 
example when one of Authority A's trading undertakings ran into 
trouble:
"We had a problem with [undertaking] in the last year. We 
budgeted for a break-even but things went bad during the 
year. We took a report from the Treasurer as far as agenda 
conference, which was then reproduced and ready to go out to 
Members. I remember being hauled rapidly up to see [Leader 
plus Chief Executive], and the issue was stopped dead ... 
After a great deal of urrming and ah-ing we took a report 
which said 'We are not really in a position to give you a 
report at this time because we have been unable to finalise 
our analysis'. That was a lie. I'd encountered an 
immediate political constraint on ... reporting the facts.
I must admit, at the time I thought, 'Who's the bloody 
Treasurers', him [Leader] or us?"' (Deputy Treasurer).
While suppression of Officers' views in this form may be relatively 
unusual, that it could happen at all is clear evidence of the 
relatively lowly status of Authority's A's Treasurer and his 
department.
To some extent, there was a direct linkage frcm the position of the 
Treasurer to the relative lack of review of the service expenditure 
base in Authority A. Treasury staff were conscious of their status, 
as the Deputy Treasurer indicated:
"I think I feel loss of face when I chat with treasurers, or 
assistants and accountants from other authorities where they 
say, 'No, we say this ...'"
Accordingly, they appeared to define their roles in relation to the 
review of the service expenditure base relatively ' un-proactively' 
because of the anticipated problems of attempting anything else. This 
was hinted at above where other means were found of constraining the 
overall budget (see, eg, ppl39, 249) and may also be gathered from the 
following recollection:
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"... we did begin to do a bit of digging, once, into the 
base a few years back, but there was one hell of a lot of
aggro. My God, but it didn't half kick up some muck in the
bottom of the pool" (Chief Accountant).
The implication was quite clearly that this review exercise was 
terminated, presumably as a consequence of the opposition it had 
engendered which the Treasurer's department was unable to overcome.
The effect of this relative lack of status on the negotiation of order 
around the review of the status quo may therefore be gauged.
However, as well as this direct impact on the level of budgetary 
review undertaken, it emerged from the data that the particular status 
of the Treasurer also had other, less direct, implications for the
level of review. It is worth digressing very slightly to explain the
background to these irrplications in the strategic direction of the 
authority. Authority A had a formally-constituted Management Team, 
but in the words of the Treasurer this was no more than "a facade", 
with the real locus of strategic decision-anaking on the officer side 
of the authority resting with the 'Central Group' of non-departmental 
Chief Officers (ie Chief Executive, Treasurer, Solicitor, Personnel 
Officer and Valuer). As the Solicitor put it, this Group had:
"... grown up as the group of people who tend to be at the 
centre of things ... One way or another, anything that goes 
on is likely to have seme sort of spin-off that involves 
these officers, so the idea is we tend to have a pretty good 
feel of what's going on right throughout".
Alternatively, as the Treasurer himself put it,
"... we are the people who have no service axe to grind and 
who are perhaps the best people in the place to take an 
objective view of things. That is not so in the Management 
Team".
It might be thought, correctly, that this latter quote ignores the 
Treasurer's own efforts noted earlier, for example, to accumulate 
slack resources even - or rather, particularly - in the face of the
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debt crisis to which we shall soon be turning, and that the Treasury 
itself, as Rosenberg (1982: pl7) also observed, was a 'spending' 
department in its own right, with its own staff and other 
requirements. Nevertheless, this was the rationale offered and 
(outwardly) accepted for the Central Group by those interviewed.
However, as one might then expect with such a rationale, the Central 
Group had developed a highly consensual style of working, with 
meetings up to four times a week, which had considerable duplications 
for the Treasurer's working methods both in relation to budgetary 
review and other areas. Clearly, there was always a certain respect 
for each officer's own competence:
"There are professional limits. Say they said 'You've got 
capital receipts, use them to reduce next year's rate', 
which in my view would be frittering the Council's capital, 
I'd say 'No, and I'll recomnend the Ccmnittee not to do 
that', but in my experience where an officer feels that 
strongly, the Group will go along with his judgment" 
(Teasurer).
At the same time, though, because of this consensual style, the 
Treasurer' s own input, in particular into the strategic financial 
direction of Authority A - the area with which the Group was 
predominantly concerned - could become blurred. As the Solicitor 
observed:
"I've never regarded my input as in any way limited. I feel 
free, as I think all of us does, to express views as we 
like. Finance tends to be specialised, but if I want to 
caiment and put my views, I wouldn't have the slightest 
hesitation. That's not to say that if the Treasurer stands 
up and says something I'm going to stand up and say 'That's 
absolute tripe', but also I think it would be quite wrong to 
give the impression that [the Treasurer] goes away and locks 
himself in a closed room, and comes back with a report on 
this or that which is laid like mannah from the desert 
before us. Life's not like that, there's very little comes 
up that's brand new. Since we meet several times a week, 
people know the general run of things so what the Treasurer 
produces is perhaps half or three-quarters an agreed draft 
before anyone looks at it".
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One implication of this style of working was of course that the 
Treasurer gained access to, and a voice in policy areas which might 
otherwise not have been his particular preserve. However, for his own 
part, he himself seemed happy enough with this same approach to a 
function which in many other authorities might have been his exclusive 
concern:
"Say we were outlining the budget, we would put the 
assumptions together to give the prospects for next year's 
rate, and I would discuss that with the Central Group and we 
would come to a conclusion that that was just about the best 
forecast we could make, and frame things accordingly ..." 
(Treasurer).
Authority A's finance function was at this strategic level therefore 
rather broader than the Treasurer alone: it would more accurately be 
described as an overall resources function involving all the 
strategically placed (Chief Executive and Solicitor) or resources 
(Treasurer, Valuer and Personnel Officer) chief officers, and arising 
out of their consensual and day-to-day interactions. The relevance of 
this to issues of reviewing the status quo will shortly become clear.
Pursuing the digression further, however, the critical factor in this 
arrangement which ensured that the Treasurer was not even 'first among 
equals' was the dominant and binding role of the (legally-trained) 
Chief Executive:
"The Chief Executive is a man of great force of character, 
as you've probably gathered. He tends to be the man who 
introduces ideas. I think he regards the Central Group as 
an extension of himself ... He could reduce me to a 
book-keeper and [the Solicitor] to a mere legal adviser. 
Our Group doesn't operate that way, but at the end of the 
day we have to accept that his voice carries more weight 
..." (Treasurer).
A further aspect of this domination was that the Treasurer and Chief
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Executive in fact 'shared' the same Comnittee. They were both working 
to the same group of Members, rather than, say, in Authority B where 
each officer was able to cultivate his own political power base (see 
also Rosenberg, 1984s p55 for another example of this position). The 
Treasurer' s own separate influence suffered accordingly.
Indeed, even where the Treasurer did appear to gain ground at other, 
non-strategic levels, it was often not of his own doing. Thus, we saw 
his functions had expanded at a time of resource shortage, but there 
is a strong sense in which this happened as part of the growth of the 
wider overall resources function:
"There was some feeling that there were financial operations 
going on in Housing and Joint Admin over which we had very 
little control. There's been a major process of sorting out 
financial-oriented staff in other departments ... If the 
Treasurer is responsible for the accounts of the place, then 
he ought to be responsible for those people on the grounds 
that anything they do may reflect on the Treasury. There 
were effects on our accounts which we didn't know about
until we did our final accounts. That pattern of thought
was initiated by the Chief Executive'1 (Deputy Treasurers 
emphasis added).
It may be seen that in this instance, the Treasurer effectively found
himself propelled into a wider remit as part of the Chief Executive's
development of the resources function, and would have found this to 
some extent whatever his own inclinations.
To summarise our digression, therefore, the order negotiated around 
the roles of participants in the strategic financial direction in 
Authority A was one of an overall resources function, of which the 
Treasurer was but one part. The exercise of this function was in 
effect the primary rationale of the Centreil Group which the Chief 
Executive had gathered around him, and this Group exercised its 
resulting pre-eminence under his relatively dominant leadership. How
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then, does this help us explain the pattern of review - or rather, as 
regards the service expenditure base, the relative lack of it - which 
is after all a different issue from the more strategic functions? The 
first connection is once again the lack of predominance of the 
Treasurer, which might conceivably have influenced his own definitions 
of the extent to Which he was sanctioned in developing reviewing 
aspects of his role. Although he found himself sharing his strategic 
role with the Centred. Group, paradoxically it was still from his 
membership of the Group - ie as a 'co-strategist' - that he derived 
his authority. It may therefore have been that he did not define 
himself as being in a position to step outside this role, unless 
specifically empowered, to undertake anything other than routine 
reviewing activities.
However, the preoccupations of the Centred. Group then make it easier 
to see how he could have arrived in this position. Hie creation by 
the Chief Executive of the overall resources function, with its 
implicit relative subordination of the Treasurer, ensured that the 
Group's emphasis on strategic and organisational, rather than 'purely' 
budgetary, review would always be prominent even had the Treasurer 
himself wished otherwise. Now, we have already noted how the debt 
issue was defined by Treasury staff as offering sufficient scope for 
savings to influence profoundly definitions of the relative worth of 
effort expended in seeking those savings in the service expenditure 
base itself; we shall further see, shortly, that because of its sheer 
size and impact the debt issue also came to be defined not merely as a 
matter of review per se, but as the major strategic issue facing 
Authority A, and accordingly was much emphasised by the Chief 
Executive and Central Group. Definitions of where best to expend 
reviewing resources, which led to the preoccupation with reducing and
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manipulating debt rather than reviewing the service expenditure base 
for savings, therefore arose as a consequence of those strategic 
definitions. In short, in the order which had been negotiated, review 
of the service expenditure base was in effect 'crowded out' by the 
debt issue.
(ii)(c) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority A: Member-side 
Configurations
Before moving on to examine the all-important debt issue, though, 
there is a further piece, or set of pieces, to the jig-saw of the 
politics of budgetary review in Authority A, namely the ordering of 
definitions negotiated around the matter of review within the Member 
side of the authority. We shall see later that much of the Central 
Group's status rested on its function - and that of the Chief 
Executive - as the Leadership's vehicle on the officers' side, and 
accordingly Central Group members defined their role to a considerable 
extent with reference to the leadership's own definitions and 
preoccupations•
The leadership itself rested in the Party Group Executive Carmittee 
which was effectively the 'Inner Cabinet* of the most influential 
Members, whose style and behaviour towards their supporting Party 
Group was generally at least autocratic (as we saw in pp85-6 above), 
and certainly secretive*. As one Chairman and member of the Executive 
Gonniittee confided,
(* The style of Authority A's Leadership has been well documented in 
a separate study: unfortunately, this cannot be cited since to do so 
would divulge the identity of Authority A.)
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"You've got to show your capability to command your 
argument, and not be easily floored. By virtue of the fact 
that by the time the Group are asked to make a decision on a 
crowded agenda on a Friday night and I may have been dealing 
with the matter for a few months, whatever argument is put 
up I can more or less pee all over it. It's a tremendous 
advantage and I use it regularly1'.
Gyford (1976: p78) traces a "predilection" for autocratic control on 
Labour Groups, deriving from traditions of collective action and 
solidarity in the wider Labour movement. With few exceptions, 
Authority A's Leadership (and a significant number of its ordinary 
Members) were strongly in this traditionalist mould and therefore 
perpetuated the trend under which they had themselves embarked on 
their political careers. The effect in the authority was that the 
input of ordinary Members was scmewhat circumscribed (cf also Green, 
1981: p36), in this case by the Leadership's autocratic enforcement of 
fairly un-proactive definitions of what was or was not feasible.
There were of course exceptions to this proactivity, as we shall see, 
but we have already seen in Chapter 3 how, for example, a standstill 
budget emerged as a result of the Leader's enforcement of an 
essentially cautious definition of the 'best' way to proceed. This 
same relatively un-proactive approach was also applied to defining 
what was amenable to change within the budget, thus effectively 
reducing the scope of any Member-level review of it.
Here, the Leader's own definition may be gathered from his quotation 
cxi p227: the impression this gives was then reinforced by his Deputy:
"It isn't local government, really, it's a local agency on 
behalf of national government ... In the old days it was a 
different kettle of fish because you had manoeuverability 
because you were doing more. Now of course you're 
restricted to a fairly tight situation in your budget, and 
more than three-quarters of it is established fact".
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When such definitions were linked to the fairly autocratic means of 
their enactment in the Party Group, the effects were as outlined 
bitterly by one dissident back bencher:
"We'd done quite a lot of work in trying to work out how to 
get more involvement in the budget. At the moment, the 
attitude is that it's much too complicated, circumstances 
are changing. The first budget is alv^ys drawn up on a 
standstill anyway, which is a simplification we could talk 
about if we got the chance but we never do ...
At the moment, most of the Group is excluded. [Leader] gave 
us a six page paper, given out as we went into the Group 
meeting itself. That was all we got until we got the budget 
book three days before it was due to be published. That's 
the way [Leader] presents it in Party meetings, he comes 
along and says '99% of the budget is the same as last year 
so there's nothing for you to get involved in', and on the 
information we get given you could say he's bloody right. 
There is nothing" (part of this quote appeared on p86 
above).
The inpact on the level of examination by Members of existing 
activities of this excellent example of the exercise of Lukes' "second 
dimension" of power (1974: pl6-20) may be seen very clearly: 
dissenting - car rather potentially dissenting - views on the budget 
were, along with the review itself, simply prevented from happening.
The impact of this position an scrutiny of the budget on the officer 
side of the authority was less tangible, but nonetheless apparently 
profound. With a general unwillingness amongst the Leadership to 
examine existing activity - even if only to free funds for further 
activity, which may well have been the objective of the previous 
respondent - this was a further reason why review of the service 
expenditure base was not defined by Treasury officers as 
'sanctioned'. Accordingly, particularly with competition from the 
other normal Member pressures for staff and time resources, it was not 
generally undertaken.
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(ii)(d) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority A: The Debt 
Issue
At this point, however, having set the scene we can now approach the 
debt issue which it emerged lay behind the relative lack of emphasis 
cxi the review of service expenditure in Authority A, and which was so 
critical to explaining the order observed to be negotiated around the 
review of the status quo in general. We saw earlier (ppl38-42) that 
Authority A had seme of the largest capital debts of any local 
authority, with debt charges in the first year of research totalling 
£50m in a net revenue budget of seme £3Qm. A good proportion of this 
was housing debt, arising frcm an immediately post war house-building 
boem, although after such a long period much of this was approaching 
maturity. A further very large proportion, hcwever, arose from a 
massive capital investment in the 1970s in a trading undertaking which 
had ceased to generate sufficient income to pay off this debt and 
which had thus allowed it to grow, caipounded by a substantial trading 
loss. At the time of the research, debt charges on this undertaking 
alone accounted for fully 50% of Authority A's rate income, and were 
further liable to incur penalty block grant reductions - bringing yet 
further rate burdens - by pushing Authority A's expenditure above its 
'target* set by the Government.
With such a burden, it is not difficult to see how perceptions of 
savings to be made from reviewing the rest of the budget paled into 
insignificance beside the defined need to reduce debt and debt 
charges, and how the debt issue distorted the whole profile of 
budgetary, and indeed service, activity, in Authority A. As the 
Deputy Treasurer speculated:
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"We’ve got the bloody [undertaking] and there's nothing we 
can do about it. We're spending money out there not frcm 
political will, but because the bloody thing's there ... If 
[it] wasn't, I’m sure we'd have a very different nature and 
ethos behind this Authority ... We'd really be one of the 
bad boys the Secretary of State is after ..."
This was confirmed by the Leader himself:
"The need for a rate input into the [undertaking] creates a 
compulsory priority • •. The Council has to meet the debt 
charges and a trading loss. I think a lot of people in the 
Party fail to understand the tremendous influence its 
finances have on the way we can respond to the many social 
aspirations which they have. If we were able to get down an 
the amount of money we put into [the undertaking], we'd be 
in a better position to put cash and effort into many other 
things the area is in need of".
The impact on the political (conventionally defined) order of 
Authority A may be seen, and the overriding ccrmiitment to "reduce the 
burden", or "loosen the grip" of the problem (as it was frequently 
expressed) together with the Leader and Leadership's definition of 
only limited room to manoeuvre, seen in the previous section, may thus 
be understood.
Indeed, it is tempting to view the position regarding the trading 
undertaking as a specific "brute fact" for Authority A. Certainly, 
its impact on the negotiated order observed in the authority was as 
all-pervasive as the brute facts of resource shortage and uncertainty 
already examined. For example, it heightened perceptions of the debt 
issue through the authority in general: hence the preoccupation with 
debt manipulation as opposed to budgetary review noted on ppl38-42 
above, and hence also the fact that Authority A's Valuer was seen as 
being of sufficient importance to be on the Central Group, as an 
integral part of the strategic resources function of which we have 
seen it was the locus. The disposal or re-negotiation of leases 
observed on pi37 above, of which the Valuer was in control, arose frcm 
the strategic definition that as many of Authority A's considerable
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property assets as possible should be realised to raise imnediate 
funds (in the example on pi37, £1.6m at the expense of securing a much 
reduced rent thereafter) as a major part of the debt redemption 
effort.
On the other hand, however, ranged against the view of the issue as a 
localised "brute fact" were the political machinations to remove the 
problem altogether, preferably by selling the undertaking, or else by 
shutting all or part of it (even though the debt itself would have 
remained, funds released from subsidising the trading loss would then 
be available to pay this off). Here, the negotiated nature of even 
the most apparently 'fixed' and inviolable of 'existing ocranitments' 
becomes vividly clear, in the face of what was in effect a localised 
resources crisis severe enough to prompt their attempted redefini­
tion. As we have noted, both Ingelstam (1981: p213) and Jons son 
(1982: p41) observed that a crisis makes larger changes somewhat 
easier and certainly with the debt issue the Leader himself, for 
example, was rather more proactive with his attempted response than in 
the other instances of his behaviour which we have observed.
However, the initial attempts to sell the undertaking, sponsored by 
the Chief Executive and Leader, with the help of a merchant bank, 
failed for want of a buyer. Accordingly, again primarily at the 
instigation of these two, a firm of chartered accountants were 
retained as consultants to report on the options available, which were 
defined by them to range frcm essentially managerial measures through 
to complete closure. The option eventually chosen was somewhat 
towards the 'managerial' end of the spectrum, involving inproved 
marketing, redundancies and land sales to pay off some of the debt:
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this was despite the fact, however, that the Chief Executive made 
little secret of the fact that he hoped the consultants would 
recommend at least partial closure of the undertaking:
"I would have gone for closing it ... That was my view. 
There is no future in my judgment for it ... but the tide 
was against us. We had people suggesting that [Leader] and 
I were out to close it out of vindictiveness. The whole 
thing proved too big. The pressures, the intrigue, the 
vested interests in the area and in the [enterprise] crushed 
me, there is no doubt of that. So I guess I do it bit by 
bit. Option 4 was selected as a recognition of the 
pressures we [Chief Executive plus Leader] were under. 
They'll never forgive us what we tried ... All sorts of 
people just walked away frcm us".
It may be seen that the two most powerful actors in the authority were 
defeated in their attempt to renegotiate the constraint imposed by the 
debt issue after an exceptionally bitter struggle.
The expression of the status quo in the conflict came frcm the 
Ocrnnittee with oversight of the enterprise chaired by a former (but 
still feared and respected) Leader and, as the Chief Executive hinted, 
the commercial interests around it. Now the consultants themselves 
had recommended partial closure as their favoured option; however, in 
the struggle to redefine the commitment to the undertaking, their 
report itself became the focus of the argument, first in the attempt 
to use it, and then discredit it:
"My own experience is that a prophet frcm his own country is 
never accepted. I still remember when we had a 
redevelopment and we were pushed into getting Sir Hugh 
Casson to design it. All he did was put the cherry on the 
top of the drawings our own people had done, and all these 
professionals fall down flat on their faces and say 'Sir 
Hugh, what a marvellous chap you are'. To get the cherry on 
the top is what attracts people and that's what happened 
with these consultants. Old [Leader] thought it'd give him 
sane sort of answer. It's really another way of buying 
time, and I make no apology, that's what we were doing. We 
needed to be seen to be doing all we could ...
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In the end, we'd be critical of consultants because they 
tell you what to do without telling you how, and we'd 
already envisaged the shedding of labour, but how to achieve 
it is another matter. How do you achieve it in industrial 
relations berms and how do you destroy a corrmunity?
... I notice consultants always justify further work by 
themselves. In the end the cost gets horrifying, but they 
served us okay at the time ..." ([Enterprise] Cfcnmittee
Chairman).
In the end, it was the argument of the practical difficulties of 
partial closure which wen the day, together with a well-timed 
disclosure by the previous respondent of information indicating a 
possible future upturn to the enterprise's trading prospects, which 
had not been made available to the consultants.
The fact that the issue in this negotiation of order was not merely 
about attenuating the impact of the undertaking's position, but about 
removing it entirely, therefore argues against viewing it as a "brute 
fact", even if in the negotiated order which emerged the undertaking 
remained intact, albeit no doubt under a vaguely defined pressure to 
'put its house in order1 • However, as a concluding ccnment, while the 
definition of this key issue which was ultimately enacted remained 
rather closer to the status quo than the changes defined as 
'necessary' or even 'vital* by sane of the actors involved, the 
'politics' of this particular piece of the status quo had the largest 
single identifiable influence on the pattern of resource allocation 
observed in Authority A during the research period. The 
incremental/' fixed budget' argument outlined earlier, as exemplified 
by, eg Wildavsky (cf 1979) or Pendlebury & Jones (1983) would have 
missed it altogether.
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(iii)(e) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority A: Summary and
Conclusion
To suirmarise our study of the politics of budgetary review in 
Authority A, at the time of the research the negotiation of order in 
relation to the review of the status quo was dominated by the issue of 
the debt surrounding the trading undertaking, and the definitions 
which this prompted around the need to reduce debt and debt charges, 
not just in the undertaking itself but right throughout the 
authority. To a point, the effect was analagous to Jonsson's "pull 
effect" whereby the defined solution to the "push" of a crisis creates 
its own momentum (1981: p41). These preoccupations fed through to 
influence the direction in which the margin of feasible change widened 
in response to resource shortage, and thus the level of review for 
savings in the service expenditure base itself. 'Core* definitions 
about the provision of services themselves therefore remained intact 
almost by default: ordinarily, one might have expected definitions of 
a financial crisis to have turned attention to the service expenditure 
base and reduced the level of incrementalism there but, via the 
definition that any likely savings in this area were insignificant 
beside those to be realised from debt manipulation and reduction, 
service spending itself remained to that same degree unreviewed in the 
pursuit of economies. The defined response to the crisis was to 
tackle the agent of it (debt charges), even if not the source in the 
shape of the presence of the trading undertaking itself. This was 
where the margin of feasible change was defined to have widened 
throughout the authority: hence the asset disposals noted above, and 
the highly proactive attempts at debt re-financing noted on pl41, and 
hence also (although the margin did not ultimately prove quite 'wide' 
enough) the attempt to close part of the trading undertaking.
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In the immediate crisis however, these preoccupations both influenced 
and reflected, via the Chief Executive, the configuration on the 
officers' side of Authority A in such a way as to reinforce, so to 
speak, the relative lack of review. The Centred. Group of officers 
defined the debt issue in strategic terms which tended to preclude a 
more imnediate focus on deriving economies frcm the service 
expenditure base. In the Group's role as the locus of the overall 
resources function under the aegis of the Chief Executive, the 
Treasurer's own relative subordination as but one 'aspect' of this 
function was a matter of confirmed fact. As part of the resources 
function therefore, and as part of the Group with its consensual style 
of working under the Chief Executive' s acknowledged domination, the 
Treasurer' s own espoused definitions of what the situation required 
were unlikely bo have differed frcm those held by the Group 
(particularly as these were in turn sanctioned and emphasised by the 
Leadership), and they may well have contributed bo the Group's 
de f inition-forming processes. Frcm this aspect, also, therefore, the 
relative lack of emphasis in Authority A on reviewing the service 
expenditure base, even at a time of resource-based crisis, becomes 
ccmprehens ible.
It may be argued that, because many of the actors involved defined 
Authority A to be 'in extremis', the responses which we have observed 
were too idiosyncratic to allow us to learn anything of general 
significance. While we can see very clearly the political (as defined 
here) processes through which order was negotiated in Authority A, 
thereby setting the parameters of review, in 'normal' circumstances 
such processes could well be rather more 'fixed'. This argument, as 
we outlined at the end of the previous chapter, is wrong. Although in 
more 'normal' circumstances, the processes of defining or redefining
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the parameters of review may be rather less stark and obvious, we 
should continue to be sensitive to their operation if we cure to 
continue to explain how levels of budgetary review cure determined. We 
new turn to demonstrating this in Authority B. Authority A, through 
its very extremity as an example, has illustrated 'what to look for'; 
however, in Authority B we shall see many of what would seem in 
reality to be the more 'day-to-day' features of budgetary review, 
which were simply ' lost' in the data frcm Authority A because of its 
overwhelming preoccupation with its trading enterprise and debt.
(iii) THE POLITICS OF BUDGETARY REVIEW IN AUTHORITY B
(iii)(a) Introduction: Cultural Parameters
As with Authority A, the focus in setting the scene for the politics 
of budgetary review in Authority B is the interaction between 
definitions of resource shortage and the continued enactment of 'core' 
definitions of the desirability of services per se. We saw earlier 
(p52), for example, how Authority B's Leader defined the position:
"No service will be entirely taken right away, we'll keep 
the basics so that when we can go ahead again, we've got a 
programme and we can build on that".
Similarly, the Chief Executive commented that:
"It's a question of the heartlands of all the major 
services, and Members' very great reluctance to crawl all 
over them".
We have already seen (pp82-3) how in the first year of the research 
the resources position was defined within Authority B - a relatively 
high spender over its Government target - still to allow room for a 
certain amount of budgetary growth, and to this extent it could be
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said that the brute fact of resource shortage had not really 
'impinged* as fully as in Authority A. The cuts exercise of which we 
have already seen seme details did not take place until the second 
year of the research, and the assumption noted earlier of an annual 
increment of growth in resources had - chiefly through very high rate 
rises to cover grant penalties - to that point therefore been 
maintained much more nearly intact. Further, Authority B had no 
outstanding issues or problems such as we saw in Authority A with its 
trading and debt problems, and no great issues of social stress to 
alleviates "... a very average sort of place," was how the Chief 
Executive described it.
As one might perhaps expect of a relatively 'unstressed* authority 
where the brute fact of resource shortage was not yet defined fully to 
have 'bitten', the attitude towards the review and examination of the 
budget and existing activities at the start of the research period 
emerged from the data as rather more relaxed and 'incremental' than it 
was later to become, both among Members in general and seme Chief 
Officers:
"I'm interested in getting Members to think a bit more 
critically about the effectiveness of services. That's by 
far the most difficult thing to get them to do. It's a 
painstaking analytic job for which politicians with few 
exceptions are not wall suited. One can engineer the means, 
for example performance review [of which more belcw] but 
it's difficult to persuade them to approach those mechanisms 
with any great energy...
... Insufficient rigour in testing present practices.
That's partly a philosophical problem with Labour councils 
if I'm honest. There are clearly opportunities for making 
quite considerable savings, and still providing the 
service. These have been brought to Members' attention, but 
only half-heartedly tackled. By and large, I might add, 
Chief Officers don't want then reviewed either, it means 
upset and disruption and perhaps even personal criticism" 
(Chief Executive).
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The reference to the "philosophical problem with Labour councils" is 
interesting, as an aside, if only because the ascription of Party 
motives by officers to Members' behaviour in Authority A was 
completely absent. There, the Treasurer observed that:
"I sometimes wonder what the Tories would do differently if
they were in power. To be quite honest, if you discount all
the wind in Council meetings, I doubt if there's a hell of a 
lot".
This echo's Jonsson's finding (1982: p70) in Gothenburg at a time when 
heavy cuts were necessary: the implication is clearly that 'crises' 
such as that found by Jons son, and that in Authority A arising frcm 
the debt issue, can cut across Party lines, although it also needs to 
be said that when cuts were also defined eventually to be necessary in
Authority B, there was no noticeable decrease in partisan conflict.
Returning to the main argument, however, the relative lack of 
finance-induced stress, at least at the start of the research period, 
with its resulting lack of interest by Members and some officers in 
reviewing service spending, meant that within the order negotiated 
around Authority B's status quo the margin of feasible change (in 
particular so far as reviewing officers were concerned) was not always 
clear-cut, and in specific circumstances could be circumscribed by 
reviewing "blind spots" where 'known' inefficiencies were defined to 
exist but were beyond those defining officers' power to change. As 
the Treasurer put it:
"There are some cases of inefficiency which are politically 
protected ... You have to induce a political change of 
heart before you can act on them".
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Examples which we have already seen, and to Which no doubt he would 
have pointed, were the lack of a wages establishment and also the 
pre-start checks issue (see pl52). The Chief Executive provided some 
further instances:
"If you were to look at school performance it would be 
impossible to arrive at the conclusion that a school was 
lousy, putting it really extremely ... I mean, I don't 
think that is the case, but if you talk to the teaching 
profession, clearly they are aware of schools that perform 
less well than others. That's the real heartland of 
education. Likewise in housing, with their financial 
situation [a large rate fund subsidy to the HRA] there's a 
bit of a blind spot there, and likewise the DL£>. It's a 
question of 'Does it represent some brick of the welfare 
state?', and in looking at that brick [Members] confuse 
looking at whether it's efficient with an assumption that 
it is a precursor to abolishing it. Luncheon clubs in the 
meals service are an example. The case for providing 
luncheon clubs is much less strong than a meals [on vdieels] 
service at a time of tight resources. There is also more of 
a case for extending home helps. Free teacher meals cost us 
half a million quid a year but is basically non-productive
II
This division of attitude between Members and (some) officers in 
Authority B was at times quite marked, and the Member-level 
constraints within which review for efficiency and effectiveness of 
service provision necessarily took place may clearly be seen. Indeed, 
it is perhaps symptomatic of the cultural and socialised definitions 
of services and review underpinning the negotiated order in Authority 
B, certainly at the start of the research period, that where a 
Member-level engagement was secured in a performance review exercise, 
for example, the end result was frequently not a review of performance 
within existing spending levels, which was the original intention, but 
a specification of optimum service levels. The spending involved was 
then sanctioned by the Member-level involvement in drawing up those 
optimum levels:
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"Reviews tend to start out trying to assess the 
effectiveness of a given level of service, but end up trying 
to lay down the best possible level. I think that's 
probably the net result. For example, on building 
maintenance, which was the best performance review because 
it had very little input frcm officers, it was chosen 
because it was always a vote where you could say '10% off' 
without really looking at the consequences, which had tended 
to happen. So they had a look to see what the effect has 
been and they were aghast. There's now been a complete 
_ reversal and building maintenance monies are sacrosanct ... 
The Architect reckons there is a completely different 
attitude throughout the Council. He's delighted, of course" 
(Senior Administrator).
Although it could be (and, in justification, was) argued that such 
spending resulted in longer term maintenance savings, this episode may 
be seen as indicative of an attitude towards the review of service 
spending: however sound the reasoning, what began as a review of 
efficiency within a given area of the budget ended by expanding it, 
and through the power of Members' sanction by rendering it virtually 
immune to further examination.
To summarise, it may be gathered that the research period began with 
what were in effect essentially 'incremental' Member-level parameters 
of review and control offering little by way of encouragement to those 
seeking to examine the status quo, whether simply to improve service 
effectiveness or whether efficiency and economies were the objective, 
and still less to those seeking actually to reduce spending. The 
prevailing cultural definitions of service spending at the 
Member level were at times almost self-consciously uncritical. As the 
Chairman of the Finance Committee remarked,
"When I first started in the job, I kept bleating on about 
how I thought we could run the place for a million quid 
less. What really annoyed me was not so much that people 
said 'No', they totally ignored the issue and went on to 
talk about something else".
It was within these unpromising Member-level cultural parameters that
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those, mainly officers, wishing to promote a greater level of 
budgetary review had then to operate.
(iii) (b) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority B;
Officer Side Configurations
What effect did this position have on the officer side? We saw 
earlier that, certainly, as the Chief Accountant illustrated (see 
ppl44, 240,) there was a perception among Treasury officers that there 
was 'fat' in Authority B's base which could be removed. We shall also 
see that existing levels of overall spending were defined by them to 
be as high as could reasonably be contemplated, and that reductions 
frcm this level were at least desirable. At once, therefore, as in 
Authority A, the politics of budgetary review became also the politics 
of budgetary containment: the purpose of review was predominantly to 
reduce spending. Unlike Authority A, however, with no overwhelmingly 
'obvious' sources of savings to divert attention, that review extended 
to the service expenditure base itself. While we have seen that in a 
number of ways a rigid 'guardian v advocate* dichotomy is in general 
much too simplistic for realism, we also noted (on pp76-7) that it was 
perhaps in the area of 'above the line' service spending (such as that 
which we saw examined on ppl48-52 in the roll-forward process in 
Authority B), that Treasury officers came closest to their 'guardian1 
stereotype. Accordingly, if any one trend or issue may then be said 
to characterise the politics of - ie, the negotiation of order around 
- budgetary review and containment in Authority B, it was those 
officers' attempts to enact their definitions and widen their margin 
of feasible change in relation to 'above the line' spending, in the 
face of disinterest or active opposition from Members and some
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officers in favour of the status quo.
To a certain extent therefore, within this picture the roll-forward 
process itself represented an excellent (opportunity for review and 
containment because in its essentially 'administrative' setting it was 
hidden from Members' or even Chief Officers' view. The scope for 
defining and re-defining what is implied by the status quo in the base 
may, as we saw from Chapter 7, be considerable; also, in cases of 
dispute with spending departments in the roll-forward process itself, 
there were several stages of arbitration, and so only rarely did 
disagreement 'surface' at Member level:
"If they [spending departments] tell you to get stuffed you 
go to the Treasurer, but normally I deal with it. It's a 
tacit understanding that if necessary I'll go higher, but 
it's rare that it goes beyond the Treasurer and that Chief 
Officer ... After all, I think we'd all feel it was a 
pretty unhappy position where you're arguing in public, in 
front of Members" (Chief Accountant).
While this last comnent perhaps appears a little pious, it does seem 
to be consistent with Jonsson's "organising principle" in local 
government bureaucracies of unity (eg 1982: pp27-8), of which more 
later. The claim is not that officers were in agreement in front of 
Members (we shall see that frequently they were not, and briefed their 
Chairmen in private accordingly), but merely that disagreements were 
seldom allowed to appear. On this basis, the strategy of review and 
containment adopted may be seen essentially to consist of negotiation 
backed by bluff: the manipulation of definitions of 'likely 
reactions'.
However, this approach had its limitations because where Treasury
275
staff were unable to enact their definitions by negotiation or 
bluffing that the issue would be taken higher, they could themselves 
be precluded frcm pursuing the issue further by the 'known' 
disposition of Members where these were defined or anticipated as 
being unfavourable (examples here might be new attempts to initiate 
the review of those areas cited on p272 above by the Chief Executive, 
where there had already been a failure to achieve a satisfactory 
outcome). Further, even had Members' anticipated reactions been 
defined as 'favourable', there was also, perhaps, the encouragement 
that allowing an issue to 'surface' would give to service Chief 
Officers to undermine the unity principle for their own ends, over an 
issue where Members were less likely to take the Treasury view.
Accordingly a second tactic which emerged, especially as resource 
constraints began to impinge on definitions of spending, was to cash 
limit areas of the budget securing, much as we have already noted, 
what were in fact fairly large 'real terms' reductions in overall 
spending. From the Treasury point of view the key attraction of cash 
limits was that they combined the issues of review and overall 
spending levels by using a control on the latter to prompt a ready 
solution to the former: they forced departments to find the necessary 
economies for themselves while being somewhat easier to carry through 
than specified cuts. One reason for this, as the quote on p240 
hinted, appeared to be Members' lack of ccmprehension which served to 
'hide' what was really implied; a second reason, though, was that the 
effects of cash limits could be portrayed as something other than the 
imposition of Treasury will. Certainly, the impetus for cash limits 
came from the Treasury (and, given the cultural definitions of 
spending hitherto prevailing, it could be argued that achieving these 
was in itself an achievement), but thereafter departments retained
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control of their own destiny in the form of scope to negotiate the 
impact of resource shortage - within the cash parameters laid down - 
for themselves (cf also Tomkins, 1983: pl3). As one Chief Officer 
reported of his own department's cash limit:
"I said to the Gcmtiittee, 'You will be short, certain 
things will not get done'. Now they didn't pursue what 
wouldn't get done. They said to me, 'Okay, you're paid to 
manage, try to do as much as you can. If you can do 
everything we'll be very happy, if you can't, well you're 
not going to get a rollicking' ... In the event, I think 
what our lads achieved was fantastic, we put our pressure on 
grass cutting and now get more cuts for less money ... I 
think the cash limits idea is far better than zero [based: 
sic] budgeting [of which more later], because you say, 
'That's the money you've got, get what you can for it'. 
That's when you find the real managers".
Perhaps the third reason why cash limits appeared attractive was that 
in Authority B, as this quote hints they 'squared the circle' of 
reducing the budget with no necessary impact on service levels 1
However, because cash limits were a somewhat 'looser' form of control 
by the Treasury than a direct supervision of review and spending 
reductions, for all the size of reduction which they were capable of 
achieving they too were not without their problems in terms of 
attempted negotiation and evasion by spending departments:
"The classic one was when the Baths Manager produced this 
fantastic series of sheets for his equipment, there was 
pages of it with about 20 different headings for this and 
that. The unfortunate thing was, I used the list he 
produced as the basis of the budget, and when I went through 
it with the Director of Arts and Rec, he sat there saying, 
'Well, I don't see these figures'. It eventually transpired 
that [Baths Manager] had his list, he'd given a list to the 
Director which was supposedly going to please him, and me a 
list which was different again. Mine was the least, the 
Director's was the most. We came to a ccrnprcmise, seme 
things got in and [Baths Manager] got an almighty 
bollocking" (Chief Accountant).
This particular example was one of the more flamboyant instances of 
attempted evasioni However, it illustrates clearly that for all their
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attraction as a solution to the problem of imposing some measure of 
restraint over the budget within existing Mariber-level constraints, 
cash limits had their limitations. We may begin to see that the type 
of review chosen has power implications: Treasury staff were less able 
to enact their definitions (ie had less power) than with seme of the 
'tighter' techniques of review which, as we shall see shortly, were 
adopted later.
Treasury officers did however have a further power resource for 
negotiating order around their own definitions, namely the Financial 
Regulations (appended to the authority’s Standing Orders) governing 
virement (see pl44 above). These in effect 'dealt the Treasury a 
card' as follows:
"A Committee may divert money from one estimate item to 
another, excluding estimates for employees, debt charges, 
building maintenance . •. provided that -
"(a) such diversion may be made only after submission to the 
Cormiittee of a written report prepared in consultation with 
the Treasurer ..." (Authority B: Financial Regulations).
Rosenberg (eg 1982: p8) observed that the use of virement may be seen 
as part of the bargaining process and an element of this emerged frcm 
the data in Authority B, albeit in the small part of the budget not 
including employees and debt charges. Thus, when the Chief Accountant 
was asked about the power resources he possessed to enforce his 
definitions of the review and control of expenditure, apart from such 
political sanction as there was for the cash limit itself, his answer 
was:
"If somebody felt like being really bloody minded and said 
'Up yours', they still could if their Chairman played along 
... but sooner or later they'll come to us wanting 
virement. If we want that to look absolutely insensible, 
we'll make sure the figures show it".
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In this instance, the virement mechanism itself was used - it would 
appear more tacitly than explicitly - to induce Departments to remain 
broadly in line, rather than an individual virement package becoming 
the focus of a bargained transaction. Although the latter no doubt 
occurred, the data here appears also to accord with what Rosenberg had 
in mind.
In this sense, the control of virement then became a power resource 
for Treasury staff to negotiate order almost by bestowing ' favours', 
where monies were found by them to allow spending Departments to 
undertake particular activities within the overall cash limits. The 
1 iron fist* that virement control could have represented was kept well 
within the 'velvet glove': as both Rosenberg (1982: p27), and at the 
national level, Heclo & Wildavsky (1981: p46) observe, too many flat 
'Noes' would be counter-productive, in this case by destroying the 
potential of a constructive attitude to departmental requests to vire 
as an inducement to accede to Treasury definitions elsewhere. As the 
Chief Accountant again put it,
"There will be times when we really dig our heels in and say
'No', but we don't deliberately try to do that ... We try
to see how we can solve the problem".
It would also be the case, of course, that too many 'Noes' would incur 
Member-level opposition, and thus further problems for enacting 
Treasury definitions.
Leaving this last point aside, however, the results of this strategy 
of the constructive use of virement sanctions to secure broad 
departmental compliance may be seen from the following fulsome tribute 
to the Chief Accountant from a Chief Officer:
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"I reckon oar Treasury is the best I've ever worked with.
We don't look on them as a separate Department. We got 
[Chief Accountant] who came to us as a dyed-in-the-wool 
accountant, you know, black suit, no smile etc, but he got 
involved and he understands. We look on him as our 
accountant who happens to be in the Treasurer's. If we have 
a problem we go to him for help and very rarely have they 
let us down ... They've usually found a way. If we needed 
money and we had it in one area and wanted it in another, 
they've usually said, 'This is the best way to do it'.
We'll query things at estimates' times, but that's as much 
to let them know we're doing the books properly and we knew 
one and one makes two. They're valuable allies ... The 
picture loan scheme and the sculpture exhibition all came 
about as a result of [Chief Accountant] finding monies to 
use ..." (Director of Arts and Recreation).
While outwardly this is evidence of a complete reversal of the 
'guardian' stereotype of Treasury staff, it is argued here that the 
tribute from the Chief Officer is in fact the fruit of a subtle and 
effective definition of it, in order to deepen the level of review and 
containment which Treasury staff were able to negotiate within what 
were, as we saw, rather unhelpful Member-level parameters:
"We' ve put in a lot of changes in the two years I have been 
here. People come and talk to us a lot more and the 
accountancy section is a lot better known in the Council 
now. People know we haven't got horns on ... People used 
to put reports up to Conmittee which we never saw. They're 
actually bringing them to us now beforehand, spending 
departments acme down and talk to us and people are going 
out into the Departments. That's partly pressure of events, 
but also a change of emphasis from how I run things to what 
the previous chap did. Departments are caning to us for 
advice more, that's part of our selling the accountancy 
section, so it's all power to us at the moment ..." (Chief 
Accountant).
In terms of enabling Treasury officers to exercise control by 
diversion and ' steering', rather than risk open confrontations which 
they might have 'lost', the second and third "dimension" (Lukes, 1974) 
power implications of this strategy may be seen clearly.
Perhaps the clearest example of all to emerge frcm the data, though, 
of how this ' constructive' approach could enhance the level of review
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and attainment negotiated by Treasury staff was in respect of the 
computer system installed, also under the supervision of Authority B's 
particularly proactive Chief Accountant, to allow the monitoring of 
budgets and expenditure. We saw earlier on ppl05-8 and also in the 
Extracts on pl48-52, the extent to which this system extended the 
scope of the Chief Accountant's role. However, the critical point 
about the system was that Treasury staff did not load the data into 
the machines: Departmental staff did, and the intention was that they 
should be prompted to exert greater control over their own budgets - 
while of course enhancing the Treasury's own oversight and review of 
expenditure. Accordingly,
"You tend to see the whole thing as strategies and 
counter-strategies I think, especially at the moment, 
because spending departments do not like reducing, and 
you've got to keep one step ahead of them if you're going to 
control them. That's the main reason we put the new 
terminal screens in. It's great for us to use of course, 
but you've also got to make it for the user [ie spending 
departments]. Okay, we want something we can operate, but 
I'd almost say it was more important the system being what 
the user department needs, because they are spending the 
money and it's them you're trying to control. We sold it to 
them, and now it's the best thing since buttered bread, they 
sit and play with their terminals all day long" (Chief 
Accountant).
Once again, therefore, the strategy of control and review through 
mutual involvement, using greater contact and co-operation to 
negotiate a deeper level of access to and oversight of spending 
departments' activities may clearly be seen.
Authority B's Chief Accountant has figured praninently in our account 
so far of the negotiation of order around the status quo, as an 
excellent illustration of the inpact of proactivity as a dimension of 
actors' role-definitions relating to their responses to perceived 
constraints around them, and their attempts to negotiate or bypass
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these. There are further strands to be woven into our picture of the 
negotiation of order around budgetary review in Authority B, however, 
in particular the position and role of the Treasurer, who through 
seniority obviously had rather greater contact with Chief Officers and 
Members than the Chief Accountant. The first point to be made here is 
that the Treasurer was by no means as clearly subordinated to the 
Chief Executive as was the case in Authority A. Authority B's 
Management Team, as we shall see in more detail later, was far more 
genuinely the central forum for the officers' side of the authority, 
with no inner 'Central Group' of officers which could be discerned. 
Accordingly, the overall 'resources function' was rather less of a 
coherent entity in itself than Authority A and rather more diffused, 
with discussions taking place in the broader forum of the Management 
Team and with all sixteen Chief Officers, including those of minor 
spending departments, present and allowed to participate.
In seme ways of course, as in the Central Group in Authority A, this 
allowed Chief Officers an 'entry' into the Treasurer's sphere of 
influence, and in particular the Chief Executive (again, 
legally-trained, as in Authority A) was keen to have an input. We saw 
at the beginning of this section his attempts to sponsor an attitude 
of review and appraisal at Member-level, but he also had further 
designs of his own:
"Hie officer in charge of finance is clearly the Treasurer, 
but the main issues with which I am concerned and want to 
see that my colleagues are concerned, are the main strategic 
issues relating to the structure of our budget, general 
performance particularly in terms of capital spending, and 
key elements of the budget such as manpower and overtime" 
(Chief Executive).
This interest in the strategic direction of the budget which the Chief 
Executive tried to sponsor within the Management Team was very similar
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to the function which Authority A's Central Group defined for itself, 
and of course had considerable implications - in the view of the Chief 
Executive at least - for the role of the Treasurer:
"We are actually in business to provide services and the big 
generators of issues and problems on the ground and demands 
for spending, access to facilities and all the rest of it 
are the service departments, not the centre. Central 
departments are basically consultants" (Chief Executive).
The Chief Executive's own definition of his 'guardian' role, noted 
earlier, is clearly to some extent qualified by this declaration. 
Interestingly, though, it could also be argued that it was very much a 
'consultancy' relationship which the Chief Accountant was seen to be 
pursuing earlier, as a much more single-minded enactment of his own 
'guardianship* definitions: the same means (ie the 'consultancy' role 
itself), in effect, was serving almost diametrically defined aids.
There could well have been friction between the Chief Executive and 
Treasurer, arising from the former's forays into the area of review 
and appraisal of the budget, even if they had shared the same 
objectives and definitions:
"I think the Chief Executive tends to play at being 
Treasurer sometimes. I think [Treasurer] gets a bit cheesed 
off with that, as you can imagine" (Chief Officer).
However, the fact that Chief Executive, and Treasury staff (ie, one 
presumes, with the Treasurer's sanction), had formed different 
definitions of their guardianship roles seems likely to have 
exacerbated the situation further (although neither the Treasurer 
himself, who appeared in any event to be of taciturn disposition, or 
the Chief Executive would confirm this) and was an important feature 
of the politics of the status quo in Authority B (cf also Rosenberg,
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1984: p60). The fact that the conflict occurred at all was an 
interesting departure from Authority A, in that it signified in 
Authority B a much greater parity between the Treasurer and Chief 
Executive, Indeed, the Treasurer himself and his department had at 
least four substantial power resources of their own which ensured that 
direction of their role from other sources such as the Chief Executive 
was unlikely, and which also ensured their continued ability or power 
to enact at least a good part of their own definitions in the 
negotiation of order around the status quo.
The first and least remarkable of these power resources was the status 
accruing from the Treasurer's role in interpreting and defining an 
uncertain environment for the authority. This was also seen vis-a-vis 
Chief Officers in the ' consultancy' role defined and enacted by the 
Chief Accountant. However, the Treasurer himself also noted of 
Members that:
"More and more Members are wanting another voice, another 
opinion on which to base their own political [opinions]. 
We're lucky. It's the traditional Treasurer's bit about 
going to a meeting and you've got 10% more power than anyone 
else because you control the books, and at the end of the 
day most things have a cost and it comes back to us".
As in Authority A, this power resource was not necessarily easy to 
use: first, Members' dispositions towards spending and restraint has 
already been noted, and second, in his taciturnity, the Treasurer 
found on occasion that
"No matter what I say, the next time it's mentioned I feel 
people haven't understood it and that it's my fault".
Nevertheless, the custody of this role of ' interpreter' to Members 
and other officers was keenly protected, particularly from the Chief
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Executive, which would indicate the value which it was perceived to 
offer as a power resource.
The second of the Treasurer's power resources vis-a-vis the Chief 
Executive was the Management Team itself. We have seen that within 
the process of debate and discussion in the Management Team, the roles 
of each participant, including that of the Treasurer, could at times 
become slightly blurred to the extent that actors were able to 
contribute their views in areas other than their own. However, the 
Team was at the same time a much more open forum than Authority A's 
Central Group, without the domination by the Chief Executive that was 
observed there, and so the likelihood of the Treasurer's view being 
submerged or overridden - even had the Chief Executive attempted this 
- never really arose:
"I carry on as I always have and respond to the things the 
Chief Executive wants to know. We have the Management Team 
where I say things, and if he wants to change them, he's got 
to do it with the concurrence of everybody else"
(Treasurer) •
The Management Team was at once the source, and this position in it 
the recognition, of the parity between the two actors. As an aside, 
it may also be speculated that the Chief Accountant's activities noted 
above vis-a-vis service Departments would have increased the sympathy 
with which Chief Officers heard the Treasurer's views.
The third power resource for the Treasurer (and an important 
difference from Authority A) was that while the Chief Executive 
reported mainly to the Majority Party/Chief Officer Policy Group, the 
Treasurer had a separate Finance Ccmnittee to which to report and from
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which to seek support. The following plaintive comment shows that the 
Chairman was distinctly less than enthusiastic about his post:
"It's a terrible job being Finance Chairman. Everyone on 
the Council thinks I'm a bastard because I won't let them 
spend money to improve services ... and I'm supposed to be a 
Socialistl"...
... but the value of a separate 'contact' could at times be 
considerable. As the Treasurer himself observed:
"[Chief Executive] has got the ear of the Leader. I've got 
the ear of the Deputy Leader [Finance Chairman], so you 
could put all your differences into a different forum if you 
wanted to".
The fact that the Finance Chairman was also Deputy leader no doubt 
enhanced the value of the contact.
From this point however, what was in effect a fourth and very 
important power resource for the Treasurer developed. The Deputy 
leader was replaced as Chairman of the Finance Committee by the leader 
himself, thereby bringing a further, direct, line of contact and 
backing for the Treasurer as the principal Chief Officer supporting 
that Committee. The effect on the Treasurer's position was 
illustrated by the Chief Accountant:
"Now that [leader] is back as Chairman of Finance, the 
Treasurer is getting the upper hand. We had a thing where 
you write to the Chairman of Finance for a supplementary 
estimate or virement. He found out that somebody had 
wrritten to him about something the Treasurer knew nothing 
about. He got very uptight and started hollering about 
standing orders [financial regulations: see above, p278] and 
made it clear that he would only answer letters if they came 
through the Treasurer" (Chief Accountant).
By the Leader's move, the Treasurer both kept the advantage accruing 
from reporting to a separate Committee (unlike his counterpart in 
Authority A) and acquired a formal route of access to the Leader to
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parallel that of the Chief Executive's through the Policy Group, (cf 
also Rosenberg, 1984: p59, who illustrates the importance of such 
links), bringing a much more effective voice in the Majority Party 
Group. For his part, the Leader followed the approach observed of 
most Chairmen in the authorities studied (of which more later) of 
seeking to bolster and underpin 'his' Chief Officer: hence the 
powerful endorsement of the Treasurer's position revealed above by the 
Chief Accountant. Hie trend in power, it may be seen, ultimately 
moved away from the Chief Executive rather than towards him.
We may now summarise the trends which have been illustrated so far in 
the negotiation of order in the officer side of Authority B around the 
review of the status quo. The key to the position was the attempts of 
Treasury staff within unpromising Member-level parameters, also 
reflected by the attitude of seme Chief Officers, to enact their 
definitions vis-a-vis the status quo of the need for a greater level 
of review and control. Because of their uncertain position, to 
achieve this, Treasury staff had to employ tactics of bluff and cash 
limiting, together with an overtly ' constructive' attitude towards 
spending departments and the control of virement, rather than attempt 
to impose their position, but in the event they did this with some 
success. As a cross-current within the overall picture, the relative 
status of the Treasurer himself and the Chief Executive appeared to be 
much less resolved than in Authority A, although the general trend, 
particularly following the Leader's take-over of the Chair of Finance, 
was towards the Treasurer and his definitions of what was required.
Our interim conclusion from this must be that even though Authority B 
was, as we saw, in the words of the Chief Executive "a very ordinary
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sort of place", the processes of defining and negotiating order around 
the status quo were on the evidence so far at least as important as in 
the more "stressed" Authority A in determining the level of review 
observed. Had Authority B's Chief Accountant and Treasurer, for 
example, been less proactive and subtle in advancing their own 
definitions of the situation within the officer side, it may be 
speculated that the level of review of the status quo would have been 
rather lower than was in fact the case; equally, had the Member-level 
constraints been looser to this point, the level of review could well 
have been higher. While Authority B was outwardly "ordinary", 
therefore, in terms of the negotiation of order determining the level 
of review (and thus the level of incrementalism) within it, the 
concept of an "ordinary" authority appears on the evidence so far to 
be meaningless.
(iii)(c) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority B: 
Member/Officer Interactions
Our introduction above of the activities of the Leader allows us to 
move on now to a further strand in the politics of the status quo 
in Authority B: having examined the negotiation of order within the 
parameters of Members' attitudes towards service spending, we now 
examine the attempts by the Treasurer actually to negotiate those 
parameters themsleves.
Leaving aside the implications for the Chief Executive, it may be 
thought that the Leader's position as revealed by the last quote was 
at odds with what we have seen of Members' attitudes to scrutiny and 
containment of the budget. To some extent this would be correct,
283
although the Leader's behaviour was not without its ambiguities: one 
example which we shall see shortly is where he expressed a personal 
interest in a zero-based budgeting initiative but declined to 
undertake the necessary work in his Party Group to ensure its support 
and success. These ambiguities arose, however, because the Leader's 
views on the issues of review and containment were, to use a loaded 
term, 'ahead' of the general trend in the Party Group. He personally 
appeared increasingly to share many of the definitions of the 
Treasurer as to what the situation required, hence perhaps his move to 
the Chair of Finance, and the strong support for the Treasurer just 
observed against attempts arising from within the Group to circumvent 
him. This gap between the Leader's position and that of the Group 
contrasted with the much more dictatorial leadership exercised in 
Authority A where such a gap, though not unheard of, was rather less 
likely to have a significant effect; further, it became a major strand 
in its own right of the politics of budgetary review in Authority B, 
and nowhere more so than with the cuts exercise to which we have 
already referred.
We have seen that throughout the research period, large parts of 
Authority B's budget were cash limited. However, within the framework 
which the cash limits supplied, in the second year of the research the 
brute fact of resource shortage was finally defined in such a way as 
to prompt the preparation of a cuts package of £3.5m, or roughly 5%.
We have already seen (pp220-l) that £lm of this was later reinstated 
(much to the Treasurer's evident regret) following windfall grant and 
other inccme: nevertheless, the politics of budgetary review and 
containment around the original imposition of the cuts is instructive.
The f i r s t  p o in t to  be made is  th a t  th e  Leader had in  fa c t been under
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pressure to implement spending reductions to avoid grant penalties for 
seme while:
"The Treasurer has been throwing into my ear for about the 
last three years that we needed to cut, that there are ways 
of cutting without disintegrating services, but I put these 
blandishments aside 'till I could see the Group were ready. 
We may be a year late, I don't know" (Leader).
Late or not, if one recalls the relatively slight impact which 
anticipated grant penalty levels were allowed to have on Authority B's 
actual spending patterns at the start of the research period (see 
especially pp82-83 above), the extent of the about-turn which this 
implies may readily be gauged; equally, the 'balancing act' performed 
by the Leader, between the Treasurer's (and apparently increasingly 
over time, his own) view on the one hand, and the resistance of his 
Party Group to the idea of reductions on the other, may also be seen. 
What finally tipped this balance in favour of reductions was as 
Ingelstam (eg 1981: p213) and Jens son (eg 1982: p41) might have 
predicted, the perception that a 'crisis' point had been reached 
because of impending penalty liabilities:
"I think often as politicians if we are going to go along a 
road which is distasteful to us, we have to be forced down 
it by a catalyst. While we wouldn't have bothered so much 
in the past, this new lot of grant penalties caning in would 
have been a real harrmering" (Leader).
And so, choosing from a set of options presented by the Treasurer 
depicting the level of penalty still to be incurred after cuts of 
given levels up to £4.5m had been made, the Policy Group selected a 
volume reduction of £3.5m.
The inpact of this 'conversion' in Authority B should not perhaps be 
overstated though. Not only were a number of the reductions later 
reinstated, but the original enactment was only made at the expense of
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three back-bench Members having the Whip withdrawn for refusing to 
support the measure. There are then other aspects which serve to put 
the issue in perspective. Although a 5% cut ultimately proved too 
large a sum to accept, 5% is not a 'large' or, leaving aside its 
precise definition, 'non-incremental' portion of the budget, and 
neither was it as large as the Treasurer would have wished at the 
time. As he indicated same months later, "At the time we were doing 
it we would have liked, certainly, £4.5m", although even then the 
total value of the exercise would have been rather less than the 
real-terms savings realised from the 'cash limits' approaches noted 
earlier, for all the fact that it represented a greater assertion by 
the Treasurer of his position.
Further, although the cuts which were enacted represented at least a 
'one-off' widening of the margin of feasible change, we have already 
seen (on pl98 above) that this did not extend to the Leader being able 
to enact his own definition of the need for prioritised cuts, because 
they were levied pro-rata to existing budgets. Also, it has to be 
stressed that at no time did it appear that the 'core' cultural 
definitions of service desirability per se were even remotely 
endangered, as the Leader's own address to the Council made very 
plain:
"This saving will be achieved across the board in all 
services pro rata to their general level of budgeted 
expenditure in the current year. We propose to lay down 
certain guidelines ... Whilst standing by our ' no 
compulsory redundancies' policy, we must achieve significant 
reductions in our overall staffing, and we propose to do 
this by implementing a carefully controlled early retirement 
scheme ... We believe that it should be a cardinal 
principle of these volume reductions that no service 
establishment should be closed and there should be no 
complete abandonment of any service".
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These, then, were the parameters within Which solutions were to be 
sought. Treasury staff, and in particular the Treasurer himself 
operating with the Leader, had succeeded in making inroads into 
Members' cultural attitudes towards growth and service provision to 
the extent that cuts were eventually contemplated, but at the same 
time it has to be said that any re-negotiation of the ordering of 
definitions of the status quo took place around rather than in the 
"heartlands" of each service (to use the Chief Executive's earlier 
expression) which thereby remained immune from scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the role in the negotiation of order of the particular 
axis between the Treasurer and Leader in securing any cuts at all and 
to that extent re-defining the status quo is apparent, and the subject 
of such axes is explored further in the next chapter.
(iii)(d) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority B:
Assimilation of Cuts
The writer was then able to witness the process whereby Authority B's 
Management Team selected the reductions and early retirements to be 
made. Imnediately and predictably the impact of the Leader's search 
parameters - and of others arising from Members' predispositions - was 
readily discernible as Chief Officers reported the outcome of their 
efforts to preserve the "heartlands" of their services:
"... the scope and range of the education service should be 
preserved as far as possible ... The shape of support 
services ought to be preserved as far as possible so that 
the service is well poised to grow again when better times 
return" (Education)
"The package of economies proposed represent the best that 
can be suggested bearing in mind:
"(a) the need to keep services provided ..." (Housing)
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"In arriving at the recommendations set out, an assumption 
has been made that the Council will not want to see further 
cuts in highway maintenance. This is borne out by the 
Performance Review Report on Highway Maintenance 
..."(Engineer).
Further, it might also be added that all the areas cited by the Chief 
Executive (see p272) above as being effectively iitmune from review and 
appraisal remained, with the exception of seme changes in the school 
meals area, at their 'pre-cut' funding levels; and practices such as 
the pre-start checks (see pl52 above), which had irked the Chief 
Accountant, similarly continued in being.
However, while we have been careful not to over-emphasise the impact 
or implications of the cuts exercise, the pressures on existing 
assumptions and expectations, of which the exercise was both cause and 
effect, were sufficient to cause substantial upset as order was 
renegotiated around the new definitions of the overall position (see, 
eg, Rosenberg, 1982s p8). Thus, we saw the withdrawal of the Whip 
from the three back-bench Members, but in particular the dissensus 
arising in the Management Team above what may be termed the 
'background' level (which was itself at times fairly high) became on 
occasion quite acute. As we saw earlier, for example, arguments could 
arise where Chief Officers were found by Treasury staff attempting to 
evade the full impact of the reductions:
"The Chief Officers were told to produce reductions which 
came to their share. We had very little if any input into 
what those reductions were to be. Now, we've got problems 
where the figures are not on. One thing was the ... News at 
a £10,500 reduction, but what they didn't take into account 
was seme £3,000 in advertising income so that the net cut is 
only £8,000 or so. There have been several examples of 
that. We had something similar on the audio visual aids 
where they got marketing money ... We had to go back to 
them on that ... One or two departments got a bit shirty" 
(Chief Accountant: part of this quote appeared on p74).
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As one might expect with such a pretext, the Treasury did not then 
relinquish this power which it had gained to enforce its definitions 
of the desired reductions but from which, in the first instance, it 
had evidently been excluded frcm actually selecting. However, that 
such incidents of attempted deceit arose at all is evidence of the 
pressures which actors defined themselves to be under.
One particular aspect of the dissensus arising frcm the cuts, in 
essence from their pro rata application, was the 'across the board' 
nature of the issues raised. An example here was the perceived effect 
on smaller departments, as Rosenberg (1982: pp25-6), again also 
noted. Thus, the Chief Education Officer (with Education of course 
being the largest department), noted how this prompted an automatic 
assumption of slack budgeting:
"The sheer size of our budget leads critics to assume that 
simply because it is so big there must be at least a few 
hundred thousand [pounds] or even a million or two in it 
which is relatively wasted, and which if reapplied would 
transform the budgets of smaller departments ..."
The Architect, who of course headed just such a small department, 
albeit 'central' rather than 'service* oriented, provided an example 
of the type of definition to which the Chief Education Officer 
referred:
"There's a great danger with averaging like this, it 
punishes the good manager. Anybody who's had his ship in 
relatively trim condition prior to an exercise of this 
nature suffers equally with someone who's been appalling.
The larger the cut of the cake that you have, to use a 
phrase on everybody's lips at the moment, and thus the 
greater the number of areas where you can change or redirect 
your view, the more opportunities there cure and the less the 
likelihood of having to introduce dramatic change. You can 
spread it out more evenly".
This was a point of view actually expressed on several occasions in
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the Management Team with the Treasurer present, which contrasts with 
Rosenberg's observation (1982: p28) that departments perhaps tended to 
refrain from falling out in public for fear of helping the Treasury.
On the one hand, that it happened here may be a 'one-off' occurrence, 
perhaps reflecting the depth of feeling on this occasion; on the other 
though, given that here, as we saw in the previous paragraph, the 
Treasury did not start by selecting cuts but only scrutinised then, it 
may be that the degree of help offered to the Treasury by such dissent 
was in any case rather less. As against this, though, it may be that 
pressures frcm smaller departments did help the Treasury in one sense: 
thus, the Education department, to take the previous example, was 
commended both by the Chief Executive for having "delivered on the 
line", and by another Chief Officer for having "never dragged its 
tail", in terms of producing its share of the cuts, which might 
suggest that the pressures outlined had had some effect.
A second issue raised in the Management Team was the 'guardian* role 
assumed by the Chief Executive in relation to the early retirement 
part of the cuts exercise, arising frcm his duties in reporting to 
Authority B's Vacancy Panel set up to deal with staffing issues and 
economies. One disgruntled Chief Officer takes up the story:
"One could utilise [Management Team] meetings to twist an 
officer from a properly held objective. Today you heard one 
where the Chief Executive, with the early retirement, 
decided to overlay on a Member request, ie reducing numbers 
of staff to offer a specific sum. In my department, it was 
two, and that was what Members had asked. Now the Chief 
Executive subsequently asked us to prepare two more lists of 
how we could release more, or all those applying for early 
retirement. My immediate reaction was that this department 
could only afford two posts. Then pressure was brought to 
bear. Initially I said 'No', but he said "There must have 
been some way'. So I agreed to four, provided they changed 
the ground rules, that I could release two others if they 
allowed me to lose the posts at a much lower level. Members 
accepted that at the time, but now I gather the ground rules 
won't be changed. We've been conned, and who's seeking 
medals out of the exercise?"
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The Chief Executive's reaction to this - when the charge was put to 
him in the Management Team by this respondent and other Chief Officers 
- was that they "must have guessed that something of the sort was 
likely". For his part, the Treasurer, rather than react publicly to 
the Chief Executive's encroachment into the 'guardian' role, on this 
occasion remained silent, perhaps on the basis that if somebody else 
was willing to acquire the odium of enforcing this reduction, it was 
advantageous to allow them to continue 1 Thus, when the above 
respondent was asked if he thought the Treasurer and Chief Executive 
were in alliance, he replied "Oh, I'm dead sure they were, but you 
can't blame [Treasurer] because he's got to have some doors to escape 
through".
Space precludes any more numerous examples of the dissensus within 
Authority B's management team arising from the cuts exercise. As a 
concluding comrvent however, it may be seen that following the 'pro 
rata' - ie 'across the board' - nature of the cuts, the dissensus 
arising was similarly based ' across the board' • Argument was not 
between disparate alliances of departmental Chief Officers as one 
might perhaps have expected had the cuts been prioritised, but on 
broader issues such as the relative impact of pro rata cuts on large 
and small departments in general, and resentment at the way the Chief 
Executive was defined to have handled the early retirement issue. 
Departmental clashes, as such, arose out of the 'large v small 
department' issue but that was all: with the perception of roughly 
equal misery all round, although the re la tionship between the 
Treasurer and Chief Executive remained strained and problematic, 
alliances between service Chief Officers of more than a transient 
nature in response to stages of each conversation in the Team were not 
found. Given the logic of the argument, it would seem plausible
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to  h ypothesise th a t th is  m ight a ls o  be th e  case w ith  'p ro  r a ta ' c u ts  
elsew here.
However, at this point we now turn aside frcm the main thrust of the 
politics of budgetary review which has been outlined in Authority B, 
to examine the tangential but related issue of the attempts observed 
by Treasury staff to introduce a form of zero-based budgeting (ZBB). 
Although slightly divorced from the ' mainstream' of review politics in 
the authority, this episode nevertheless illustrates further many of 
the themes which we have outlined, and offers a number of pointers of 
a more general significance.
(iii)(d) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority B; Zero-Based 
Budgeting
Purely chronologically, the ZBB exercise began in a small way with an 
unusually intensive examination of spending patterns in the past year 
on two 'line items' - furniture and fittings, and operational 
equipment - throughout the authority. The aim at this initial stage 
was to see 'where the money had gone' and to establish the likely 
potential for savings in the event of a fuller ZBB approach. The 
initial analyses of these codes showed that over 40% of the spending 
they covered took place in the last quarter of the financial year, 
which appeared to the Assistant Treasurer to verify his own 
suspicions:
"It is my contention that the financial people usually say,
' e ith e r  you spend th a t  o r lo s e  i t ' , so I 'v e  alw ays been 
convinced th a t  peop le  spend money fo r  th e  sake o f  i t ,  i f  you 
l ik e  . . .  T h is  is  g e n e ra lly  accepted , th ey  spend th e ir  
budgets to  make sure th ey  g e t th e  same n e x t y e a r" .
A cco rd in g ly , w ith  th e  h e lp  o f th e  Management S erv ices  Departm ent,
every single invoice on the two codes during the previous year was 
then checked to probe this spending pattern further. While some 
year-end loading was expected to be justifiable, it transpired that 
48% of the total allocation had been spent on 'new' rather than 
replacement items in a supposedly standstill year; and that a further 
11% had been miscoded. Whatever the care taken in constructing the 
budget, therefore, expenditure through the year was a rather different 
matter.
Not unnaturally, this was construed as indicating that an extension of 
the experiment might be warranted! Accordingly, following the 
preference of the Assistant Treasurer for a code including smaller 
numbers of higher valued items, in order to reduce the paperwork 
arising, the next area to be examined was vehicle purchasing. Here, 
though, the outcome was a relatively clean bill of health, notwith­
standing the rather greater sums of money involved. Nevertheless, it 
was decided to advance the experiment by zero-basing for the first 
time areas of an actual budget, in this case for 1983/84: chiefly, 
these were social services provisions, baths and libraries with 
special reference to overtime, and the parks expenditure which we saw 
on ppl48-52 being reviewed prior to the ZBB experiment. The choice of 
areas was determined, apparently, by two factors, namely 'known' (as 
defined) areas of ineffiency, and where the Chief Accountant's 
relations with service staff were sufficiently amicable to secure 
their cooperation. It was after this budget, of course, that the 
fieldwork terminated.
In  p u re ly  fa c tu a l term s, th is  is  th e  s to ry  o f  A u th o rity  B 's  experim ent 
w ith  w hat was la b e lle d  ' ZBB' .  O utw ard ly, th e  re s u lts  w ere somewhat 
unrem arkable. I t  may be seen th a t  th e  e x e rc is e  o n ly  in flu e n c e d  a
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budget towards the end of the observation period, and even then there 
was no sign of the 'decision packages' which ZBB's originator, Pyhrr 
(1970: ppl03-9; cf also Jones & Pendlebury, 1984: pp93-6) had 
envisaged, let alone any weighing of priorities or consideration of 
alternatives (eg Pyhrr, 1977: pl08). Indeed, we have seen that the 
selection of items, certainly at first, was on a line-item basis, 
although the inclusions in the 1983/84 budget were managerially 
discrete in the manner Pyhrr (1970: pl04) advocated.
Further, it can be stated with confidence that the review exercises 
had little or no influence on prompting any subsequent realignment of 
priorities (cf Wildavsky, 1979a: pp208-9), for all the fact that this 
was clearly envisaged for it. As a private memo frcm Authority B's 
Treasurer explaining ZBB to the Leader put it:
"[ZB B] p ro v id es  th e  f a c i l i t y  fo r  p o lic y  o p tio n s , v iz ,  shows 
a reas  where grow th o r c o n tra c tio n  can be contem plated . I t  
can a ls o  p o in t to  th e  p o s s ib ility  o f  a  s h i f t  in  resources  
frcm  one p la c e  to  an o th er . • .
To take the technique to its logical conclusion, it must 
follow that the need for, and quality of service provided 
should be critically examined simultaneously. A whole 
budget can be analysed into discrete functions or operations 
Costs are assessed ... as well as alternative ways of 
achieving the same result, with the consequences of not 
performing it also examined ... Different levels of 
performance ranging from minimum to maximun are examined 
... Ultimately, all functions are evaluated and can then 
ranked ..."
It may be seen clearly that the ultimate objective was much closer to 
Pyhrr's archetype, with all the implications this would have had for 
resource allocation, than was actually achieved. This therefore 
raises the issue of why ZBB did not develop fully in Authority A, and 
in exploring the factors involved we shall underline many of the 
themes which we have seen so far in the politics of budgetary review 
in Authority B.
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The first point to be made, however, is that for the officers 
involved, although ZBB's inpact on the budget was scmewhat limited 
relative to the aspirations for it, it was not a complete failure. As 
the Chief Accountant caimented after the 1983/84 budget had been 
settled:
"The place is so vast and a lot of our backing papers and 
working papers are poor in places. [ZBB] will help give us 
that underpinning. We saved a few bob and even though it's 
less than if the cash limit hadn't been there as that 
tightened things down anyway, now we know what goes on.
W e've g o t a lo t  more in fo rm a tio n  th an  we had, w hich w e 'l l  be 
a b le  to  use n e x t tim e  around".
The chief benefit of ZBB was therefore that, albeit as we saw at the 
expense of extra paperwork at the outset (cf Pyhrr, 1970: pill; Jones 
& Pendlebury, 1984: plOO) the depth of knowledge available to 
budgeters and thus the prospects for their future review and control 
of spending, increased in the areas where it applied. Further, on the 
codes which were zero-based in the 1983/84 budget, the cut-off point 
beyond which review was not taken was set at items at the lower end of 
the range of costs accounting for the 'bottan 20%' of the value of the 
code: thus 80% by value of each code was reviewed, which is rather 
greater than the proportion envisaged even by Pyhrr himself (1970: 
pll2), particularly at so low a level in the overall resource 
allocation process (cf also Wildavsky, 1979a: pp209-10). Not that the 
Chief Accountant saw this as anything remarkable:
"I maintain that's how estimates should be produced, the 
group accountant should be able to explain for every head in 
his estimate, say, 'staff, that's 36 employees at grade 
so-and-so, and the maintenance of equipment, that's made up 
of these contracts', and that's how you build it up."
This, as we saw on ppl48-52, was the level of knowledge displayed by 
the Chief Accountant in the extracts of his review of parks 
expenditure. Apart from where ZBB was itself applied to the parks
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budget, how ever, th e re  was a strong  sense in  w hich fo r  o f f ic e r s , ZBB 
was a means o f  re c t ify in g  d e fic ie n c ie s  in  c e r ta in  areas  o f th e  budget 
as a w hole a llo w in g  th en  to  ach ieve  th e  same depth o f re v iew  on those  
areas as elsew here.
At this officer-level, therefore, ZBB such as it was had its 
attractions. However, ZBB is a 'bottom up' process (eg Wildavsky, 
1979a: p215), and we have then to ask why it had such a lack of input 
on priorities formulated at higher levels in Authority B. The 
Treasury officers involved would not themselves have expected to be 
involved in such decisions, as the Assistant Treasurer pointed out 
after the initial 'trial run':
"Two-thirds of the money spent on those items [ie the 
percentages spent on 'new items' or miscoded] need not be 
spent. I don't mind, as such, but Members ought to be aware 
of what's happening in their standstill ..."
Our attention is therefore turned to the higher levels and it is here 
that the political answer to the lack of development of the experiment 
into 'full' ZBB emerges. Echoing the thane which emerged above in the 
context of cuts in Authority B, the fortunes of ZBB were closely bound 
up with Members' ccmnitment to it which ultimately was not forthcoming 
in the necessary form.
The key feature here is that the position of the Leader himself 
remained somewhat ambivalent:
"Personally, at the moment I’ve got no views at all. I'm 
prepared to have a look at it ... [Officers] put it up to 
us and I don't think any of us really understood what it was 
about. It's seme highly technical Treasurer's financial way 
of looking at things. I don't mind them trying it, but I'm 
not convinced".
However, after the initial experiments, and in parallel with the
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decision to zero-base parts of the 1983/84 budget, it also became a 
stated Member objective to set up a Budget Scrutiny Ccmnittee, a 
development welcomed enthusiastically at the time by the Assistant 
Treasurer:
"I think what we've got to do next is to make sane 
recannendations as to what the Budget Scrutiny Committee 
should deal with. Once they are involved we could be going 
somewhere. If they are prepared to have a look at, say, 
venture play as an example, they can look at that and see 
what it's producing and what they're getting for their 
money".
Accordingly, the future of ZBB in Authority B was strongly and visibly 
linked to the establishment of this Ccrrmittee. The writer has in his 
possession a draft of a report from the Treasurer to it, setting out 
the aims and purposes of ZBB and concluding unequivocally that:
"Consideration should be given to a program of ZBB analysis 
of the Council's ... budget."
Unfortunately for ZBB, however, the Budget Scrutiny Carmittee never 
emerged. The reasons for this, so far as can be ascertained, rested 
with the Leader's lack of conviction which we have already noted, 
coupled with further political opposition to it and the idea of ZBB 
which he was either not willing or not able to overcome. The 
Assistant Treasurer had also noted during the experiment that "Chief 
Officers really hinder the process", following a notably 
unenthusiastic response from the Management Team to a progress report, 
and it seems likely that their lobbying of Chairmen may on this 
occasion have influenced the outcome. Certainly, we saw (on p277 
above), that the exercise was relatively unpopular because of its 
implications for departmental jurisdiction over 'their own' funds. In
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any event, though, the development of ZBB in Authority B was 
effectively stymied. Although the Treasurer was able to take 
advantage of the Leader's continued ambivalence (specifically, his 
enquiry at a Chief Officer's luncheon about the progress of the 
experiment) to secure the inclusions already noted in the 1983/84 
budget, the Chief Accountant acknowledged the inpact of the 
Oarrmittee' s non-appearance even here:
"The Budget Scrutiny Oomnittee would have made all the 
difference. The thing was, with seme departments, we put it 
round saying, 'Any problems, come and see us, we'd be happy
to talk to you about what we're trying to do' and we hoped
we'd get a response. Because we didn't have the Oomnittee, 
we couldn't say to anyone 'You've got to do it this way', 
otherwise they'd have challenged us".
This echoes the earlier theme of the Chief Accountant's reliance, 
given his lack of power resources to compel, largely on persuasion and 
voluntary cooperation. The result here, though, was less successful 
than his other attempts to deepen review of Authority B's budget, 
resulting in ZBB's relatively limited overall impact: some information 
was gained of potential future use and some savings (although these 
were relatively reduced given the impact of cash limits already in 
operation, and also the education capitation system - see pl45 above),
but at no time was ZBB allowed to 'feed up' even as far as Chief
Officers' policy deliberations.
However, even though th e  experim ent d id  n o t produce ZBB in  th e  
a rc h e ty p a l sense, i t  would be wrong to  d ism iss i t  as a com plete  
f a i lu r e .  As th e  research  c lo se d , i t  was p lanned to  a p p ly  th e  approach  
as i t  had evo lved  to  th a t  p o in t to  fees  and charges, in  e f fe c t  using  
th e  p reced en t w hich th e  e x e rc is e  had e s ta b lis h e d  fo r  deeper s e le c tiv e  
re v ie w s , even i f  th e  prospects fo r  these w ere le s s  fa v o u rab le  than  i f  
th e  e x p l ic it  san c tio n  o f  th e  Leader o r a Budget S c ru tin y  Gommitte had
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been gained. To this extent, while noting the similarity of the 
position with the pessimistic picture of the feasibility of ZBB 
painted by Wildavsky (1979a: pp215-8), the position remained fluid and 
with seme benefits which could be pointed to sufficient, presumably, 
to justify the intended examination of fees and charges.
Conclusions about ZBB itself therefore stand suspended, albeit with 
the benefit of considerable doubt about the policy-making archetype 
(ie as opposed to its use as a reviewing tool). Other conclusions, 
however, are rather clearer. The whole episode has confirmed 
graphically hew the level of review found in an authority will be a 
function of the ordering of definitions negotiated around the issue; 
how vital are the Member level parameters within which review, 
particularly in forms as overt as this, must take place (this is a 
theme of wider importance and will be returned to); but also how that 
review may occur and be deepened in ways which might otherwise have 
remained hidden. It might reasonably be surmised that Authority B's 
experiment with ZBB would appear to, eg, Wildavsky to confirm his 
scepticism; but the fact renains that in all the areas where it was 
applied the effect was the negotiation of an order that was less 
incremental than hitherto.
(iii)(e) The Politics of Budgetary Review in Authority B:
Surinary and Conclusion
Perhaps the best concluding remark about the politics of budgetary 
review in Authority B was provided by the former Finance Chairman. We 
saw earlier how he expressed in vain the view that "... we could run 
the place for a million quid less ..."; however as he then continued:
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"I gave that up, but since then we’ve had the financial 
crisis and it's been proved that you can run the place on a 
million quid less because they did it [and more] ... They 
brought in that early retirement scheme and suddenly found 
that departments who two or three years previously had 
increased their staff and said they couldn't cope without 
the extra were suddenly shedding staff and saying they could 
cope after all. It teaches you a lot about the way the 
place works".
The dcminant theme in the negotiation of order around budgetary review 
in Authority B was attempts by Treasury staff with or without further 
help to modify culturally-based definitions of the desirability of 
service spending and the lack of need for review and restraint, 
sufficiently to allow their own definitions of the correct response to 
what was defined as a worsening resources position to be enacted. As 
in Authority A, the stimulus and primary objective was to avoid 
penalty block grant losses; unlike Authority A, however, there was no 
single issue to overwhelm any conflict as to where and whether this 
was to be achieved, and which might have left review of service 
expenditure merely as a residual means of reducing spending. In 
Authority B, the politics of review also became the politics of 
budgetary containment, but on a much broader front across the budget 
base as a whole, rather than just part of it.
The various strands within this main theme were numerous and 
interwoven: Treasury staff operating within unfavourable and 
restrictive Member level parameters which were only gradually altered; 
the use of cash limits to secure 'hidden* (but fairly large) real 
terms reductions; the gradual attraction of the Leader' s support and 
sanction for Treasury definitions of the need for further, explicit, 
cuts - but not for ZBB - which he was eventually then able to ' sell', 
partially at least, to his Party Group; the role of gradually forming 
definitions of resource shortage in this process; the occasionally
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competing views and activities of the Chief Executive; and the ZBB 
exercise itself. Together these provided an important lessen, in 
terms of a set of clues as to the dynamics of Chief Officer/Chairman 
linkages, and the power of Member sanction to which we shall shortly 
be turning.
Once again, the conclusion must be that the level of review - ie the 
level of incrementalism - and the particular pattern of activity found 
in Authority B, as in Authority A, was a function of the negotiated 
order of definitions of the status quo, as conditioned by underlying 
cultural attitudes towards it and growth in resources. For all the 
setbacks observed in attempts to deepen review, Authority B was less 
incremental, in these terms, at the end of the research than when it 
began, and it had experienced a real terms expenditure reduction which 
fell outside most definitions of the incremental range. The 
Treasurer, aided by the Leader, was therefore eventually able to 
negotiate these underlying attitudes to the point where his 
definitions of the necessary response to external events - which he 
had been advancing for seme years - were partially enacted. The 'pro 
rata' nature of many aspects of their enactment was also a function 
(ie an outcome) of the particular order negotiated, or rather 
renegotiated, just as the dissensus which arose was itself a function 
of the renegotiation process.
(iv) THE POLITICS OF BUDGETARY REVIEW: OVERVIEW
Although the general thrust of our argument on the politics of 
budgetary review should now be abundantly clear, some concluding
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points may be made by way of offering an overview and providing 
pointers for the development of our overall argument in the next 
chapter.
While many of the budgetary outcomes in the case study material 
presented in this and the preceding chapter were 'incremental' - 
defined in 'day-to-day* terms rather than with any specific 
quantification in mind - changes from the status quo, both Authorities 
A and B moved to less 'incremental' levels of review during the 
research, but each in their own distinctive way. With our view of the 
breadth of the politics of the status quo, certainly far broader 
either than the ' conventional' view or the stylised and restricted 
pluralist underpinnings of incrementalism itself, the key truth which 
emerges is that no area of the budget is a priori apolitical, ie, 
inmune from review in some form. Particularly at a time of resource 
shortage, if order is negotiated in such a way that areas of the 
budget pass entirely unreviewed - if Wildavsky's "iceberg" really is 
as consistently lacking in buoyancy as he implies (1979a: p!3) - this 
would be a significant outcome in itself.
Rather, each of the authorities studied here had its own unique and 
clearly defined pattern of review and revision arising from the 
definitions within it of how the status quo should be approached, and 
from the manner of combining these definiticxis, but which the broad 
generalisations of political incrementalism would have missed. On the 
evidence of the data, just as Danziger conceived of each authority 
having its own "critical policy style" in terms of "its own unique 
configuration of resource allocations" (1978: p76), each will also 
have its own, related, "critical reviewing style" in terms of the 
distinctive order negotiated and sustained around the status quo at
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any one time. Specific factors in the composition of this style which 
were isolated from the data included socialised background or cultural 
assumptions conditioning definitions of resource availability and 
attitudes to the status quo itself; consequent definitions of the 
'need for change'; the defined availability of reviewing resources, 
and their deployment; proactivity in attempting to enact definitions 
that review and change are necessary; and so on, as represented in the 
ways in which the actors involved defined their roles and interacted 
with each other. It was frctn these aspects that order was observed to 
be negotiated and the level and pattern of review determined.
Further, for all the avowedly micro-level focus of this study, it is 
here that we have the beginnings of a satisfactory model explaining 
how 'incremental' levels of review - or any other, 'non-incremental' 
level - came about. That is, we have a model based upon the loosely 
symbolic interactionist concepts employed which make the actors 
themselves the critical 'variables' in explaining how, in this case, 
local authorities appeared to 'respond to' external events, such as 
the brute facts of resource shortage and uncertainty, which presented 
themselves from the data; and in explaining how definitions and 
perceptions from within the authority had their impact on this 
response. While the specific negotiated order of these definitions in 
each authority will almost certainly be unique, it is perhaps through 
comparisons of the types of factors outlined above that a more general 
theory of the budgetary review may be arrived at.
However, we turn now to developing the insights which we have gained 
into the Member/officer configurations in the authorities studied, and 
to exploring the order negotiated in them through the politics of
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resource allocation. Fran the "critical reviewing styles" we shall 
new turn to the "critical policy styles" which Danziger originally 
conceived, although the examination of these will also further inform 
our view of the politics of budgetary review.
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CHAPTER 9. THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
(i) INTRODUCTION
So far in our account we have looked at the politics of reviewing or 
revising existing expenditure, ignoring the issue of how, so to speak, 
it 'got there in the first place'. The implicit assumption has been 
that it was 'given', somehow devoid of any process of enacting it. We 
therefore turn now to examining the political interactions which 
determine what was characterised earlier (p91) as the content of 
resource allocation processes, that is, the pretexts tacitly or 
explicitly defined for allocating money. How is this content arrived 
at: how are resources allocated?
As we noted, the area in which we shall be working is that giving rise 
to Danziger's "critical policy style": the patterned configuring of 
people, definitions, and interactions in each authority through which 
and as the expression of which order was negotiated around the 
allocation of resources. In effect, we shall be analysing these 
oontent-def ining processes of negotiation in terms of how they allowed 
the competing definitions available to be selected, adjusted and 
combined as ' resource allocations', and thus whose definitions were 
consistently likely to be the most nearly enacted as 'allocated 
resources'. Our interest in the roles defined and enacted by the 
actors involved as they negotiated order will therefore continue from
our examination of the politics of budgetary review, as will our own
very wide definition of politics, even though (as we noted earlier) 
our specific focus will in fact change from the lower-level
interactions where budgets tend to be reviewed, to the more
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'conventionally political' interactions between Members and Chief 
Officers. It was here that the data suggested that, over time, the 
content of resource allocation processes was largely enacted.
This allows the introduction of the first of two general themes before 
moving on to examine the data itself, namely that relatively few 
Members and officers in the authorities studied consistently and 
significantly affected the allocation of resources. Over time, the 
content of resource allocation processes was, particularly in the more 
autocratically run Authority A but also to a marked degree in 
Authority B, largely enacted by a small 'budgetary elite* (eg 
Rosenberg, 1983: pl7) of key actors (although this should not be taken 
to imply any necessary unity between them), made up of Chief Officers 
and leading Members (cf also Laffin & Young, 1985: p43). (The latter 
have been referred to collectively as 'the Leadership* of each 
authority, amongst whom the Leader himself was pre-eminent. However, 
all leading Members were also Committee Chairmen: this had 
implications which we shall see appeared to conflict with those 
defined to arise from 'being a leading Member', and depending on the 
context they will therefore also be referred to as Chairmen.) This is 
not to deny at all that a wider group than this elite was interested 
in the resource allocation processes observed, and that on occasions 
they sought to exert influence of their own (for example, much as we 
have already seen in Authority B in connection with the cuts issue, 
each majority Party Group will be shown to have formed the parameters 
within which at any one time Chairmen and Leaderships operated), but 
it was largely through Chairmen and Chief Officers that the views of 
others in the authority were observed to acme to bear.
The second general theme was that Members and officers within the
311
budgetary elite were distinguishable, inter alia, by a tendency to 
display different socialised and 'learnt' perspectives which 
conditioned definitions of resource allocation, events and each other 
(cf also Bate, 1982: pp3-6). Jonsson (1982: p27; 1984: ppl33-4), in 
particular, develops sane of the specific themes which were observed 
here with his conception of the "organising principles" of each side 
of the authority: a unity-seeking, hierarchical bureaucracy applying 
pre-generalised rules to specific instances, is portrayed as 
interacting in the resource allocation process with conflict-dominated 
politicians whose raison d'etre is to oppose each other by gaining 
backing for counter-arguments. Now, to a point this is a fair 
summary, although the data indicated that it needs to be treated with 
a certain caution. There were times, as we shall see, where officers 
were 'conflict dominated', just as politicians appeared on occasion to 
pursue unity and consensus (and also, referring to our earlier 
criticism of pluralism, to enact their definitions through avoiding 
overt conflict). However, provided that, in particular, Jonsson's 
dichotomy is not read to imply that 'politics', as the negotiation of 
order, is restricted to the Member side of each authority only, and 
while there are caveats which prevent it being universally applicable, 
we shall see that it emerged on many occasions as a useful device for 
structuring what was observed.
Accordingly, despite the caveats, we have a basic formulation of the 
content of resource allocation processes arising frcm interactions 
between two relatively small groups of actors, who tended to view 
events from differently defined perspectives. We turn now to 
expanding this basic statement, by looking at the negotiation of order 
around the allocation of resources within each side of the budgetary 
elite in the authorities studied, and then between them. While the
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examination is perhaps a little laborious at times, it is nevertheless 
worthwhile outlining all the component elements in this negotiation of 
order to allow as complete a picture as possible to be built up, 
particularly in view of the paucity of research in the area of 
officers' and Members' roles and interactions (cf Rosenberg, 1984: 
p47? indeed, as Greenwood, 1983: pl61, acknowledges, Rosenberg himself 
is one of the few writers to have explored the field in any depth, 
which accounts for the long passages in what follows here where he is 
the only writer, if any, cited). Further, while some of the data to 
be presented is based on observation unsupported by formal interviews, 
there is at the same time a certain overlap into the broader field of 
policy-making more generally. This latter, though, is in many ways 
both unavoidable given that resource allocation is integral to this 
wider political discourse, and therefore also to that same extent 
justified. However, excuses and justifications over, we now turn to 
the data I.
(ii) THE BUDGETARY ELITE: LEADING MEMBERS
Taking first the Member side of the budgetary elites observed, in both 
Authorities A and B it has been suggested that to a greater or lesser 
degree a relatively small Leadership group monopolised Member-level 
direction setting. In Authority A, we have already seen that this was 
drawn from Qximittee Chairmen or the Party Group Executive Gonmittee 
(cf Green, eg 1980: p41); in Authority B, the definition of the 
Leadership group was looser, but rested with the Chairmen who sat on 
the Majority Party/Chief Officer Policy Group, a classic "Bains "-type
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forum (Bains, 1972) and similar to that observed by, eg, Saunders 
(1979: pp217-9) in Croydon.
Formally, there was no necessary reason why even the tighter
arrangements in Authority A should have filtered the definitions
brought to bear on resource allocation. Neither body had more than
advisory powers over their respective Party Groups, and it was 
therefore on these Groups that each Leadership relied for its support 
and continued pre-eminence. To this extent, as Green (1981: p40) also 
found, the wishes of each Party Group at any one time did in a real 
sense form the parameters within which each Leadership had to 
operate. For this reason, and because Group approved, was the sole 
legitimation acceptable to them in terms of their basic Party beliefs, 
each Leadership showed a strong predisposition to be bound by Group 
decisions. As one might expect, leading Members themselves were keen 
enough to stress this on tape: as more convincing, however, is the 
fact that the data revealed no single instance of a Leadership or 
leading Member openly defying a clearly expressed Party Group 
preference (cf also Green, 1981: p40). To this extent, therefore, 
definitions from a wider circle of Members than either Leadership 
could in theory gain entry in the Party Group to the resource 
allocation process.
This formal picture begins to change, though, with the virtual 
certainty that a majority for each Leadership in its respective Group 
- and so control of the authority - would be forthcoming. In 
Authority A, the data revealed no examples at all of the Executive 
Ccrmittee's recommendations, concerning the allocation of resources or 
any other issue, being overturned or even altered, and so far as could 
be ascertained the last occasion where this did happen was in 1977
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where the Group refused to demote a Camrdttee Vice-Chairman to make 
way for a retiring and deeply unpopular Lord Mayor I The position was 
perhaps less predictable in Authority B where Policy Group advice was 
on occasion amended, although even here on only one occasion in the 
research period - where the Party Group refused to cancel an 
application far Urban Aid funds - was the Policy Group's 'advice' 
actually overturned.
One reason for this, of course, was that each Leadership was not in 
business to be rejected, and therefore only put forward proposals for 
allocating resources which were (almost always successfully) defined 
to be sure of sufficient support:
"If I can see quite clearly that I wen't get my way, then I 
will have to change tack" (Chairman, Authority A).
"It's a conscious way to look at something and see what I 
think I can get away with ... The secret is sitting down 
with them over many years and knowing how far one could go" 
(Chairman, Authority A).
Alternatively, as with the 'pro-rata v prioritised cut' debate in 
Authority B, the issues could be set out without the Leadership 
actually revealing to the Group its own preference, so that if success 
could not be guaranteed, the appearance of defeat was at least avoided 
by an open vote.
However, even where a majority was not forthcoming on the Leadership's
terms at a particular point in time, comfort could always be drawn
from the fact that the parameters of 'Group opinions' were themselves 
often moveable in the longer run:
"If I've got something very dodgy, I'll sound out opinion 
and say, 'Look, this is likely to happen and my attitude to
it is this ...' It leads them along the sort of line I
would like to go" (Chairman, Authority A).
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"If I can't get what I want and convince the Group, I could 
still get it in the long run if I feel it's right. It's a 
matter of negotiation ..." (Chairman, Authority B).
"If there's a real nitty gritty problem that has to be 
solved, I'm going to sow the seed early, debate, discuss, 
fall out, bring back the point, discuss, maybe fall out less 
and so on like that until eventually you've picked the thing 
off" (Chairman, Authority A).
Even where leading Members had to forego their own opinions in advance 
of the debate in the short term, rather than risk defeat, in the 
longer term it may be seen that they were able effectively to 
'relocate' the parameters of 'Group definitions' over a period of time 
until they embraced and thus legitimised the desired course of 
action. A potential constraint was thereby transformed into a 
substantial power resource.
As well as issues being 'readied' for debate by these means, though, 
each Leadership's success in enacting their declared definitions once 
they had 'gone public' suggested, correctly, that they had substantial 
further power resources. First, ordinary Members appeared to share 
the same ideological disinclination to public dissent against Party 
Group decisions, once taken, as each Leadership. Thus, decisions in 
each of the authorities to withdraw the Whip from dissident Members 
(two in Authority A and three in Authority B) who did dissent in 
public from the budget parameters enacted were passed with notably 
little opposition. We have seen that Gyford traces this to the 
tradition of collective action and solidarity inherent in the Labour 
movement (1978: p78), although Saunders (1979: p221) also found the 
same phenomenon in Conservative-controlled Croydon. Second, each 
Leadership had considerable resources of patronage, with 40-50% of the 
Members in each Group serving as Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen of 
Ccmnittees. Third, and perhaps most important of all (especially in
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Authority A, as we saw on pp259-61 above) was the control of 
information enjoyed by leading Members, in that example to restrict 
debate on and examination of the budget, and of which more will be 
seen very shortly.
To surrmarise so far, as the formal position indicates, in allocating 
resources (or on any other issue) each Leadership did indeed operate 
within the parameters of its Party Group's shared preconceptions - 
which was why each went to considerable lengths to ensure that those 
preconceptions were eventually 'located' in such a way as to sanction 
the actions which the Leaderships themselves wished to undertake. 
Party Groups were prevented or diverted from asserting their formal 
status - and thus from providing their own definitions directly for 
input into resource allocation processes - precisely because of their 
importance in offering the power resource of legitimacy. Such 
definitions as did emerge from ordinary Members in each Party Group, 
as we have seen, were if necessary moulded and mediated by leading 
Members until they were in an acceptable form, or else they were 
effectively suppressed by the principles of Group loyalty, once again 
profoundly reducing any direct input from ordinary Members into the 
resource allocation process.
Thus far, Jonsson's "organising principle" of conflict would at least 
have to be stretched to cover second and third dimension power 
processes (see pp204-5 above) where Group members' definitions were 
covertly either suppressed or subverted by each Leadership. Where 
more overt conflicts did surface, this was less due to action by 
ordinary Group members as due to the nature of each Leadership and the 
dual allegiance of each leading Member to the Leadership itself and 
also to his Camiittee (cf Gyford, 1976: p83; Green, 1980: p42). While
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much of the data on this aspect is derived from Authority A alone, it 
appeared there that the principle of collective responsibility within 
the Group Executive Committee masked fierce conflicts between the 
leading Members in their positions as Caimittee Chairmen (cf Green, 
1980: p42). As one senior Chairman put it,
"Life on the Exec gets a bit bloody savage sometimes. I 
find myself quite frequently in a minority on it. One of 
the worries is that once they've made a decision, you're not 
able to speak against it in the Group. There are some who 
feel we shouldn't have an Executive, and I wouldn't be 
against that".
However, it is revealing that despite "quite frequently" being in a 
minority, we shall see that this respondent was able to maintain his 
status, through his power base as Chairman of Housing, Authority A's 
largest spending Oommittee.
Similarly, other leading Members chaired major Comnittees, which 
became the vehicles for their own personal status and ambitions for 
their programme areas (cf Gyford, 1976: p83). Ties between Committee 
Chairmen and Committee members tended to be much closer than those 
between Party Group members in general and each Leadership as a whole, 
and as a result a good Chairman could count on his own core of support 
in the Party Group for his own definitions and position. As the 
Housing Chairman put it:
"I'm Chairman because the Labour Group want me to be, so I
have to take them along with me. Nov I can only do that as
long as I'm backed by the [Housing] Committee members, who 
will not always speak in one voice but at least if we 
disagree it's only on the fine point of things".
By the same token, these cross-cutting Oomnittee allegiances and
memberships sometimes allowed ordinary Members a more direct input of
their definitions into, say, the area of the budget covered by that
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Ccrrmittee, even if only as a result of the purely pragmatic 
considerations of the Chairman:
"... Part of the game is to always leave something out so 
that everyone else can contribute. The best example of that 
is actually the budget. I could come along and dot every 
'i' and cross every ' t*, but the thing is always to leave 
something, to say, 'It is your decision to change that', 
otherwise they see themselves as rubber stamps, don't 
they?".
It may be seen that to this extent, the service Ccrrmittee itself was 
maintained, within the scope defined by its Chairman, as a separate 
source of ideas and definitions of policy and the allocation of 
resources within the Leadership and Party Group.
In Authority A, the result of these separate pulls and loyalties could 
at times be spectacular since, unlike Saunders' findings in Croydon 
(1979: p220) and contrary to the trend detected by Laffin & Young 
(1985: p52), the other leading Members could not always guarantee the 
outcome in the Party Group against a powerful and determined Chairman 
who was one of their nuntoer (cf also Rosenberg, 1985: p77). The 
subject of disputes was usually either Comnittee jurisdictions or 
finance, the latter particularly at a time of resource shortage. Thus 
Authority A's Housing Chairman described how he gained the premise of 
a rate fund subsidy for his Housing Revenue Account:
"We took them [the rest of the Leadership] for half a 
million. That was a bit of a con trick. I was able to 
justify it in debate because through the HRA we made a 
massive contribution to wardens' salaries, which ws [Housing 
Ccrrmittee] thought was a social service. Unfortunately, we 
had to throw that on the Group at the eleventh hour because 
we made the decision here in Comnittee on Friday afternoon 
and on Friday night the decision had to be taken. That 
caused problems because we hadn't given [the Leader] a 
chance to look at it, which I am sure he didn't appreciate".
The impact of cross-cutting Comnittee loyalties in the Party Group cn
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resource allocation may clearly be seen: in the final event, however, 
the usefulness of the Party Group as a power resource was underlined 
by the fact that the Leader was able, also by appealing to it, to have 
certain conditions imposed on the use of the money.
A further example, this time demonstrating a rather different 
approach, was supplied by the same Chairman in connection with a £lm 
capital receipt:
"There had been certain pressures caning on from the Exec 
for using that million but I took a simple view. The terms 
of reference for my Ccmnittee are set down and as long as I 
operate that, I feel I've got a clean pair of hands... If 
the pressure's caning on I'd let them take it to Group 
because the terms of reference are quite explicit, we have 
jurisdiction over our money".
For the Chairman to have raised the matter in the Group would have 
implied uncertainty in the strength of his own position. The attempt 
was to ' routinise' his action and thus gain Group acquiescence to his 
interpretation of his terms of reference, by relying on the 
legitimising precedent of the fact that the Group had itself 
(presumably) approved the terms of reference in the first place. He 
succeeded, thus demonstrating further that as a legitimation device 
and power resource, the Group was 'available' for whoever could 
control it around the issue in question. The overall picture which 
these examples give of the dynamics of Ccmnittee - Leader - Group 
interactions was fairly typical of what was observed (even if the 
style displayed was distinctive), with resource allocations then 
influenced by the cross-pulls which were set up.
On this note, however, the power resources and activities in this 
area of each authority's Leader himself come to the fore. Gyford 
(1976: p83) shows how an authority's Leader may play his role more or
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less proactively, as a major policy initiator or as a mere spokesman: 
those in the authorities studied were much more towards the 
'proactive' end of this spectrum, although with Authority A's Leader, 
for all the evidence of cross-cutting Ccmnittee allegiances, emerging 
as the more autocratic in his personal style towards the Party Group 
as a whole. Both were respected for their experience and 
intelligence. At least one other writer * has made this observation 
of Authority A's Leader, corroborated by the Deputy Treasurer as 
follows:
"He's about 70 and you'd never believe it. He's very alert, 
in some ways he's a difficult bloke bo deal with because he 
won't let go of something until he's absolutely satisfied. 
Nine times out of ten he's right, and we back down finding 
some excuse for doing so. I gather he can be a bit of a 
blighter in the [Party] Group, but I've personally got a 
great deal of admiration for him".
Similarly, Authority B's Leader was held in sufficient respect to be 
accused of blackmail, but at the same time to have his own definition 
of a desirable rate rise enacted, by his Party Group, simply by 
threatening to absent himself from the Council rate-fixing meeting 
(this being as close as he would go to actual public dissent from the 
Group view).
However, although each Leader was undoubtedly the most powerful 
politician in his authority, capable, as we have seen and as we shall 
see further, of influencing in a personal capacity the resource 
allocation patterns of their authorities, as members of their 
respective Leadership groups both men were subject to the constraints 
which this imposed. On the one hand was the greater personal power 
resources which came simply from being Leader and having the personal
(* who cannot be cited without divulging the identity of Authority A: 
see p259 above).
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qualities to reach that position, but on the other there was the 
greater number of conflicting demands for support which the position 
itself generated. In a very real sense, therefore, the powsr of each 
was, in the famous phrase, "the power to persuade". For all his 
autocratic style and undoubted personal authority, Authority A's 
Leader could not have imposed his definitions against those of the 
others in the Leadership (as the evidence of the cross-cutting effects 
of the Ccmnittee allegiances has shewn), and neither could he have 
moved without Group support, albeit that this was evidently fairly 
easy to secure. Similarly, the Leader of Authority B enacted his 
definition of the desirable rates rise essentially by appealing to 
Group loyalties: the accusations of blackmail arose because other 
Members then felt morally obliged to back his position.
More will be seen of the role of each Leader shortly. We may 
summarise these ccrmnents on the politics - ie the negotiation of order 
- amongst Members around the allocation of resources in the 
authorities studied, by noting on the one hand the trend to 
restricting the sources of definitions allowed to feed frcm the Party 
Group into the resource allocation process, but on the other - cn 
evidence mainly frcm Authority A - the cross-pull of Comnittee 
loyalties. Even here though, the effect seemed primarily to allow 
Chairmen to put more strongly their own definitions of resource 
allocations in the Party Group, as legitimised by Comnittee members 
distinctly frcm the Leadership's collective definitions. Both in 
Groups and Ocmnittees, the primary role defined for ordinary Members 
appeared to be to varying degrees to legitimise what was put in front 
of them, thereby reducing any distinctive input into resource 
allocation of their own to a minimum: with the operation of Jonsson's 
"organising principle" of conflict, ordinary Members accordingly
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served primarily as a power resource to be sought and applied in 
support of given definitions. This is a testament both to the impact 
of definitions of Group solidarity, and the powsr of the Leader and 
Chairmen to manipulate and persuade within these.
(iii) THE BUDGETARY ELITE: CHIEF OFFICERS
(iii)(a) The Budgetary Elite: Chief Officers in Authority A
As we have already noted, the key officers determining the content of 
the resource allocation processes studied were the departmental and 
central Chief Officers.
Taking Authority A first, we have already seen that the conventional 
'Bains-type' Management Team was greatly reduced in status through the 
dominance, under the Chief Executive, of the Central Group of non- 
departmental Chief Officers, wherein lay the overall 'resources 
function' of the authority. The Chief Executive himself expanded on 
the rationale for the Centred. Group thus:
"I have a Management Team, but the management of the 
authority in resources terms is by the Central Group. I 
don't think you could manage an authority this size with a 
dozen people round a table. There's an awful lot going on 
which requires meetings twice and even four times a week, 
and it would be too disruptive to bring in a dozen 
individuals. We'd take something very major to the 
Management Team when we'd prepared it and taken a view 
amongst ourselves. [It] meets much less frequently, now, 
particularly in the present resources position. We've 
broken it down into working groups, and we don't say 
'everything goes there' anymore because we have this core of 
very senior officers who deal with everything and who keep a 
finger on what's going on".
The result of this pursuit of Jonsson's "organising principle" of
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unity in Authority A, for the Management Team itself, was that Central 
Group officers could afford to treat it in an almost 'off-hand' way, 
having in effect taken the relevant decisions before it met or in 
other fora. As this quote hints, the Team's role was virtually 
reduced to one of consultation, with any meaningful input into 
resource allocation minimised and strictly filtered. As the Deputy 
Treasurer reported of the selection of capital projects for one year:
"There must have been sane fixing. I found out about it 
when I went to the meeting. I went up with [the Treasurer], 
but he kept wandering in and out, he was there some of the 
time, not all of the time. That's when it dawned on me that 
an awful lot of lobbying and sorting had gone on 
beforehand. I would imagine, indeed I now know, the Central 
Group had been interviewing certain Chief Officers".
How had this concentration and centralisation (Greenwood et al, eg 
1980a: ppl3-20) of power come about? Authority A had a long history 
of independent spending departments linked to a similar history of 
powerful service Oomnittees. We have seen that at least some of these 
Oonmittees retained their power which, by means which will shortly be 
explained, allowed 'departmentalist' attitudes and definitions to 
remain alive on the officers' side. With the Leader's backing as his 
major power resource, however, the Chief Executive attempted in the 
face of this historical trend to promote a more collective approach to 
management by the inposition of the Centred. Group on and over the 
more 'departmentalist' Management Team. We saw above, for example, 
(p257) how the Treasurer found himself propelled into a position of 
greater scrutiny over the budget, as part of this imposition. The 
Chief Executive's tough and dictatorial stance noted earlier (p256) 
closely mirrored that of the Leader himself whose bidding he was 
doing, and who as we shall see stood to gain where the Chief 
Executive's assertion of his own authority made it harder for service
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Chief Officers to uphold unilaterally their Comnittees' and thus their 
Chairmens' interests. The inposition of the Central Group eventually 
reached the point where it became virtually inpossible to pursue 
definitions which it had not sanctioned through the officers' side in 
isolation, because it had effectively monopolised (or rather, 
neutralised) the available means of doing so. As an example, a 
working group set up to suggest structures for Authority A's DLQ had 
produced a report which the Central Group defined as giving too much 
credence to a 'departmentalist' point of view. It was sinply altered, 
extensively, after the Management Team had accepted it but before 
being handed on to the Leader (this was the report which we saw 
earlier (pp200-l) that the Deputy Treasurer was so reluctant to read).
This monopoly expression of Jonsson's "organising principle" of unity 
meant that a Chief Officer wishing to advance a definition of where to 
allocate resources which did not have the approval of the Central 
Group had little option but to fight the officer battle on the Member 
side of the authority (see also Rosenberg, 1982: p25). Being able to 
do this depended in turn on having as a power resource the backing of 
a Chairman capable amongst the Leadership and in the Party Group of 
outweighing any support for the Central Group on the issue from the 
Leader and the rest of the Leadership. As we have seen, such a 
Chairman would himself have been a member of the Leadership to have 
stood a chance of achieving this, although clearly, much then depended 
on the issue itself and in a more passive sense on the collective 
dispositions and definitions of Group and Comnittee members. What we 
have already seen of the dynamics of Authority A's Party Group 
suggests however that some Chairmen could indeed deliver the necessary 
support for at least some of the Chief Officer's own definitions to be 
enacted and, as we shall see very shortly when this avenue is pursued
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further, the Central Group could on these occasions be out-flanked.
For the present, though, we may summarise that the effect of this 
negotiation process on officers' definitions of where to allocate 
resources would have been two-fold. Where the Central Group had not 
originated those definitions themselves, either the definitions would 
in any case have needed its sanction (or at least that of the 
Treasurer as his staff constructed the budget within the Central 
Group's overall guidelines: see p256 above), which of course served to 
filter Chief Officers' output passing through that channel; or, those 
definitions had to emerge through the Chairman himself, who as we 
shall see might well also have been keen to filter them into 
accordance with his own. In either event, in effect surrmarising the 
position in Authority A the opportunity for direct input of service 
Chief Officers' own definitions into allocating resources was thereby 
filtered and restricted, and the control of their activities was 
correspondingly increased.
(iii)(b) The Budgetary Elite: Chief Officers in Authority B
Turning now to Authority B, we have already seen one inmediate 
contrast with Authority A: although in terms of revenue spending 
Authority B was nearly three times larger, with a much wider range of 
service responsibilities, it operated a full Management Team of all 16 
Chief Officers. Although, as Hinings et al (1980: pi90) also found, 
there were certainly pressures to adopt a 'Central Group' formation, 
the idea was viewed with distaste by a number of Chief Officers, 
including the Chief Executive:
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"We go round and round on this one. It's been pressed on me 
but I still find the first and second class citizen argument 
sets up a tension which is too great a price to bear. It 
doesn't make all that much difference, the few extra bods.
Do you go the whole hog and just have central departments? 
... I feel that's quite wrong" {Chief Executive).
"1 hope I don't show overweening pride with a budget of 
£45m, but I do voider sometimes what Environmental Health 
are doing there. But, on the other hand, one hears horror 
stories where major decisions are taken by a cabal of the 
Chief Executive, Treasurer, and one or two others, and 
before you know it, people are into all kinds of cloak and 
dagger stuff to bring pressure to bear. If the price of 
avoiding that is to have the large group we've got, it's 
better there should at least be the confidence" {Chief 
Education Officer).
The contrasts with Authority A are both clear and somewhat ironic.
As the second respondent hinted, however, the confidence did indeed 
have its price. Hie oorrbination of numbers of service departments 
represented, with the presence of the brute fact of resource shortage, 
at once meant that a greater range of cross-cutting interests ware 
present, with more reason to express their points of view. As a 
consequence, the Management Team, even leaving aside the dissensus 
which we saw around the specific issue of the cuts in Authority B, was 
not wdthout its tensions:
"I suppose in the abstract we ought to have a more 
collective and rigorous view about running the Authority as 
a whole ... I' ve come to the conclusion that that is an 
abstract view and doesn't relate to actual circumstances, 
because the interests of service departments are so 
different. Very broadly, I think we've got about the best 
we can out of it" (Chief Executive: emphasis interpreted).
"Sometimes, I don't know that we have a Management Team. 
Sometimes we'll act in group fashion, sometimes as 
individuals" (Architect).
The effect ves that the Management Team could not impose the same type 
of monopoly over officers' consideration of resource allocations that 
we saw in Authority A. The use of, or appeal to one's Chairman was 
certainly a conmon tactic in Authority B, as we shall see, but it was
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by no means the only tactic available: on occasions service Chief 
Officers could advance their own definitions of resource allocations 
and other issues within the officers' side alone, by working within 
the Team itself to gain its support in a way that would not have been 
possible in Authority A.
As an example, we saw earlier (p295) frcm our study of the politics of 
budgetary review that the Architect had complained of the effect on 
his department of its quota of early retirements arising from the cuts 
exercise. Although the Chief Executive controlled the Management Team 
agenda, the Architect sought and gained leave to put a report bo it on 
the increased likelihood that design delays would lead to slippage, 
using as a 'lever' the concern of Chief Officers for projects in their 
own departments:
"They [Chief Officers] know it's real, I'm not inventing the 
problem, and that failure to recognise it will have a 
detrimental effect on things they have sought to achieve. 
There could be slippage in some areas ... I felt the need 
that all Chief Officers were aware because many of them were 
going to be affected by it. If you like, I was tacitly 
enlisting their support".
A second example comes from the Chief Housing Officer's account of how 
he negotiated himself greater freedom of action, granted with the 
Team's blessing, compared to the situation which he inherited of a 
'weak' department under close scrutiny frcm the Chief Executive and 
other Chief Officers:
"I by-pass them quite a lot actually. I flooded them with 
housing issues until they changed their tack and said 'We 
don't want to see any more*. That started out quite 
innocently, but then I put something out called a 'Housing 
Policies, Procedures and Priorities Document' for 
consultation. Half-way through it I realised what the 
effect would be so I churned out 48 pages of consultation 
and comments. That was the final straw, I think. They 
couldn't bloody stand any more and were only too happy to 
let go of us".
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Clearly, it is at least possible that this Chief Officer acted with 
the knowledge and tacit support of his Chairman, as would probably 
have been the case in Authority A. At the same time, though, it may 
be seen that he was able bo use the Team to legitimise his own 
definition of the situation, albeit that this then involved a 
reduction in the Team's influence, without the virtually automatic and 
direct (if hidden) approach to his Chairman to act in the Party Group 
which we might have expected in Authority A.
However, it was within these parameters, at once allowing more sources 
of possible dissent and more scope for its expression, that the Chief 
Executive had to operate as head of the Management Team. Con­
sequently, the depth and quality of the Team's consideration of, eg, 
resource allocation was much more visibly tied to the level of unity 
which could be maintained around each issue than was the case in 
Authority A:
"I'm not in the business of seeking disagreement. I'm more 
concerned to get to a position where advice can be tendered 
to the authority with reasoned acceptance by people. I 
suppose if there's a lot of difficulty I won't get too 
specific" (Chief Executive).
On several occasions in Authority B - for example, the selection of 
one year's Urban Aid applications - the use of ambiguity to secure 
consensus among Chief Officers was taken to the point where it was 
'agreed not to agree': to make no reccmnendation and leave the 
selection to Members. As the Chief Executive continued,
"If there are disagreements between officers, and there are 
from time to time ... we prepare a report in which the 
arguments are set out and Members make their minds up".
At other times, the Team appeared content to function as little more 
than a ' routing mechanisn' for issues as these arose, with agreement
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seemingly only possible, after debate, on which sub-group of Chief 
Officers should be set up to consider the matter. Examples here 
connected with resource allocation were numerous: capital slippage, 
land acquisitions, the early retirements issue noted on pp295-6 above, 
planning gain and many other issues, on occasion accompanied by 
sardonic conments about "corporate management in action" albeit, one 
judged, at least partially for the writer's hearing 1
When this apparent inability to take, or disinterest in taking, actual 
decisions was raised with interviewees, though, the issue was 
invariably turned on its head: even if this was a limitation in the 
instances where it applied, was it in fact the Management Team's role 
to take decisions? Like Authority A's Central Group, the view was 
clearly that the Team should 'manage' the authority and provide 
cohesion and unity, but the definition of what this actually implied 
was very different. Far frcm the centralisation of power and 
approaches to resource allocation, for example, with the strong 
possibility of a veto on uncongenial output from lower-level working 
groups, 'management' in Authority B was defined often to involve 
acting as little more than a clearing house and coordination point for 
officers' input and output:
"A lot of stuff that carves to the Team is worked up from 
elsewhere in the authority, so although it comes via me it 
comes half prepared. On the whole, the processes which lead 
to matters being considered there themselves contain the 
reconciling mechanisms, if you like" (Chief Executive).
It may be seen that, even if the depth of consensus and examination 
which could be achieved around an issue such as the allocation of 
resources was at times circumscribed, the routine breadth of input 
into such issues in Authority B was rather wider with a much greater 
emphasis on the Team as a channel for debates and definitions
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originating outside it. In Authority A, by contrast, the "reconciling 
mechanism" was much more likely to have been the narrower negotiation 
process within the Central Group itself.
It may then be asked how this difference of approach to 'management' 
had ccme about. In particular, for all the greater breadth of view 
enjoyed by the Team, why did it continue with all Chief Officers on it 
when the impact on its effectiveness in imposing cohesion was 
evidently detrimental? One possibility was that this situation 
represented a de facto balance of interests, perhaps with each 
Ccmnittee, for example, powerful enough to ensure that 'its' Chief 
Officer gained a seat on the Team. If so, however, it needs to be 
recalled that the Chief Executive himself was in favour of the idea 
(see p327 above). He expanded on his own rationale thus:
"It gives Chief Officers an opportunity to express a view.
It gives legitimacy to certain areas of work where it can 
then be said that 'Chief Officers have said this or done 
that' • It's very important to have the acceptance of Chief 
Officers for some things one wants to carry through. I'd 
rather have them sitting there doing nothing but feeling 
part of it and therefore being able to appeal to them from 
time to time, and seek their support".
It begins to become clear that for all the tensions and conflicts, 
especially at a time of scarce resources, the Team was as much an 
expression of Jonsson's officer-side "organising principle" of unity 
in Authority B as the Central Group in Authority A, but by the wholly 
different means of its ability to legitimise through its breadth of 
membership Chief Officers' aims, objectives and definitions. We have 
here the Chief Executive alluding to the need to process his own 
objectives through the Team in just this way; we saw on pp328-9 that 
the Architect and Chief Housing Officer both attempted the same 
thing.
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If this is so, the issue arises in turn of how the Team acquired and 
maintained its defined ability to legitimise Chief Officers' 
activities. We saw earlier how there was in each Party Group a strong 
ideological sanction against public dissent or activity contrary to 
the Group line: the data also revealed, however, that there were 
collective pressures on Chief Officers to abide by Whatever 'norms' 
the Team consciously or unconsciously defined to apply to the issue, 
and more generally not to advance their own definitions - too 
explicitly - outside the Team on issues of general concern (such as 
allocations of resources across the authority) to which it felt 
collectively that it should have an input. Thus, it could be seen 
earlier that even the Chief Housing Officer's strategy for breaking 
free of the Team's above-average level of oversight of his department 
rested in effect on obtaining its consent for this step, albeit under 
pressure, in order to legitimise it. As a second example, while we 
saw that the Architect clearly felt it legitimate to attempt to 
mobilise support from within the Team at its meetings, certain other 
tactics were ruled out. As he observed:
"We don't have little meetings beforehand and say, 'You say 
this, I'll say that'. Chief Officers here are very prepared 
to play the game according to the ground rules that have 
been established, and it would take something serious for 
that to arise".
A third example came when the Chief Education Officer was actually 
defined to have ' transgressed' the 'rule', as defined, about not 
pursuing one's definitions by by-passing the Team, in putting a 
certain paper direct to a private Sub-Committee meeting. This was not 
something which he was actually prohibited from doing, yet he came 
under immediate pressure to defend his position and, so far as could 
be ascertained, this tactic remained relatively uncommon (if not 
entirely absent) during the research period.
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While the group sanction in the Management Team, as this last example 
indicates, was not wholly effective in actually preventing the Team 
from being by-passed (it certainly never approached the conformist 
pressures in the Party Group experienced by Members), the data 
indicated that its impact on the order negotiated in Authority B 
around issues of resource allocation should not be understated. 
Critically, this impact continued even through the tension engendered 
by the brute fact of resource shortage. Thus, although he was accused 
of deceit in enacting his definition of the desirable levels of early 
retirement (see above, p295), the Chief Executive continued to seek 
the legitimacy of Chief Officers' agreement to his proposals being put 
to the Policy Group, much as we outlined on p331 above. A second and 
even clearer indication of the continuing power of the Team to 
legitimise - or in this case render illegitimate - arose from the 
Treasurer's strategy of using the group sanction within the Team to 
enforce spending restraint and observance of the level of cuts which 
we saw were finally enacted:
"If somebody felt like being really bloody-minded they still 
could, but because we'll be following up our budget 
instruction saying 'This is what did happen, this is what 
didn't', they'll be looking at that. Those that did will 
say 'Well bloody hell you didn't', and we'll have the 
leverage on the rest through group sanction. It doesn't 
sound like much, and as I say, somebody could ride over it, 
but you'd generally be surprised what sort of a pressure it 
gives us" (Treasurer).
Thus, compliance with the cuts order was effectively enhanced by 
rendering any alternative course of action 'illegitimate'.
To sumnarise what we have seen of the negotiated order around 
resource allocation in the officers' side of Authority B, therefore, 
at first sight the picture was one of apparent relative dissensus and 
tension within the Management Team, with the Chief Executive on
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occasion, unable to enact his own definitions of the situation 
necessarily in the form he might have wished. The level of consensus 
and depth of consideration of the issues involved - with the former 
being maintained on occasion by restricting the latter - appeared to 
suffer thereby. These appearances, however, and the apparent ability 
of Chief Officers to advance their own 'departmentalist' definitions 
of resource allocations without the automatic recourse to the Chairman 
to do this that we saw in Authority A, both need to be set carefully 
in context. The Management Team in Authority B had gained and proved 
able to retain, even at a time of scarce resource, group sanction and 
the defined ability to render legitimate or illegitimate Chief 
Officers' own definitions of resource allocations, including those of 
the Chief Executive. This prompted both the "concentrating”
(Greenwood et al, eg 1980a: pl3) tendency to opt for routing 
definitions of where to allocate resources through the Team when it 
was anticipated that the Team itself would in turn define the issue 
concerned as within its purview, and, at the same time, the need to 
present those definitions in a way which it would accept. The 
collective input of all Chief Officers into such definitions, even if 
through the anticipation of their reaction rather than any overt 
expression of their opinion, was potentially enhanced thereby.
(iii)(c) Chief Officers in the Budgetary Elite: Comparison of 
Authorities A and B
Turning now to a ccnparison between Authorities A and B, points may be 
made on two levels. In both authorities, the central Chief Officer 
body observed in many ways expressed Jonsson's officer-side cultural 
"organising principle" of unity, but each through a wholly different
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negotiation of order. The approach in Authority A involved 
restricting the role in resources issues played by non-Central Group - 
ie service - Chief Officers, thereby restricting in turn the extent of 
unity of consensus which was actually necessary to manage the 
authority on the Officers' side. As we saw, the Central Group was 
able to filter and control definitions of where to allocate resoures 
which went forward to the powerful and autocratic Leadership and thus 
- except where Chief Officers successfully mobilised Chairmen - which 
stood a chance of being enacted. More will be seen of both these 
possibilities very shortly. At the same time, though, it appeared 
that this restriction of the locus of power on the Officer side of 
Authority A to the relatively small Central Group, plus the fairly 
close and consensual style of working under the Chief Executive, 
served to deepen the consensus around its members' central 'binding' 
definition of their strategic control function. By contrast, the 
approach in Authority B was then seen to be a complete reversal, in 
that with the much larger Management Team, it was sought to broaden 
the input of Chief Officers, even if this had its price in terms of 
the depth of unity and consensus which could be achieved around any 
one definition or set of definitions.
To surrmarise this first level, therefore, we have a tendency on the 
one hand to what may be characterised as a narrow but deep unity and 
consensus around the management and direction of Authority A, 
contrasting with the tendency to a 'broad but shallow' level of unity 
around the management of Authority B. The impact of these tendencies 
upon the negotiated order of definitions of the allocation of 
resources in each authority has already been glimpsed, and will be 
expanded upon.
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Moving then to the second level of comparison, we have a contrast 
between the styles of management within these constraints. The 
emphasis in Authority A can be characterised as promoting the control 
of the output of the officers' side? the corresponding emphasis in 
Authority B might be characterised as securing legitimacy from Chief 
Officers collectively for individuals' output. Within the management 
configurations studied, these emphases repeatedly emerged as integral 
to the definitions formed by the actors 'in power* - ie non-service 
Chief Officers in Authority A, but a wider group in Authority B - of 
the best approach to issues as these arose, and of the rationale for 
perpetuating the negotiated order represented by the management 
configuration in each authority. Accordingly, they may usefully be 
isolated conceptually.
Starbuck (1982: p3) speaks of ideologies as "... logically integrated 
clusters of beliefs, values, rituals, and symbols": leaving aside the 
issue of their logical integration (which in any case begs the 
question of 'who's logic?'), as opposed to being integrated 
subjectively through the definitions of those enacting them, the 
emphases observed here can plausibly be conceptualised as ideologies. 
Thus, within the officers' side of Authority A influencing and 
filtering definitions of, and configurations for, the allocation of 
resources, we have what may be termed the ideology of control? 
performing the same role in Authority B, we have the ideology of 
legitimacy. Both these ideologies served to channel the negotiation 
of order around the demands taken to arise from the more culturally 
based and defined "organising principle" of unity in each authority. 
To this extent, therefore, ideologies may usefully be distinguished 
from more 'background' cultural or sub-cultural features such as the 
organising principles themselves, (although both were in effect
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'learnt' or socialised sets of definitions consciously, or more 
probably unconsciously, applied to issues as they arose), in terms of 
their more narrowly specific impacts in colouring definitions of 
particular problems (ie, in this case, unity) and of solutions to 
them. The relevance of the concept of ideology to observed 
consistencies in the definitions formed of where and how actually to 
allocate resources, will be expanded in the course of what follows.
So far in our account of the politics of resource allocation, however, 
we have tended to view the budgetary elite groups of leading Members 
and Chief Officers as distinct and operating separately. This was 
not, of course, the case. We now begin to examine the interactions 
between these groups, on the basis that actors in neither group in 
each authority, whatever their tactics amongst others on their own 
'side' of the authority, were able to enact their own definitions of 
resource allocations without also interacting with members of the 
other group. These interactions themselves were therefore of great 
significance in negotiating order around the allocation of resources. 
It is accordingly to exploring the dimensions of this relationship 
that we now turn.
(iv) THE BUDGETARY ELITE: BASES OF INTERACTION
(iv)(a) Introduction:
As a first step in examining the relationships between each side of 
the budgetary elite in the authorities studied, it is helpful to 
examine the particular resources, and needs, which each group tended 
to bring to the negotiation of order, and it is to the first of these
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- each group's own resources - that we turn here. The intention is 
not, as it might appear, to imply a necessarily adversarial 
relationship between members of each group - indeed, although this is 
clearly a possibility (eg Laffin & Young, 1985: pp42-3), the actors 
studied here generally sought for reasons which will become clear to 
cultivate their' Chairman or Chief Officer rather than oppose him. 
However, we have seen that, with 'politics' as we have defined it, in 
any interactions anywhere, adversarial or otherwise, the key factor in 
the ability of the actors involved to enact their definitions will be 
the resources which consciously or unconsciously they are able to 
apply in support of their points of view. Thus, while relations 
between Chief Officers and Chairmen were not often ' adversarial' as 
the term is usually understood, it remained the case that certain 
power resources (apart from purely personal attributes such as 
persuasiveness) emerged from the data as being consistently available 
to members of each group to use in their dealings with the other, as 
they were able or saw fit. These particular resources, out of the 
liberally infinite range potentially available, were therefore 
significant factors in the negotiation of order, and they are 
accordingly now briefly outlined. The apparently contradictory 
position arrived at, of the potential power accruing to both groups of 
actors by virtue of the resources available to each, will then be 
resolved, as the key to the overall relationship, in terms of their 
mutually interlocking deployment.
(iv)(b) Chief Officers: Power Resources
The first and perhaps the most obvious power resource available to 
Chief Officers was the ability to interpret and define trends and
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events in an uncertain world to Members. At its most extreme, Gy ford 
(1976: p44) speaks of Chief Officers presenting a 'united front of 
expertise' which the part-time lay Member would have little chance of 
penetrating. As one officer put it:
"When you suggest things in certain ways to a Corrmittee 
you're actually making it very difficult for them to refuse, 
to publicly stand up and say 'No'" (Solicitor, Authority A).
(cf also Gy ford, 1976: p43). Clearly, as we have already seen, in 
particular the sheer complexity of the grant system will tend to 
enhance this power resource for Treasurers willing, and able, to use 
it to enact their definitions.
Building on this possession of expertise, it is then perhaps hardly 
surprising that as, eg, Saunders (1979: pp222-3) also observed, Chief 
Officers may derive considerable de facto power from the day-to-day 
management of the authority:
"By and large the greater part of departmental 
decision-making is carried out by heads of departments, with 
Chairmen involved in those matters which are sensitive" 
(Chief Executive, Authority B), ...
•.. extending then into policy initiation:
"Without a turnover of Chairmen they [Members] run out of 
politically based ideas. Increasingly as time goes on the 
ideas come up through the administration. Ethnic minorities 
is a good example. We’ve a large ethnic minority, but which 
doesn't present us with quite the same stresses as 
elsewhere. On the whole, the pressure for Members to 
address their minds to the issue has come from me and other 
officers. It's not that they're unsympathetic by any means, 
they just haven't put the pressure on" (Chief Executive, 
Authority B).
"Members don't innovate much. Their contribution tends to 
relate to events. Officers tend to have the longer view as 
they are the permanent feature" (Chief Executive, Authority 
C).
It seems reasonable to speculate frcm this that (particularly as an
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administration nears its end) there may be a tendency over time for 
Manbers to define their own roles more reactively and less proactively 
(cf Alexander, 1982: p82).
As Chief Officers' second power resource, therefore, Members' 
increasingly narrow definition of their roles often prompted them 
actually to wait for officers' contributions before forming further 
definitions of their own of the issue:
"If you're not careful, you can just sit back and allow 
officers to do it. They pose you a series of problems and 
give you answers and expect you to accept one of their 
choices, as against thinking politically yourself and saying 
'I don't agree with any of them'. There's a danger they'd 
came up with all the bright ideas" (Chairman, Authority A).
Indeed, Authority A presented perhaps the most extreme example of 
Members' readiness to await officers' definitions of where to allocate 
resources, where the autocratic control by the Leadership of the Party 
Group which we have already seen over the budget (see pp85-6, 259-61 
above), extended to enforcing, in effect, a vacuum of ideas on the 
Member side:
"I've been to meetings where [Chairman] has said, 'It's 90% 
administation anyway, so why get wound up?'. The biggest 
pressures for change must come from the officers. It 
doesn't come about through political means" (Back-bench 
Member, Authority A).
As Rosenberg (1983: p24) found, leaving aside the autocratic aspects 
of how it was enforced, it is evidence of how strongly this definition 
was held that Chairmen regarded officers' influence over their 
thinking as entirely natural:
"If you have a problem, there's only two or three ways of 
solving it and if an officer can't come up with those he 
ain't really worth his salt, is he?" (Chairman, Authority 
A).
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"I'm only doing this part-time, and if the professionals 
don't come up with the ideas there's something wrong" 
(Chairman, Authority A).
"A Chairman has to learn his business and in talking to you 
you find they are looking to you for some influence" 
(Treasurer, Authority B).
This acquiescence appeared to spring from two sources hinted at in 
these quotes: there was an element of Chairmen accepting a situation 
which they found upon taking office, but more importantly it appeared 
to stem from the (unconsciously) defined sheer obviousness that 
full-time professionals should take a lead in the way that they did.
Further, as well as at times coming close to monopolising the 
allocation of resources in the authority (cf also Cockbum, 1977: 
p28), it is perhaps not surprising in view of the foregoing that Chief 
Officers' definitions even proved influential in the inner workings of 
each Party Group:
"At the last election what I asked all the Chairmen to do 
was let me have two pieces of paper, one listing the 
achievements of their Gonmittees over the last four years 
and one listing what they aim to do over the next four. I 
would say quite a percentage of that was written by the 
officers" (Leader, Authority B).
Similarly, in Authority A, officers' influence spread to each 
Chairman's annual report to the district Labour Party:
"Without telling tales out of school, if you put all those 
reports together you can see which ones the Chairman has 
written and which ones are just officers' reports. Seme 
Chairmen are like that ..." (Chairman).
To summarise the overall point, it may be seen that through the 
acquiescence of Chairmen, borne largely of their inferior information 
resources and their generally part-time status, Chief Officers' 
definitions of where to allocate resources were profoundly influential 
in the negotiation of order, even in the inner-most Party circles.
However, even where Chief Officers were not allowed, so to speak, to 
form Members' definitions of where to allocate resources for them, it 
was sometimes possible, as Chief Officers' third major power resource, 
to use their involvement in compiling agendas to manipulate Chairmen 
and Gomnittees into reaching the desired decision (eg Gy ford, 1976 s 
p44). The methods of doing this ranged from the near-standard 
admission of selectively wording reports:
"We don't actually encourage aggro. The report I was 
looking at this morning talks of 'land sales'. New you know 
very well that Labour politicians don't like the word 
' sale', so we altered it to ' land disposals' which can 
encompass long leases at a premium" (Solicitor, Authority
A),
bo the admission that the ability to "tell 99% of the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth", was "at the least a useful 
attribute" (Assistant Treasurer, Authority A). However, along with 
the ability to manipulate information were the subtler skills of 
manipulating people:
"There are devices for dealing with difficult Ocranittees.
You let everybody have their say, you mull over votes, don't 
take a vote too soon, you let some people talk themselves 
out or ... damage their case, and you may be able to say, 
'Well I take it that's agreed' and it's not put to the vote, 
whereas you know very well there's a fair number who oppose" 
(Chief Executive, Authority B).
"You knew there wall be a discussion, people will express 
strong views for and against. You know some won't talk at 
all and some won't know what it's about, you can't tell 
which way they'll go, and others who wall already have made 
up their minds or wall according to what's heard. You judge 
the right time, you can be too early or too late. I would 
interrupt without appearing to and make a reference to a 
number of Members who'd spoken so they all thought 'Ah, he 
heard what I said', and say, probably 'It seems to me we've 
given the Conmittee enough to make a decision and we wonder 
whether the resolution as it's put is right'. If someone 
else is starting to talk one has bo judge whether to defer 
or not and smile and say, 'May I?' It's very dangerous in a 
way, when something is decided and you feel you've 
manipulated the entire thing" (Chief Executive, Authority 
C).
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It is of course possible to over-stress the picture provided by these 
examples in isolation, and we shall see below that each Chairman's 
involvement with agendas could also provide him with substantial power 
resources. Nevertheless, techniques, if that is the word, which 
perhaps some Chief Officers did not realise they had, formed an 
important "second dimension" (Lukes, 1974) power resource for them, in 
conjunction with the superior flow of information and the tendency of 
Members to defer to their judgment and ideas, in enacting their 
definitions and negotiating order around resource allocation or any 
other issue.
(iv)(c) Leading Menbers: Power Resources
We turn new to the power resources which it emerged from the data were 
available to leading Members (in this context, particularly in their 
roles as Chairmen) in enacting their definitions within the resource 
allocation and policy process. However, it is immediately noticeable 
how relatively few writers are prepared to 'allow Members a chance' 
against Gyford's "united front of expertise" presented by Chief 
Officers. As Dearlove complains,
"Nowadays it is seen as a mark of hard, realistic and 
relevant scholarship to retreat into a critical cynicism 
asserting that all councillors are rubber stamps and that 
all power lies with the officers" (1979: p53).
As against this, in the face of the substantial powar resources 
available to Chief Officers as just outlined, such a conclusion is 
perhaps unsurprising. On the other hand, we have already seen that 
while it is one thing to note the availability of these power 
resources of expertise and information, it is quite another to suppose
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that they will always be deployed in such a way as to render Chairmen 
no more than cyphers. To assert otherwise is to overlook the critical 
fact noted earlier that the inpact and realisation of power resources 
depends on the actors involved, and it is also to simplify the nature 
of Chairmen/Chief Officer relationships to the point of distortion. 
Clearly, sane Chairmen will be easier to steer or dominate than 
others, just as some Chief Officers will be more adept at steering or 
dominating, and using the power resources available to them. As 
Gyford (1976: p45) noted, a key issue is the willingness of Chairmen 
to allow Chief Officers to 'make the running' in this way, or if 
necessary his ability to assert his own definitions:
"I think the decision one takes is whether one takes A, B or 
C from them [Chief Officers] or whether you see if there 
might not be a bit of good in each. Sometimes you've got to 
look between the alternatives. I would prefer to have the 
facts and it's up to the politician to decide. I'm not 
taking anything away from the officers, but I don't expect 
them to know, old hackneyed phrase maybe, the sort of 
solutions the working class is looking for " (Chairman, 
Authority A).
This occasional suspicion of Chief Officers, and unwillingness to 
defer to them was also noted by Rosenberg (1983: pp20-l).
A refusal to take officer advice - in effect, the ability to act 
' irrationally', in the sense of ignoring information advanced by Chief 
Officers - was actually quite widespread in the authorities studied 
(cf also Haynes, 1980: pl4), and may be viewed as Members' first major 
power resource in enacting their own definitions where these 
conflicted with officers':
"I remerrfoer I wanted something done on the computer. It was 
seme silly little thing, and I was given all sorts of 
reasons why not. In the end, in a totally childish way I 
more or less just stamped my foot and said 'I don't care, 
just do it', and they did" (Chairman, Authority A).
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"When I'm told that a leisure centre will cost £7m, I 
inraediately ask why we can't do it for £4m, because I 
suspect the £7m is for the gold roof on it. I think there 
is a tendency for sane officers to go overboard, just 
because a thing is in vogue they put the best possible plans 
up, no doubt at all. We had this where we'd got [name 
of Leisure Centre] as part of a planning gain, but the 
Architect said we couldn't do it with the two acres we'd 
been given. The developer said any more than that and he 
couldn't bear the costs of developing. In the end I just 
saw [the Architect] and said, 'Look, its two acres you've 
got to bloody use, go and put a leisure centre on it'. The 
first time he came back with an abortion and said 'we can't 
get it on' and I said again 'go away and put one on there 
for me*. He came back and he'd done it". (Leader,
Authority B)
Bruns son (1982: p34) also notes how ignoring information can prompt 
action more than a more 'rational' approach involving a wider 
consideration of the issues: while these examples may not have been 
what he had envisaged, it can be argued that they are cases in point.
In particular, however, and most importantly from our point of view, 
officer advice seemed especially vulnerable when it came to framing 
the budget, or parts of it. Thus, we saw how Authority A's Treasurer 
was obliged to bargain an estimate of interest rates with the Housing 
Chairman? in Authority B we saw how it took the Treasurer several 
years to persuade Members to contemplate cuts and also how £lm of 
these cuts was reinstated against his advice. Similarly, the Chief 
Executive of Authority C reported the following:
"Last year we made an assumption that in line with previous 
policy the Council would want to hold the rate if it could, 
and as it was possible we drew that conclusion in the 
estimates report. Members were critical that we had 
expressed an opinion. This year we just set down the 
position - which led inexorably to the conclusion that the 
rate would be lOp. That was accepted. There was then a 
reduction to 9p as a purely subjective decision by the 
Members in control that the rate must not go up by 50% [6.6p 
to lOp], though our justification of lOp was accepted".
The hypothesis arising fran this evidence would presumably be that
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officer advice, and their power to enact their definitions in conflict 
with Members', diminishes with the political (conventionally defined) 
salience of the issue. Framing the budget - or even part of it - is 
of course highly salient, especially at a time of resource shortage 
and uncertainty, and therefore leading Members' own definitions were 
able to feed through.
However, it is also perhaps easy to overstress the extent to which 
officers' information and expertise, for all their full-time status, 
was inevitably superior. As a second power resource available at 
least to seme Chairmen, like officers in their professional capacities 
it may be possible for them to acquire information and form 
definitions from sources outside the authority:
"Because we're a big authority a number of our Members sit 
cwi national bodies. [Leader] is on the [local Authority 
Association], on the Consultative Council and all that. 
Because of that he gets not only advice from us but from the 
[Association's] advisers and from the DoE itself" (Deputy 
Treasurer).
Thus, while it is not claimed that this Leader was able to challenge 
the expertise of, say, the Treasurer, he was in a position to follow 
events more closely. As he put it:
"I have the Treasurer look at something for me first, but 
I'm able to question him a little more closely than most and 
probably from time to time suggest another approach is 
needed".
Equally, as Haynes (1980: pl4) also noted, some Members were further 
able to develop their own power resources of information and 'nous' by 
their sheer familiarity with their subject area and experience of the 
authority:
"I don't know what education he's had, but [Chairman] is a 
better housing accountant than I am" (Deputy Treasurer, 
Authority A).
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"I can often tell from where officers have put things in the 
estimates that they don't mind them being knocked out, and I 
can often see the things they dearly want left in, from the 
position in the accounts and the way they present it. It 
tends to be hiding in the figures. I usually find that 
they've put seme thing there which they know will look 
contentious, that they don't really want, and you find them 
only half-heartedly arguing for it. I then look at the one 
before and the one after, because that's where the dodgy one 
tends to be" (Leader, Authority B).
It may be seen that on the evidence from the data here seme Members, 
at least, in each authority were able to deal with Chief Officers on 
much more equal terms than might have been supposed, and thereby 
advance their own definitions of resource allocations vis-a-vis those 
officers.
A third major power resource available to Chairmen, notwithstanding 
the advantages in this area noted earlier which could also accrue to 
Chief Officers, was their control over Oomnittee agendas (cf also 
Laffin & Young, 1985s p45). In particular, perhaps capitalising on 
the power resource offered by Chief Officers' greater enforced 
reliance on them to circumvent Central Group opposition, Chairmen in 
Authority A were notably coercive in their approach to the content of 
agendas, where it appeared relatively ccnmon for officers' reports to 
be altered:
"I never let an officer report go without an input from me, 
apart from routine matters. On nearly every major report 
there will be paragraphs which I have written because I 
believe it's important to have a political input. I may be 
unusual in this respect. I know [Leader] bends to be of the 
attitude of tearing reports up and saying 'I don't like it, 
do it again', whereas I say 'If that's seriously your 
professional judgement, I'm going to temper it'" (Chairman, 
Authority A).
Wherever this occurs, Gyford's emphasis (1976: p44) on the power 
accruing to Chief Officers by virtue of drafting Oomnittee reports is 
to that extent misplaced: the Chief Officer's preferences were not
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necessarily the outcome. Indeed, from Members' altering reports it is 
but a short step to suppressing them, both as we saw earlier (p253) 
and as the following example also suggests:
"I don't like the idea that any officer has a right to put 
any item on a Committee agenda ... I would want to know 
what it was all about before it went on, and if it was 
contrary to policy, then that item would never appear" 
(Chairman, Authority A).
The main vehicle of the Chairmen's control over the form and content 
of agendas in Authority A was the agenda conference between each 
Chairman and 'his' Chief Officer prior to each Oomnittee meeting.
Here the Chairman's and Chief Officer's definitions of the issue, and 
the former's further definitions of what his Oomnittee (not to mention
the Party Group) would accept and legitimise, were combined to be put
to the Oomnittee for that legitimation. Accordingly, as another 
Chairman in Authority A put it:
"Officers have to sell something to me first, and there's a
hell of a lot of things which never see the light of day
because they've been thrown out by me and [Vice-Chairman] at 
agenda conferences. There's an awful lot of fixing, in the 
correct sense of the word. The way a Chairman handles his 
agenda conference is a crucial part of the whole set up".
We noted earlier how the respective personalities of the Chairman and 
Chief Officer were significant factors in their relationship and in 
determining whose definitions, or which compromise definition, was 
enacted as 'allocated resources'. It may be speculated that in these 
focal and central, but essentially private fora (a Treasury officer 
and the Vice-Chairman were usually the only other people present), the 
role of respective personalities in the negotiation of order around 
the allocation of resources was at its most influential: agenda 
conferences were, for example, apparently much more of a 'make or
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break' point for definitions in Authority A than Corrrriittee meetings 
themselves, and far more clearly a determinant, as opposed to a 
legitimator, of whichever definitions were actually enacted as policy 
or allocated resources.
The position in Authority B was somewhat different, in that any 
'fixing' of agendas which did occur was at least less easy to locate 
precisely than in Authority A. It may be that it occurred in places 
other than the specifically identifiable fora of agenda conferences, 
since these were less in evidence, but there is equally evidence that 
other 'filtering' mechanisms were of a more generalised significance. 
Thus, a good deal of filtering actually took place in the Management 
Team on the basis of the Leader's assessment of what would 'go' in the 
Member side, as conmunicated to (and, of course, defined for) the Team 
by the Chief Executive. Member 'control' over the business of 
Authority B, to the extent that this was routed through the Management 
Team, therefore tended to be at one stage removed, through the 
mechanism of Chief Officers collectively anticipating their 
reactions. While this was also highly important in Authority A, as we 
shall see, this collective emphasis seemed to give it a particular 
significance in Authority B, and it may be that the incentive to abide 
by the Management Team's decisions and defined norms, noted earlier 
(pp326-7), was increased by the presence of authoritative information 
on what was or was not feasible at that time.
(iv)(d) Power Resources; Surinary and Conclusion
These mechanisms in each authority will be returned to. To sumnarise 
the position so far, however, the data indicated that Chairmen were
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not necessarily mere cyphers in the hands of their Chief Officers, and 
that to suggest otherwise is greatly to oversimplify the position 
which actually obtained. Rather, we have seen that Chairmen in fact 
had substantial potential power resources vis-a-vis Chief Officers to 
enact their own definitions, and that on many occasions the order 
negotiated between them was rather closer to the Chairman's 
definitions and views than the Chief Officer's. Drawing on what we 
have seen of the power resources potentially available to each 'side' 
of the budgetary elite, therefore, and as a prelude to examining the 
relationship between Members and Chief Officers in each elite, if 
either group is taken in isolation, one could find apparently 
contradictory evidence for its predominance in terms of its members' 
ability to have their definitions of resource allocation enacted.
It is from this position, though, that we can now develop our argument 
a stage further. Often, as the example of control over Committee 
agenda shows especially clearly, the resources available to either 
side effectively conditioned those available to the other. Thus, the 
coercive control over agendas exercised by Members in Authority A was 
in fact primarily reactive to what had been written in the first place 
by officers - but at the same time, as we shall now see, those 
officers would have taken it as self-evident (had they consciously 
considered the matter at all) that their starting point in drafting 
their reports, and the parameters within which they had to be seen to 
advance their own definitions, were Members' 'known' (as defined) 
predispositions. The relationship was one of simultaneous influence 
and counter-influence, and the picture which emerged from the data was 
therefore rather more complex than it has so far appeared. Given 
the presence of the other group, in effect, neither was in fact 
paramount: because of their respective strengths and weaknesses the
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negotiation of order between than was conditioned by the need of each 
for, and thus bo accomodate the other in order to enact its own 
definitions. We now explore the interactions which arose as a result, 
to illustrate their critical significance in negotiating order around 
the allocation of resources.
(v) TOE BUDGETARY ELITE: NEGOTIATED ORDER THROUGH SYMBIOSIS
(v)(a) Introduction
We have examined the Member and Chief Officer 'sides' of the budgetary 
elite in the authorities studied and concluded tentatively that, 
because of the particular powar resources generally available to the 
other 'side', neither was likely to have been able to enact its own 
definitions of where to allocate resources without the support or 
compliance of the other. Far from the 'adversarial' impression which 
might initially have been gained, because of their de facto mutual 
reliance,
"... there are strong grounds for suggesting that the 
relationship of Chief Officers to the leading Members is 
more that of close allies ... [T]he officers depend upon 
the leading Members as much as the Members do upon them; the 
relationship is symbiotic in that the 'political elite* 
needs the help, advice and information which only the 
officers can provide, while the officers in turn cure obliged 
to address themselves to the ideological predispositions of 
the elite members if their proposals are eventually to be 
accepted ..." (Saunders, 1979: p224).
Saunders himself ascribes this relationship in Croydon to the fact 
that it was Oonservative-ccxitrolled, and speculates that the same may 
not be true of other more left-wing authorities (1979: p224-5).
However, the data here suggests otherwise: while Authority C was
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also Ooaservative-contxolled, Authorities A and B were of course 
Labour-run (albeit to varying degrees fairly 'right-wing' in Labour 
terms), and all three contained compelling evidence of mutual 
dependency.
Accordingly, while the previous section examined how actors in each 
group were potentially able to use their own strengths and the others' 
weaknesses as power resources, here we examine the extent to which in 
negotiating order around resource allocation, each group was of itself 
effectively the other's major power resource. Putting it the other 
way about, the picture becomes one of symbiosis, as we introduce an 
element of need: each group needed the other if it was to enact its 
own definitions, and had therefore to acccmtodate the other 
accordingly. As we have noted, it is in this relationship that we 
begin to penetrate to the core of the negotiation process through 
which the content of resource allocation processes come into being, 
and we therefore now explore it in some detail.
(v) (b) Synbiosis in the Budgetary Elite: The Needs of Leading 
Members
Taking the point of view of Members in the budgetary elite first, we 
have observed the operation of Jonsson's "organising principle" 
amounting to a culture amongst politicians of conflict? however, it 
emerged from the data that certain factors became critical to 
bolstering the strength and status of leading Members in these 
conflicts and that these factors were to a substantial extent in the 
hands of Chief Officers. The first of these, as Saunders noted and as 
we have already seen ourselves to some extent, was the need for
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concrete information as a power resource for enacting one's 
definitions in the face of opposition from others who do not share 
those definitions, either by persuasion or overruling them. As the 
Deputy Treasurer in Authority A noted of the demand from the 
Leadership for information on RSG developments:
"They always need it in black and white, something 
concrete. If you were to look at [the risks of] predicting 
like that too closely, you'd back away from the whole thing, 
and there's no way the politicians would accept that, no 
way. You've got to give them something to go on, without it 
they're absolutely adrift ..."
With that information, or at least a monopoly on whatever was 
authoritatively available, we saw earlier that leading Members were 
able to "... more or less pee all over" (p260) counter-arguments - in 
this case from within their own party - to the point of being able as 
we also saw virtually to negate criticism of the entire budget. An 
even clearer reliance on information supplied by officers came from 
Authority B where Chief Officers were called upon to advise, via 
counsel's opinion, whether the authority's budget was framed so as to 
avoid any possibility of a legal challenge or the threat of writs on 
individual leading Members.
The second need of leading Members revealed by the data to arise from 
their "organising principle" of conflict was a perception of 
competence and achievement as a means of underpinning their defined 
authority largely as Oomnittee Chairmen, but also as a collective 
Leadership vis-a-vis back-bench Members, potential rivals and 
opposition, and also constituency and district parties (quite apart, 
of course, from a desire to 'achieve' for its own sake). As an 
example, Authority B's Chief Executive explained the relative lack of 
interest noted earlier (eg pp269-74) in budgetary review:
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"By far the most difficult thing is to persuade elected 
Members to think a bit more critically about the 
effectiveness of services, because of course the very 
purpose of getting thonselves elected was to get things 
done, and it doesn't fit their desires for that".
No doubt politicians of a different persuasion would define 
'achievements' differently, but the basic point remains that, however 
it is defined, a 'record of achievement' is likely to form part of the 
underpinning of the authority defined for each Leadership, or for each 
Chairman individually. Once again, the role of Chief Officers 
accordingly became crucial:
"One of the assets that any Member has is the attitude of 
the officers towards him. If they have confidence in you as 
a person then of course you're more likely to get more out 
of them than if they think you're a complete idiot. I've 
set out my stall as an active Chairman and if I can't get 
them to work with me I'd soon lose out ... There's got to 
be that rapport" (Chairman, Authority A).
More specifically, the reliance on officers to allow and protect 
achievements and reputations was especially evident in the case of 
individual Chairmen/Chief Officer pairings where, notably visibly in 
Authority A, Chief Officers were needed by Chairmen as their 'agents' 
in the officer side of the authority. As the previous respondent 
continued,
"I think what I've discovered is that the ability to get 
your budget not only depends on the quality and personality 
of the Chairman in fighting and arguing his case, it depends 
on the Chief Officer. I certainly expect mine to get 
involved in political arguments supporting my case, 
political with a small 'p', I mean."
Similarly,
"I expect [Chief Housing Officer] to fight for Housing among 
the officers. He must do that" (Housing Chairman,
Authority B).
Thus, although we noted the relative concentration of power in
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Authority A in the Central Group-Leadership axis, we saw also the dual 
allegiances and roles of leading Members as Ccrrmittee Chairmen and 
that, where they defined it as necessary or expedient, some Chairmen 
could use the support for their Committee's stance to by-pass or 
circumvent the line collectively defined by the Leadership of which 
they were also a part. As these quotes indicate, Chief Officers as 
'agents' became integral parts of such strategies, as Chairmen used 
thorn to apply pressure on other departments or on the Central Group 
itself, as necessary, to advance or defend their interests and the 
definitions of their Ccmnittees. Of course, the opportunities for 
Chief Officers to append their own definitions to the Chairman's own 
or even subtly to modify them in terms of what the Chief Officer 
claimed he could realistically expect to pursue on the officer side, 
were also present.
A particularly clear example of how in this way politicians' conflicts 
needed also to be fought in the officers' side of the authority 
concerned a £1.3m capital allocation received by Authority A after the 
1981 moratorium on council house-building, an allocation which the 
Leader had clearly lost track of:
"We'd already had the approval of the [Party] Group to spend 
the £1.3m when we made our original HIPs bid which the Group 
had been in on. The original allocation was creamed away by 
the moratorium, but when I heard there might be ideas afoot 
to take it back, I could say I had the right that it should 
be used for Housing. I was aware that certain other people 
had rather taken a view that it should be used for other 
things. My own view was simply to instruct [Chief Housing 
Officer] not to bring the report forward" (Housing Chairman, 
Authority A).
Thus, the Chief Officer was to be used as part of the strategy to 
' lose' the £1.3m from view. The Deputy Treasurer took up the story:
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"I was quite shaken to hear the Leader's reaction. At the 
agenda conference before the Resources Oorrmittee [of which 
the Leader was Chairman], the Treasurer reminded him of 
Housing's allocation, increased by the £1.3m. Now that 
allocation was returned in March. It's now July. A few 
times I've said to [Treasurer], 'Are you going to mention 
this' and he'd been advised by [Chief Housing Officer] that 
the Chairman of Housing had informed the Leader directly.
At this particular agenda conference the Treasurer said 
'Don't forget the £1.3m' and the Leader said 'What £1.3m?' 
There was a breakdown in oonmunication which I can only 
describe as deliberate. We were deliberately wrongly 
advised by the Director of Housing".
It may be seen how the Chairman of Housing used his Chief Officer to 
mislead the Treasurer (and thus Central Group) into not raising the 
overall issue. Consequently, when the issue finally did surface, 
the Housing Oorrmittee could say it had already voted on an allocation 
of the £1. 3m, leaving the Leader and the rest of the Leadership with 
no chance of enacting their own definitions in the Party Group of 
where the money should go.
However, while this example is especially clear, we should not lose 
sight of the fact that Chairmen relied on Chief Officers' 'agency' 
activities, and the latter defined these roles for themselves, not 
just as a series of 'set pieces' such as this but as a process: the 
relationship was essentially routine in nature, to be applied to 
day-to-day events as these arose. As such, the basic features of any 
interpersonal relationship, such as the level of trust which the 
Chairman felt he could invest in 'his' Chief Officer (cf also 
Rosenberg, eg 1985: p69) then became significant:
"[Chief Officer's] predecessor was more of an academic ...
He would never take a decision. He was on the 'phone to me 
20 times a day. But one of the failings of [present Chief 
Officer] is he lets it be known he's more on the socialist 
side of things by what he says. That is a great danger, so 
there are times when he's going to says things in Committee 
and I' 11 tap him on the leg and say ' I' 11 take this one'.
If I had to vote for him again I wouldn't necessarily do so, 
because I might prefer the [predecessor's name] type of guy" 
(Chairman, Authority A).
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The fact that this was a Labour Chairman speaking only serves to 
strengthen the point. A favoured strategy of this Chairman in 
outflanking opposition in his own Party Group to his Ooranittee's 
status was to mobilise the tacit support of the Conservatives on the 
Conmittee within their own Party Group. A Chief Officer unable to 
mind his tongue in such circumstances was an obvious liability 
(although the example itself contrasts strongly with Laffin & Young's 
finding - 1985: pp51-2 - of the growing expectations of political 
identification by Chief Officers).
In particular, however, in the context of these 'agency' expectations, 
there was a routine reliance on the Chief Officer as a ' back-watcher', 
a defensive or intelligence function helping the Chairman through the
conflicts arising naturally from the business of the authority:
"You can't plough down a furrow if you could be doing damage
to your Chairman. There are instances where if I hadn't
intervened and scrubbed something, he would have got 
clobbered. There's always a certain amount of information 
held back. It depends on who was asking and vhy. One gets 
to know the attitude of certain Members and officers, and I 
would always advise the Chairman, so he's aware of what 
questions are likely to arise. I've got to protect my 
relationship with the Chairman and protect him" (Chief 
Officer, Authority B).
A further example came from the Housing Chairman/Chief Officer pair 
which we have just seen in operation in Authority A, where they 
colluded to ensure that unwelcome information from the Treasury often 
did not reach the Chairman formally and so, not having his approval, 
did not become public in Conmittee:
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"Housing quite often prepare reports without coming to us.
We tend to get the papers on the Friday before the agenda 
conference on the Monday, and reading them over the weekend 
you can't get in touch if there's a query. Now, Housing is 
the only [formal] agenda conference where the Chairman 
doesn't attend. The Director attends and has a word with 
the Chairman later in the sort of real agenda conference. I 
don't know that that's right because if you want to raise 
things directly with the Chairman you have to get hold of 
him yourself" (Accountant, Authority A).
It may be seen that the Chief Officer was in effect needed in an
'agency' capacity by the Chairman to help him manage the demands and
pressures placed upon him: the accountant's irritation revealed here
was presumably a measure of the success of the approach.
To sunmarise what we have seen, the data revealed that what were 
defined as the functional imperatives of Jonsson's Member-side 
"organising principle" of conflict promoted a reliance by leading 
Members on Chief Officers for several reasons. The first of these was 
for concrete information to a higher level than any opposition either 
within their Party or outside it. The second was that if, as 
Chairman, leading Members were to underpin their authority by being 
defined as 'a success', they again needed Chief Officers to promote 
their interests and those of their departments or Committees within 
the officers' side of the authority; this in turn extended into the 
more generalised 'back-watching* and intelligence functions which we 
have just seen. Chief Officers were their Chairmen's 'agents' in the 
officers' side of the authority, and thereby played a vital part in 
securing the latter' s fortunes: hence, we also begin to see the 
significance of individual Chairman/Chief Officer pairings (cf also 
Rosenberg, eg 1983: p24) and of the level of mutual trust between 
them, as influences on which definitions of where to allocate 
resources were actually incorporated in the action being negotiated. 
These themes will be expanded in what follows.
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(v)(c) Symbiosis in the Budgetary Elite: The Needs of Chief Officers
We now turn to what the data revealed of Chief Officers' needs in this 
symbiosis. On one level, as we shall see, the reliance of leading 
Members upon Chief Officers afforded the latter significant power 
resources for themselves. However, for all the clear opportunities 
for Chief Officers arising frcm this position, we immediately find the 
relationship between each 'side' of the budgetary elite cemented by 
reciprocal bends of reliance by Chief Officers on leading Members.
Thus officers, in Jonsson's formulation of "organising principles", 
seek to maintain unity and consensus through applying predefined rules 
and procedures to events as these arise (Jonssen, 1982: p27): a key 
prerequisite of being able to achieve this is stability of demands (or 
at least the absence of conflict in these), and of course one of the 
key sources of demands is elected Members themselves. Accordingly, 
Chief Officers were observed in the at times quite dedicated pursuit 
of this stability through the conflicts of local authority and 
Member-side politics:
"Most officers tend to the centre. It's there you find the 
widest measure of agreement and it's easiest to feed things 
through the machine" (Chief Executive, Authority B).
"Hie trick is to prevent them undoing all the good things. 
We're producing R&D work which will sustain me if the fight 
canes on with the Tories when they start saying things like 
'60% of the people on the waiting list don't need housing' 
which is something they always say. It could be leaked the 
day after they achieve office if necessary" (Chief Housing 
Officer, Authority B).
"Politicians take a short-term view. I take a long-term 
view, I have to. I'm looking for a stable situation, 
something that isn't going up and down all the time" 
(Treasurer, Authority A).
Further examples of this preference for stability at Chief Officer
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level, and of the effects of its removal - such as dissensus over the 
implementation of cuts in Authority B, or the abhorrence of officer 
disputes in Oorrmittee which this revealed (see p275) - vrere numerous.
However, as a primary potential source of instability and turbulence 
within each authority, it was to leading Members themselves that Chief 
Officers looked for help in maintaining stability:
"The political side must be right. If we don't have that we 
don't have anything" (Chief Executive, Authority A).
"The Leader only came in May, he will take a little while to 
bat himself in. The problem is, we are a Conservative 
Council with an overwhelming majority and lack an effective 
opposition. Therefore we have too many Members prepared to 
follow their own ideas, and the political identification of 
a cannon purpose is not really strong enough at the present 
time ... That will be his main task" (Chief Executive, 
Authority C).
"I realise any politician worth his salt will say 'Oh, it's 
dressing up a bourgeois attitude as administrative 
expediency' and there's a grain of truth in that, but if 
politics is the art of the possible, the skilful politician 
is one who may have fire in his belly but realises he'd as 
well study the organisation rather than charge at it like a 
bull in a china shop" (Chief Executive, Authority B).
Unity, as above all the present resource shortage has demonstrated, is 
easier to maintain around a consistent, or at least predictable and 
anticipated Member input than around politicians who make sudden, 
conflicting or extreme demands on officers. Thus, just as Member- 
level disarray would quite easily prompt Chief Officer disunity and 
instability in turn, a degree of cohesion could have the opposite 
effect.
"... the authority is not actually run by the Management 
Team of course, but on the whole, Members take a fairly 
cohesive view, and they're not trying to pull in opposite 
directions, which of course enhances the status of the 
Management Team because the tendency there to do the same 
thing is correspondingly reduced" (Chief Executive, 
Authority B).
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It may be seen that as their first need of leading Members, therefore, 
Chief Officers required at least a degree of unity and cohesion in the 
Member side, because in effect their own fortunes were bound up with 
Whatever happened there.
This allows us to turn now to the second way in which Chief Officers 
needed leading Members, arising from the very obvious and basic fact 
that only elected Members could enact the policy and allocations of 
resources which Chief Officers defined to be desirable. In 
particular, the theme of individual Chairman/Chief Officer pairings 
comes to the fore at this point. Thus, when a Chief Officer had 
definitions of his own which he wished to pursue, however easily 
persuaded the Chairman himself was, the Chief Officer remained 
reliant, first, on the former's ability to predict the likely success 
of the measure in question (the data here is at odds with Rosenberg's 
finding - 1985 s p68 - of a Chief Officer advising his Chairwoman in 
this respect, although this could very easily be a function of no more 
than the personalities involved):
"Management-wise, I can tell them the best line, but 
politically they have to tell me. There's no sense in iry 
pushing things where they say 'You can't do it now'. I can 
give you umpteen examples where they've said to me 'Not now, 
in 12 months', and as far as I'm concerned they've always 
delivered. It's a partnership, and his [Chairman's] bit is 
being able to judge what will go" (Chief Officer, Authority
B).
Leading Members were themselves well aware of this needs
"I allow myself to be used as a sounding board for Chief 
Officers for ideas they may have. I hate to see Chief 
Officers wasting their time, so I prefer them to try things 
out on me, as a good judge of what the Party and Group 
members will accept" (Leader, Authority B).
Other examples of this role which Chief Officers needed their Chairmen 
to play to guide them through the conflicts on the Member side, and
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the particular significance in this context of Authority B's Leader, 
will become apparent.
Beyond this, though, the Chief Officer was then reliant on his 
Chairman's ability to 'deliver' the necessary support for his 
definitions when the time came. Here, however, because of the 
respective ideologies observed earlier governing the approaches 
which had evolved to maintaining officer-side unity in Authorities A 
and B, the manner in which Chairmen were needed to 'deliver' tended to 
vary at least in emphasis and so, accordingly, did the manner in which 
order was negotiated in each resource allocation (and wider political) 
process. These tendencies in the Chairman/Chief Officer relationships 
and the negotiated order in each authority are therefore now examined.
Taking Authority A first, we saw earlier that the operation of the 
'control' ideology associated with the dominance of the non-service 
Chief Officer Central Group meant that in negotiating order around the 
allocation of resources, Chairman/Chief Officer linkages were heavily, 
if often furtively, used by the latter. On the one hand, the Chief 
Executive relied on the Leader (his 'Chairman') to underpin the status 
of the Central Group as the vehicle for his own status and power to 
enact definitions (as also did other Central Group members who with 
the exception of the Valuer had no Chairman of their own):
"Obviously I'm constrained by the backing I get. I can run 
the management - although we [Central Group] could be 
undermined in that - but when you go public in Oorrmittee, 
that's when you could lose, that's when you also need the 
backing. When I say lose, I mean having your advice not 
taken ..." (Chief Executive).
On the other hand, if a service Chief Officer found the enactment of 
his own definitions of allocations (or anything else) blocked by the
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Central Group, alternative avenues within the officer side were 
generally non-existent, leaving virtually the sole option of lobbying 
one's own Chairman. The situation was if anything worse than that 
found by Rosenberg (1982: p25), where officers not on the equivalent 
of the Central Group in the authority he studied at least had the 
option of lobbying those who were: in Authority A, the data showed 
that where the Central Group had firmly set its collective face for or 
against a proposal, the chances of reversing this were slim.
However, where a Chairman was powerful enough to take on the Leader 
and Leadership in the Party Group on a specific issue, thereby in 
effect counteracting the Leader's or Leadership's backing for 
definitions advanced by the Centred. Group, then the Chief Officer 
acquired the power resources to enact his definition over the Central 
Group itself or its members:
"I find it very difficult to encompass the fact that in the 
last week in December people knew nothing of their imnediate 
needs, and by the second week in January there's suddenly an 
urgent need come up. People have a quiet word with their 
Chairman not to bring it up in Conmittee so as not to alert 
us. A fortnight later, out it comes, just as we've 
completed the budget on the standstill lines agreed [ie with 
the Leader] and the Chairman may be able to stifle any 
debate on it at all" (Treasurer).
Of course, much as we saw with leading Members' reliance on Chief 
Officers, being needed like this ensured that the Chairmen in 
Authority A on whom Chief Officers relied were enabled, as the tacit 
and sometimes even unconscious 'price' for their support, to offer it 
strictly on their terms: thus, we saw earlier (p341), for example, 
that Chairmen in Authority A were notably willing and able to be 
coercive over the contents of officers' reports to Goranittees.
Once again, howaver, the quoting of specific examples should not be
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allowed to give the wrong impression. The emphasis was as much on 
negotiating order and establishing a modus operandi over a period of 
time - ie, a continuous process rather than a series of 'set piece' 
incidents - although in this, such incidents could always be used as 
precedents:
"I was asked to go to the Centred. Group and present what I 
felt ought to be the HIPs programme. There were a lot of 
people who felt it ought to be changed, so I said 'I'll give 
you a little piece of extra information. What I've given 
you is what I have discussed with the politicians. I don't 
know what the Chairman will say, but I' ve a strong feeling 
he'll make the odd adjustment and that'll be about it'.
They were all uptight about that at the time, but now I just 
take the HIPs programme up and tell them what we've done" 
(Chief Housing Officer).
Authority A's Housing Chairman/Chief Officer axis has featured 
prominently, largely as further proof of the point we are making: the 
Chairman was a powerful man, thereby enabling the Chief Housing 
Officer to pursue his definitions with the sanction of his Chairman 
(who would have inposed his own stamp on these, to be sure) even in 
the face of Centred. Group opposition, with a rather greater chance of 
enacting them than any other service Chief Officer in the authority.
The principle in Authority A of using one's Chairman directly as a 
power resource in this way also extended to disputes between service 
Chief Officers, for example where the Chief Housing and Environmental 
Health Officers clashed over jurisdiction over a housing renovation 
progrannie. As the Housing Chairman observed:
"They [the two Chief Officers] have been having a go at each 
other and of course since I supported [Chief Housing 
Officer], it brought me into collision with [Public 
Protection Chairman] who is a very colourful character and 
has a lot of sway and power in the [Party] Group. We've had 
our battles ..."
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Once again, it was the Chief Housing Officer who was enabled by his 
Chairman to prevail: in passing it may be gathered that, perhaps 
arising from the position with the Party Group (and as we shall see 
from a keen appreciation of his cwn position) the Chairman apparently 
expected to become involved on behalf of his Chief Officer.
Finally in Authority A, by this same logic, where a Chairman was weak 
then the Chief Officer - and that policy area - tended to lose out in 
the negotiation of order around the allocation of resources. One 
Chairman lost ground in the Member side of Authority A following the 
poor performance of his service, canpounded by a widespread dislike of 
the man himself. The Chief Officer was sacked, prompting another, 
echoing Rosenberg (1985: pp67-80), to remark:
“[Chairman] is so weak politically, [Conmittee] is an 
absolute non-runner. In fact at one stage I gather he was 
following [Chief Officer] on his way. If there's any spare 
funds available, they just don't go there".
Although the Chairman suffered in part for the performance of his 
Chief Officer - further illustrating the importance of the latter, 
noted above, in securing favourable definitions of the Chairman 
himself in terms of his competence etc - the new Chief Officer found 
the lowly status of his Chairman sufficient pretext to desert him 
(albeit at the instigation of the Leadership, Which could scarcely be 
refused) and look for other avenues of influence altogether (cf 
also Rosenberg, 1982: pl4), in this case through a direct link to the 
Leader himself and the Central Group. The new officer's status then 
increased with the success which he was defined to be making of 
running the department.
We can now sunmarise the way in which Chief Officers' reliance on
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their Chairmen influenced the order negotiated within what we have 
termed the budgetary elite in Authority A. The key dynamic was one of 
service Chief Officers attempting to mobilise their Chairmen to 
advance their definitions for them in the Member side of the 
authority, where these were blocked or faced substantial alteration by 
the Central Group, just as the Chief Executive and Centred. Group in 
turn relied greatly on the other leading Members and above all the 
Leader himself to enact their definitions vis-a-vis those of service 
Chief Officers. Similar principles also then applied in disputes 
between service Chief Officers. In a very real and obvious sense, 
therefore, Chief Officers' battles were fought between Members, and 
the latter in turn appeared to accept and expect this. As a final 
and very important conment, we are beginning to see how the effect of 
this configuration was that the initiatives which each Chief Officer 
advanced were seldom outside the de facto parameters represented by 
the Chairman's own definitions at the time: otherwise, the support 
which the Chief Officer needed would not have been gained.
Turning now to Authority B, we have seen that the tactic of mobilising 
one's Chairman was certainly not absent, and to that extent the 
fortunes of Chief Officers and their abilities to enact definitions of 
resource allocations and policy were again directly linked to the 
status of, and the success of their relationship with, their 
Chairmen. Thus, we saw earlier (p286) how the Treasurer's influence 
grew when the Leader became Chairman of the Conmittee to which he 
reported, and further examples were also provided by other Chief 
Officers, both of a successful relationship with the Chairman:
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"What I've became aware of in ny time is just how dependent 
the Chief Officer is on his Chairman, and I've been blessed 
with an excellent one ... I was of course rather pleased 
that [the £lm restoration of cuts noted earlier] was not 
done pro rata but by bids. Certainly, the outcome is an 
index of the effectiveness of my Chairman. I think he 
pulled it off because he had been persuaded by me, but the 
format in which the Policy Group [originally] considered the 
bids was not the format in which I had submitted ours to the 
Chief Executive. The effect was to make it harder to follow 
my proposals. [Chairman] retyped my submission over the 
weekend before the meeting to make it easier to carry the 
discussion through. What would have happened in previous 
years with [name] as Chairman, goodness knows... Once 
[present Chairman] is briefed he'll take a thing forward and 
deliver the goods in the Party Group" (Chief Education 
Officer),
- and of an unsuccessful relationship, illustrated by reference to the 
same cuts exercise. As another Chief Officer sourly remarked of his 
Chairman;
"Our relationship is remarkably unstrained. The fact of the 
matter is, the bloody man's never here. He only comes in 
when someone is having a go and something's worrying him. I 
tried to use our links to attenuate the size of what we were 
going to be asked to knock off, but he never bit".
The former example echoes again the extent to Which mutual trust 
within a Chairman/Chief Officer pairing can be a major power resource, 
for both actors; the latter echoes Rosenberg's observation (1983; p33) 
that for all their natural wish to defend their Conmittee's budget, 
particularly at a time of resource shortage other pressures could 
prevent them from 'delivering' for their Chief Officers.
However, we have seen that in Authority B the 'legitimacy' ideology 
prevalent in the officers' side meant that the Management Team was not 
necessarily the closed or at least rigidly controlled avenue for Chief 
Officers to advance their definitions that Authority A's Central Group 
was shown to be; it was in fact often possible to pursue a particular 
line into the Member arena through the Management Team, in an attempt
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to seek its support. While the data here (where previous examples do 
not illustrate the argument) is based on observation only, this 
position allowed Chief Officers in Authority B a choice of 'route* in 
pursuing their line that was not generally available to their 
counterparts in Authority A, which meant that their needs of their 
respective Chairmen differed according to the route they chose. 
Certainly, as one 'route' it remained necessary (as defined) on 
occasion to bypass the Management Team by mobilising one's Chairman 
directly, much as Chief Officers attempted more frequently in 
Authority A, and an example here was the Chief Education Officer's 
success, just noted, in mobilising his Chairman to secure a larger 
than pro-rata restoration of cuts. While the penultimate quote does 
not show it, the Team had also in fact been shown the 'bids' in the 
Chief Executive's proposed format, and could have been relied upon to 
oppose, had they known of it, this unilateral strengthening of the 
education 'bid'. In such cases as this, it may be seen that if the 
Chief Officer's definitions were to reach and pass through the Policy 
and Party Groups, his need in placing his definition in the Member 
arena was for the direct support and advocacy of his Chairman, as in 
Authority A, at a level sufficient to resist any attempts by the Chief 
Executive (through the Leader) or other Chief Officers (through their 
Chairmen) to intercept them. In such cases the officer-side battle, 
as in Authority A, was once again fought amongst Members.
As the other, and much more frequently used route in Authority B, 
though, the ideologically 'looser' approach to achieving unity meant 
that a Chief Officer could raise an issue for himself in the 
Management Team, specifically for discussion or in an attempt to win 
support and legitimacy. This was usually with the Chairman's prior 
knowledge, although not always so. If the support of the Team was
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forthcoming the issue could be taken on again by the Chairman to 
advance through his Comnittee and the Policy Group; however, it would 
also go forward through the the Chief Executive/Leader axis, assuming 
at least their acquiescence, with the Chief Officer (and his Chairman) 
thereby gaining potentially the major power resource of the Leader's 
tacit or explicit sanction when the issue was finally put to the 
Policy Group, Equally, a similar arrangement appeared to function 
where a Chief Officer wished to block another's definition, an example 
here being the opposition, noted on p302, to the ZBB experiment being 
pursued by Treasury officers. In these cases, Chief Officers' main 
need of their Chairmen was more for their indirect and background 
'presence* rather than their direct intervention (notwithstanding the 
more direct lobbying which was also speculated to have occurred over 
the ZBB issue). In this way, Chairmen were used as a reminder or very 
tacit 'threat' of opposition or an attempt to bypass the Team in the 
event of a contrary definition being adopted by it. Certainly, the 
Chief Executive appeared to be sensitive to this possibility (although 
he would not directly discuss it), and he and the Team were observed 
to consider the likely reactions on specific issues of even quite 
minor Chairmen and Ocmnittees such as Trading Standards, whereupon it 
was of course up to the Chief Officer to 'use' his Chairman by 
defining his reaction for the Team appropriately for whatever he was 
trying to achieve.
We have seen already that the status of the Management Team was 
enhanced by the relative cohesion among Authority B's Members. Its 
role as a 'route' for Chief Officers' definitions which offered the 
prospect of the Leader's sanction, together with its defined ability 
noted earlier to legitimise those definitions, further ensured that 
although its aspirations to control departmental activity were lower
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than Authority A's Central Group, its role in channelling that 
activity was at least as great. Bluntly put, Chief Officers used the 
Management Team to advance their own ideas because it was worth their 
while: the role of the "sounding board" which we saw on p361 above 
that the Leader defined for himself only increased this tendency by 
allowing the Team to became the forum where the Chief Executive could 
report authoritatively on what was or was not feasible at that time.
In both routes in Authority B, of course, the likely success of the 
Chief Officer in advancing his definitions of the situation was 
dependent, in cases where other Chief Officers opposed him (as could 
of course easily happen with proposals to allocate resources at a time 
of resource shortage), as in Authority A on the power which his 
Chairman was defined to possess. Equally, in both routes, the Chief 
Officer's definitions were prone to adjustment, deflection or 
compromise in his dealing with other actors, depending on their own 
definitions and power resources, with 'policy' or 'resource 
allocations' in effect representing the negotiated outcome (after due 
consideration by the Party Group and Council). However, the inherent 
attractions of the Management Team route, which made it the means most 
frequently used in advancing definitions into the Member arena, meant 
that the particular needs of Authority B's Chief Officers of their 
Chairmen were always more likely to be for indirect and tacit, rather 
than the direct and 1 active' support, which we saw was more likely to 
be required in Authority A, or at least some combination of the two 
involving an 'indirect' element. To this extent, while it was for 
example inconceivable that Authority A's Central Group did not take 
account of the likely reactions of, in particular, the powerful 
Housing Chairman, the situation in Authority B was at once more open, 
with its generally wider levels of discussion in the Team, and
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more subtle, with its greater element of Chief Officers' negotiating 
order through the combination of their own resources and through their 
Chairmen's anticipated reactions, rather than their direct 
intervention.
As a final ccrrment on officers' needs in Authority B, the Chairmen 
themselves appeared content that the Management Team route should 
exist for as long as the definitions advanced by Chief Officers 
accorded with their own. This, they usually did, because this route 
was in no sense a weakening of the Chairman's oversight or of the 
relationship between them: while it was observed that the Team would 
discuss how to block or divert a Chairman from a disruptive or 
unwelcome definition, if the Chief Officer was to advance proposals of 
his own, he would have been ill-advised to do so without the 
Chairman's prior approval, given the letter's ability to 'catch up' 
with those proposals in the Policy Group. The resulting opposition 
and tension would obviously seriously have embarrassed the Chief 
Officer, and would have undermined his own ability to enact his 
definitions subsequently.
The effect of what we have seen here was one of the most important 
features of the symbiotic arrangement, and serves to summarise the 
position in Authority B and also in Authority A. While the nature of 
their dependency in each authority or each route varied, Chief 
Officers' need for the tacit or active support of their Chairmen 
ensured that the latter's definitions represented at a given point in 
time the parameters within which Chief Officers had to be seen to 
advance their own. In other words, Chief Officers could advance their 
own definitions of the situation so long as they also, at the same 
time, accorded sufficiently with their Chairmen's. It is this aspect,
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obviously critical to our overall explanation of bow the content of 
resource allocation processes came to be fixed, to which we new turn.
(vi) SYMBIOSIS: PARAMETERS AND DIRECTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATION OF ORDER
We have now specified the operation of the mechanism which the data 
frcm the authorities studied revealed to determine the content of 
policy and resource allocation. This was the negotiation of order by 
Chief Officers and leading Members/Chairmen within what was labelled 
the ' budgetary elite', and in particular within and between individual 
Chairmen/Chief Officer pairings, where neither 'side* had the 
necessary power resources to enact their definitions without needing 
various forms of support frcm the other. Thus, leading Members 
needed Chief Officers to advance and pursue their definitions and 
defend their interests as their 'agents' in the officer side of the 
authority, without which those Members would not have been able to 
enact their definitions or maintain their status and 'records of 
achievement'. Equally, Chief Officers needed Chairmen either for 
tacit support or open advocacy in the Member side of each authority in 
securing the enactment of their owii definitions.
However, the symbiotic mechanism in each of the authorities studied 
'produced' policies and allocations of resources which were different, 
and which combined differently the definitions of the situation 
advanced in each by the actors involved. In other words, if what we 
have seen portrays the operation of the mechanism, we have as yet to
explain the directions it took: we have shown hew order was negotiated 
within the policy and resource allocation processes studied (ie how 
Danziger's "critical policy style" in each authority was sustained), 
but as yet we have not shown why it was negotiated in the form that it 
was, and why the particular patterns observed in terms of policies and 
allocations of resources actually arose.
Our examination of the data so far has been in terms of two halves - 
ie, two sets of definitions and dependencies - of what was in fact a 
circular relationship, while only hinting at how those halves came 
together. The 'hint', though, was that for all the genuine mutual 
dependency and for all the fact that Chief Officers so often appeared 
to 'make the running' (this will be returned to), it was only Members 
who oould actually bring those definitions into being as legitimised 
policy or resource allocations: to this extent, as Rosenberg, 
following Self, notes " ... Politicians are the ultimate controllers 
of political systems" even if " ... one of their chief problems is to 
demonstrate and maintain the reality of their control" (1983: p22). 
Consequently, if we are to locate the source and means of direction- 
setting within the symbiotic mechanism outlined, it is here that we 
need to look.
Chief Officers had in effect to be defined to be operating within 
politicians1 sanction, and in particular (although not invariably or, 
necessarily, only) that of their own Chairmen, even if as Laffin & 
Young (1985: pp48-9) document, exactly what is included in that 
sanction may be unclear or ambiguous where the Chairman had t not made 
himself fully explicit. In providing the Chief Officer with certain 
power resources such as political (conventionally defined) support,
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the Chairman was in effect rendering those areas 'open* to the Chief 
Officer, thereby delineating at that time the area within which the 
latter could operate and advance proposals (cf Rosenberg, 1984: p55), 
just as the parameters of Party Group or Ocmnittee opinion delineated 
at any one time the areas 'open' to the Chairman himself. As such, 
the Chairman (or whoever) may be said to have provided his Chief 
Officer with an 1 unbrella' based on his own definitions, protecting 
that area of operation or range of definitions for the benefit of the 
Chief Officer and thus, given his own reliance on the Chief Officer 
for status and effectiveness, for the pair of than.
Although the data revealed only one example (in Authority A where the 
manager of a trading undertaking moved under the Leader's 
instruction), it is quite conceivable that a Chief Officer could for 
practical purposes move under a different umbrella, perhaps even just 
for part of his overall function. However, whoever was 'holding' the 
umbrella, its 'size' then represented both the range of definitions 
and activities (including of course those which the 'uribrella holder' 
advanced or originated himself) which the Chairman or other ' holder1 
was willing to sanction, and also the extent to which the 'holder' was 
able to uphold his sanction in the face of carpeting pressures from 
other actors. For his part the Chief Officer not only had to remain 
'under' the particular umbrella that sanctioned the activity in 
question if he was to succeed in enacting his definitions; if he was 
to fulfil the role for which his Chairman in turn relied on him, he 
had also to use that umbrella to its full extent even if he did not 
share some of the Chairman* s own definitions of the situation which 
came within it (cf Laffin & Young: 1980: p47). In effect summarising 
the concept of umbrellas, therefore, it may be seen that they were at 
once Chief Officers' major power resources or their major constraint.
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One of the clearest examples of the operation of umbrellas in the 
negotiation of order to emerge from the data was that provided by 
Authority A's Leader for the Chief Executive. We have seen already 
that the Chief Executive was a powerful and forceful operator having, 
for example, visibly subordinated the Treasurer and other Central 
Group Officers as part of his vehicle for controlling the resources 
function in Authority A as a whole. The concept of his umbrella now 
allows us to see how he gained and maintained his pre-eminence. Thus, 
Authority A's Leader describes the Chief Executive's remit as follows:
"In Ireland, they have Town Managers ... I look on the 
Chief Executive here as being the sort of managing director 
whose job it is to ensure departments cure running 
efficiently together ... If he needs major change to get 
what he's after, he must bring it before the appropriate 
Conmittee. His job is complete oversight to ensure [the 
authority] is properly managed and efficient and meeting 
needs. He must take initiatives in his own right in an 
Authority like [this one] because the Canmittee side has so 
many inbuilt conflicts, it's very difficult to get ... a 
straight line to anything. He must be the official who can 
take that straight line ..."
Many of the conflicts referred to, of course, relate to the Leader's 
problems noted elsewhere with seme of the more independent Conmittee 
Chairmen who were also on the Leadership. Clearly, the ' agency' role 
expectation by leading politicians of their Chief Officers applied 
markedly here, also.
However, it may also be seen that the unbrella outlined by the Leader 
would have provided many of the power resources necessary to explain 
the Chief Executive's pre-eminence in Authority A, something which the 
latter confirmed for himself in coining the term 'unbrella' which we 
have used:
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"Obviously, I'm constrained by the political backing I get 
... I need his [Leader's] backing, as indeed he needs mine 
... Our outlooks are very similar, certainly insofar as the 
way this authority should be managed. I haven't been 
prevented from running the job in basically the way I want. 
Now I know there are seme people here who would not 
necessarily want me to do it the way I'm doing it, but no 
one's done anything about it ... The position of the Leader 
must make a difference to me, therefore. He can create a 
higher umbrella or a lower one because of how he stands, and 
that helps, the unbrella has been created for me. I act in 
my own right, but [Leader] has created the umbrella which 
allowed me to do so. I would have found it much more 
restricted if he vas".
Here the two dimensions outlined which define the 'size' of the 
umbrella may clearly be seen: the range of views which the 'umbrella 
holder' is willing to allow the Chief Officer to pursue, and the 
effectiveness of the 'umbrella holder' in maintaining that area for 
the Chief Officer to act in free frcm other hindrances.
Significantly, though, another notable example of an umbrella in 
operation in Authority A was where the Chief Housing Officer was shown 
to benefit frcm the very strong and extensive sanction provided by his 
powerful Chairman, even to the point of counteracting on some issues 
that provided for the Chief Executive (and Central Group) by the 
Leader. Certainly, this Housing 'axis' was perhaps the most 
consistently successful in challenging that between the Leader and 
Chief Executive, and the clash of unbrellas would in turn go some way 
to explaining the clashes observed between the two Chief Officers 
themselves, as they upheld their Chairmen's, and thus their own, 
interests. A final example in Authority A shows how the Treasurer's 
unbrella also expanded.
"They've given me authority to deal with leases in the same 
way as loans ... I asked for delegated powers because of 
the growth in leases, and they said 'Yes'" (Treasurer, 
Authority A).
This follows the now common practice arising from the workings of the
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1980 capital allocation system of leasing vehicles and plant rather 
than making capital purchases. Capital spending, subject bo detailed 
approval by the Council, was effectively thereby transformed into a 
routine revenue activity, giving the Treasurer oversight over a whole 
'new' area of resource allocation.
Turning to Authority B, we saw a particularly clear example frcm the 
politics of budgetary review of how the Treasurer's umbrella came 
increasingly to be held by the Leader, and widened in scope thereby, 
to the point where cuts were eventually sanctioned once the Leader had 
himself found sufficient support in the Party Group. Equally, though, 
we saw that this same unbrella did not extend as far as prioritised 
cuts (for all the Leader's own views on the issue) or to allowing the 
ZBB experiment to develop as intended. We then had the evidently very 
large umbrella derived by the Chief Education Officer from his 
Chairman (see p367 above), strengthened by the very substantial 
measure of agreement between them which meant that his and the 
Chairman's own definitions were very often indistinguishable:
"... we know one another's mind, and I don't believe we've 
disagreed on a single thing since he took office. I cton't 
feel there's any guideline in the sense of something that's 
made explicit, and we're often hard put to think of who 
thought of something first" (Chief Education Officer).
Alternatively, we also saw on p367 how Authority B ' s Chief Housing 
Officer suffered by comparison from his Chairman's umbrella not 
extending to allowing him to escape making cuts; equally, the Chief 
Executive also illustrated how on occasion his umbrella could impose 
burdens of its own:
"I believe like my colleague in Manchester I may be told to 
set up a Nuclear Free Zone. I shall of course do it to the 
best of my ability, but I shan't pretend it will be with 
100% enthusiasm."
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To repeat therefore, umbrellas may impose their limitations on, as 
well as offer power resources to, Chief Officers.
As an aside, it may be seen the observational appearance of unbrellas 
in operation could be misleading. If Chief Officers' proposals are 
'pre-filtered* so as to remain 'under* their umbrellas, it should 
scarcely cause surprise when they are adopted by Members, even though 
this may give rise to the impression that the latter are no more than 
'rubber stamps' for officer ideas. To the unwary external observer, 
this could correspond, for example, with the most passive of Gyford's 
three stereotypes of Members' behaviour, namely "policy acceptance" 
(1976: pl37), when in fact the real position might represent a far 
more proactive assertion of Members' own definitions than is 
apparent. Indeed, to the extent that, as we shall see. Chief 
Officers' definitions came automatically to be framed within the 
parameters of their Chairmen's unbrellas, this would be an excellent 
example of Lukes' second and even third "dimensions" of power accruing 
to Members, as conflicts were in effect prevented from arising or even 
being defined as such by Chief Officers.
In the context of the order negotiated through what we have labelled 
'the politics of resource allocation', and thus of Danziger's 
"critical policy style", it may then be seen how umbrellas were 
integral to the 'direction setting' aspect of the mechanism of 
symbiosis already outlined, as Chief Officers framed ideas within the 
parameters set thereby:
"Members are very much requiring things feeding up frcm the 
officers. We take a feel of the way they are going and the 
level of activity they want ... and suggest ideas according" 
(Treasurer, Authority A).
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"Because the major policy decisions were taken in 
[Chairman's] first two years, I've been able to work to 
thou. I know his mind and he generally ratifies what I've 
done. I've used the manifesto quite a lot as tramlines, but 
then he submitted it to me for my approval" (Chief Officer, 
Authority B).
For Chief Officers, the awareness of their umbrellas, and the taking 
account of leading Members' known views and anticipated reactions was 
largely a routine activity (cf also Rosenberg, 1983: ppl9-20).
Failure to locate proposals and activities within these parameters 
was, as a simple fact of organisational life, likely to be a waste of 
time for all concerned:
"You know which way the politicians will go and you know 
their minds, more or less. You therefore know that certain 
things, while they may be logical and sensible will upset 
them. I see that sort of constraint as almost automatic - I 
mean, if you can't swim, you just don't jump in the water" 
(Solicitor, Authority A).
"We've been criticised by the staff when we recommended 
something ... we felt the Council would adopt. In the long 
run though, there is no point in recommending a course of 
action if, for various reasons, the Council wouldn't adopt 
it. Take our environment enhancement programme. We ought 
to be surveying where they ought to be planting trees, not 
for now but for forty years on. You couldn't sell that to 
the public in this area so the Council couldn't and wouldn't 
do it. There's no point our wasting time on it, the 
Leadership just isn't interested" (Chief Executive, 
Authority C).
The extent of leading Members' second or even third "dimension" power 
in the policy and resource allocation processes studied, in rendering 
certain definitions simply 'out of court', thereby becomes apparent.
To the extent outlined, the internalised role definitions by Chief 
Officers of exactly which areas were and were not sanctioned tended to 
prevent definitions from 'outside' their umbrella even being aired in 
public.
Building further on the thane in the previous quotation, in patterning
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the definitions of policy and resource allocations which are 
adinissable at a given time, it may be seen that umbrellas also cane to 
be integral to 'locating' those processes in the outside world, as one 
means by which, eg, needs, pressure groups, uncertainty or resource 
shortage are assimilated within then. We have seen how actors would 
define such features, as any other, in terms of the meanings which 
they attach to them, so deriving for themselves a prescription of 
action. Here, as the set of parameters within which each Chief 
Officer tacitly or actively presented his definitions and actions, a 
Chairman's umbrella (whether based either on definitions of the 
outside world held within the Party Group or his Conmittee which 
constrained his own freedom to act, or more directly on his own 
definitions) clearly influenced and channelled the response defined to 
external pressures. Indeed, although this begs a number of questions 
about their role which will be returned to, with Chief Officers acting 
'under' their umbrellas, constantly and routinely defining and 
anticipating Members' reactions to whatever they advanced, and with 
leading Members reacting favourably (as those Chief Officers intended) 
to initiatives which wittingly or unwittingly they had thereby shaped 
or even instigated, it may be seen that umbrellas were part of a much 
wider phenomenon. They reflected and perpetuated what the data showed 
to be ideological (in the particular sense in which the term is used 
here: see pp336-7, above) consensi around the issues in question, 
which channelled and shaped responses to those issues (and also for 
example responses to legal constraints and ' existing conmitments', 
much as we noted earlier). In so doing, they also entrenched and 
perpetuated the particular 'view' through which responses were 
defined, and thereby also the negotiated order which embodied that 
view.
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These consensi are the 'vogues' referred to earlier. We may begin to 
illustrate what is envisaged by this term with the observations of 
Authority A's Leader on the ideological predispositions of his 
authority;
"In every decade there is an objective created politically 
to do certain things ... Each decade has its way of 
influencing the way [we] meet what one felt to be the then 
objectives ... The authority has in the past put a great 
deal of store on improving sports facilities. Imnediately 
following the war a great deal of energy was put into 
attacking housing, then the open space shortage. I'm now 
very keen to improve the street scene. We've plenty of 
parts looking derelict and my pet subject is improving 
them".
Thus, the Leader's definitions of what was 'needed' came to influence 
the activity of the authority by providing a greater relative sanction 
for resource allocation in the area of conservation, as Authority A's 
Solicitor independently confirmed;
"Conservation is one thing that occured to me. 5 or 10 
years ago, we did very little ... I think, clearly, 
politicians of both sides now accept that if there's any 
possible funds available, that's where they channel them 
... You can trace this change of heart to particular 
changes of Chief Officers, but in particular you've got to 
say that [the Leader] takes his responsibility for it".
It may be objected that vogues as defined here really reflect no more 
than actors' definitions of national trends in local activity, and 
that as a result the mechanisms of symbiosis and 'umbrellas' which we 
have laid out are not really relevant. Outwardly there was even some 
evidence for this;
"Sometimes a particularly forceful person has a way of 
getting things done. It happens in all walks of life and 
certainly in national government. But at the end of the day 
the ability you have to do things dominates the way you 
think. Certainly environmental improvement and things like 
that are the vogue at present, but ... vogues are determined 
by fashions in society. Road planning is now much maligned, 
but it was once in vogue" (Chairman, Authority A).
However, the same respondent then concluded that;
381
"... personalities do come into it, and I think why certain 
programme areas are strong or weak can be laid to the 
forcefulness of individuals".
As with the original brute facts of resource shortage and uncertainty, 
therefore, external trends and opinions are 'there* to be taken 
account of but, it may be seen, via the medium of actors defining 
their roles and responses to them, in this case from within the 
particular consensus operating at the time.
A comparison of the responses in Authorities A and B to one particular 
shared problem allows this point to be amplified. Both authorities 
had responded to the vogue or trend of re furbishing, rather than 
replacing, their housing stock, while financing the necessary work 
from capital expenditure. However, it emerged that the responses had 
widely differing motives and were based on widely differing 
definitions. In Authority A, the perception was that refurbishment 
was likely to become the only response permitted by the Government and 
was therefore accepted as a ' second best' option to rebuilding:
"Up to 10 years ago we were into redevelopment. Then the 
Labour Government introduced Hxising Action Areas, although 
seme of us didn't like them entirely. I still don't but 
within them was money for the treatment of the environment, 
so we jimped on the bandwagon. Take [Area] ... Our 
original plan was to pull large parts down and rebuild but 
the Government made it clear they would stop us. In the end 
we decided to restore it because the HAAs gave us the 
statutory power" (Housing Chairman, Authority A).
In Authority B on the other hand, the perception behind the 
re furbi shment policy was that it was necessary to maintain large parts 
of the existing housing stock in adequate repair. Rather than a means 
of making longer term plans for an area as in Authority A, it was a 
means merely of meeting an inroediate maintenance problem:
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"We' d gone beyond the pale... to the point where nothing 
could be done and we had to switch money fran new 
buildings. It's quite simple really. If you're in such 
shit you can't cope, you've got to not just put right 100 
dwellings in one year while the other 3,800 fall apart, you 
go round the 3,800 doing what is necessary as part of an 
overall plan ... We capitalised the entire maintenance 
programme" (Chief Officer, Authority B).
In each authority a given national trend - in this case the view that 
refurbishing Council housing was preferable to rebuilding - was 
espoused and promoted by particular actors as the solution to very 
different problems. (The fact that the examples here relate to 
capital expenditure should lead us to lose sight of our primary 
interest in vogues as an influence on revenue expenditure, either in 
the first instance or as here, through debt charges and other costs as 
revenue 'knock-ons'.)
However, and this is the reason why they should not, ultimately, be 
seen as 'brute facts' on a par with resource shortage or uncertainty, 
the data also supplied evidence that apparently clearly identifiable 
national trends should not necessarily be hypothesised as having any 
impact at all on the oonsensi or ideologies within an authority. As 
an example, much is made at present of the need for leisure facilities 
at a time of high unemployment, a view expressed in the manner one 
might expect by Authority B's Leader:
"We' re moving into the leisure age, and we want to be 
there. There's definitely a leisure vogue",
and set in context by the Chief Executive:
"With the change in the emphasis of the housing strategy 
[see above] Members turned their attention to social 
services and new leisure ... I think now, in the lifetime 
of this Council, they've given an emphasis to arts and 
leisure, they've been prepared to support new initiatives 
... It's clear that social services has grown considerably, 
and new arts and leisure, although it's still problematic in 
terms of the pecking order ..."
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Accordingly, Authority B had a large and growing Arts and Recreation 
Department in effect entrusted with the management and furtherance of 
this vogue. These expectations were not borne out, though, by the 
position in Authority A, although it too was Labour controlled:
"I've tried to push recreation. I've got the odd sports 
centre but I can't get a department. There's a view about 
that here. It's not an area I find I can get developed like 
other things" (Chief Executive).
A Chairman offered an explanation for this consensus against providing 
recreation facilities:
"What's happening is, whereas a few years ago all recreation 
facilities where possible were provided by the local 
authority, because of financial constraints particularly at 
the mcment more and more private clubs whether rugby, 
football, cricket or whatever cure doing their own thing. 
One's quite receptive to this".
It might of course be argued that this does no more than reflect the 
existence of another consensus around the appropriate role of the 
public sector per se. Whichever though, the extent to which the order 
negotiated around resource allocation vogues will varyingly reflect 
national trends, is clear. It is therefore still the negotiating and 
defining processes themselves which explain the policy and allocations 
of resources in the authorities studied, rather than any direct causal 
linkage from the national trends in question.
We can summarise so far by means of a more general comment. It may be 
seen that Chief Officers could come to owe a substantial portion of 
their departmental budgets to the present or past application of 
vogues or ideological consensi channelling solutions defined to 
particular problems, and resources to particular areas. Much of this 
arose from the essential discretion with which, as we have seen, local 
authority actors are invested by the mediating role of their
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defining of external factors such as, legal constraints, 'existing 
cornuitments', national trends, resource shortage, etc: we are looking 
here at how that discretion was applied. More generally, while the 
presence of prolonged vogues was noted earlier (p203) to sit very 
uneasily with the pluralist underpinnings of incresnentalism (in that 
they appear to negate any operation within a realistic time span of 
countervai 1 ing power), we may now see how the presence of 
'incremental' change - leaving aside any attempt at precise definition 
- may sometimes be ascribed directly to ideological preferences, that 
is, over-arching and possibly even sub-consciously held definitions 
learned by the actors studied of the 'best' approach to issues of 
change in general:
"At the last Election we won against the national trend and 
got a larger majority. We think we went forward with a 
gradualist approach, and not madly with a rush. We weren't 
saying 'we're going to do so and so overnight', we were 
saying 'here's where we're going, and it's going to take 
three years'" (Leader, Authority B).
"You try to make sure that each policy area is doing 
something to improve. To be able to do that, you require 
considerably more resources than you are getting in any one 
year. You've got to have rolling programmes depending on 
political priorities. From a politician's point of view, it 
means spreading more thinly over a wide area, and not 
spending it all in one area" (Chief Officer, Authority A).
"The main structure of [place] so far as the ... Council is 
concerned is a known set of activities which are slowly 
improved ... The Labour Group would from time to time have 
before it proposals to add to or improve those facilities" 
(Leader, Authority A).
Umbrellas, to conclude, represent the reality of leading Members' 
control of where and how resources cure allocated: in the terms of our 
remit, to this extent, the responsibility for the 'direction-setting' 
of the symbiotic mechanism processing definitions of policy and where 
to allocate resources, is that of leading Members'.
At this point however, we turn to the final level of our examination
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of the politics or negotiated order of resource allocation, by 
returning to the role of Chief Officers. While their own particular 
umbrellas form the parameters within which they had to be defined (by 
the 'umbrella holder') to be acting if they were to be successful in 
having their definitions realised, this is not to deny that if the 
Members themselves acted in a way that was perceived to warrant it, 
Chief Officers in both Authorities A and B shrank from voicing their 
disquiet:
"If I thought it needed it, I'd push something right up to 
the point where they told me to get lost if necessary, which 
they would do of course (Treasurer, Authority A).
"I have a pretty good idea of what will go, but even if I 
don't think it will, I've got to spend time talking to 
people" (Chief Executive, Authority A).
"Members have got to understand what the hell it is they're 
doing" (Chief Officer, Authority B).
"I make ny own judgements as to what I tell Members, whether 
they take my advice is up to them. There are times when we 
know something will conflict with their view and we're 
likely not to be followed. We don't put things up for the 
sake of being controversial, but we indicate to them the 
consequences of some of their actions" (Treasurer,
Authority B).
However, the striking feature which these examples have in cornnon is 
that none of the respondents appeared to have any real hope, in the 
circumstances where they felt driven to express a view in this way, of 
actually enacting their definitions. They were beyond the cover of 
their umbrellas and appeared to realise it: their actions were 
therefore more in the nature of putting their own views on record.
Clearly, this was a less desirable outcome from Chief Officers' point 
of view, in that presumably they had failed to prevent or divert the 
action in question. Much better, surely, to move their umbrellas so 
that the definition which they were advancing was then sanctioned, 
'under* that umbrella, thereby through an exercise of Lukes' 'third
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dimension' of power preventing conflict from actually arising. The 
data revealed that, over a period of time, this is exactly what Chief 
Officers sought to do. As with leading Members' role in setting 
umbrellas at a given time, this scope for input of Chief Officers' own 
definitions (perhaps incorporating their own 'professional' points of 
view) was also part of each authority's linkage with the outside 
world. Inter alia, it was presumably on the basis of their 
definiticxis of the demands being imposed by external factors such as 
needs or resource shortage that Chief Officers such as Authority B's 
Treasurer sought in this way to move their umbrellas to sanction their 
own viewpoints, in this case the need for a cut in spending.
Chief Officers' key power resource in this negotiation of order was 
the nature of the urrbrellas themselves, which were as we have seen 
general parameters within which Chief Officers needed to be defined by 
the 'umbrella holder' to be acting. Hie definition is all important: 
as Wildavsky also noted, the result was that:
"It is not so much what administrators do, but how they meet 
their particular Sub-Ccmnittee's or Chairman's expectations 
that counts" (1979a: p76).
Over time, the lack of exact precision inherent in processes of 
defining events then opened up two areas of opportunity to Chief 
Officers. The first was that the parameters representing their 
umbrellas could gradually change of their own accord, as leading 
Members defined and assimilated events as these occurred and reacted 
to them. This meant that opportunities could be presented for astute 
Chief Officers to insert their own definitions of what was needed. As 
Jonsson observed:
"Politicians influence the planning process not so much 
through initiatives and directives as through reactions ... 
Officers listen - they become Board watchers" (1982: pl07).
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Authority B's Chief Accountant corroborated this as follows:
"You've got to keep in the back of your mind the political 
situation. Half the game is, 'How can you sell this to the
Members?', 'What do they want?'. They make a statement in a
few words that means a lot really, and it's up to you to
pick up that comment".
By such means, presenting at opportune moments the 'right' solution to 
Members, umbrellas could be moved towards the Chief Officer's 
position: an example of this was where Authority B's Treasurer 'worked
on' his Leader until the spending cuts which the former desired were
eventually supported, even if the Leader's umbrella did not then 
extend to preventing a partial restoration of those cuts.
The second means whereby Chief Officers could achieve this relates to 
the uncertainty and imprecision noted earlier in Chapter 8 surrounding 
the meaning of 'the status quo*. The data showed that officers would 
attempt to portray seme thing as the status quo, ie within their 
unbrellas at that point, when in fact the particular initiative had 
implications which could be well beyond it:
"You use the phrase 'dangling a carrot' in front of [the 
Committee]. I think its true to say that you would try in 
describing any given project to identify those parts of it 
which are in line vdth the Committee's existing views or 
ideology, so that the perceived departure from what they're 
currently about isn't too radical" (Chief Planning Officer, 
Authority A).
Thus, we saw in Chapter 2 how this respondent adopted a "camel's nose" 
tactic of putting apparently unconnected increments to Committees in 
pursuit of a particular policy, until he judged that the time was 
right to broach the issue of commitment to the overall objective. At 
the time he began, his umbrella sanctioned (if that is the right word 
for something the Chairman was presumably not fully aware of) the 
increments, but not the overall objective: he was able nonetheless to
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move towards the umbrella over time, until the objective was 
explicitly adopted by the Council.
This opens up a further source of explanation of 'gradual' or 
'incremental' (however defined) change, as umbrellas were themselves 
slowly changed over time. As the Deputy Treasurer in Authority A put 
it:
"I think there are consensuses [sic], generally, but I think 
... there are sort of little legs which grow out of it in 
some ways. Individual officers come 15) with an initiative 
more or less in line with a consensus, but perhaps pushing 
it slightly".
Wildavsky (1979a: ppl08-9) notes a similar manipulation of the status 
quo to the example above and, indeed, the position here is outwardly 
similar to the incremental explanation of marginal change in terms of 
attachment to the status quo which we rejected as necessarily true, 
but which we were careful not to rule out entirely, earlier in our 
account (see ppl95-6).
These, then, are the two features inherent in the nature of each Chief 
Officer's umbrella itself which allowed them over time to relocate 
those umbrellas to sanction at least some of the definitions that they 
held. The third power resource available to Chief Officers, however, 
which we have already seen, was leading Members' own reliance upon 
them for information and advice, which allowed the former a 
particularly effective means of influence:
"There's a strategy of education so as to influence future 
policies. You start off by taking political constraints as 
absolute, but more and more members are wanting another 
opinion on which to base their own political ones, and in 
the end of course it does influence them".
One of the clearest examples of the Treasurer's "strategy of
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education" was of course his attempts during the course of the 
research period to gain the necessary backing for expenditure cuts 
where, as we saw, he was partially successful in 'moving' his umbrella 
to sanction the definitions he was advancing. Similarly, Authority 
C's Chief Executive illustrated how his "strategy of education" 
virtually created the equivalent of the leisure vogue noted earlier in 
Authority B:
"Take our leisure programme. The constituent authorities 
didn't have a clear leisure programme because in our area 
the Parish Councils were taken as the front line leisure 
authorities, but indoor facilities are far too expensive for 
them. If there is a need it's got to be the District 
Council. We started with nothing at all, we had to think of 
a policy and produce it in such a way that Members would 
eventually, as a Council, adopt it. Individually they would 
each have agreed it was right, but collectively, in their 
background and support it wasn' t worth it. But by 
publishing a draft policy for consultation, interpreting 
reactions, meeting objections over a period of time, the 
decision became in the context of 'Well, we've got to have a 
leisure policy, what is it?' If you'd said at the start, 
'We've got to have a leisure policy', the answer would have 
been 'We can't possibly afford it'".
To summarise now the "direction-setting" aspect of the mechanism which 
processed definitions of policy and resource allocations, the key was 
the circularity of the relationship involved. Leading Members' 
urrbrellas formed the parameters within which at any one time Chief 
Officers thought and acted, but only at that time. Chief Officers 
were capable with time of moving the parameters within which they 
operated, just as leading Members were also observed to move those in 
their respective Party Groups and Committees (see pp315-7), until 
these embraced and thereby sanctioned their own desired courses of 
action. Chief Officers would do as they were asked, and this would 
include actions of which they disapproved, but over the longer term 
they were able to influence what they were asked to do. Interestingly,
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after our use of Jonssou's concept of "organising principles", the 
picture here was in scrne respects almost the mirror image of Jonsson's 
finding that:
"... the bureaucracy will impose its current planning views 
gently on the political organisation, and things will be run 
in accordance with this view until the environment or lack 
of resources sets a limit. Then the political veto will be 
applied and ideas reorganised" (1982: pp28-29).
Here, Members imposed their views "gently" on Chief Officers, and
things ran "in accordance with that view until the environment or lack
of resources [was defined by officers to set] a limit". Then officers
succeeded in changing that view to some extent and ideas were, to that
extent, reorganised.
(vi) RESOURCE ALLOCATION AS NEGOTIATED ORDER: CONCLUSIONS
We have attempted to show both how each authority's "critical policy 
style" (to apply Danziger's concept to the patterned configuration 
of definitions of resource allocation in each authority which 
represented the negotiated order as it applied in this area), came 
into being and why it took the form in each authority that it did.
The key mechanism in explaining the first part of this was the 
symbiosis between leading Members and Chief Officers within the 
budgetary elite, arising out of the fact that neither group could 
enact its definitions without the other, and that each therefore 
needed and was prone to having to accomodate the other. At the same 
time, the direction setting process which explained 'why' the order 
negotiated in each authority took the form that it did was shown to be 
traceable to the mechanism of the 'umbrellas' provided principally
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by Chairmen for their Chief Officers, consisting of the parameters 
represented by the former's definitions at any given time, but which, 
over time, Chief Officers could move to sanction and Legitimise their 
own desired actions. By these means were definitions of trends and 
events outside the authority assimilated within it; in effect, by this 
means also the authority located itself in the world outside it.
These processes structured the negotiation of order which determined 
the content of resource allocation in the authorities studied.
Briefly, since we shall expand the theme in the concluding chapter, as 
we saw with the politics of budgetary review, the relationship of the 
incremental model of budgeting and policy-making to our conclusions is 
once again ambivalent: policy and resource allocation may or may not 
take place in 'incremental' steps, however defined, but the processes 
we have seen are manifestly wider ranging than those posited by the 
incremental model of politics. Wildavsky's "fair shares", for 
example, as with his "guardians v advocates" could adequately capture 
how order was negotiated in some circumstances but if so, this would 
once again be a notable conclusion in itself. Further, the role of 
second and third dimension (Lukes 1974) power processes within the 
mechanism outlined may be seen clearly, thereby distancing the 
conception here further from the incremental review of politics and 
its 'one dimensional' pluralist underpinning. While the negotiated 
order was capable of reproducing incremental features and outcomes 
(amongst others), the interactions within it which largely determined 
the content of resource allocation processes took place along power 
'dimensions’ which the incremental view of politics would miss 
altogether.
392
Again briefly, in making people the critical variables in explaining 
the patterns of resource allocation noted, it is here that we have the 
basis of a model which could be applied to other authorities.
Concepts of culture, ideology/'vogues', symbiosis, 'umbrellas', power 
and power resources, may be applied generally, even if the specific 
circumstances of their application will vary in each case, thereby 
allowing the possibility of a comparative framework actually grounded 
in what people cko as they negotiate order. This framework is 
foreshadowad in the conclusions which now follow.
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CHAPTER 10. SUNMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
(i) SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
We m y  now summrise the major thanes and findings which emerged 
from the data. Although these sire not always presented below in 
exactly the same order in which they emerged or ware covered in the 
main body of the text, the arrangement here nevertheless shows the 
development of the various strands to our overall argument.
(i)(a) Turning first to the external circumstances within which the 
authorities studied were obliged to operate:
- resource shortage was identified as a key "brute fact" with 
which authorities had to contend following the invalidation 
of the underlying assumption of an annual increment of 
growth in resources;
- the margin of feasible change around the budget base in each
authority was widening as a result of this invalidation, but 
'core' assumptions about the role of and need for services 
in themselves appeared at that time to have remained intact;
- the widening of the margin of feasible change had been 
accompanied by a growth in levels of dissensus within the 
authorities as relationships formed at a time of more 
plentiful resources came under strain;
- however, responses to resource shortage appeared also to 
exhibit considerable variations in terms of spending trends, 
and in timing, which suggested that substantial discretion 
remained and that resource shortage could not be seen as 
having a determining impact on the overall pattern of
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resources allocated;
uncertainty was identified as the second key "brute fact" 
with which authorities had to contend, but with its impact 
contingent upon the perceived freedom of choice available to 
those allocating resources. The key area of discretion for 
our purposes was that allowed by the "brute fact" of 
resource shortage;
- the budget base, reviewed or unreviewed, emerged as a 
'holding' response to uncertainty; similarly the 
accumulation of slack resources, both by so-called 
'advocates' and 'guardians', also emerged as a response, in 
making it matter less what actually transpired;
- once again, however, there appeared to be no determining 
impact of uncertainty (it is after all bound up with the 
idea of discretion), because the actual use of the budget 
base, and the actual pattern of accumulating slack both 
varied according to the views of the relevant actors of what 
was expedient or desirable.
(i)(b) This brings us now to the conclusions which emerge 
specifically about the adequacy of the constituent elements of what 
was outlined as the incremental syndrome, in capturing the reality of 
resource allocation.
1) Incremental conceptions of resource allocation outcomes emerged 
as analytically useless, and valid only in figure of speech terms, 
because:
- problems of definition mean that there is no agreed view of 
what constitutes incremental change and that, even if there 
was, this would be an external imposition with no guarantee
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that it would relate meaningfully to the resource allocation 
processes in question;
- problems of focus in at least four areas mean that, however 
defined, the level of incremental ism found will be more a 
function of the observer than the observed. These four 
areas are the level of aggregation (eg authority, depart­
ment, cost centre) at which outcomes are measured; the time 
interval between measurements; the choice of spending 
figures (eg budgets or outturn) to be measured; and the 
definition of expenditure measured. There are no clear 
answers to any of these choices.
2) The cognitive limits variant of incrementalism emerged as being 
of similarly questionable usefulness and validity:
- the cognitive limits argument in any event has little to say 
about how the content of resource allocation processes comes 
into being and thus why resources are allocated where they 
are.
On cognitive problems of scale, it emerged that:
- features such as the factoring of tasks and problems through 
the organisation and through time, which might plausibly 
have been hypothesised as responses here, could be explained 
equally well by reference to basic and ' nan-cognitive' 
features of local authority life such as the presence of 
elected Members and temporally fixed points in the budget 
process;
- while there must ultimately be a ceiling on hunan cognitive 
powers, there is a substantial trade-off between cognitive 
problens of scale and resources available for tasks such as
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reviewing the budget.
The cognitive limits argument in this context is therefore either 
redundant, mis-specified, or at least faced with variations in its 
impact which of itself it cannot explain.
On cognitive problems of value decisions, it emerged that:
- features such as line-item budgeting and vertical 
comparisons between spending figures, which might plausibly 
have been hypothesised as responses to cognitive problems in 
this area, could also be explained equally well by reference 
to 'non-cognitive* aspects of local authority life; thus:
- a line-item budget need not imply a line-item budget process 
(which of itself argues against any hypothesised cognitive 
role), but may more usefully be seen as but one part of the 
overall finance function in local authorities which may 
also involve progranroe-oriented budgeting and analysis;
- vertical comparisons may well be caimon, but horizontal ones 
are not precluded, albeit still employing the budget figures 
themselves, reified as service or output indicators;
Once again, therefore, the cognitive limits argunent is in this 
context either redundant in the presence of other more obvious 
explanations, or left with explaining why the cognitive constraints it 
posits may in fact be negotiated.
On the budget base, seen here as a response which might plausibly have 
been hypothes ised to cognitive problems both of scale and value 
decisions, it emerged that:
- seme areas of the base (such as debt charges) are routinely
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rather easier to review to a greater depth than others, and 
that in a cognitive context 'the base' cannot be seen in 
blanket or uniform terms;
- the relative lack of review in some areas was explicable in 
'political' rather than 'cognitive' terms;
- the standard 'incremental' roll-forward process appeared to 
demand the detailed levels of application and 'local 
knowledge' of the budget base which the cognitive limits 
argument claimed would either be avoided or are impossible;
- the budget base is unlikely to be reviewed as a whole, from 
a single unified source of review, because of the multiple 
and overlapping links of account within local authorities.
It was therefore concluded, again, that the cognitive limits argument 
was either redundant, or flawed in its own terms where it appeared to 
be mis-specified to the point of factual inaccuracy. (We had of 
course already seen that a budget base, reviewed or unreviewed, may be 
employed as a 'holding' response to uncertainty). Surrmarising the 
overall themes to emerge from our examination of the cognitive limits 
argument, the impact of cognitive constraints - such as they were - on 
resource allocation processes emerged as variable rather than uniform, 
while offering no clue as to why this should be so. Cognitive 
constraints therefore cannot be said in any meaningful sense to 
explain those processes.
3) Turning now to the political strand of incremental ism, it was 
concluded, partially on the basis of what had emerged in examining the 
cognitive limits argument, but also partially anticipating data to be 
presented, that:
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there is no a priori reason why 'political feasibility' 
should produce either incremental changes from the status 
quo, or a budget base as a given proportion of a budget 
which leaves only an incremental margin of change around it?
- the pluralist conception of politics as bargaining, which 
underpins incremental ism, often cannot be sustained;
- the "one dimensional" concept of power underpinning 
pluralism and incremental ism would need to be revised away 
from an a priori specification of countervailing power, and 
to accorrmodate second and third dimension power processes.
In effect, the various features of political incrementalism were 
rejected as necessarily applicable, while allowing that they may be 
reproduced in the course of politics in the resource allocation 
process. In concluding this section of the argument, however, 
Wildavsky's view was endorsed that 'politics' is in one sense a 
response to the cognitive demands of making value decisions in 
permitting 'an answer' to be formed where none, or several, were 
readily available. This was demonstrated by further reference to the 
'guardians v advocates' model, but at the expense of further 
discrediting the incremental role stereotypes of Treasury ' guardians' 
and departmental ' advocates'.
Turning then to the politics of budgetary review, it emerged that:
- legal obligations and 'existing conmitments' sure not as 
inmutable, and the 'politics of the status quo' is therefore 
not as irrelevant, as the incremental 'fixed budget' 
argument would claim;
- 1 the status quo', in the shape of these legal obligations 
and existing comnitments is not something external and
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objective, but is defined in ways which are conditioned at 
least in part by perceptions of available resources - hence 
the significance of the politics of the status quo at a time 
when these perceptions may be undergoing a revision;
- a budget base would itself in fact be a function of the 
negotiated order of definitions of the situation held by 
those allocating resources in each authority;
- developing this finding, the level of and specific 
approaches to review in each authority may also be seen as 
expressions of the negotiated order in each: these 
idiosyncratic patterns were labelled as each authority's 
"critical reviewing style".
It was implicit that the negotiated critical reviewing style in each 
authority might reproduce 'incremental* patterns of review, but there 
was no a priori reason why order should be negotiated in this way, and 
much evidence that it would not necessarily be so. In any event, the 
incremental model of politics could not have embraced many of the 
processes which were observed to be involved in negotiating and 
perpetuating these critical reviewing styles.
From the politics of resource allocation it emerged that:
- Danziger's original notion of each authority's "critical 
policy style" may also be seen as an expression of the 
negotiated order around the allocation of resources in each;
- once again, the order negotiated may take an outwardly 
incremental form, for example where there is an ideological 
preference for gradualism, but again there is no a priori 
reason why it should;
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- the presence of prolonged 'vogues' or ideological consensi 
tended to undermine the applicability of the notion of 
countervailing power; equally, as indeed with the politics 
of budgetary review, with a symbiotic mechanism whereby
officers and Members often unconsciously formed definitions
of the situation within parameters defined and manipulated 
by each other, the need to employ second and third dimension 
concepts of power in analysing the position was plainly 
apparent.
For these reasons, it was concluded once again that while the 
negotiation of order could readily reproduce apparently incremental 
features of resource allocations, it need not necessarily do so, and 
that the processes involved were a great deal more subtle and often
less explicit than the incremental mechanism itself would have
allowed.
(i)(c) Turning now to the political 'model' which was outlined in 
the course of our examination of incrementalism and responses to the 
brute fact of resource shortage and uncertainty, its constituent 
elements may be presented as follows:
- individual actors form definitions of the situation in which 
they find themselves, both vis-a-vis ' non-interactive' 
features of each situation, and in interacting with each 
other: these definitions contain both a perceptive element, 
and a prescriptive element in terms of what the actor's 
response should be;
- in these processes of defining, individual actors construct 
for themselves, over time, roles, as their 'stock' of learnt
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or remembered definitions relating to their place and 
purposes in the world, and aspects of which they then apply 
to what they perceive going on around then, in order to 
define their response. Roles therefore provide an important 
thread of consistency and recurrence in an essentially fluid 
overall picture;
politics was then defined as the processes whereby 
individuals interact, in any and every context, in pursuit 
of their definitions of the situation: politics serves, in 
effect, to combine definitions in some way, often as a 
compromise between the views on offer, as a basis on which 
action may proceed;
in political interactions, the key feature is the power of 
each actor, defined as his ability to have his definitions 
of the situation enacted. This in turn will depend upon the 
power resources which the actor is further able to create or 
deploy in his own support;
anything may be a power resource in a given context, but the 
critical factor is whether it is used as such: however, 
certain features of local authority life routinely emerged 
as at least consistently available to resource allocation 
actors to use as power resources (see below), which provided 
a further thread of continuity and cohesion in the overall 
picture;
indeed, particular patterns and orderings of interactions 
and definitions emerged in each authority around, for 
example, the budget base, reviewing activity or allocating 
resources, which were sustained and modified over time: 
these were what was characterised as the negotiated order in 
each authority;
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- still further threads of consistency and continuity emerged 
with the underlying and frequently unconsciously learnt or 
socialised cultural perspectives and definitions which 
tended to 'inform' actors' approaches to their roles and the 
negotiation of order. Examples here ware the "organising 
principles" in each side of the authority? the key cultural 
influence, however, had before and during the research been 
called into question; this was the underlying assumption of 
an annual increment of growth in resources;
- on the same theme, a number of ideologies were identified, 
as sets of definitions guiding and filtering responses 
defined to particular problems, but more 'immediately' than 
cultural definitions. Examples were the ideological 
predispositions in each authority to maintaining 
officer-side unity or prompting Member-side conflict, and 
the ideological predispositions noted briefly to gradual 
change, that could presumably 'explain* incremental outcomes 
in their own right; equally, we had the ideologically-based 
vogues or oonsensi which tended to channel resource 
allocation and responses to external problems. Once again, 
therefore, the influence on the negotiated order may be 
seen.
However, while this outlines the more general concepts within the 
political 'model', the following specific aspects were observed, most 
explicitly in the context of allocating resources but also guiding 
budgetary review;
- in the negotiation of order it emerged that while Chief 
Officers and Members had power resources of their own which 
they sought to deploy, these tended to be used in ways which
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* conditioned' or even cancelled out those available to the 
other: accordingly, within what were the key pairings 
between Chief Officers and their Chairmen, each was in 
effect the other's major power resource, because neither 
could expect to be able to enact their definitions without 
the tacit or active assistance of the other;
- within this symbiosis, a key concept was the 'unbrella', or 
manoeuvring space, which each Chairman was willing or able 
to maintain for 'his' Chief Officer, and which in effect 
determined the area where the Chief Officer could expect to 
be able to advance his (and the Chairman's) definitions.
The umbrella was delineated, in effect, by those of his own 
definitions which the Chairman was willing or able to 
enforce, and thus represented the reality and extent of each 
Chairman's influence on the negotiation of order;
- at the same time, however, it emerged that Chief Officers 
were often able to 'move' their Chairmen's views, and thus 
the umbrellas which the latter provided, over time until 
they sanctioned the definitions which the Chief Officer 
desired to advance.
This circular mechanism of 'definitions within definitions', with its 
second and third dimension power processes, proved within the cultural 
and ideological parameters outlined above to be integral to 
negotiating order around the allocation of resources. Also, as 
exemplified by the ZBB experiment in Authority B, it was of more 
general impact in the politics of budgetary review.
We are now close to the point where, having set out fairly baldly our 
conclusions on incrementa 1 ism, we may begin to extract the features of 
it and our model which it is argued will prove of significance in an
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analysis of the ’rational' pole of the incremental/rational 
dichotomy. However, we need first to set out briefly our conclusions 
about the normative strand of incremental ism identified in Chapter 1. 
Although these conclusions were not made explicit in the text, the 
threads which were nevertheless present may now be pulled together in 
a manner which helps our approach to the the rational pole.
(ii) NORMATIVE INCREMEOTALISM
To recall, briefly, the normative arguments in favour of incre­
mental ism as set out on pp5-6 above, these were:
- a claim that incrementalism produces 'better* decisions 
which, being relatively small changes from the status quo, 
can be reversed if necessary and which may in any case 
maximise the points of view represented;
- a claim that incrementalism is politically astute in 
maximising support and legitimacy and avoiding foci for 
opposition ;
- a claim that incremental processes are inherently fair or 
even democratic.
Taking these, for ease of coverage, in the reverse order we have seen 
that the fairness argument is linked in effect to the operation of 
countervailing power, but that there is no necessary reason why this 
should actually obtain. Indeed, there was a good deal of evidence 
from within even the small study here (for example, the ideological 
consensi or vogues outlined) that it may well not apply within any 
meaningful time span. Correspondingly, incrementalism's claim to the
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fairness which would have arisen from the 'self-balancing' effect of 
countervailing power, is to that extent undermined: seme interests may 
not, in fact, be countervailed. Further, though, if this argument is 
developed to apply to the budget base, used by incremental writers 
such as Wildavsky as a collection of precedents which are not normally 
reversed (and thus countervailed), it may be seen that the incremental 
claim to fairness is flawed in its own terms: by its own stipulation 
of the budget base, the processes working to 'balance' outcomes and 
produce that fairness are hindered from operating, or may at least 
only redress imbalances in marginal stages.
However, we also saw that the claim to fairness rested upon the ease 
of access to the political system. Given interests within the 
political system could be countervailed by others gaining access from 
outside it, to oppose them. However, leaving aside the work of, eg, 
Lukes, in refuting this claim, we saw for example from Authority A in 
particular that back-bench Members, while included within the formal 
political system, were effectively and consistently excluded from the 
parts of it which had any real influence over what transpired. Of 
course, they could have demanded a greater say - but they virtually 
never made that demand: because of their formal and visible status as 
legitimators, great care was taken by each Leadership to mould and 
subvert the definitions of back-bench Members through what were, in 
effect, second and third dimension power processes, in order to 
maintain their own pre-eminence.
In conclusion, therefore, the 'fairness' or 'democracy' argument in 
favour of incrementalism, and the pluralist premises on which it is 
based, cannot necessarily be upheld and are contradictory in their own 
terms. Incremental processes may be 'fair' where it takes only a
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marginal adjustment to restore a given balance, but equally they may 
not, and where more than a marginal adjustment is required then 
incremental processes would be prevented by the budget base from 
allowing this.
Turning now to the claim of political astuteness, much will again 
depend on the concept of countervailing power. If an actor can see 
that he has a chance 'in the long run* of enacting his definitions 
then, the argument runs, he may be more inclined to accept the status 
quo at the present. It was exactly this type of process which 
underlay the ability of an annual increment of growth in resources to 
'bey' relative harmony and cohesion, with the promise that 'there was 
always next year'. This assumption has now of course been 
invalidated, as we saw with the consequent increase in dissensus: 
however, many of the changes around Which this dissensus arose were 
themselves only marginal, which begins to argue against any necessary 
link between incremental change and political harmony. Indeed, 
leaving aside the issue of actual cuts, we saw that even a standstill 
budget could place strains on relationships in each resource 
allocation process. Further, though, the logic of our argument was 
then that if resource shortage became severe enough, less marginal 
change would result, but equally, if discretion arising from perceived 
uncertainty fell as it was increasingly defined that there was no real 
choice of response available, it would be plausible also to expect 
dissensus then to fall, perhaps in the manner of Jons son' s "push 
effect" (1982: p41), in response to the crisis.
To this extent, therefore, the size of a given change is not an 
infallible indication of the level of opposition it will incur. The 
astuteness, or otherwise, of an increment of change depends less on
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the fact that it is an increment then on what it is an increment of.
It may be seen as "the thin end of the wedge" and incur opposition on 
that account; equally, given that a crisis may make it easier under 
the 'push effect' to enact larger changes from the status quo, 
incremental changes in such circumstances may represent a wasted 
opportunity. Certainly, we saw in Chapter 2 how "camel's nose" 
strategies may indeed represent a triumph of hidden, incremental and 
in the example there very astute change, but we cannot conclude that 
there is any necessary reason why this should be so: the reaction to 
an increment depends essentially on how it is defined, and that is not 
a factor which the incremental argument is able to address. Finally 
on this theme, we should not confuse an argument for the political 
astuteness of incremental change for its own sake, with a situation 
where incremental change may be all that is possible. While the 
latter is certainly 'astute' in the sense of 'recognising reality', 
this is of course much less of an argument for the merits of such 
change, because its virtue is b om purely of necessity.
Similarly doubting conclusions then apply to the astuteness or 
otherwise of maximising involvement in the taking of decisions. We 
saw for example that Authority B's Management Team, with its ideology 
of legitimacy, performed its allotted management function relatively 
well, which suggests that the argument might be defensible. However, 
it is less clear cut whether it performed its function that much 
better them the restricted configuration in Authority A. Both could 
be bypassed, and the Management Team in Authority B was undoubtedly 
less suitable for decisive action (eg Brunsscn, 1982: p37). The issue 
then revolves, in effect, around whether legitimacy is seen as an end 
in itself. If it is not, and if one has the alternative power 
resources 'to live without' any definitions of legitimacy held by
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those with whan one must interact, then it may be seen that the wider 
involvement simply becomes a hindrance. Once again, therefore, the 
astuteness of decision-making by partisan mutual adjustment which 
maximises participation cannot be assumed to be self-evident: it may 
be a sensible strategy in the circumstances in Which order is 
negotiated; equally, it may not.
This brings us now to the claim that * incremental1 decisions are, for 
the variety of reasons outlined, 'better', as decisions, than non- 
incremental ones. One corrponent of this argument, the issue of 
reversibility, has already been dismissed. First, there is again a 
conflict here with other incremental concepts such as the budget base, 
defined as a collection of priorities and precedents which, it is 
claimed, do not tend to be reversed. Second, it was pointed out that 
many incremental changes which can be conceived of - the example 
quoted by Gershuny (1981: pl98) was of an extra mile of motorvs^y - 
would not in fact be reversible. Third, reversibility again implies 
the operation of countervailing power, which as we have seen cannot be 
relied upon. In general terms, therefore, although the cuts in 
Authority B were observed to be partially reversed, the argument 
itself is one which sits uneasily with the rest of the incremental 
syndrome, and which once again need not necessarily apply.
There is as we saw in Chapter 1 an element of this argument in favour 
of incremental ism that comes close to being a 'prejudice' in favour of 
the status quo and only marginal changes from it. However, while we 
shall refuse to join the argument in these terms, the necessary 
efficacy of gradual change for its own sake is certainly something 
which may be commented upon. Authority C's Chief Executive supplied 
an example of an opportunity foregone when, following a fire at the
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council offices, the possibility arose of including a sports hall as 
these were rebuilt:
"It was worked out as a comprehensive scheme, albeit it 
could be done in phases. We got tenders for the sports hall 
and offices which totalled £2m. The council weren't 
prepared to spend the money, to be identified as spending 
more them a million [pounds], so they admitted we had to 
build new offices but went for a package deal where you buy 
a design and the company adapts it for your site ... We got 
the tender within what they wanted to pay, but only by 
cutting out all the things that were going to serve the 
future stages. We got the offices, but unfortunately within 
a few months it became clear we would need the sports hall 
because local efforts to provide one separately failed, so 
we're back with [the original] scheme, but without the 
benefit of having it designed as a whole. The whole thing 
is a lot worse for it and a lot worse value for money ..."
Clearly, the effects of the unintendedly incremental build-up to the 
overall objective were in this case not at all beneficial. While 
this may not always be the case, we should once again be aware of a 
priori or 'blanket' claims that any given size of change is 'best'.
Extending the argument, a number of writers have stressed that gradual 
change may simply be inappropriate in the face of rapidly changing 
external circumstances (eg Gershuny, 1981: pl97). Further, 
effectively combining aspects of this with the argument of astuteness, 
Self (1975: pll7) argues strongly that even if dispersed 
decision-making does allow wider involvement, thus prompting the 
gradual change at issue here, decisions ought to be related to the 
scope of the problem in a way which, in his example, Lindblcra' s 
"partisan mutual adjustment" would never achieve. To this extent,
Self argues, even an indifferent 'synoptic* viewpoint may be 
preferable to a series of partial judgements resulting in gradual 
steps towards a decision which ought really to be taken as a whole.
This of course begins to hint at the potential of the rational pole of
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the dichotomy. However, before moving on to examine this issue as the 
final conclusion of the thesis, we might usefully pull together the 
lessons which may be derived from our rejection of normative 
incrementalism:
- the data (and many other writers) has shown that there can 
be no pre-supposition of 'balance', 'fairness' or even 
'democracy' as a characteristic inhering in political 
interactions: second and third dimension power processes may 
ensure that views remain unheard and issues remain 
unadvanced, and concentrations of power may simply prevent 
countervailing power, even in Dukes' 'first' dimension, from 
taking place;
- there ought, prudently, to be no a priori assumption of what 
is or is not politically astute, least of all that this 
inheres in a given size of change: opposition may focus on 
the size of change, but it may equally well focus on its 
content and what this is defined to imply. Similarly, max­
imising involvement in decisions may or may not be politic­
ally astute, depending on whose definitions of legitimacy 
one needs to secure, and whose opinions one needs to seek;
- incremental decisions are, simply, not necessarily better, 
and may in the wrong circumstances be positively harmful.
As a summary, it may be seen that the claims of incrementalism 
outlined in Chapter 1 to rationality - that is, to being the 'best' 
means available of realising desired states of affairs - would at 
least imply that 'the best available* (ie incrementalism) is not 
particularly 'good' in all circumstances. However, we already have 
substantial evidence that incrementalism itself is not a necessary 
condition and that its claim to rationality therefore falls. We now 
confirm this position with a look at the prospects for 'rational' 
techniques.
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(iii) THE 'RATIONAL* POLE
(iii)(a) Introduction
In this final section of the thesis we conclude with an introduction: 
we outline how the various elements of local authority life and the 
political 'model' Which emerged from the data may be applied in the 
analysis of 'rational' configurations and techniques. It is hoped 
that in outlining sane key issues which emerged from our examination 
of incrementalism, ideas will be offered which may prove useful in 
studying how those techniques are likely to be operated in local 
authorities (or anywhere else), their actual impact, and their chances 
of achieving what was intended for them. The incremental/rational 
dichotomy, as we saw in Chapter 1, implies in principle a choice of 
approach open to those allocating resources: to what extent is this 
choice real or illusory?
Referring back to the rational choice archetype set out in Chapter 1, 
the term 'rationality' is used here to cover that set of activities in 
each of the authorities studied which had the intended or unintended 
effect of moving their policy and resource allocation processes 
towards that archetype. This is a very wide definition, because it is 
designed to cover everything that represents a move away from the 
incremental pole of the incremental/rational dichotomy. This has the 
effect of blurring the distinction between features of the rational 
syndrome, notably in this context that between corporate management 
and corporate planning, although the conclusions which will emerge 
apply equally to both. It also has the effect of merging aspects of 
both poles, for example where attempts were made to increase the level 
of review in the budget base and thus increase the range of resource
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allocation options, much as we have already seen. This, though, is a 
key part of our general argument: particularly through the medium of 
bounded rationality, as we saw in Chapter 1 the two syndromes do, in 
fact, shade into one another relatively easily.
On this note, however, we now turn briefly to the data, to outline 
the relationship of 'rationality' as defined to incrementalism and to 
the 'political model' of resource allocation which we have 
constructed.
(iii)(b) 'Rationality' in Authorities A and B
In Authority A, corporate approaches as outlined above included the 
inter-disciplinary teams which we saw on p323 under the impetus of the 
Chief Executive to have replaced, largely, the influence of the 
1 departmentalist' Management Team. These were very much within the 
ethos or ideology of anti-departmental ism and integrated approaches to 
identifying and meeting needs in an area (and which we saw the 
Management Team itself was incapable of realising) as highlighted by, 
eg, Haynes (1981: p38). Further, also within this ethos, but more 
inclined to an emphasis on management rather than planning, there was 
the effectively corporately-constituted finance function (eg Norton & 
Wedgewood-Oppenheim, 1981: p56). If incrementalism is taken, as 
Alexander (1980: p77) takes it, as specifically aligned in the local 
government context with departmentalism, then these measures and their 
guiding ideology are specifically anti-incremental as well (cf also 
Dear love, 1979: pl44). Turning to Authority B, there was of course 
the full ' Bains-type' Management Team, but also a series of strategy 
groups for each service; a well developed O&M function; performance
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review activities ;and the attempts to widen the range of resource 
allocation options available through reducing the level of 
incrementalism and increasing the level of review by means of, eg,
ZBB. Authority B's corporate approach was outwardly the stronger of 
the two, in that in the strategy groups in particular there was a more 
clearly identifiable planning, as opposed to managerial emphasis. In 
both authorities, there was of course a parallel integrative function 
exercised in the Member side, in Authority A by the Group Executive 
and by the Policy and Resources Committee which served as the Leader's 
own vehicle; and by the single party, but joint officer/Member Policy 
Group in Authority B.
However, we have seen in both authorities instances of profoundly 
incremental and non-corporate or nan-rational behaviour, for example 
in the very strong departmental emphasis Which persisted in parts of 
Authority A, and in the negative reaction to the ZBB experiment in 
Authority B. Further, Authority B's planning-oriented strategy groups 
were not without their critics. As the Chief Accountant observed at 
the Leisure Strategy Groups
"To the detail we've done this, it's ridiculous. You're 
continually updating things. I find that a lot of what 
we've done there is now an embarrassment, really, because 
suddenly Members have got all these things they want to do 
and there's no way they can do them. It'll take years. Why
keep bringing it all up and then, 'No we can't do it' and
out it goes ... In the end any programme of that magnitude 
just breaks down".
To this extent, therefore, we have evidence to support the fairly 
cannon conclusion (and on fairly familiar grounds) that corporate 
structures may well hide non-rational or even incremental processes 
(eg Haynes, 1980: p95; Greenwood, 1983: pl63) or outcomes. However,
the data also offered evidence of the reverse trend, that a level of
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rationality could exist, even if hidden, in a manner that belied any 
formal incremental structural features. Thus, we saw in Authority A 
how programmes of activity with their own explict objectives may be 
deliberately hidden within a Corrrriittee structure or a line-item 
budget, and 'split up' to be fed through the Member side of the 
authority, then to be 're-assembled' as what were in fact coherent
sets of resource allocations but which happen to have been sanctioned
by a variety of Committees. The best example of this to emerge was
cited on pp42-3 above, prompting the question at the time, "When is a
programme not a programme?" but there were others. Incremental 
structures may therefore hide 'rational' or corporate processes just 
as rational structures may hide 'incremental' ones; much as we saw 
with aspects of incrementalism, the level of rationality found is 
likely to depend on where and how one looks.
Having established this initial similarity with incrementalism, we may 
pursue the comparison of rational techniques with it further. First, 
rational techniques would of course have to contend, just like 
incrementalism, with the twin brute facts of resource shortage and 
uncertainty, to which they may be defined to form a more satisfactory 
response than incrementalism (eg Greenwood et al, 1980a; passim), 
given the need for a thorough-going appraisal of existing activities, 
or a less satisfactory one given also the defined need for 
non-'rational' features such as the accumulation of 'slack' resources 
or the use of the budget base as a 'holding' position. Either way, 
however, we may speculate, unremarkably, that the success or failure 
defined for 'rational' techniques will depend in part on the extent to 
which they are in turn defined at least to accommodate, and possibly 
acrtively to ameliorate the influences of resource shortage and 
uncertainty. Strategy groups in Authority B, for example, were
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seen above to have been defined by sane to have failed this test; 
similarly, Authority B's Leader eventually came to conclude that a 
proposed five-year rolling planning process should not be implemented:
"I read my Members and I think I read them correctly, that 
they believe in the present situation that's a waste of 
time, that we can't really be looking five years ahead 
because we haven't got the slightest idea what might happen 
and therefore we just plan from day to day or year to year 
as it were".
Second, having established the universal applicability of the concepts 
of politics, power and power resources, there seems to be little to 
stipulate that they should not apply here also, in negotiating a 
'corporate' ordering of definitials of the situation as opposed to an 
incremental one. As Norton & Wedgewood-Oppenheim confirm,
"The progress made in introducing corporate planning and the 
particular aspects adopted are ultimately the outcomes of a 
struggle among individuals and groups with opposing 
ideologies and interests. The outcome depends upon the 
exercise of power by those involved" (1981: p66).
The level of 'corporateness' in the authorities studied, and the 
degree to which their processes were 'rational' in the corporate sense 
were a function, in exactly the same way as the level of incre­
mentalism was a function, of the negotiated order in each - and this, 
of course, was governed by a 'rationality' all of its own (eg 
Rosenberg 1983: pl2, Jons son, 1982: pp28-9), which may or may not 
enhance the pursuit of 'corporate' rationality. It follows that if 
the predominently organisational level prescriptions of the rational 
syndrome are to achieve anything at all, they must be injected into 
the negotiation of order by those individuals and groups who define 
them as desirable, in a manner and form which can either be imposed 
cxi the other individuals and groups around them, or which they are 
willing and able to accept.
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Third, if this ‘sets the scene' for the implementation or otherwise of 
'corporate' or 'rational' configurations in similar terms to those 
applying to incrementalism, it was also of course precisely the same 
features, trends and configurations of actors which were significant 
in the negotiation of order around this issue as in the negotiation 
processes which we have already observed, because both were part of 
the same overall activity. As before, certain power resources from 
the infinite possible range were observed to be consistently at least 
available to those seeking to raise the level of 'rationality', to 
attempt to use in pursuing their definitions as they could. One such 
was the 'umbrella' provided from within the Member side of the 
authority, primarily by the Leader for the Chief Executive as the 
principal corporately interested officer (especially in Authority A); 
on the other hand, an example of where such an umbrella did not extend 
to 'cover' an exercise pursuing a greater level of 'rationality' was 
Authority B's ZBB experiment. Another potential power resource, in 
some respects, was the brute fact of resource shortage itself (cf 
Rosenberg 1983s p29 and others) which was available as a pretext for 
corporate initiatives (as distinct from prcnpting them, although the 
two could co-exist):
"It's a pcwsr game. It's most distasteful and a great 
shame, but that's why you need a war. You need sane outside 
force that's bigger than you all ... That's one advantage of 
the present situation. It's something that's bigger than 
you that you have to fight and pull together to achieve 
things which would not otherwise be achieved. I have 
certainly used that situation and use it all the time"
(Chief Executive, Authority A).
Conversely, of course, in other respects resource shortage was not an 
unmitigated benefit in pursuing greater levels of corporate 
rationality: we have seen, for example, the greater levels of 
dissensus which it also prompted and which would have worked against
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any corporate unity and integration (eg Rosenberg 1983: p40). As in 
the negotiation processes already examined, therefore, the precise 
inpact of a given feature as a pov^r resource depended wholly on the 
use to which actors were able to turn it.
Fourth, also as we saw before, corporate or 'rational' initiatives 
would have had to accommodate or even use the various ideological 
parameters within which order was negotiated. The integrative role of 
such initiatives had clear affinities with the ideological "organising 
principle" of unity observed on the officer side of each authority 
(Jonsson, 1982: p28), although departmental opposition to them serves 
also to emphasise the caveats entered earlier about the "organising 
principle" of unity itself. Perhaps more difficult, however, is a 
reconciliation with the ideological "organising principle" of conflict 
in the Member side of each authority. Skelcher (1979: p36) notes, for 
example, how in Broxtow DC corporately generated "position statements" 
were rejected by Members because they did not wish to be tied so 
explicity to those positions. Further, we saw how the powerful and 
independent Housing Chairman was able on occasion to act against the 
rest of the Leadership, and in so doing induce similar actions by the 
Director of Housing within the officer side of the authority. As the 
Chief Executive remarked in this context, "the political side must be 
right. If we don't have that we don't have anything" (see also p360, 
above). However, even the ideology of conflict, or at least same of 
its manifestations could be harnessed to promoting greater levels of 
'rationality':
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"We still have the thing where the Chairman of Education or 
whatever becomes 'Mr Education* in the borough, and if you 
like it's his service, not the borough's ... The Chairman 
of the Group was probably the most hardened, dyed-in-the- 
wool anti-performance review, O&M, strategy group-ist there 
is, but he is my best friend and he will allow me to 
overcome his better judgement. I made him Chair of the ... 
Committee which has got Management Services under its 
control, and O&M and all that, which he doesn't believe in, 
but he's being won over. When I said about 'Mr Education', 
it was him I had in mind, because he really was when he used 
to be on [Education Ccnmittee], so I knew whatever job I put 
him on he'd take it, and now he'll be the greatest defender 
of O&M there is, because it's his Committee. He thinks 
corporate management is a load of rubbish, but he'll defend 
it and not see any inconsistency in that" (Leader,
Authority B).
In the context of a service Ccnmittee, this Chairman's attitude would 
have been a positive hindrance to achieving a greater level of 
'rationality'; when transplanted, though, the same attitude was 
transformed into a major power resource in enacting definitions that 
greater levels of 'rationality' were desirable.
A similarly two-edged conclusion emerged about a further area of 
critical importance in the negotiation of order which we have already 
examined, namely the interactions between Chairmen and Chief Officers, 
as the primary interface between the "organising principles" of unity 
and conflict. Rosenberg (eg 1983: p24) shows hew Chairmen-Chief 
Officer pairings can be a key delimiter in the corporate unity of 
purpose which it is possible to achieve, and as the housing axis in 
Authority A shows clearly, the influence of these pairings can indeed 
be damaging to corporate aspirations. However it was not necessarily 
the case that their influence was destructive of these aspirations.
It was, for example, a similar pairing between the Leader and Chief 
Executive (and to a lesser extent the Central Group as a whole) on 
which such corporate unity as was achieved in Authority A actually 
rested. Here we see once again how important is the Member "umbrella"
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for the prospects of corporate or 'rational' initiatives. As a 
corollary, of course, it was this same relationship which we saw 
underpinned the Leader's own general control (the incursions of the 
Housing Chairman apart) of the conflicts among Members in the 
authority.
These, then, were in outline some of the key features in the 
negotiation of order around attempts to increase the level of 
corporateness or 'rationality' in the authorities studied - exactly 
the same key features as we saw in the negotiation processes studied 
earlier. Further, much as we saw earlier, the particular order 
negotiated in each authority had its own unique characteristics and 
configurations of techniques and ways and extents to which they were 
operated as intended. The data suggested, therefore, that this aspect 
of the negotiated order could be conceived of as the authority's 
"critical corporate style", in the manner of the "critical reviewing 
style" and Danziger's "critical policy style" which emerged earlier.
Of course, the styles overlapped in terms of embracing common events 
or trends, but this underlines the key conclusion, and the proposed 
resolution of the incremental/rational dichotomy: the level of 
incrementalism and the level of corporateness or 'rationality' found 
were both functions or artifacts of the negotiation of order in each 
authority.
(iii)(c) Conclusion: the Incremental/Rational Dichotomy
Building on the ideas tentatively just sketched, seme implications for 
the incremental/rational dichotomy itself may be outlined. The first 
point is that the opposition outlined in Chapter 1 between
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incrementalism as a set of individual level constructs, and the 
rational pole as a set of organisational level ones, collapses.
Insofar as they occur, both may be viewed in the approach set out here 
as a function of negotiation processes which are rooted essentially at 
the individual level. That 'rational' techniques may be specified at 
the organisational level should not blind us to the fact that they 
will have to originate in and be perpetuated by the interactions of 
the individuals who are to enact them, and who will therefore 
determine what impact they are to have.
The second point concerns the contrasting stances also noted in 
Chapter 1 of incrementalism as a series of purported factual 
statements about the 'reality* of budgeting and resource allocation, 
and the rational pole of the dichotomy as a series of aspirations for 
what it should comprise. Leaving aside the normative attempts by 
incrementalists to erect a virtue out of alleged necessity which have 
already been dismissed, in the dichotomy 'what is' opposes 'what might 
be' • The resolution which emerged from the data, howaver, was that 
while greater levels of rationality were aspired to, in some areas 
progress had already been or was being made. Equally, incrementalism, 
even in its political guise, was shown not necessarily to obtain? 
movement away from the incremental and towards the 'rational' pole was 
shown to be possible and even worthwhile inasmuch as, say, the level 
of review and thus the range of options available were increased 
thereby. Least of all should cognitive constraints be posited as an 
identifiable influence on the level of rationality achieved, although 
it is repeated that there must presumably be a limit at some point to 
human cognitive capacities.
The third point then concerns the term 'rationality' itself. We have
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seen already in section (ii) above that the claims of incrementalism 
to rationality in seme form as necessarily the 'best' way to maximise 
a desired state of affairs may be dismissed. To the extent that, for 
example, an increase in the level of review of a budget may be 
worthwhile for its own sake, or that even a poor 'synoptic' view may 
be an improvement over a series of partial or incremental views, and 
to the extent that an active pursuit of incremental resource 
allocation would hinder such improvements, then its claims to 
rationality are undermined further still. However, it would also be 
helpful (to put it no more* strongly) if the 'rationality' claimed by 
the so-called 'rational' pole of the dichotomy was called something 
else, because insofar as rationality is a property of selecting the 
best means available of maximising a desired end, then the 
organisational-level claims of the ' rational' pole to this have no 
necessary force either.
In this context, the 'rational* pole merely posits a particular style 
of operation and a set of methods, which may be feasible to seme 
extent, in some circumstances, or they may not. Such methods may also 
produce 'better' decisions, or they may not, depending on the need for 
a wider consideration of the issues, balanced against the need for a 
speedier and more decisive decision-making process (eg Bruns son, 1982: 
p37). Here, the incrementa 1/rational dichotomy again collapes, 
because these are of course precisely the same caveats as those placed 
on the claims advanced by the normative variants of incrementalism 
examined in Section (ii) above, on account of its pluralist 
underpinning. The normative opposition outlined in Chapter 1 between 
the two poles of the dichotomy turns out in practice to be 
unsustainable: neither can be stated on a priori grounds to be the 
'best' method of decision-making, and the constraining factors on such
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a statement appear to be the same in each case.
Faced with such a position, it is tempting to recall the overlap of 
the incremental and rational poles noted in Chapter 1 in their joint 
annexation of the concept of bounded rationality, and to posit this as 
the resolution of the dichotomy which emerged from the data. However, 
if bounded rationality is to perform this role, it is as a symptom 
rather than a cause, through being reproduced in the negotiation of 
order. At root, the only operative rationality is that which 
specifies the most effective means of enacting as much as possible of 
a desired definition, or more generally negotiating and maintaining as 
much as possible of a desired order. We may agree with 
incrementalists that 'the best' must be conditioned by a view of 'the 
possible's the 'rationality' advanced by either pole, however, is only 
defensible if it happens to coincide with the political rationality of 
power and the maximised deployment of available power resources 
demanded by this negotiation of order. Often, as we have seen, 
neither incrementalism nor 'rationality' meet these criteria, and 
positing them as normative opposites is therefore futile: this much 
can be stated with some conviction. What would appear to be worth 
exploring further, however, is whether and how forms of 'bounded' 
rationality may readily be sustained through the negotiation of 
order. The data here suggested that, as a conment on the rational 
pole, this might be as much as could be expected; but, as a conment on 




As the introduction explains, this thesis arose from a studentship 
linked to a research project taking an intensive, naturalistic and 
qualitative look at accounting and resource allocation in local 
authorities. The project was well under way When the writer joined 
the team but from discussions with its other members of their 
experiences and views, and from reading the existing literature, the 
objective was formed of testing the accuracy and validity of the 
concepts in the incremental/rational dichotomy by reference to the 
actions and interactions of those actually involved in allocating 
resources. Even in the abstract, apparent inconsistencies and 
confusions could be identified within each pole of the dichotomy, and 
also in the way in which they ware set in opposition to each other.
The suspicion therefore grew both from the apparent flaws in the 
claims of each pole about the other, and in those relating to 
themselves, that the performance of either in accurately 'capturing' 
\drvat takes place as resources cure allocated, and of the dichotomy 
itself in expressing the choices of approach open to those involved, 
might prove to be less than adequate.
As the introduction also briefly set out, the apparent confusions in 
the dichotomy therefore suggested the need for a ' return to basics': a 
close and detailed exploration of just what does actually happen 
as resources are allocated, in order to be able to say which of the 
incremental or rational concepts and claims are justified.
Accordingly, the decision was taken to pursue the research as a small 
set of intensive case studies, seeking to avoid as far as possible any
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pre-theorisation or formulation in advance of hypotheses to test, and 
instead to proceed inductively from qualitative data, to produce a 
conceptualisation that was thoroughly rooted in the data which 
underlay it. Undoubtedly, this decision was influenced by the 
theoretical stance and existing activities of the writer's new 
colleagues, but Patton's observation (1980: p281) of the usefulness of 
a full and detailed understanding of specific contexts, perhaps as a 
basis on which to rest further studies, also struck a strong chord - 
indeed, in view of the confusions outlined in the dichotomy, it seemed 
self-evident. It was therefore intended to build up an avowedly 
impressionistic picture of the actions and interactions through which 
resources were allocated, and from which it was hoped that part or all
of one or both poles of the dichotomy would emerge as the most
adequate available conceptualisation of that activity, or that 
alternatively, some other schema might emerge which out-performed 
either pole.
Of course as the above, and also Bulmer (eg 1979: p667) show, the pure
inductive or "grounded theory" (Glaser & Strauss, 1968: passim) 
archetypes must remain at the level of ideals only. They sure 
unattainable in practice because it is impossible to achieve the 
necessary vacuum or 'tabula rasa' vhich is entirely free from 
preconceptions or prior impressions (cf also An sari & McDonough, 1980: 
pl39): there is always an element to which exploration is deductive. 
Thus, while in this particular study the 'tabula rasa' was in some 
ways more nearly achieved through the writer's initial unfamiliarity 
with the subject area, as the thesis also shows it was equally the 
case that a prior degree course in politics exerted a profound 
influence of its own. To this was then added, however, in the nine 
months' reading and discussion prior to the fieldwork phase, the
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preconceptions already hinted at above. These ought now, at the risk 
of some repetition, to be made fully explicit.
(ii) Preconceptions
1) First, as we have just outlined there was the strong suspicion 
rationalised and analysed in Chapter 1 that the dichotomy between 
"incremental" and "rational" approaches to budgeting and resource 
allocation appeared in its own terms to be ill-founded. Neither pole 
appeared to be entirely plausible or logically sound in itself, either 
as an analysis or as a prescription; also, the implied or explicit 
opposition between each pole appeared to be either a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (and thus of limited real value), or unsustainable. While 
these suspicions inevitably compromised the extent to Which the 
product of the research was fully inductively grounded (see below), 
they were unavoidable inasmuch as they prompted the thesis I Hie 
'return to basics' - ie, the focus on the actual activity observed 
around the allocation of resources - which the research represents - 
was therefore felt from the outset to be justified by the possibility 
either of improving the incremental/rational dichotomy, or 'resolving' 
it with a superior conceptualisation in its place.
2) Second, there was a view derived in part from the intellectual 
surroundings of the project, but also from the perceived demands of 
the envisaged 'return to basics' that what Halfpenny (1979; p801) 
identifies as a "positivist" as opposed to an "interpretivist" 
approach to the research would be unlikely to prove satisfactory. 
Briefly, without wishing to enter too deeply the underlying
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philosophical arguments examined by, eg, Benson (1977) or Colville 
(1981), there were at least three elements to this perception.
a) The first was that an explicit formulation in advance of hypotheses 
for deductive testing might, leaving aside any consideration of their 
truth or falsehood, unavoidably pre-define what was or was not 
relevant. This would not have been appropriate to the investigative 
brief set for the research and the impressionistic overall picture 
which we have seen it was felt necessary to construct. As we have 
seen, an attempt was to be made to root a conceptualisation of 
resource allocation in what was actually observed to occur: the idea 
of pursuing or testing hypotheses, with perceptions and analysis 
weighted only towards investigating the particular validity or 
invalidity of these, could not easily be reconciled with the open mind 
that was felt to be necessary (cf also Colville, 1981: pp20-l). There 
was a need for, as far as possible, what was in effect a 'bias' 
against bias.
This of course meant a certain tension with the initial suspicions of 
the incremental/rational dichotony which prompted the research, since 
for the purposes of the investigation itself each pole had in effect 
to be 'assumed* to be neither valid nor invalid. However, the 
contradiction was not in practice as great as it appears, partly 
because the data showed some of the initial suspicions themselves to 
be ill-founded (as evidenced by the fact that some 'incremental' 
precepts are acconmodated within the conceptual isation developed in 
the thesis); and partly because it was not known in advance exactly 
what the practical implications of these suspicions, derived only from 
prior reading rather than actual experience, would be 'on the 
ground*. Non-incremental, or non-rational resource allocation could
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be envisaged, but trying to grasp in advance the operation of sane 
combination of the two, or resource allocation involving neither 
(either of Which might apparently have been inplied by the suspicions 
of the dichotomy as a Whole), proved rather more difficult.
b) The second element of the prior rejection of a 'positivist' 
stance chi the research was the rejection in parallel with the above of 
the pursuit of 'scientific' truths or law-like generalisations (eg 
Colville, 1981: p9? Halfpenny, 1979: p801). It seemed that the area 
to be studied suffered already from an excess of such generalisations 
most of Which, in Argyris's terms, appeared often to present precise 
enough expressions of a general rule or principle in themselves, but 
at the expense of accuracy in 'capturing' any specific context (1980: 
pl32). In particular (if one excludes the notably imprecise 
incremental categorisation of resource allocation outcomes dismissed 
in Chapter 2) it appeared that incrementalism as propounded by, eg, 
Davis et al (1966), Wildavsky (1975) or even (for all its richness in 
evoking the specific context of US Federal budgeting), Wildavsky 
(1979a) was culpable in this respect; so, too, was the rational pole 
of the dichotomy as represented by, eg, the contingency theorising of 
Greenwood et al (1977, 1980a), or Hinings et al (1980). These works 
were not rejected out of hand, but it was felt to be rather too easy 
to point to instances, both from the work of the research team at Bath 
and in the literature itself, Where the generalisations Which these 
writers presented did not apply.
c) The third element in rejecting a 'positivist' stance and in 
embracing an "interpretivist" one followed directly frcm the second, 
namely that it seemed self-evident that people allocate resources and 
that the focus should therefore be on their actions and dealings with
A5
events and each other. It was suspected that many of the perceived 
inadequacies outlined above arose from insufficient attention to this 
fact, and that the often quite marked emphasis on apparently "writing 
people out" of the account offered effectively implied, at best, a 
' standardisation' of the impact which it was allowed that they should 
have an their own circumstances. At its worst, as Oolville (1981: 
pll) puts it, "Such a philosophy and methodology treats people as 
things". Incremental writers seemed perhaps less at fault here, with 
their greater concentration on individual-level constraints on 
budgeting, although the implied universality of the impact of 
cognitive constraints in promoting a budget 'base', for example, is a 
standardisation that proved not to be sustained by the data.
This preconception of the role of individuals in the account to be 
offered was only vaguely formed at first, although as the thesis 
details it was then writers from within the symbolic interactionist 
perspective such as Ashworth (1980), Maines (1977) and above all, 
Mangham (1979) who, it was felt, redressed the balance by rooting 
action observed in the perceptions and definitions of the situation of 
those actually 'acting'. There was the gradually dawning realisation 
that the reality of resource allocation lay within these definitions, 
actions and interactions, rather than in any fixed and apparently 
'objective' or 'taken for granted' features such as organisational 
hierarchies, differentiation, span of control and etc (eg Benson,
1977: p6? Oolville, 1981: pp 16-17).
3) Moving now to the third major preconception with which the 
research was approached, there was the view directly linking the 
theoretical stance above and the methodology chosen (eg Patton 1980:
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pp45-6; Benson, 1977: p7; Halfpenny, 1979: p805) that, given the need 
to explore anew and in detail the concept of resource allocation and 
the action within this, the best vehicle would be the qualitative case 
studies already outlined and similar to the work being pursued by the 
project team. A conscious decision was taken to gain the maximum 
possible depth of access to, involvement in and thus empathetic 
understanding (Patton, 1980: p22) of the actions of the people 
involved in allocating resources in the case study locations. It was 
recognised and, ultimately, intended that the results of such an 
explicitly subjective and impressionistic picture would require 
validation by testing or replication in other contexts, and that in 
providing an essentially unproven set of conclusions and concepts the 
research would pose at least as many questions as it answered.
However, this was felt to be a reasonable price to pay for the depth 
of insight which it was hoped would be gained, and of which it was 
judged the subject area was in need. The underlying assumption was 
that posing questions which could not otherwise even have been framed 
was an advance in its own right.
(iii) "Retroduction"
The presence of these preconceptions has considerable implications for 
the mode of learning employed. The thesis itself shows the extent to 
which they were or were not found from the data to be justified, but 
where they were justified, the question is inevitably raised of how 
genuinely inductive was the research? It might be argued that the 
results of the research in such cases were simply the product of a 
closed mind, in effect a self-fulfilling prophecy that the writer saw
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only what he wanted to see. This may even be true: to some extent, 
"the proof of the pudding is in the eating", or rather in this case in 
its replication at the hands of other researchers in the same area, 
and in whether the research really does offer greater insight into how 
resources are allocated than the alternative conceptualisations 
already available.
However, there are a nurrber of points which need to be made in favour 
of the thesis as it stands here. The first is that, as detailed 
below, considerable care has been taken to validate the data by 
cross-referencing it and obtaining the reactions of the actors 
involved. Second, the preconceptions with which the research was 
approached may be seen to be concerned at least as much with that 
approach itself, rather than the results of the research. While 
Oolville (1981: pp9-ll) details how the choice of methodology in 
effect channels and even determines what it is possible for us to 
learn from a given piece of research, and while certain aspects of 
this research such as the focus on individuals' actions and 
interactions could be predicted from a knowledge of these 
preconceptions, it remains the case that there is little in the 
conclusions arrived at or concepts developed which could similarly 
have been predicted. Thus, we have seen that the initial suspicion of 
the incremental/rational dichotomy itself has not prevented aspects of 
incrementalism emerging in the conceptualisation of resource 
allocation finally arrived at, and has not led to rational techniques 
being rejected out of hand. Further, although the initial focus was, 
perhaps predictably, on action and interaction, this did not preclude 
a major theme emerging from the data of the structurally-located role 
of Chairman/Chief Officer pairings in channelling the types of 
interaction and outcome which were observed.
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This in fact introduces the third and major point, Which is that any 
allegation of ' pre-determining' the products of the research would be 
to misconceive the learning process actually employed in it. Buhner 
(1979: p659) recognises the inpossibility of avoiding entirely any 
deductive learning or validation by reference to prior impressions, 
and therefore labels avowedly inductive learning as "retroduction".
As he puts it,
"Concepts and observation are ... interdependent, but in a 
quite specific sense. Concepts are not just developed out 
of observations, but neither are they an a priori category. 
Rather, their use is justified in terms of their context in 
a particular theory and particular observations which that 
theory seeks to explain ... (T)heories are not developed 
deductively or inductively, but both deductively and 
inductively. There is a constant interplay between the 
observation of realities and the formation of concepts, 
between research and theorising, between perceptions and 
exploration" (emphasis in original).
Buhner goes on to supply the logical sequence of retroduction:
"1) Some surprising phenomenon, P, is observed,
2) P would be explicable as a matter of course if H were 
true.
3) Hence there is reason to think that H is true" (1979: 
p659)•
The deductive element within the inductive process is of course in the 
second stage, where H is adduced to explain P (ie working from the 
general to the particular), but at the same time as the occurrence of 
P is further validating H (ie working from the particular to the 
general) by the very fact, in effect, that H may be adduced to explain 
it.
Bulmer may in fact overstate his case against the possibility of more 
genuinely inductive learning, inasmuch as it is conceivable that an 
entirely unanticipated concept may emerge from a body of data and for
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which there is no previous reference either to verify or falsify it. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that much of the conceptual output 
of the thesis emerged from the data retroductively, where in effect P 
'triggered' H being 'called upon' to explain or supply a convincing 
pattern for the set of Ps collected as data. It may be seen that 
retroduction in fact captures precisely the methodology of the 
'inductive testing' envisaged from the outset for the incremental/ 
rational dichotomy. The key question was whether either, both or 
neither poles would be 'called upon' as explanations or 
categorisations (Bulner, 1979: p652) of what was observed. Often, as 
we have seen, neither was, either because of the presence of superior 
alternatives or because there were positive reasons why P could not be 
explained or categorised in those terms.
(iv) Data collection and analysis
What then of the observations - the gathering of the 'Ps' - on which 
the research rested? As noted in the introduction, the case studies 
took place over the period from June 1981 to November 1984, with the 
most intensive phase lasting until October 1982, but with a series of 
follow-up interviews thereafter. These latter were pursued as 
frequently as the writer's new full-time employment would allow until 
March 1983, thus allowing the budget cycle for 1983/84 to be covered 
in detail along with that for 1982/83 covered by the main part of the 
full-time fieldwork phase. As we also noted in the introduction, 
there was in effect little choice of how the sample of authorities was 
constructed. Authorities ware chosen where, through personal or 
indirect contact, the level of access sought was on offer. An
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immediate priority on gaining access to each authority was to use the 
data-gathering process to develop further, well placed, contacts fran 
wham there would be the maximun chance of gaining confidential 
information where this was necessary for the development of the 
thesis,
A major factor prompting actors in each authority to help, once 
initial access had been gained - and a major vindication and 
reinforcement of the original decision - appeared to be the style of 
research. It happened in several instances that initial hostility 
disappeared when it was explained that the objective was to focus 
simply on what happened, and to construct an account which also made 
sense to those researched rather than simply in terms of the 
theoretical stance of the author. It was they, in effect, who were 
going to provide the structure of the research and concepts 
developed. While, as Patton (1980: ppl98-9) cautions, a refusal to 
provide any form of structure for an interviewee can be carried too 
far, leaving him or her justifiably wandering exactly what is wanted 
from them, in general the reaction offered a vindication of the 
approach adopted here.
The particular style of interviewing actually adopted is discussed in 
more detail below. However, rather than an end in itself, this style 
was symptomatic of a more deliberately unstructured overall approach 
whose implications for the direction of the research and 
data-gathering were several-fold. First, there was no preconceived 
notion of which parts of each local authority would be investigated. 
Following Turner (1982: pl2) and others, the research was bounded not 
by structural features of the authority such as departments or 
specific levels of a hierarchy, but by a pursuit of whatever appeared
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to be subsumed within the gerunds of the activity being studied: if 
something could be described as part of the process of 'budgeting' or 
'allocating resources' or even 'making policy', the attempt was made 
to explore it. While it is not claimed that the exploration of these 
gerunds was complete, this meant in practice that the focus ranged 
from lower tier budget officers concerned with the detail of budgeting 
cxi the one hand, to Chief Officers and Members, and then on to 
Caimittee Chairmen, on the other hand.
The second set of implications of this unstructured approach provides 
a theme through the actual process of gaining data. We have seen that 
three major sources of data were tapped: (mainly tape-recorded) 
face-to-face interviews, documentary sources, and participant 
observation. The intention was that these data sources would provide 
some form of mutual "triangulation" (eg Hari Das, 1982: pll; Flynn, 
1979: p744), albeit largely within the overall qualitative paradigm 
in which this research was set, as opposed to across paradigms to 
embrace quantitative data in the manner envisaged by Hari Das.
However taking the first data source, interviews, the format of each 
interview rested on no more than a checklist of issues which it was 
desired to raise with the interviewee as the opportunity arose. These 
issues could arise from listening to the tape of the previous 
interview, from conversations with other actors in the authority in 
question or in the others being studied, observations, queries about 
documents which had been read, or from a reading of the work of other 
researchers in the field. Where these issues related to other than 
purely factual queries, it may be seen that their passage into an
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interview checklist forms part of the process of emergence from the 
data from which themes and concepts of more general significance were 
derived. The interviews ware almost all tape-recorded. Only very 
rarely did an interviewee object to the tape recorder: and such 
objections as there were usually disappeared once that person had been 
shown where the 'stop* button was, and offered the opportunity of 
using it, as and when he or she wished.
Turning to documentary evidence, again no prior view was taken of 
documents which it was felt to be necessary to see, although clearly, 
there was a strong impression that the budget book itself might 
figure, if only to discount it as an adequate 'measure' of the process 
which gave rise to it I In the event, access both to internal and 
Caimittee papers in all the authorities studied was virtually 
unhindered. The participant observation and ad hoc conversations were 
pursued on the same "following the issue of the moment" basis that 
was used to structure the interviews. As noted in the Introduction, 
this evolution and pursuit of issues was helped immeasurably by the 
provision of a desk in the Chief Executive's section within Authority 
B which the writer endeavoured to use as a base for at least two to 
three days a week of the main research period, even if no specific 
interviews or meetings were scheduled. The value of this gesture in 
gaining further insights, both into the specific activities within 
Authority B, and into local authorities in general, cannot be 
overstated. Once again, however, as with the interviews, as issues 
and themes emerged from the data this served to structure the approach 
and prompt a focus on particular aspects of the context under 
observation, and ultimately to allow the emergence and development of 
wider concepts and generalisations.
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It may therefore begin to be seen that, rather than being provided in 
advance, the structure of the research itself was allowed to emerge as 
issues and themes came to the writer's attention. In a very real 
sense, of course, this meant that the structure of the research 
'became' the conceptual structure with which it concludes. The 
chronology of the developments of this conceptual structure further 
illustrates this process, and also the interplay of observations and 
concepts outlined above by Bulmer. It is, therefore, worth setting 
out briefly the sequence of events.
The writer accordingly began his fieldwork, once initial contacts had 
been established, with the preconceptions set out above and very 
little else, least of all any real idea of what was expected or even 
what was required. As the order of the thesis suggested, howaver, 
perhaps reflecting the dominant impression frcm the reading but also 
the initial tendency for access to concentrate at lower levels in the 
authorities studied where such issues were more prominent, the initial 
focus was on what was identified as the "cognitive limits" strand of 
incrementalism. (In Authority B, which was the more 'corporate' of 
Authorities A and B, the initial focus was also on the corporate 
apparatus in operation there, but which it subsequently has not proved 
possible to discuss in this thesis from the explicit point of view of 
the rational pole of the dichotomy.) In Glaser & Strauss's (1968: 
p84) terms, this experience then began to "sensitise" the writer to 
the scope of individuals to 'make a difference' and the possibility 
that individuals so minded could, given the necessary circumstances 
and interactions, combine substantially to negotiate any cognitive 
constraints they might face. Cognitive constraints were therefore 
variable in impact and the cause of this variation was the individuals 
involved and the interactions between them.
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Concepts such as proactivity - ironically suggested, in the first 
instance by Wildavsky (1979: pp20-l), whose work it was being used to 
criticise - accordingly emerged from the data as justifiable and 
useful. Particular environmental features - notably resource 
shortage and uncertainty - where variations in the proactivity of 
response were especially at issue were used, as "brute facts", almost 
as 'bench marks' against which to test proactivity. Ihis sensitising 
influence also turned the focus to the nature of the interactions 
involved and effectively ensured a receptive response to ideas 
associated with symbolic interactionism and negotiated order theory 
prominent within the writer's School, but in particular to the 
"micro-political" perspective of Mangham (1979), which was read at 
about this time. The trend of the thesis itself is sufficient 
indication of the profound influence which this work exerted.
Following in turn from this development, it became a natural 
progression, in effect, to expand the focus to include what was 
identified as the more explicitly "political" strand of 
incremental ism. What appeared to be strong evidence was being 
obtained all the while that interactions which could be conceptualised 
as "micro-political" could be adduced to explain both the level of 
review achieved (a key concern of incrementalism) and the destination 
of resources. The "cognitive limits" strand was not forgotten in 
these developments, but rather, it became interwoven in the developing 
analysis. Within the impressionistic overall picture, the 
culmination of the process was the set of politically-rooted concepts, 
eg 'umbrellas', 'power* and 'power resources' as defined here, which 
are in effect abstractions from the interactions observed and which, 
it is hoped, may be applied elsewhere to derive further insights.
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At the same time, a parallel strand in the development of the argunent 
was the analysis of the data once gained. In the first instance, 
interviews were not fully transcribed, because of the expense of doing 
this: instead, notes were taken from them as if reading a book or a 
journal, roughly referenced by the reel counter of the tape recorder. 
An attempt was made at the time to write out quotations which seemed 
likely to be of particular value. Notes were similarly written up as 
fully as possible and documents were read and indexed, both as soon as 
possible because they often raised issues which needed to be pursued 
while they were fresh in interviewees' minds.
However, it was then the analysis of this data which was the key to 
the whole learning process. Very soon after the fieldwork oomnenced, 
a card index was begun whereby each data episode (eg, event witnessed, 
document, interview etc) was scanned for what appeared to be the 
'gist' of whatever seemed to be happening or being said at each 
observation point within that episode. The sumnary of the 
observation point was then stored on the card index, with its 
reference details, at first under its own heading but then, 
critically, under existing headings where observation appeared to 
duplicate another already indexed. Any observation could be recorded 
under any number of headings that suggested themselves, be these new 
or already emergent. Where a particular heading appeared to be 
heavily subscribed, one was then drawn to that point for further 
analysis and development, and for further interviews and explorations 
in the field.
This process is conceptually similar to that recorded by, eg, Turner, 
(eg 1982: p2), although he established connections between pieces of 
data by physically manipulating the cards on which they were recorded.
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and observing the results of particular juxtapositions. The process 
here of recording and examining the points where data appeared to 
' coagulate' continued right throughout the research, often with many 
false starts in terms of headings which subsequently proved less 
useful and also - here introducing another element of deduction within 
the Mretroductive" framework outlined above - much back-tracking to 
examine previously gathered data for instances in support of headings 
which had only subsequently emerged and which had not been perceived 
in that way at the time. Ultimately, 79 major headings emerged from 
the data in this way, often with highly idiosyncratic titles which 
meant something only to the writer, and often with sub-headings within 
them. Some 23 of these major headings were concerned with the role 
and status of actors in Authorities A and B who appeared to be 
especially relevant to the proceedings, and a further 12 concern the 
role and status of bodies within each authority - eg Oonmittees, 
Management Teams etc. Thereafter, headings began fairly prosaically, 
for example, “cognitive constraints: acknowledged effects of"; or 
"political feasibility: visible consideration of", but became 
progressively more abstract: for example, "urtorellas", "attitudes to 
innovation", "power resources" etc. It may be seen that out of the 
headings in this card index developed the conceptual structure of the 
impressionistic overall picture, which is the ultimate product of this 
thesis.
(v) Validation
A further set of questions then concerns the validation of the data 
once gathered, that is, checking for accuracy of observation and 
authenticity. To some extent, validation was provided as observations
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appeared to reproduce the card index headings described above, 
although this is clearly not an adequate validation on its own given 
the possibility of perpetuating a distorted basic perception, perhaps 
for lack of sane other heading to use as a 'peg' on which to hang an 
observation.
Hari Das (1982; plO) lists five methods of validating qualitative 
data, any one or more of Which may be of value. These may be 
paraphrased as
- several investigations in the same area;
- comparison with outside sources and known facts;
- sel f-oonfrontation and checking for internal consistency of
the data;
- seeking to have those studied 'own* the data and conclusions
about them;
- predictive discrimination.
The first of these, as set out above and in the introduction, is 
beyond the scope of one writer's pursuit of a limited set of case 
studies, and it is accordingly hoped that validation in this area will 
come as others find our conceptual structure and overall picture 
useful in understanding other contexts. A particular example here 
might be instances of 'rational' approaches to resource allocation. 
Similarly, the fifth approach listed could, in theory, come as 
hypotheses are developed and tested from the work carried out here.
The second source of validation was pursued as the data was gathered 
and also, most importantly, in the light of the writer's subsequent 
experience in the Finance Section of the ACC. The impact of this
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experience may be seen at several points in the thesis, notably in the 
presentation of the "brute facts" of resource shortage and 
uncertainty. The third of these has in effect been outlined in the 
indexing process above: however, self-confrontation, to use Hari Das's 
phrase also came during the writing-up phase, in the form of the 
rigorous concentration and analysis of the data necessary to recall 
past events accurately. The fourth source of validation, by reference 
to those actually studied, was pursued continuously during the main 
fieldwork phase both as informal meetings and interviews, and also 
thereafter, as the thesis was being written. One important means of 
doing this was what Patton (1980: p213), for example, might view as 
bad practice. Tentative conclusions of being tested were either 
floated by means of a 'blatantly* leading question or an extreme 
statement of that particular conclusion (eg "my impression is ... how 
do you respond", or "it appears to me that ... is that fair?") in 
order to elicit a reaction which might itself then be explored.
Another means by which this happened was unintentional where, for 
example, it became clear that questions asked of interviewees were not 
merely difficult for them to answer but were actually wrongly 
conceived: to some extent, therefore, the style of research of 
pursuing emergent issues to their logical conclusion was 
self-validating.
This completes the outline of the methodology employed during the 
research, and also indicates some of the processes which continued 
during the so-called 'writing up' phase. As we have indicated, 
though, the act of beginning to write the thesis did not signify a 
clean break from either further reading or further fieldwork, and of 
course much of the development and ' fine tuning' of emergent ideas 
only came as pieces of data were selected and arranged to make the
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points in question. Further, it was during this stage that the 
additional data source of the writer's post at the ACC became 
operative, the effect of which may be seen clearly throughout the 
thesis, but in particular in Chapter 3* There were also opportunities 
to 'try out' concepts and ideas which had been developed with other 
local government professionals. To this extent, the writing of the 
thesis should be seen as an integral part of its development, not 
merely the putting on record of a piece of research.
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